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0.1 Abstract 
 
 This thesis presents an interweaving of the discourse surrounding Colin McCahon and 
Ralph Hotere, the philosophy of art, and Lacanian psychoanalysis. In so doing, a 
Lacanian understanding of subjectivity, painting, discourse, and their interrelationships is 
elaborated in order to generate some new perspectives on, specifically, the work of 
McCahon and Hotere, and related writing and testimony, and more generally, the practice 
of art history and art criticism in Aotearoa/New Zealand. In the first place, this project 
explains, develops, and applies a Lacanian model of subjectivity/meaning-making 
understood in terms of the figuring of desire. This formula models expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making in terms of the reciprocity obtaining between the agent-like, 
metaphoric precipitation and automatist, metonymic perpetuation of symptomatic 
formations or points de capiton in discourses of desire. Secondly, this study analyses the 
discourse comprising paintings by McCahon and Hotere, and related writing, from the 
perspective of two points de capiton – the key features of which are gathered under the 
rubrics ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’. The thesis demonstrates that these 
two formations enliven the possibility of interpreting McCahon discourse and Hotere 
discourse, respectively, in terms of repeated and contradictory characterisations of 
McCahon as a visionary and a doubter, and of Hotere as eloquent and reticent. 
Furthermore, the thesis shows how, by virtue of their fixation on the symptomatic 
formations ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’, respectively, McCahon and 
Hotere discourses bear witness to radically contingent affirmations of, or leaps of faith in, 
praxes of contradiction, thereby sustaining fantasies of the revelation of the reality and 
truth of the being and meaning of art subjects and art objects. The impossibility of 
objectively realising these fantasies testifies to the status of subjective desire as that 
which seeks only its own perpetuation or that finds fulfilment in endlessly missing its aim 
and, by the same token, in Lacanian terms, underscores the (structural and ethical) 
necessity of subjectively being in and as traversing fantasy.
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0.3 List of Figures and Image References 
 
 This thesis mentions many works by McCahon and Hotere. However, in order to keep 
copyright permissions at a manageable level, I reproduce only a small number of works 
addressed in detail. With a few exceptions, these are limited to McCahon’s ‘written 
paintings’ of 1969 and 1970, as shown in the exhibition Colin McCahon Recent 
Paintings, Victory Over Death or Practical Religion (1970), and examples of Hotere’s 
Malady series paintings, as shown in the exhibitions Black Paintings 1970 – Malady 
Series (1970) and Ralph Hotere, Malady (1970). For other works, of more tangential or 
ancillary interest, I provide references to online and print reproductions. Figures and 
image references to works by McCahon include links to the most comprehensive source 
available: the Colin McCahon Online Catalogue, administered by the Colin McCahon 
Research and Publication Trust in conjunction with Auckland Art Gallery, Toi o Tāmaki. 
These works are also identified with a unique ‘cm’ number. At the time of writing, no 
equivalent resource exists for works by Hotere – although, the lavishly produced Ralph 
Hotere (2008) contains over two hundred, excellent quality, colour reproductions of 
many key works, thereby constituting the most definitive Hotere image reference to date. 
 
 0.3.1 Figures 
 
01  Colin McCahon, Victory over Death 2 (cm001502, February 1970, synthetic   
  polymer paint on unstretched canvas, 2075 x 5977 mm,  National Gallery of    
  Australia, Canberra). See Colin McCahon  Online Catalogue,        
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001502, (11.06.14). Image from Marja Bloem and  
  Martin Browne, Colin McCahon: a question of faith, exh. cat. (Amsterdam:    
  Stedelijk Museum and Nelson: Craig Potton Publishing, 2002), 110-11. 
 
02  Colin McCahon, Practical Religion, the resurrection of Lazarus showing Mount  
  Martha (cm001019, December 1969 – February 1970, synthetic polymer paint on  
  unstretched canvas, 2075 x 8070 mm, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa     
  Tongarewa). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,           
 xii
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001019, (11.06.14). Image from Colin McCahon: a 
  question of faith, 108-09. 
 
03  Ralph Hotere, Painting from “Malady” (1970, acrylic on canvas, 1116 x 912 mm, 
  Jennifer Gibbs Trust Collection). Image from Ralph Hotere, Kriselle Baker and  
  Vincent O’Sullivan, Ralph Hotere (Auckland: Ron Sang Publications, 2008), 60. 
 
04  Colin McCahon, I one (cm001358, 27 August 1959, enamel on hardboard, 1218 x  
  609 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin McCahon Online    
  Catalogue,  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001358 (11.06.14). Image from Peter  
  Simpson, Colin McCahon, The Titirangi Years, 1953-59 (Auckland: Auckland   
  University Press, 2007), 145. 
 
05  Ralph Hotere, Portrait – Bill Manhire (1971, mixed media on paper, 312 x 266  
  mm, private collection). Image from Bill  Manhire, Selected Poems (Wellington:  
  Victoria University Press, 2012), 2. See also Landfall 191, new series, v4, i1,   
  March 1996, front cover. 
 
06  Colin McCahon, The Lark’s Song (a poem by Matire Kereama) (cm001360,   
  August – October 1969, synthetic polymer paint on two hardboard panels, 1626 x  
  1980 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin McCahon Online   
  Catalogue,  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001360, (11.06.14). Image from Colin  
  McCahon: a question of faith, 105. 
 
07  Ralph Hotere, Darkness Settles Down (1972, acrylic on canvas, 1220 x 1220 mm,  
  Chris and Dayle Mace Collection). Image from Ralph Hotere, 67. 
 
08  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting XII from “Malady” (1970, acrylic on canvas, 1775 x 
  915 mm, Hocken Collections, Uare Taoka o Hākena, University of Otago). See  
  Otago University Research Heritage online,              
 xiii 
  http://otago.ourheritage.ac.nz/items/show/5422, (20.02.15). Image from Ralph   
  Hotere, 55. 
 
09  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting XV from “Malady” (1970, acrylic on  canvas, 1777 x 
  915 mm, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa). See Museum of New   
  Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Object/36543,   
  (11.06.14). Image from Ralph Hotere, 54. 
 
10  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting XIIB from “Malady” (1970, acrylic on canvas, 1775 
  x 915 mm, Fide Trust, Christchurch). Image from Ralph Hotere, 57. See also   
  Artnet.com, http://www.artnet.com/artists/ralph-hotere/black-painting-xiib-from- 
  malady-I2jclabjqnOTbLZ3Be_Ong2, (23.02.15). 
 
 0.3.2 Image references 
 
01  René Magritte, The Two Mysteries (1966, oil on canvas, 650 x 800 mm,     
  private collection). See Siegfried Gohr, Magritte: Attempting the Impossible (New 
  York: Distributed Art Publishers, Inc., 2009), 116. 
 
02  Colin McCahon, Te Tangi o Te Pipiwhararua (The Song of the Shining Cuckoo)  
  cm001609, October 1974, synthetic polymer paint on five, unstretched canvases,  
  each approximately 1750 x 900 mm, Hocken Collections, Uare Taoka o Hākena,  
  University of Otago). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,        
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001609, (13.03.15). See also Colin McCahon: a   
  question of faith, 127. 
  
03  Colin McCahon, Takaka: night and day (cm001361, July 1948, oil on canvas on  
  board, 915 x 2130 mm, Auckland Art Gallery, Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin     
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000828, (05.03.15).  
  See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 174. 
 
 xiv
04  Colin McCahon, On building bridges (triptych) (cm000010, July – September   
  1952, oil on three hardboard panels, total dimensions 1067 x 2745 mm, Auckland  
  Art Gallery, Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,      
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000010, (05.03.15). See also Colin McCahon: a   
  question of faith, 34. 
 
05  Colin McCahon, The days and nights in the wilderness showing the constant flow  
  of light passing through the wall of death (cm000621, April – June 1971, synthetic 
  polymer paint on  unstretched canvas, 2350 x 1842 mm, private collection). See  
  Colin McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000621,    
  (05.03.15). See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 117. 
 
06  Colin McCahon, Victory over Death 2. 
 
07  Colin McCahon, The Angel of the Annunciation (cm001039, April 1947, oil on   
  cardboard, 647 x 521 mm, Museum of New Zealand  Te Papa Tongawera). See   
  Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001039,   
  (10.03.15). See also  Laurence Simmons, The image always has the last word   
  (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2002), 70. 
 
08  Colin McCahon, Hail Mary (cm001221, December 1947 – March 1948, oil on   
  canvas, 935 x 890 mm, Govett-Brewster Art Gallery). See Colin McCahon Online 
  Catalogue,  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001221, (10.03.15). See also Simmons,  
  71. 
 
09  Colin McCahon, Annunciation (cm000630, July – November 1949, oil on    
  cardboard, 654 x 520 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin    
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000630, (10.03.15).  
  See also Simmons, 71. 
 
 xv
10  Titian, The Entombment (1559, oil on canvas, 1360 x 1745 mm, Prado Museum,  
  Madrid). See Museo Nacional Del Prado Galería online,          
  https://www.museodelprado.es/coleccion/galeria-on- ine/galeria-on-     
  line/obra/entierro-de-cristo/, (14.03.15). See also Simmons, 67. 
 
11  Colin McCahon, Entombment (after Titian) (cm001089, oil on cardboard, 515 x  
  635 mm, private collection). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,      
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001089, (14.03.15). See also Simmons, 66. 
 
12  Colin McCahon, Entombment (after Titian) (cm001034, January – May 1947, oil  
  on cardboard mounted on hardboard, 517 x 644 mm, Museum of New Zealand Te  
  Papa Tongarewa). See Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa,      
  http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Object/44138, (11.06.14). See also Simmons, 66. 
 
13  Colin McCahon, Practical Religion, the resurrection of Lazarus  showing Mount  
  Martha. 
 
14  Ralph Hotere, 4 + 4 (1996, metallic oxides on glass, gold leaf, gold dust, window  
  frame, 1000 x 900 mm, Bornholdt Family Collection). See Ralph Hotere, 274. 
 
15  Ralph Hotere, Painting from “Malady”. 
 
16  Colin McCahon, I Am (cm000828, February 1954, oil on jute  canvas, 361 x 555  
  mm, Hocken Collections, Uare Taoka o Hākena, University of Otago). See Colin  
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000828, (11.06.14).  
  See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 80. 
 
17  Colin McCahon, Gate III (cm001186, November – December 1970, synthetic   
  polymer paint on canvas, 3050 x 10670 mm, Victoria University of Wellington Art 
  Collection). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,            
 xvi
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001186, (11.06.14). See also Colin McCahon: a   
  question of faith, 214. 
 
18  Colin McCahon, I one. 
 
19  Colin McCahon, One (cm000418, May – July 1965, synthetic polymer paint on  
  hardboard, 607 x 607 mm, National Gallery of  Australia, Melbourne). See Colin  
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000418, (11.06.14).  
  See also Colin McCahon, I will need words: Colin McCahon’s word and number  
  paintings, exh. cat. (Wellington: National Art Gallery, 1984), np. 
 
20  Colin McCahon, Upper corners off, the second large gate (cm001017, April 1961, 
  enamel on hardboard, 1524 x 1218 mm, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa    
  Tongarewa, Wellington). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,       
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001017, (11.06.14). 
 
21  Colin McCahon, Gate, Waioneke (cm001041, March – May 1961, enamel on   
  hardboard, 1798 x 1220 mm, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa,   
  Wellington). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,           
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001041, (11.06.14). See also Colin McCahon: a   
  question of faith, 90. 
 
22  Colin McCahon, Waioneke (cm001040, May 1961, enamel on hardboard, 1812 x  
  1195 mm, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, Wellington). See Colin  
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001040, (11.06.14). 
 
23  Colin McCahon, Here I give thanks to Mondrian (cm000676, March 1961, enamel 
  on hardboard, 1215 x 915 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin  
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000676, (11.06.14).  
  See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 91. 
 
 xvii
24  Colin McCahon, The Second Gate Series (cm001001, 1962, enamel on hardboard, 
  sixteen panels, 1208 x 12505 mm in total, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa   
  Tongarewa, Wellington). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,       
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001001, (11.06.14). See also Peter Simpson,    
  Answering Hark, McCahon/Caselberg, Painter/Poet (Nelson: Craig Potton    
  Publishing, 2001), 70-71. 
 
25  Colin McCahon, Waterfall (cm000452, November 1964, oil on hardboard, 304 x  
  300 mm, private collection). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,      
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000452, (11.06.14). 
 
26  Colin McCahon, The days and nights in the wilderness showing the constant flow  
  of light passing into a dark landscape  (cm001226, April – June 1971, synthetic  
  polymer paint on  unstretched canvas, 2360 x 1840 mm, Govett-Brewster Art   
  Gallery, New Plymouth). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,       
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001226, (11.06.14). See also Colin McCahon: a   
  question of faith, 116. 
 
27  Colin McCahon, Light falling through a dark landscape (cm001250, October 1971, 
  charcoal on paper, 452 x 598 mm, private collection). See Colin McCahon Online  
  Catalogue,  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001250 (11.06.14). 
 
28  Colin McCahon, Urewera mural (cm001411, synthetic polymer paint on three,   
  unstretched canvases, each 2158 x 1820 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki, 
  on loan from the Department of Conservation Te Papa Atawhai). See Colin    
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001411 (11.06.14). See 
  also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 223. 
 
29  Colin McCahon, A Letter to Hebrews (cm001038, October 1979, synthetic polymer 
  paint on unstretched canvas, 1870 x 2406 mm, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa  
  Tongarewa, Wellington). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,       
 xviii 
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001038, (11.06.14). See also Gordon H. Brown,   
  Towards a Promised Land: on the life and art of Colin McCahon (Auckland:   
  Auckland University Press, 2010), 173. 
 
30  Colin McCahon, Is there anything of which one can say, look this is new?    
  (cm001300, March 1982, synthetic polymer paint on unstretched canvas, 1955 x  
  1810 mm, Bank of New Zealand Collection). See Colin McCahon Online    
  Catalogue,  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001300 (11.06.14). See also Colin   
  McCahon: a question of faith, 153. 
 
31  Ralph Hotere, Untitled (1967, enamel on board, 600 x 600 mm, Farmer Collection). 
  See Ralph Hotere, 16. 
 
32  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting (1969, acrylic on canvas, 1015 x 915 mm,     
  Christchurch Art Gallery Te Puna o Waiwhetu). See  Christchurch Art Gallery Te  
  Puna o Waiwhetu, http://christchurchartgallery.org.nz/collection/objects/69-631/,  
  (11.06.14). See also Ralph Hotere, 41. 
 
33  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting (1970, acrylic on canvas, 1815 x 1368 mm, Museum 
  of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa). See Museum of New Zealand Te Papa   
  Tongarewa, http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Object/318352, (11.06.14). See also  
  Dunedin Public Art Gallery and Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongawera,  
  Ralph Hotere: Black Light, Major works including collaborations with Bill Culbert, 
  exh. cat. (Wellington: Te Papa Press, 2000), 81. 
 
34  Ralph Hotere, Port Chalmers Painting No.10 (1972, acrylic on canvas, 1220 x   
  1220 mm, Jennifer Gibbs Trust Collection, Auckland). See James Ross (ed), New  
  Zealand Modernism – The Content of Form, Paintings from The Gibbs Collection  
  (Auckland: The Gibbs Collection, 1997), 57. 
 
 xix
35  Ralph Hotere, Requiem for Tony (1974, lacquer on hardboard, 1520 x 1220 mm,  
  Paris Family Collection). See Ralph Hotere, 80. 
 
36  Ralph Hotere, Godwit/Kuaka (1977, lacquer on hardboard, 2400 x 18000 mm,   
  Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki,   
  http://www.aucklandartgallery.com/the-collection/browse-artwork/8535/godwit- 
  kuaka, (11.06.14). See also Ralph Hotere, 114. 
 
37  Ralph Hotere, No Ordinary Sun (1984, acrylic on hardboard, 1560 x 1180 mm,  
  Jennifer Gibbs Trust Collection). See Ralph Hotere,  253. 
 
38  Ralph Hotere, Portrait – Bill Manhire (1971, ink and water colour wash on paper,  
  dimensions unknown, whereabouts unknown). See Bill Manhire and Ralph Hotere, 
  The Elaboration (Wellington: Square and Circle, 1972), 8. 
 
39  Ralph Hotere, Portrait – Bill Manhire. 
 
40  Ralph Hotere, Drawing of Bill Manhire (1972, ink on paper, 350 x 290 mm, private 
  collection). See Gregory O’Brien, Hotere, Out The Black Window, Ralph Hotere’s 
  work with New Zealand poets (Auckland: Godwit Publishing, 1997), 61. 
 
41  Vincent van Gogh, Flowering Plum Tree (after Hiroshige) (September – October  
  1887, oil on canvas, 550 x 460 mm, Van Gogh Museum, Amsterdam). See The  
  Vincent van Gogh Gallery online, http://www.vggallery.com/painting/p_0371.htm, 
  (12.06.14). See also, Susan Alyson Stein (ed), Van Gogh, A Retrospective (New  
  York: Park Lane, 1986), 114. 
 
42  Utagawa Hiroshige, The Plum Garden at Kameido (1856-59, woodblock print, 377 
  x 265 mm, various collections). See Brooklyn Museum, Hiroshige’s One Hundred 
  Famous Views of Edo online,                  
  http://www.brooklynmuseum.org/opencollection/research/ 
 xx
  edo/detail.php?view=toc.30&total=118, (12.06.14). See also Matthi Forrer, Suzuki 
  Jūzō, and Henry D. Smith  II,  Hiroshige, Prints and Drawings, exh. cat. (Munich  
  and New York: Prestel-Verlag, 1997), catalogue number 93. 
 
43  Colin McCahon, Jump E19, To Tomioka Tessai (cm000946, 1974, synthetic   
  polymer paint on unstretched jute canvas, 926 x 590 mm, private collection). See  
  Colin McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000946,    
  (11.06.14). See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 119. 
 
44  Colin McCahon, If a man walks after nightfall (cm001525, April 1969, synthetic  
  polymer paint on hardboard, 605 x 605 mm, private collection. Image from Colin  
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001525, (11.06.14). 
 
45  Colin McCahon, The Lark’s Song. 
 
46  Ralph Hotere, Darkness Settles Down. 
 
47  Ralph Hotere, Me Tangi Ko Te Mate I Te Marama  (1972, acrylic and ink on paper, 
  525 x 422 mm, whereabouts unknown). See Mutual Art.com,         
  http://www.mutualart.com/Artwork/Me-Tangi-Kapa-Ko-Te-Mate-I-Te-Marama--- 
  T/3800D288FCB75921, (11.06.14). 
 
48  Colin McCahon, O let us weep (cm001590, April 1969, synthetic polymer paint on 
  four hardboard panels, each 610 x 609 mm, Bank of New Zealand Collection). See 
  Colin McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001590,    
  (11.06.14). 
 
49  Ralph Hotere, Hone Tuwhare’s ‘Not by Wind Ravaged’ (1972, acrylic and ink on  
  paper, 525 x 425 mm, whereabouts unknown). See Artnet, 
   http://www.artnet.com/artists/ralph-hotere/te-whiti-from-hone-tuwhares-not-by- 
  wind-ravaged-PJw1NXBKMgOutkZNSzZHcg2, (20.02.14). 
 xxi
 
 50  Ralph Hotere, Te Whiti: From John Caselberg’s ‘The Voice of the Maori’ (1972,  
  acrylic and ink on paper, 490 x 365 mm, private collection, Auckland). See Te   
  Miringa Hohaia, Gregory O’Brien and Lara Strongman (eds), Parihaka, The Art of 
  Passive Resistance, exh. cat. (Wellington: City Gallery, Wellington and Victoria  
  University Press, 2001), 125. 
 
 51  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting XII from “Malady”. 
 
 52  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting XV from “Malady”. 
 
53  Ralph Hotere, Malady Malady Malady (1970, watercolour on paper, 760 x 560   
  mm, whereabouts unknown). Image from John Furphy, Australian Art Sales   
  Digest online, http://www.aasd.com.au/index.cfm/search-         
  title/?q=malady+malady+malady&Submit= 
  Search+for+Title&qa=&qw=&house=&medium= 
  0&sold=2&lo=&hi=&loe=&hie=&height=&width=&loy=&hiy, (12.06.14). 
 
54  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting from “Malady” (1970, acrylic on canvas, 2115 x 740 
  mm, Dowse Art Museum, Lower Hutt). See Emma Bugden, ‘We Remember Ralph 
  Hotere’, Dowse Art Museum, http://dowse.org.nz/news/blog/2013/we-remember- 
  ralph-hotere, 24 February, 2013 (20.02.15). See also Ralph Hotere, 58. 
 
55  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting III from “Malady” (1970, dye and acrylic on canvas, 
  1800 x 1240 mm, Te Manawa Museum of Art, Science and History, Palmerston  
  North). Image available by request from Te Manawa internal database. 
 
56  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting IIIa from “Malady” (1970, acrylic on canvas, 1681 x 
  1376 mm, Te Manawa Museum of Art, Science and History, Palmerston North).  
  Image available by request from Te Manawa internal database. 
 
 xxii
57  Ralph Hotere, Malady Panels (1971, acrylic on canvas, seven panels, each approx  
  1780 x 1065 mm in total, Christchurch Art Gallery Te Puna o Waiwhetu). See   
  Christchurch Art Gallery Te Puna o Waiwhetu,             
  http://christchurchartgallery.org.nz/collection/objects/79-3881-7/, (11.06.14). See  
  also Ralph Hotere, 50-51. 
 
58  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting XVII from “Malady” (1970, acrylic on canvas, 1780 
  x 915 mm, private collection). See Ralph Hotere, 56. 
 
59  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting XI from “Malady” (1970, acrylic on  canvas, 1795 x 
  935 mm, private collection). See Ralph Hotere, 52. 
 
60  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting XIV from “Malady” (1970, acrylic on canvas, 1780 x 
  915 mm, private collection. See Ralph Hotere, 53. 
 
61  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting XIIB from “Malady”. 
 
62  Ralph Hotere, Black Painting XIII from “Malady” (1970, acrylic on canvas, 1776 x 
  914 mm, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa). See Museum of New   
  Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Object/38756,   
  (12.06.14). 
 
63  Ralph Hotere, February, May and the Birds of Ice. The Moon Drowns in its Voices 
  of Water (1970, pigment dyes on alkyd resin on canvas, four panels, each 3050 x  
  1525 mm, Dunedin Public Art Gallery. Image available on request from Dunedin  
  Public Art Gallery internal database. 
 
64  Ralph Hotere, Working Painting for Big Panel (1970, pigment and dye on canvas,  
  1775 x 910 mm). See Webb’s, Important Works of Art, (c. 2009), np,      
  http://www.webbs.co.nz/node/77555, (27.11.13). 
 
 xxiii 
 65  Ralph Hotere, O For Love (1970, dye and enamel on canvas, 1760 x 910 mm,   
  Farmer Collection). See Ralph Hotere, 61. 
 
 66  Colin McCahon, Are there not twelve hours of daylight (cm000011, February 1970, 
  synthetic polymer paint on unstretched canvas, 2077 x 2580 mm, Chartwell    
  Collection, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin McCahon Online   
  Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000011, (11.06.14). See also Colin   
  McCahon: a question of faith, 115. 
 
 67  Colin McCahon, A question of faith (cm000015, February 1970, synthetic polymer 
  paint on unstretched canvas, 2080 x 2615 mm, private collection). See Colin   
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000015, (11.06.14).  
  See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 113. 
 
 68  Colin McCahon, This day a man is (cm001515, February 1970, synthetic polymer  
  paint on unstretched canvas, 2070 x 2608 mm, Museum of Contemporary Art,   
  Sydney). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,             
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001515, 11.06.14). See also Colin McCahon: a   
  question of faith, 114. 
 
 69  Colin McCahon, A grain of wheat (cm001022, February 1970, synthetic polymer  
  paint on unstretched canvas, 2080 x 3435 mm, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa  
  Tongarewa). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,           
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001022, (11.06.14). See also Museum of New   
  Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Object/42098,   
  (11.06.14). 
 
 70  Colin McCahon, James 3, Practical Religion (cm001625, 13 October 1969,    
  synthetic polymer paint on hardboard, 600 x 600 mm, private collection). See Colin 
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001625, (11.06.14). 
 
 xxiv
 71  Colin McCahon, Victory over Death (cm000661, 10 October 1969, synthetic   
  polymer paint on hardboard, 610 x 610 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). 
  See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000661,   
  (11.06.14). See also Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki          
  http://www.aucklandartgallery.com/the-collection/browse-artwork/6182/victory- 
  over-death, (11.06.14). 
 
 72  Colin McCahon, Our friend Lazarus has fallen asleep, but we shall go and wake  
  him (cm001626, 13-14 October 1969, synthetic polymer paint on hardboard, 600 x 
  600 mm, private collection). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,      
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001626, (11.06.14). 
 
 73  Colin McCahon, Easter Morning (cm000662, February-April 1950, oil on jute   
  canvas, 712 x 920 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin McCahon 
  Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000662, (11.06.14). 
 
 74  Colin McCahon, The Marys at the Tomb (cm000669, January-March 1950, oil on  
  canvas on board, 806 x 1054 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin 
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000669, (11.06.14).  
  See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 74. 
 
 75  Colin McCahon, Comet (F1, F2, F3) (cm000244, 1974, synthetic polymer paint on 
  three, unstretched, jute canvases, dimensions unknown, private collection). See  
  Colin McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000244,    
  (08.12.14). 
 
 76  Colin McCahon, Comet (F4, F5, F6, F7) (cm001526, 1974, synthetic polymer   
  painting on four, unstretched, jute canvases, 930 x 388 mm, 930 x 405 mm, 930 x  
  460 mm, 930 x 385 mm, private collection). See Colin McCahon Online     
  Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001526, (08.12.14). 
 
 xxv
 77  Colin McCahon, Comet (F8, F9, F10) (cm000672, 1974, synthetic polymer paint  
  on three, unstretched, jute canvases, 930 x 508 mm, 930 x 500 mm, 930 x 623mm, 
  Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,   
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000672, (08.12.14). 
 
 78  Colin McCahon, Comet (F11) (cm001562, 1974, synthetic polymer paint on   
  unstretched, jute canvas, 920 x 620 mm, private collection). See Colin McCahon  
  Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001562, (08.12.14). 
 
 79  Colin McCahon, Comet (F12) (cm000309, 1974, synthetic polymer paint on   
  unstretched, jute canvas, 909 x 514 mm, private collection). See Colin McCahon  
  Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000309, (08.12.14). 
 
 80  Colin McCahon, I Paul to you at Ngatimoti (cm000666, 1946, oil on cardboard on 
  plywood, 505 x 635 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin    
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000666, (21.02.15).  
  See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 67. 
 
 81  Colin McCahon, Crucifixion according to St. Mark (cm001062, October 1947, oil  
  on canvas on board, 800 x 1095 mm, Christchurch Art Gallery Te Puna o    
  Waiwhetu). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,            
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001062, (12.06.14). See also Colin McCahon: a   
  question of faith, 69. 
 
 82  Colin McCahon, The Promised Land (cm000668, February – August 1948, oil on  
  canvas, 920 x 1370 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin McCahon 
  Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000668, (21.02.15). See also   
  Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 71. 
 
 xxvi
 83  Colin McCahon, Rustic bird roost for vultures (cm000977, 1973, charcoal on   
  paper, 300 x 258mm, Te Manawa Art Society, Inc. See Colin McCahon Online  
  Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000977, (08.12.14). 
 
 84  Colin McCahon, Work towards the first stations of the Cross (cm000299, 1973,  
  conte crayon on paper, 301 x 459mm, whereabouts unknown). See Colin McCahon 
  Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000299, (08.12.14). 
 
 85  Colin McCahon, Teaching Aids 2 (June) (cm000004, June 1975, synthetic polymer 
  paint on ten sheets of paper, each 1092 x 728mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o   
  Tāmaki, on loan from a private collection). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue, 
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000004, (08.12.14). See also Colin McCahon: a   
  question of faith, 128. 
 
 86  Colin McCahon, Teaching Aids 2 (July) (cm001514, July 1975, synthetic polymer 
  paint on ten sheets of paper, each 1092 x 728mm, private collection). See Colin  
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001514, (08.12.14).  
  See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 129. 
 
 87  Colin McCahon, Teaching Aids 3 (cm001347, 1975, synthetic polymer paint on ten 
  sheets of paper, each 1095 x 725mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See  
  Colin McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001347,    
  (08.12.14). See also Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki,          
  http://www.aucklandartgallery.com/the-collection/browse-artwork/6371/teaching- 
  aids-3, (08.12.14). 
 
 88  Colin McCahon, Moby Dick is sighted off Muriwai Beach (cm000211, February  
  1972, synthetic polymer paint on canvas, 764 x 1272mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi 
  o Tāmaki, on loan from a private collection). See Colin McCahon Online    
  Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000211, (08.12.14). 
 
 xxvii
 89  Colin McCahon, Through the Wall of Death: A Banner (cm001405, 1972, synthetic 
  polymer paint on unstretched canvas, 1840 x 2355mm, Dowse Art Museum, Lower 
  Hutt). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,              
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001405, (08.12.14). 
 
 90  Colin McCahon, I applied my mind (cm001660, 1980-82, synthetic polymer paint  
  on unstretched canvas, 1950 x 1805mm, private collection). See Colin McCahon  
  Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001660, (08.12.14). See also   
  Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 155. 
 
 91  Colin McCahon, I considered all the acts of oppression (cm000169, c.1982,   
  synthetic polymer paint on unstretched canvas, 1964 x 1810mm, private collection). 
  See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000169,   
  (08.12.14). See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 157. 
 
 92  Ralph Hotere, Sangro Panel (1962-63, acrylic on board and card, 510 x 510 mm,  
  Dr. Allan Godfrey Collection). See Ralph Hotere, 3. 
 
 93  Ralph Hotere, Winter Landscape, Sangro River (1963, acrylic on hardboard, 735 x 
  960 mm, Dunedin Public Art Gallery). See Ralph Hotere, 8. 
 
 94  Ralph Hotere, Port Chalmers Painting No. 14 (1972, acrylic on canvas, 1220 x  
  1220 mm, private collection). See Ralph Hotere, 65. 
 
 95  Ralph Hotere, and Port Chalmers Painting No. 16 (1972, acrylic on canvas, 1230 x 
  1236 mm, The Suter Art Gallery, Te Aratoi o Whakatu). See Ralph Hotere, 62. 
 
 96  Ralph Hotere, Founders Theatre Memorial Mural (1973, lacquer on hardboard,  
  three panels, 4885 x 1070 mm, 4885 x 7490 mm, 4885 x 1070 mm, Collection of  
  Hamilton City Council Courtesy of Waikato Museum of Art & History Te Whare  
  Taonga o Waikato). See Ralph Hotere, 92-93. 
 xxviii 
 
 97  Ralph Hotere, Black Window (1983, lacquer on stainless steel and acrylic on   
  hardboard, dimensions unknown, whereabouts unknown). Work is discussed but  
  not illustrated in Peter Leech, ‘Style and Change in Ralph Hotere’, Art New    
  Zealand, n29, Summer 1983-84, 19. 
 
 98  Ralph Hotere, Baby Iron (1983, lacquer on corrugated stainless steel and acrylic on 
  hardboard, dimensions unknown, whereabouts unknown). See Leech, ‘Style and  
  Change in Ralph Hotere’, 19. 
 
 99  Ralph Hotere, Window In Spain (1978, acrylic on unstretched canvas, 1385 x 900  
  mm, Dr. Allan Godfrey Collection). See Ralph Hotere, 162. 
 
 100 Ralph Hotere, Aramoana (1982, lacquer on corrugated iron and wood, ten pieces,  
  each 3048 x 826 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Auckland Art   
  Gallery Toi o Tāmaki, http://www.aucklandartgallery.com/the-collection/browse- 
  artwork/6514/aramoana, (13.06.14). See also Ralph Hotere, 170-71. 
 
 101 Ralph Hotere, Ralph Hotere, La Mort a les Couleurs du Paon (1985, acrylic on  
  unstretched canvas, 1960 x 1810 mm, private collection). See Ralph Hotere, 241. 
 
 102 Ralph Hotere, Black Paintings (1968, lacquer on glass, seven panels, each 700 x  
  245 mm, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa). See Museum of New   
  Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Object/252937,   
  (13.06.14). See also Ralph Hotere, 26-27. 
 
 103 Ralph Hotere, Black Paintings (1968, lacquer on hardboard, seven panels, each  
  1230 x 623 mm, Govett-Brewster Art Gallery, New Plymouth). See Ralph Hotere: 
  Black Light, 73-79. 
 
 xxix
 104 Ralph Hotere, Black Painting (1967-68, enamel on four metal panels with perspex, 
  1750 x 1260 mm in total, Jennifer Gibbs Trust Collection, Auckland). See New  
  Zealand Modernism – The Content of Form, 53. 
 
 105 Colin McCahon, Elias, Why cannot he save himself (cm000139, April – August  
  1959, enamel and sawdust on hardboard, 1475 x 1000 mm, private collection). See 
  Colin McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000139,    
  (12.06.14). See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 83. 
 
 106 Colin McCahon, Will he save him? (000664, June-August 1959, enamel on    
  hardboard, 1220 x 900 mm, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki). See Colin   
  McCahon Online Catalogue, http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000664, (12.06.14).  
  See also Colin McCahon: a question of faith, 86. 
 
 107 Colin McCahon, Was it worthwhile (000414, August 1959, enamel on hardboard,  
  672 x 440 mm, private collection). See Colin McCahon Online Catalogue,    
  http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm000414, (12.06.14). See also Colin McCahon: a   
  question of faith, 84. 
 
 108 Ralph Hotere, Black Window Towards Aramoana (1983, acrylic and lacquer on  
  board, installation utilising eight window frames of various dimensions, now   
  dispersed into various public and private collections). Two of these works are   
  illustrated in Art Gallery of New South Wales, The Fifth Biennale of Sydney,   
  Private Symbol: Social Metaphor, exh. cat (Sydney: Biennale of Sydney Ltd.,   
  1984), np. For another reference to the first work, see Ralph Hotere, 208, where it  
  is listed as Black Window – Towards Aramoana (1983, corrugated stainless steel,  
  acrylic on hardboard, wooden window frame, 1113 x 960 mm, private collection).  
  For another reference to the second work, see Ralph Hotere: Black Light, 87, where 
  it is listed as Black Window, Port Chalmers (1982, acrylic on hardboard, wooden  
  window frame, 1030 x 970 mm, Hocken Collections, Uare Taoka o Hākena,   
  University of Otago). 
 xxx
 
 109 Ralph Hotere and Bill Culbert, Pathway to the sea – Aramoana (1991, paua shells, 
  rocks, fluorescent tubes, ~30400 x 1170 x 340 mm (installation size variable),   
  Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa). See Museum of New Zealand Te  
  Papa Tongarewa, http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Object/41267, (13.06.14). See  
  also Ralph Hotere: Black Light, 95. 
 
 110 Ralph Hotere and Bill Culbert, P.R.O.P. (1991, lacquer on corrugated iron,    
  fluorescent tubes, 3000 x 12000 mm, Dunedin Public Art Gallery). See Ralph   
  Hotere: Black Light, 93. See also Waikato Museum, Te Whare Taonga o Waikato, 
  http://waikatomuseum.co.nz/about-us/news/article/58/, (22.02.15). 
 
 111 Ralph Hotere, Black Phoenix (1984-88, burnt wood, metal, 5000 x 12900 x 5650  
  mm, Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa). See Museum of New Zealand 
  Te Papa Tongarewa, http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Object/37093, (13.06.14). See 
  also Ralph Hotere, 198-99. 
  
 xxxi
 0.3.3 Illustrations 










 1 
Introduction and Prologue
 2 
0.4 Introduction: figuring a thesis, context and structure 
 
 0.4.1 Figuring a thesis 
 
 This thesis is an intervention in and interweaving of the discourse surrounding Colin 
McCahon and Ralph Hotere, the philosophy of art, and the psychoanalytic theory of 
Jacques Lacan. As such, its primary objective is the generation of some new perspectives 
on and potentials for the practice of art history and art criticism in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
– although, I would suggest, these perspectives and potentials may be applied to arts 
discourse in general. The accomplishment of this primary, practical aim is facilitated 
through the realisation of a secondary, theoretical objective – namely, the elaboration of 
a Lacanian understanding of the nature of subjectivity, painting, discourse, and their 
interrelationships. In pursuing these aims, the thesis makes a twofold contribution to 
existing scholarship. Firstly, it explains, develops, and applies a Lacanian model of 
subjectivity understood in terms of the figuring of desire. This novel formulation serves 
as convenient shorthand for what, in Lacanian parlance, may be referred to as the agent-
like, metaphoric precipitation and automatist, metonymic perpetuation of symptomatic 
formations or points de capiton in discourses of desire. Secondly, this project analyses 
the discourse comprising paintings by McCahon and Hotere, and related writing and 
testimony, from the perspective of two points de capiton – the various complexities and 
inconsistencies of which are subsumed under the headings ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and 
‘Hotere’s reticence’.1 
                                                 
1
 The Lacanian point de capiton (also translated, variously, as ‘button tie’ or ‘quilting point’) is 
key concept that will merit further elaboration in later chapters. For the time being, it suffices to 
say that the point de caption admits consideration, variously, as a sign, meaning, symptomatic 
formation, figure of discourse or, indeed, a collection of such. For references to the point de 
capiton, see Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book III. The Psychoses, 1955-1956, 
ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans Russell Grigg, with notes by Russell Grigg (London: Routledge, 
1993, originally published as Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre III. Les psychoses, 1955-
1956 (Paris: Seuil, 1981)), 258-70, and ibid, ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious or 
Reason Since Freud’ in Écrits, the First Complete Edition in English, trans Bruce Fink in 
collaboration with Héloïse Fink and Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006, originally 
written as ‘L’instance de la lettre dans l’inconscient ou la raison depuis Freud’ (1957) and 
originally published in Écrits (Paris: Seuil, 1966)), 419.  
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 In the course of these deliberations, three basic questions emerge, each of which 
defines one of the main divisions of the thesis. In the first place, the thesis asks: what is 
subjectivity? That is to say, from the perspective of art history and art criticism, what is 
the nature of the creative ‘agency’ or ‘motivating principle’ in art-making, and in the 
writing and testimony surrounding this activity? In this regard (and as Lacan observes in 
‘Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis’ (1948)), the instrumental point is: ‘Only a subject can 
understand a meaning; conversely, every meaning phenomenon implies a subject.’2  In 
other words, from a Lacanian perspective, ‘subjectivity’ ↔ ‘meaning-making’: always 
already, to be a subject is to be a subject in and of language. This understanding informs 
the second, key, thesis question: what is painting considered as an expression or sign of 
subjectivity? Here, the critical idea is that, considered as a sign of subjectivity/meaning-
making, painting is language-mediated: it is legitimate to speak of a language of painting 
and to seek an elucidation of its structures and laws. These first two considerations define 
the third thesis question, namely: how may these conceptions of subjectivity and painting 
illuminate certain ambiguities and contradictions appearing in the discourse surrounding 
McCahon and Hotere? In this context, the term discourse is understood to define the 
field in which there obtain exchanges of, and interactions between, expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making. From this standpoint, the discourse surrounding McCahon 
and Hotere encompasses their work and related writing and testimony – where, 
moreover, always already it is the case that paintings by McCahon and Hotere, 
respectively, are part of the discourse and reflections on the discourse. 
 
 0.4.2 Positioning a thesis 
 
 The outline presented above will merit further elaboration in the subsection detailing 
the thesis structure. However, before proceeding with that discussion, it is appropriate to 
specify how this study relates to existing scholarship and to identify the areas in which it 
                                                 
2
 Lacan, ‘Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis’ in Écrits (2006) (originally published as 
‘L’agressivité en psychanalyse’ in Revue  Francais de Psychanalyse, v12, n2, 1948, 
367-88), 83. 
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can make a contribution. Here, I would locate the thesis in two primary contexts. Firstly, 
it sits within the discourse of Lacanian psychoanalysis or, more precisely, in that part of 
the discourse addressing Lacanian theory from a philosophical, as opposed to a clinical, 
perspective. Secondly, the thesis may be located within that part of arts discourse in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand invoking ‘theory’ in order to critique and deepen understandings 
of artists’ work and the writing and testimony surrounding this work. By theory, I have in 
mind, specifically, the twentieth century, Continental discourses associated with 
psychoanalysis and post-structuralism. Even more precisely, the thesis finds its place 
within the ‘theory-flavoured’ discourse surrounding McCahon and Hotere that exists at 
the time of writing, of which, I say more below. 
 
 With regard to the context of Lacanian psychoanalysis, I should concede at the outset 
that the thesis seeks to present neither a comprehensive account nor a radical 
reformulation of Lacan’s ideas. I approach Lacanian theory as a scholar whose 
background is in art history and art theory and, from this perspective, my engagement 
with theory is, as stated above, primarily directed towards the generation of some new 
perspectives on and potentials for arts scholarship in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
Nevertheless, it may be allowed that, in some fashion, I am making a contribution to the 
philosophy of Lacanian psychoanalysis insofar as I am, inevitably, engaged in translating 
its terms of reference into forms that may be efficacious in achieving the primary thesis 
aim. These gestures may be summarised as follows: (1) I present a (Heideggerian-
flavoured) understanding of the Lacanian unconscious in terms of meaning potentials and 
possibilities, (2) I elaborate a Lacanian model of subjectivity and the formalisation of 
fantasy (as expressed in the algorithm $ ◊ a) in terms of a logically and structurally 
necessary counterpoise not only of conscious/unconscious but also of 
possibility/impossibility (where the order of the possible defines the tension between 
consciousness and the unconscious, and the order of the impossible defines what Lacan 
terms the ‘real’), (3) I engage with, as yet, little discussed or unpublished material 
(particularly, Lacan’s Seminar IX), and (4), as previously stated, I present an 
understanding of the metaphoric precipitation and metonymic perpetuation of points de 
capiton in terms of the figuring of desire. 
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 Here, the issue of translation demands further attention. Whilst this is not intended to 
be a genuflection in the direction of a mythical, original text or testimony, nevertheless, it 
should be acknowledged that this project makes recourse to English-language translations 
of material originally spoken or written in French. The body of work in question 
comprises Lacan’s essays, composed/published between 1936 and 1965, and collected in 
Écrits (1966), and the twenty seven, annual Seminar, presented between 1953 and 1980 
(just over half of which have been published in French and a mere eight in English). In 
the former case, the thesis refers to Bruce Fink’s recent translation Écrits, the First 
Complete Edition in English (2006). Compared with the nine scripts available in what 
was, for many years, the primary, English-language reference to Lacan’s Écrits – namely, 
Alan Sheridan’s Écrits: A Selection (1977) – Fink’s translation presents thirty three 
pieces of writing, in conjunction with appendices and comprehensive translator’s 
endnotes, and thus commends itself as the definitive reference for Anglophone 
scholarship. The Seminar cited in the thesis comprise translations of official texts 
produced under the editorship of Jacques-Alain Miller and unofficial translations 
produced by Cormac Gallagher, available to purchase from Karnac Books, 
http://www.karnacbooks.com/, and available to download free from the website Jacques 
Lacan in Ireland, Collected Translations and Papers by Cormac Gallagher, 
http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/. I would concede that, in the context of a doctoral 
dissertation, the propriety of making recourse to Gallagher’s translations may be cause 
for concern. By way of justifying my use of this material, I would appeal to Gallagher’s 
own observation that the official versions of Lacan’s work have attracted controversy – 
not only for the slow rate of their publication but also in relation to various editorial 
embellishments and elisions.3 Considered in this light, Gallagher’s unofficial translations 
not only provide interim access to texts that, otherwise, would be unavailable to 
Anglophone scholars, they offer, also, to provide informative, alternative perspectives on 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, the discussion in Cormac Gallagher, ‘Re-Englishing Encore’, The Letter, 
Lacanian Perspectives on Psychoanalysis, i33, Spring 2005, 1-21, 
http://whatispsychoanalysis.ie/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/The-Letter-Issue-33.pdf, (19.02.15). 
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the official versions. Moreover, I would point out that Gallagher’s translations are 
routinely employed in recent, English-language scholarship.4 
 
 Still further, as is implicit in my comment ‘translating terms of reference’, translation 
does not merely imply transposition from one language to another but also is intrinsic to 
explanation. This issue is particularly pertinent in the context of the present study. Even if 
it were not, already, the case that I am engaging with Lacan in translation, there would 
remain the necessity of making sense of texts and testimony that have a reputation for 
being difficult – if not, at times, impenetrable. In this regard, the particular challenges 
Lacanian theory presents, and the particular strategies of reading and interpretation it 
demands are evident from Fink’s comments in Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits 
Closely (2004). Here, Fink suggests that Lacan’s work is intentionally  
 
...declarative rather than demonstrative... the reader is hard pressed to find an 
argument in it to sustain any one particular claim, Lacan leaving the task of 
supplying arguments to the reader...5 
 
As Fink implies, ultimately, it is up to the reader of Lacan’s work to make their own 
sense of it. Indeed, by way of illustrating this point, Fink refers to Lacan’s remarks, in 
Seminar XVIII, vis à vis the difficulty of the material presented in Écrits. Acknowledging 
that ‘worldly people... “can’t understand anything in it” ’, nevertheless, Lacan finds this 
state of affairs to be ‘full of hope’ in that these expressions of frustration are  
 
                                                 
4
 For example, Tom Eyers’ Lacan and the Concept of the Real (2012) is one scholarly text, 
referenced in the present study, that makes use of Gallagher’s translations. A brief search online 
reveals several other recent books whose authors have, similarly, availed themselves of 
Gallagher’s work. Examples include Adrian Johnston, Time Driven: Metapsychology and the 
Splitting of the Drive (Northwestern University Press, 2005), Mathew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher, 
Žižek and Politics: A Critical Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), and 
Ian Parker, Psychology After Lacan: Connecting the Clinic and Research (Hove and New York: 
Routledge, 2015). 
 
5
 Fink, Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely (Minneapolis and London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2004), 65. 
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...the sign that one is affected by it. It is a good thing that they understand nothing 
about it! Because one can never understand anything except what of course one has 
already in one’s head.6  
 
 Notwithstanding my debt to those many scholars whose erudition has facilitated my 
negotiation of Lacanian theory, it is certainly the case that the performance of the thesis 
task has demanded my own, particular synthesis. With the aim of maximising the 
potential audience for this study (in the first instance, arts scholars and arts practitioners 
working in Aotearoa/New Zealand), I have sought to make my encounter with Lacan’s 
work as transparent as possible. In practice, this desire for clarity has necessitated a 
considerable degree of exegesis. However, in defence of this strategy, I would argue that, 
firstly, a fundamental aim of the thesis is to interweave theory and practice with the 
intention of promoting mutually enriching conversations across disciplinary boundaries. 
Secondly, there has been, to my knowledge, no comprehensive or thoroughgoing 
conversation between Lacanian theory and the discourse of art history and art criticism as 
practised in Aotearoa/New Zealand – particularly in that part of the discourse 
surrounding McCahon and Hotere. It is in this (relative) silence that the thesis finds an 
opportunity to ‘speak’.   
 
 In the context of arts scholarship in Aotearoa/New Zealand, the ‘theory-flavoured’ 
discourse, to which I alluded earlier is, perhaps, most readily apparent from the early 
1980s onwards. A comprehensive account of this field lies beyond the scope of the 
present study. Nevertheless, by way of establishing a useful context within which to 
outline the theory-flavoured discourse surrounding McCahon and Hotere, I observe that 
the mid 1980s witnessed a flurry of short-lived periodicals in which there is explicit 
engagement with matters of theory. These include, for example, Parallax, a journal of 
postmodern literature and art (three issues between Spring 1982 and Winter 1983), and 
                                                 
6
 Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XVIII. On a discourse that might not be a 
semblance, 1971, unpublished transcript in Gallagher (trans), Jacques Lacan in Ireland, Collected 
Translations and Papers, http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/Book-18-On-a-discourse-that-might-not-be-a-semblance.pdf, 
(17.08.12), Seminar 6, 17 March 1971, 12, quoted (with a slightly different translation) in Fink, 
Lacan to the Letter, 176, n2. 
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And (four issues between August 1983 and October 1985).7 However, from the 
perspective of this present study, the most relevant of these initiatives is, perhaps, Antic 
(eight issues between June 1986 and December 1990 – the penultimate issue being of 
especial significance insofar as essays on Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis 
predominate). In some of these articles, Lacanian theory is invoked only in passing or by 
way of other writers – examples being Anne Maxwell, ‘Poststructuralist and Feminist 
Literary Theories: The Problematic Relation’ (1986) and Bridget Sutherland, 
‘Psychoanalysis and the Art of Christine Webster’ (1990).8 One essay that does refer, 
directly, to Lacan’s writing is Laurence Simmons, ‘ “Tracing The Self”: the Self-Portraits 
of Rita Angus’ (1988). Here, in some detail, Simmons cites Lacan’s early, landmark 
essay ‘The Mirror Stage’ (1949) in support of his contention that Angus’ self-portraits are 
less concerned with ‘mimesis as the basis of figuration’ and, rather, ‘ego-building’ – that 
is, an imaginative process of self-realisation.9  
 
 Simmons’ work notwithstanding, among the most relevant and sophisticated 
engagements with theory to appear in Antic were Lita Barrie’s ‘Remissions: Toward a 
Deconstruction of Phallic Univocality’ (1986) and ‘Further Toward a Deconstruction of 
Phallic Univocality: Deferrals’ (1987) (both of which, originally, appeared in the 
quarterly AGMANZ journal), and Stephen Zepke’s critical response: ‘Repetitions: 
                                                 
7
 See, for example, Wystan Curnow, ‘Post-Modernism in Poetry and the Visual Arts’, Parallax, a 
journal of postmodern literature and art, v1, n1, Spring 1982, 7-28, Elizabeth Eastmond, ‘The 
Snake Slid, some Signifieds Collided – in recent works by Alexis Hunter’, And, n3, October 
1984, 31-44, and Warwick Slinn, ‘Dragons and Giants: Some Myths About Deconstruction’, And 
n4, October 1985, 65-72. For a thoughtful analysis of the manner by which postmodernism 
‘arrived’ in New Zealand in the early 1980s – including assessments of publications like And and 
Parallax – see Leonard Wilcox, ‘Postmodernism or Anti-modernism’, Landfall 155, v39, n3, 
September 1985, 344-64. 
 
8
 See Anne Maxwell, ‘Poststructuralist and Feminist Literary Theories: The Problematic 
Relation’, Antic, n1, June 1986, 59-71, and Bridget Sutherland, ‘Psychoanalysis and the Art of 
Christine Webster’, Antic, n7, June 1990, 60-69. 
 
9
 Laurence Simmons, ‘ “Tracing The Self”: the Self-Portraits of Rita Angus’, Antic, n4, October 
1988, 49. Here, Simmons refers to the version of Lacan’s essay published in Jacques Lacan, 
Écrits: A Selection, trans Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 1977), 1-7. 
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Toward A Re-Construction of Phallic Univocality’ (1990).10 In ‘Remissions’, the 
ideological tenor of Barrie’s writing is evident from her identification of the necessity for 
‘a vital intersection between theory and practice’ by which a ‘radical feminist criticism’ 
may enable ‘women to take responsibility as Subjects of their work.’11 Indeed, Barrie’s 
stance reflects Antic’s mission statement to ‘foreground aspects of a growing body of 
work dealing with... feminist and other theoretical practices often ignored by existing arts 
publications in New Zealand.’12 Still further, Barrie appeals to the thought of Jacques 
Derrida in order to deconstruct what, after Derrida, she believes to be the 
‘phallogocentric’ prejudices of Lacanian theory (i.e., in brief, the manner by which 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is thought to privilege the ‘phallus’ or ‘phallic signifier’ in its 
constructions of truth and meaning).13 To this extent, Barrie’s work provides an 
indication of the important role feminism played in the introduction of Continental theory 
into the broader arts discourse in Aotearoa/New Zealand in the 1980s, and illustrates the 
somewhat fraught relationship between feminist thought and Lacanian theory. 
Nevertheless, that Barrie’s writing may be problematic is evident from Zepke’s strong 
criticism of Barrie’s articles for being ‘theoretically inadequate by their own 
requirements’ insofar as they ‘present misreadings of... [their]... sources’ (namely, female 
authors associated with contemporary, French feminism such as Julia Kristeva, Luce 
Irigaray, and Hélène Cixous, as well as male writers like Derrida, and Lacan).14 Whilst a 
detailed examination of Barrie’s essays and Zepke’s rebuttal lies beyond the compass of 
the thesis, by way of acknowledging their achievements, and addressing the contestable 
issue of Lacanian phallogocentrism, I present a summary in section 8.1. 
                                                 
10
 See Lita Barrie, ‘Remissions: Toward a Deconstruction of Phallic Univocality’, in AGMANZ 
Journal (Art Galleries and Museums Association of New Zealand), v17, n1, Autumn 1986, 13-
19, reprinted in Antic, n1, June 1986, 87-103, ibid, ‘Further Toward a Deconstruction of Phallic 
Univocality: Deferrals’, AGMANZ Journal, v17, n4, Summer 1986/87, 3-12, reprinted in Antic, 
n2, March 1987, 19-46, and Stephen Zepke, ‘Repetitions: Toward A Re-Construction of Phallic 
Univocality’, Antic, n7, June 1990, 41-56. 
 
11
 Barrie, ‘Remissions’, 17. 
 
12
 Anonymous, untitled, editors’ note in Antic, n1, June 1986, 3. 
 
13
 See, Barrie, ‘Remissions’, 14, and ibid, ‘Deferrals’, 3-4. 
 
14
 Zepke, ‘Repetitions’, 41, 42. 
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 Although writing by Barrie and Zepke provides some idea of the level of theory-
flavoured, arts discourse in Aotearoa/New Zealand in the latter 1980s, of greater 
relevance to the positioning of this thesis is the volume and tenor of such writing in the 
discourse surrounding McCahon and Hotere. Immediately, I would point out that, whilst 
there is some writing of this kind in McCahon discourse, in Hotere discourse, this kind of 
scholarship is almost absent (which is not to suggest that Hotere discourse suffers from a 
dearth of intelligent and illuminating writing per se – on the contrary). In consequence, 
the positioning of this thesis differs in relation to McCahon discourse and Hotere 
discourse, respectively. In the former case, this project defines a position within, or takes 
a perspective on, a body of existing scholarship; in the latter event, the thesis is, to some 
degree, engaged in creating the scholarship in relation to which subsequent positions and 
perspectives may be taken. Furthermore, it also is apparent that the theory-flavoured 
writing that does exist almost completely eschews any in-depth engagement with 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. As previously suggested, this state of affairs provides the thesis 
with an obvious opportunity to make an original contribution to the discourse.  
 
 With regard to the positioning of the thesis in McCahon discourse, the principal points 
of scholarly reference are provided by the theory-flavoured writing of Simmons, Zepke, 
and Rex Butler, produced between the late 1980s and the present. However, before 
outlining this material, it is appropriate to acknowledge allusions to theory in a selection 
of work by other writers. Relevant, in this respect, are three pieces by Wystan Curnow: 
firstly, the untitled and unpaginated essay included in the catalogue accompanying the 
exhibition I will need words: Colin McCahon’s word and number paintings (1984), 
secondly, ‘McCahon and Signs’, included in the catalogue accompanying the exhibition 
Colin McCahon, Gates and Journeys (1988), and thirdly, ‘The Shining Cuckoo’, 
included in Stephen Bann and William Allen, Interpreting Contemporary Art (1991). In 
the first two pieces, Curnow appeals to semiotic theory observing that, in the former case, 
‘The difference between words and images is that words as signifiers (i.e., as aural and 
visual signs) make no pretence to resemble their signifieds (i.e., the concepts to which 
 11 
they refer).’15 Here, Curnow’s allusion to the problem of ‘resemblance’ recalls Michel 
Foucault’s discussion in ‘This is not a pipe’ (1968) and, in fact, Curnow subsequently 
cites Foucault’s essay in ‘McCahon and Signs’.16 In the context of the present study, 
Curnow’s essays are, primarily, of interest in that their appeals to theory highlight the 
tension between painting and writing in McCahon’s so-called ‘written paintings’, thereby 
                                                 
15
 Curnow, untitled essay in Colin McCahon, I will need words: Colin McCahon’s word and 
number paintings, exh. cat. (Wellington: National Art Gallery, 1984), np. Curnow’s essay will 
merit closer attention in chapter five. 
 
16
 See Curnow, ‘McCahon and Signs’ in Auckland City Art Gallery, Colin McCahon, Gates and 
Journeys, exh. cat. (Auckland: 1988), 43. Insofar as Curnow specifies his source as ‘Michel 
Foucault, This is Not a Pipe, 1982’, it is likely that he is citing from the revised and expanded 
version of Foucault’s essay published in book form: This Is Not a Pipe, With Illustrations and 
Letters by René Magritte, trans and ed. James Harkness (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
University of California Press, 1983, originally published as Ceci n’est pas une pipe (Montpellier: 
Éditions fata morgana, 1973)). 
 
 A brief consideration of Foucault’s essay seems indicated insofar as it constitutes an important 
precedent for the position advanced in the thesis that absolute distinctions between image and 
text, painting and writing cannot be sustained. Here, my reference is Foucault, ‘This is not a pipe’ 
in James D. Faubion (ed), Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology (New York: 
New Press, 1998, originally published as ‘Ceci n'est pas une pipe’ in Les Cahiers du chemin, v15, 
n2, 1968, 79-105). Particularly relevant is Foucault’s discussion of René Magritte’s The Two 
Mysteries (1966, ref. 1), which comprises a representation of a framed painting on an easel, 
depicting a pipe and an accompanying caption: ‘ceci n’est pas une pipe’ – this ensemble 
juxtaposed with another, much larger, image of a pipe floating at upper left, in an indeterminate 
space. Foucault characterises this painting as ‘a calligram that Magritte has secretly constructed, 
then carefully unraveled’ (189), defining a calligram as that which ‘brings a text and a shape as 
close together as possible... It lodges statements in the space of a shape, and makes the text say 
what the drawing represents’ and, in so doing,  
 
...the calligram aspires playfully to efface the oldest oppositions of our alphabetical 
civilization: to show and to name; to shape and to say; to reproduce and to articulate; to 
imitate and to signify; to look and to read. (190) 
 
Subsequently, Foucault uses Magritte’s unravelling of the calligram to illustrate the paradoxes 
associated with ‘Two principles’ that have ‘ruled Western painting from the fifteenth to the 
twentieth century.’ As Foucault points out:  
 
The first asserts the separation between plastic representation (which implies resemblance) 
and linguistic reference (which excludes it)... The second principle posits an equivalence 
between the fact of resemblance and the affirmation of a representative bond. (195) 
 
That is to say, the first principle insists on maintaining absolute distinctions between plastic and 
graphic, painting and writing. However, this is directly contradicted by the second principle, 
which asserts that, always already, to resemble/represent is to affirm or convey meaning. 
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placing in question the idea that absolute distinctions obtain between ‘plastic’ and 
‘graphic’, ‘pictorial’ and ‘symbolic’, ‘seeing’ and ‘reading’. To this extent, Curnow’s 
writing is in harmony with a key position taken by the thesis – namely, that, insofar as 
painting admits consideration as a sign or expression of subjectivity/meaning-making, 
painting is writing and writing is painting. Indeed, the illustration of this perspective is 
one reason the thesis engages primarily with artworks that incorporate painted text. 
 
 In Curnow’s essay ‘The Shining Cuckoo’, ‘McCahon’s modernism’ is elaborated by 
way of a brief engagement with Jean-François Lyotard’s reflections on the modern 
sublime and a, somewhat more substantive, discussion of Derrida’s critique of Kant’s 
conception of parerga or framing elements.17 A key inference of Curnow’s discussion is 
that, in keeping with Derrida’s consideration of the question of the frame, to some 
degree, McCahon’s work defines an ‘outside’ the frame of modernism that, at the same 
time, offers to enter and supplement the ‘inside’ of the modernist frame, thereby defining 
that inside as inside.18 In so doing, Curnow conceives of McCahon’s work in terms of a 
‘resistance’ to the manner by which ‘The art world “border” frames contemporary art 
practice and its reception and distinguishes a centre from provinces beyond its 
margins.’19 Here, it may be noted that the question of the frame and, in particular, the 
manner by which McCahon’s work offers to subvert or unsettle the frame of modernism, 
also is a theme prominent in the writing of Francis Pound. For example, in the Art 
Monthly Australia essay ‘Colin McCahon and the language of practical religion’ (1990), 
Pound remarks on McCahon’s ‘strangeness, the very eccentricity of his place in the larger 
modernist endeavour’ and suggests that ‘McCahon... is... ex-modern... at once inside and 
                                                 
17
 Curnow, ‘The Shining Cuckoo’ in Stephen Bann and William Allen (eds), Interpreting 
Contemporary Art (London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 1991), 36-37, 38-42. Here, Curnow’s sources 
are Jean-François Lyotard, ‘The Sublime and the Avant-Garde’, Artforum, v22, n8, April 1984, 
36-43, and Jacques Derrida, ‘The Parergon’, trans Craig Owens, October, v9, Summer 1979, 3-
41.  
 
18
 In effect, Curnow is appealing to Derrida’s conception of the logic of the supplement. For 
further elaboration of this term, see section 8.2. 
 
19
 Curnow, ‘The Shining Cuckoo’, 39. 
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outside of the whole high modernist endeavour.’20 These sentiments are reiterated (almost 
word for word) in at least three other published works – most recently, the Journal of 
New Zealand Art History piece ‘McCahon, Mondrian, Masking Tape: A Reading of the 
Centre from the Outermost Edge’ (2002).21 
  
 Whilst this by no means exhausts the field of possibilities, three further examples of 
theory-flavoured writing in McCahon discourse are worthy of acknowledgement. These 
comprise the Antic essay co-authored by Robert Leonard and Stuart McKenzie, ‘Pathetic 
Projections: Wilfulness in the Wilderness’ (1989), Richard Lummis’ unpublished, 
doctoral dissertation, Modelling the New Zealand artist: Rita Angus & Colin McCahon 
(2004), and Luke Smythe’s essay ‘Colin McCahon’ in the self-published text Bill 
Culbert, Colin McCahon (2004). In the first place, then, Leonard and McKenzie appeal to 
semiotic theory in order to interrogate the problematic nature of the artistic identity 
expressed in McCahon’s paintings. In essence, Leonard and McKenzie claim that 
McCahon’s oeuvre bears witness to a thematic development whereby, successively, 
McCahon reifies, places in question and, finally, is forced to confront the insufficiency of 
the idea that an artwork might securely express an identity between self and world. This 
thematic development is defined in terms of a stylistic progression from realism to 
abstraction, Leonard and McKenzie concluding that, with reference to three, key 
paintings, the progressive elimination of ‘the vestiges of a “realism” ’ ensures that ‘The 
landscape, initially advanced as a model of the self, finds its consummate elaboration as a 
sign.’22  
                                                 
20
 Francis Pound, ‘Colin McCahon and the language of practical religion’, Art Monthly Australia, 
n32, July 1990, 12, 13. I will return to Pound’s essay in chapter six. 
 
21
 See, for example, ibid, ‘McCahon, Skies, Stars, Writing’, Scripsi, v6, n3, November 1990, 157, 
ibid, ‘From Here: Reading and Misreading European, Russian and American Modernism’ in 
James Ross (ed), New Zealand Modernism – In Context: Paintings from The Gibbs Collection 
(Wellington: The Gibbs Collection, 1995), 16, and ibid, ‘McCahon, Mondrian, Masking Tape: A 
Reading of the Centre from the Outermost Edge’, Journal of New Zealand Art History, v23, 
2002, 16-17. 
 
22
 Robert Leonard and Stuart McKenzie, ‘Pathetic Projections: Wilfulness in the Wilderness’, 
Antic, n5, June 1989, 46. Among the McCahon paintings invoked by Leonard and McKenzie to 
support their argument are Takaka: night and day (001361, July 1948, ref. 3), On building 
bridges (triptych) (000010, July – September 1952, ref. 4), and The days and nights in the 
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 Secondly, Lummis invokes landmark writings such as Roland Barthes’ ‘The Death of 
the Author’ (1967) and Foucault’s ‘What is an Author’ (1969) in support of his 
contention that ‘artists figure as fictional creations – modelled in much the same way that 
a novelist might construct a central character, or a diarist might contrive a self’.23 Whilst 
Lummis’ engagement with theory does not extend further than preliminary, 
methodological gestures, his appreciation that fabrications of artistic identity are ‘enacted 
upon’ artists ‘through a range of commentaries, biographical texts and art reviews’, as 
well as by the ‘performances’ of artists themselves, resonates strongly with the impetus 
of the present study.24 However, a basic difference between this thesis and Lummis’ 
dissertation is that my investigations seek to go further than defining certain formations 
within the discursive field (e.g., the art subjects called ‘Angus’ or ‘McCahon’) and 
tracing the fate of these formations over time. Rather, with the aid of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, this study also is concerned to theorise the nature or conditions of 
possibility of these kinds of formations and, indeed, the nature or conditions of the 
possibility of performing analysis and scholarship per se (this latter point will become 
clearer in the second part of the thesis Introduction).25  
 
 Finally, of immediate relevance to the concerns of the thesis, Smythe appeals to the 
literary theory of Maurice Blanchot in order to interrogate the ambiguous nature of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
wilderness showing the constant flow of light passing through the wall of death (000621, April – 
June 1971, ref. 5). 
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 Richard G. Lummis, Modelling the New Zealand artist: Rita Angus & Colin McCahon (PhD 
thesis: University of Otago, 2004), 1, 2-4. 
 
24
 Ibid, 2. 
 
25
 Here, I hasten to add that I intend no denigration of Lummis’ dissertation. Within its terms of 
reference, I consider it to be a work of admirable erudition. My point is, rather, that, always 
already, scholarly terms of reference are open to redefinition – indeed, are as being constantly 
redefined in innumerably different ways. Precisely this kind of redefinition is at stake in Lummis’ 
‘Abstract’, where he asserts that his ‘primary concern is not the art but rather the cultural 
construction of... [Angus and McCahon] and their work’ (ii). In other words, Lummis is engaged 
in challenging orthodox notions of what might constitute the primary ‘objects’ of an ‘art history 
thesis’ (i.e., texts rather than artworks). Similar challenges are posed in the present study. 
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subjectivity expressed in the monumental ‘I AM’ of McCahon’s Victory over Death 2 
(001502, February 1970, ref. 6, fig. 1). Specifically, and in harmony with the position 
taken in the present study, Smythe proposes that the ‘ “I” of McCahon’s painting’ does 
not ‘bear... a concrete relation to an identifiable speaking subject’ but rather the ‘strange 
and endless murmuring... of language itself’.26 In seeking to elaborate this impersonal 
voice of language, Smythe appeals to what, in The Infinite Conversation (1969), Blanchot 
refers to as the ‘narrative... neutral voice that speaks the work from out of this place 
without a place, where the work is silent.’27 Smythe’s writing will merit only passing 
consideration in chapter three. Nevertheless, I would point out that his invocation of 
Blanchot’s ‘narrative... neutral voice’ bears comparison with Lacan’s understanding of 
the ‘letter’ as the ‘essence of the signifier’ and Derrida’s conception of the ‘trace’ – 
namely, what will be referred to as the ineffable, ‘real-as-impossible’ function of pure 
difference implicated in the structuring of the structure of the field of subjectivity.28 
 
 Having presented a brief account of some noteworthy, theory-flavoured texts in 
McCahon discourse, I now turn to the aforementioned trio of writers whose work defines, 
more precisely, the context in which this thesis operates: Simmons, Zepke, and Butler. 
This writing falls into three main categories: (1) Simmons’ essays ‘McCahon’s Myth’ 
(originally conceived in 1988), ‘The Enunciation of the Annunciation. Discourses of 
Painting’ (1990), and ‘ “after Titian”: Intertextuality and Deconstruction in an Early 
Painting by Colin McCahon’ (1991) – all of which were subsequently re-worked and 
included in Simmons’ collection of essays The image always has the last word, on 
Contemporary New Zealand Painting and Photography (2002)29, (2) Zepke’s 
                                                 
26
 Luke Smythe, Bill Culbert, Colin McCahon (Auckland: Luke Smythe, 2004), 29. 
 
27
 Maurice Blanchot, ‘The Narrative Voice (the “he,” the neutral)’ in The Infinite Conversation, 
trans and Foreward by Susan Hanson (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 
1993, originally published as L’Entretian infini (Paris: Editions Gallimard: 1969)), 385. 
 
28
 The Lacanian conception of the ‘letter’ as the ‘essence of the signifier’ is elaborated in chapter 
three. For an account of the Derridean trace, see section 8.2. For discussion of the Lacanian 
conception of the ‘real’ as the ‘order of the impossible’, see the thesis Prologue. 
 
29
 See Simmons, ‘McCahon’s Myth’ in The image always has the last word, on Contemporary 
New Zealand Painting and Photography (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2002, originally 
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unpublished Masters thesis Colin McCahon and the Writing of Difference (1992), and (3) 
recent scholarship produced by Simmons and Butler (either working independently or in 
collaboration) – of which two particularly apposite texts are Simmons’ ‘ “I shall go and 
wake him”: The figura of Lazarus in Colin McCahon’s Painting’ (2003), and Butler’s 
Colin McCahon in Australia (2010). 
 
 Beginning, then, with Simmons’ writing composed between 1988 and 1991, it is clear 
that Derridean deconstruction is a key resource, although there also are references to the 
writing of Barthes, Kristeva, Paul de Man, and others. Thus, in ‘McCahon’s Myth’, 
Simmons critiques the biographical emphasis of much McCahon scholarship, arguing 
that this feature persists in the latter 1990s. In so doing, Simmons makes reference to 
Derrida’s consideration of the term ‘signature’ in Signéponge (1984), as well as Barthes’ 
aforementioned ‘Death of the Author’.30 In ‘The Enunciation of the Annunciation’, 
Simmons addresses the relationship between painting and writing in McCahon’s work, 
proposing (in harmony with the impetus of the present study) that ‘the pictorial moment 
would not be effective if not framed by the linguistic moment that preceded it, or that 
follows it’ and ‘One can only see what one can say.’31 Moreover, Simmons invokes 
Derrida’s discussion of the ‘supplement’, the parergon, and ‘différance’ in order to 
understand the differing meaning effects of the relationships of image and text in 
McCahon’s Annunciation paintings of the latter 1940s.32 Finally, in ‘ “after Titian” ’, 
Simmons invokes Kristeva’s conception of ‘intertextuality’ in Revolution in Poetic 
                                                                                                                                                 
presented as a public lecture at Auckland City Art Gallery in 1988), 41-51, ibid, ‘The Enunciation 
of the Annunciation’ in Ian Wedde and Gregory Burke (eds), Now See Hear! Art, language and 
translation (Wellington: Victoria University Press for the Wellington City Art Gallery, 1990), 
179-88, and ibid, ‘ “after Titian”: Intertextuality and Deconstruction in an Early Painting by Colin 
McCahon’ in Interstices, Journal of Architecture and Related Arts, v1, 1991, 
http://interstices.aut.ac.nz/ijara/index.php/ijara/article/viewFile/46/109, (11.03.15), 99-115.  
 
30
 Ibid, ‘McCahon’s Myth’, 41, 42, 43. 
 
31
 Ibid, ‘The Enunciation of the Annunciation’, 180. 
 
32
 Ibid, 184-87. The works to which Simmons refers are The Angel of the Annunciation (001039, 
April 1947, ref. 7), Hail Mary (001221, December 1947 – March 1948, ref. 8), and Annunciation 
(000630, July – November 1949, ref. 9). 
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Language (1974), in combination with Derridean deconstruction, in order to unsettle the 
idea that McCahon’s paintings referring to Titian’s Entombment (1559, ref. 10) are, 
simply or immediately, expressions of artistic ‘influence’ or ‘historical-causal 
relationships’ obtaining between different works, or that they bear witness to a ‘reductive, 
subtractive mode of composition’ by which McCahon distils what is essential in Titian’s 
precedent.33 In many respects, Simmons’ essay prefigures and parallels the direction of 
the discussion presented in the opening thesis chapter. Where I would differentiate my 
approach from that of Simmons is that (1) I consider artworks and the writing and 
testimony surrounding artworks to be signs or expressions of desiring 
subjectivity/meaning-making rather than ‘texts’ per se (a distinction that, to some degree, 
encapsulates the different emphases of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Derridean 
deconstruction),  and (2) as signs of subjectivity, I understand artworks and art contexts 
to be collections of meaning/forms in accordance with what I call the function of 
representation/symbolisation (i.e., subjective experience understood as thinking in and as 
signs). That is to say, I approach the problem from the perspective that one engages with 
painted texts and/or written paintings in the field of painting/writing rather than what 
Simmons refers to as ‘paintings as text’34 – phrasing that, from the perspective of this 
project, risks sustaining artificial distinctions between painting and writing, pictorial and 
symbolic, plastic and graphic, image and text. 
 
 In common with Simmons’ writing, Zepke’s Colin McCahon and the Writing of 
Difference exhibits a sophisticated grasp of contemporary theory. Indeed, more than 
twenty years after its creation, Zepke’s thesis remains, in my view, one of the most 
ambitious pieces of critical writing in McCahon discourse. It is for this reason that, 
notwithstanding its status as an unpublished work, aspects of Zepke’s discussion merit 
special attention in chapter five. Of particular relevance to the present study, Zepke’s 
thesis makes passing allusions to Lacanian psychoanalysis – although, like Simmons, 
                                                 
33
 Ibid, ‘ “after Titian” ’, 99-100, 107-08. Simmons refers to Colin McCahon, Entombment (after 
Titian) (001089, 1946, ref. 11) and Colin McCahon, Entombment (after Titian) (001034, January 
– May 1947, ref. 12). 
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 Ibid, 100, 101, 110. 
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Derridean post-structuralism is Zepke’s primary resource.35 Furthermore, I observe that, 
in accordance with the impetus of this project, Zepke emphasises how his ‘readings of 
McCahon’s paintings have tried to avoid the metaphysics of a traditional Art History’.36 
That is to say, an art history preoccupied with the determination of what might be termed 
origins and essences, ends and absolutes of the truth, meaning, and being of art objects 
and art subjects. Precisely what this implies will become clearer in the second part of the 
thesis Introduction, where I define the methodology of this study in terms of ‘traversing 
the fantasies of the traditionalising mode of art history’. 
 
 In recent, theory-flavoured McCahon scholarship by Simmons and/or Butler, 
Simmons’ ‘ “I shall go and wake him” ’ and Butler’s Colin McCahon in Australia are 
particularly noteworthy and, indeed, merit closer attention in chapter six. In the former 
case, Simmons’ seminar piece parallels the concerns of the thesis in three main respects. 
Firstly, by way of Erich Auerbach’s writing, Simmons invokes the term figura in order to 
analyse the significance of the story of Lazarus as represented in McCahon’s Practical 
Religion, the resurrection of Lazarus showing Mount Martha (001019, December 1969 – 
February 1970, ref. 13, fig. 2).37 The congruence in question obtains insofar as, in 
essence, figura function as figures of discourse or, in Lacanian parlance, points de 
capiton.38 Furthermore, the manner by which, on Auerbach’s account, figura admit a 
dimension of prophecy, harmonises with what will be referred to as the ‘complex 
temporality’ of points de capiton such that meaning precipitates as perpetuated or 
                                                 
35
 For some references to Zepke’s invocations of Lacanian theory see, for example, Zepke, Colin 
McCahon and the Writing of Difference (MA Thesis: University of Auckland, 1992), 19, 25-26, 
29. 
  
36
 Ibid, 2. 
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 Simmons, ‘ “I shall go and wake him”: The figura of Lazarus in Colin McCahon’s Painting’ in 
Roger Taberner (ed), Colin McCahon, A Question of Faith, papers from a seminar (Auckland: 
Auckland Art Gallery, Toi o Tāmaki, 2003), 12-16. 
 
38
 Indeed, I should acknowledge that my considerations of what I call the figuring of painting are 
indebted to Simmons’ discussion of Auerbach’s figura. 
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crystallises as that which will be what it was.39 Secondly, Simmons addresses biblical 
parables (in effect, species of figura), suggesting that ‘A parabolic narrative is... in some 
way governed at its origin and at its end... by something that transcends altogether direct 
presentation.’ In this regard, Simmons’ account of parabolic narratives resonates with 
what Lacan refers to as the ‘hidden’, ‘metaphoric’ dimension of points de capiton and 
also Slavoj Žižek’s allusion to the ineffable ‘object-cause of desire’ that ‘resides in the 
curved space of desire.’40 Thirdly, Simmons relates the prophetic dimension of figura to 
Derrida’s conception of the paradoxical ‘messianic structure’ of acts of faith.41 That is to 
say, the manner by which, in the absence of any objective justification, leaps of faith, 
nevertheless, envision the emergence of meaning (i.e., the precipitation of points de 
capiton). In consequence, as Derrida points out in ‘The Villanova Roundtable’ (1994), 
faith, thus conceived, is ‘presupposed by the most radical deconstructive gesture.’42 That 
is to say, the very possibility of performing a deconstruction or, in Lacanian language, 
traversing fantasy – of fabricating meaning or conducting an analysis – is dependent on 
making a leap of faith in the efficacy of these praxes.43 
 
 Finally, in Butler’s seminar piece, Colin McCahon in Australia, one encounters 
discussion of the ‘universal, globe-spanning, messianic fate... [McCahon’s] work 
understands for itself’ – which Butler also terms ‘McCahon’s afterlife... the fate of his 
works once he is dead.’44 Subsequently, Butler elaborates the afterlife of McCahon’s 
                                                 
39
 The complex temporality of points de capiton, and what this implies for expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making, is elaborated in chapters two and four. 
 
40
 Simmons, ‘ “I shall go and wake him” ’, 17. The Lacanian and Žižekian inferences of 
Simmons’ commentary are elaborated, further, in chapter six. 
 
41
 Ibid, 21-22. 
 
42
 Derrida in ‘The Villanova Roundtable: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida’ in John D. 
Caputo (ed, with a Commentary), Deconstruction In A Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques 
Derrida (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 22. 
 
43
 The Lacanian conception of ‘traversing fantasy’ will merit closer attention in the second part of 
the thesis Introduction. 
 
44
 Rex Butler, Colin McCahon in Australia (Wellington: Victoria University, 2010), 10, 13. For 
some other references to the understanding of McCahon’s artistic legacy in terms of a messianic 
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work in terms of an ‘unknown’ quantity that defines an ‘impossible equivalence’ between 
two, mutually exclusive factors: extrinsic social and cultural ends that McCahon’s work 
serves and features intrinsic to the work. That is to say, Butler identifies the manner by 
which the locus of the meaning of McCahon’s oeuvre defines a contradictory 
simultaneity of transcendence and immanence, outside and inside.45 Where Butler’s essay 
resonates with the concerns of the thesis is that it seeks to resolve this antinomy by way 
of an appeal to a Lacanian model of subjectivity. Thus, with reference to Žižek’s 
Lacanian analysis of the conception of the ‘authority’ underlying divine revelation in 
Søren Kierkegaard’s essay ‘Of the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle’ (1849), 
Butler directly invokes Lacan’s conception of the objet petit a (the so-called ‘object... 
cause of desire’) and, indirectly, alludes to the Lacanian formalisation of the fantasy (as 
represented in the matheme or algorithm $ ◊ a).46 
 
 At first glance, the positioning of the thesis in relation to theory-flavoured Hotere 
discourse, would seem to be a simple matter insofar as there is almost no scholarship of 
this kind (this study, in effect, defining an initial position from which, subsequently, work 
of this kind may proceed). Indeed, it may be suggested that, with regard to Hotere and his 
work, critical writing per se is (at least, relative to McCahon discourse) thin on the 
ground. In the Landfall article ‘Some Paintings I Am Frequently Asked About, Talking 
with Bill Manhire about Ralph Hotere’ (1996), Gregory O’Brien remarks on ‘the paucity 
of in-depth critical writing about... [Hotere’s] work over the past two decades’ even as 
‘institutional and public recognition of... [this] work has increased markedly’ – a state of 
affairs to which, in O’Brien’s view, Hotere’s ‘reticence has almost certainly 
                                                                                                                                                 
afterlife see, for example Butler and Simmons, ‘Practical Religion: On the After-life of Colin 
McCahon’, Landfall 215, May 2008, 121, and, ibid, ‘ “The Sound of Painting”: Colin McCahon’ 
in John Dixon Hunt, David Lomas, and Michael Corris, Art, Word and Image, Two Thousand 
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contributed’.47 On closer inspection, O’Brien’s comment raises various questions that, in 
the third part of the thesis, I seek to address in my elaboration of the ambiguities and 
contradictions associated with the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’. However, in the 
context of this preliminary discussion, I merely suggest that O’Brien’s observation 
illustrates the degree to which Hotere discourse has been, simultaneously, enraptured and 
stymied by its ‘objects’ (i.e., Hotere and his work).  
 
 In the twenty years following the publication of O’Brien’s article, Hotere discourse 
has expanded substantially. Nevertheless, I would argue that this discourse remains 
problematic to the extent that it indulges hagiography or canonising gestures, presents 
Hotere’s work as fundamentally resistant to analysis or (what amounts to the same thing) 
formally autonomous or, otherwise, privileges Hotere-the-artist-individual as the primary 
point of reference in seeking to understand the meaning and significance of Hotere’s 
work (even if the defining characteristic of this individual is to be reticent). Insofar 
Hotere discourse evinces writing of this kind, it remains in thrall to what, in the second 
part of the thesis Introduction, I refer to as the ‘traditionalising’ mode of art history and 
art criticism. This is not to say that Hotere discourse lacks depth and sophistication. 
Indeed, it is apparent that, in recent decades, writing on Hotere has reflected the 
broadening of the horizons of art history and art criticism typifying the contemporary era. 
In McCahon scholarship, appeals to Continental theory are but one symptom of this 
tendency towards inclusiveness and diversity. In Hotere discourse, the discursive 
‘symptomatology’ differs in detail. Among its various manifestations, one might point to 
that body of (fairly recent) scholarship that seeks to take into account the complex nature 
of Hotere’s artistic identity and the cultural context of his work – an identity and context 
that might be characterised as a confluence of Te Aupōuri, Māori, Catholic, Western-
style modern, political activist, and so forth.48 
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 With regard to Hotere’s spiritual and cultural affiliations, writing by the likes of O’Brien, 
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spiritual dimension of Hotere’s ‘hybridised Māori-Catholic... upbringing’ forms the basis of 
discussion in O’Brien’s ‘Tenebrae – Transfigured Night, Ralph Hotere, a viable religious art and 
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 Even though Hotere discourse generally eschews the level of engagement with 
Continental theory one witnesses in writing by the likes of Simmons, Zepke, and Butler, 
nevertheless, writing exists that either alludes to theory in a tangential fashion or exhibits 
a critical stance somewhat indebted to theory (specifically, the kinds of challenges theory 
has presented to what I will term the traditionalising mode of art history). Whilst the 
following discussion makes no pretence to be a comprehensive list of this work,  I would 
suggest apposite examples may be found in texts by, respectively, Peter Leech, Damian 
Skinner, Pound, and Ian Wedde. Beginning, then, with Leech’s Art New Zealand review 
piece ‘Style and Change, Ralph Hotere’ (1983-84), one encounters a glancing 
engagement with phenomenology and semiotic theory in Leech’s discussion of the 
distinctions obtaining between ‘signature’ (which Leech defines as ‘mere visual 
recognisability’) and ‘style’ (which Leech defines as ‘a univocal language for the 
working out and through of successive artistic concerns’).49 It may be observed that 
Leech’s article occupies only a single page and omits bibliographic references. 
Nevertheless, Leech’s analytical, philosophical approach is uncommon in Hotere 
discourse and, for that reason, Leech’s short essay merits in-depth examination in chapter 
six.   
 
 Skinner’s Art New Zealand review of the City Gallery, Wellington exhibition Hotere – 
out the black window (1997) does not, explicitly, invoke ‘theory’ but, nevertheless, stands 
                                                                                                                                                 
its traditions’ in Dunedin Public Art Gallery and Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongawera, 
Ralph Hotere: Black Light, Major works including collaborations with Bill Culbert, exh. cat. 
(Wellington: Te Papa Press, 2000), 27. The occasionally ambiguous or, better perhaps, complex 
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Taberner and Ronald Brownson (eds), Hotere, Seminar Papers from Into the Black (Auckland: 
Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki, 1998) and ibid, ‘Ralph Hotere: Te Hono ki Muriwhenua’ in 
Ngahiraka Mason, Turuki Turuki! Paneke Paneke!: When Māori Art Became Contemporary 
(Auckland: Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki, 2008), and Pānoho, ‘Ethnicity in Hotere’s Art’ 
in Taberner and Brownson, Hotere, Seminar Papers from Into the Black. 
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 Peter Leech, ‘Style and Change, Ralph Hotere’, Art New Zealand, n29, Summer 1983-84, 19. 
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out in Hotere discourse for demonstrating a critical awareness of myth-making rhetoric 
and commentary that is excessively reductive or totalising. For example, whilst not 
questioning ‘the belief that Hotere’s art is generally excellent’ and even allowing that 
‘Hotere’s art seems rather rare in the public sphere’, Skinner suggests that, among other 
things, Hotere – out the black window was, for some interested parties, ‘a chance to 
crown a new reigning champion of New Zealand art’.50 Skinner goes on to observe that, 
despite the status of the touring exhibition and of O’Brien’s accompanying book, Hotere, 
Out The Black Window, Ralph Hotere’s work with New Zealand poets (1997), as 
elaborating only a single (albeit, important) thread of Hotere’s work,  
 
The most dramatic tendency evinced in the numerous reviews and articles 
occasioned by the exhibition was the obvious and immediate desire to canonise 
Hotere, to promote him to an elevated position in the pantheon of New Zealand 
artists.51 
 
Indeed, dismissing characterisations of Hotere as New Zealand’s ‘greatest’ artist as 
‘ludicrous... unsubstantiated rhetorics that buy into outdated modernist ideas about art, 
artists and artistic value’, Skinner insists that 
 
A lasting appreciation and evaluation of Hotere will not substitute the terms of a 
debased arts journalism for a well thought-out art history with a built in skepticism 
of hierarchy and canonisation.52 
 
  In common with writing by Leech and Skinner, Pound’s essay ‘Tiger Country, 
Hotere, Reinhardt and the US Masters’, included in the catalogue accompanying the 
touring exhibition Ralph Hotere: Black Light (2000), makes no direct reference to 
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Continental theory. However, ‘Tiger Country’ does invoke theory, indirectly, in a two-
fold sense. In the first place, Pound’s discussion alludes to semiotics and the Derridean 
logic of the supplement. Thus Pound frames his discussion of Hotere’s Black Paintings of 
1968 within the context of a copy of the exhibition catalogue Ad Reinhardt (1991), which 
Hotere selectively annotated with references to the US Masters Golf Tournament of 
1997. In an act that is, simultaneously, appropriation and homage, Hotere reframes the 
rules and syntax of one system of meaning (i.e., painting) within the rules and syntax of 
another system of meaning (i.e., golf). Pound’s essay reiterates this strategy in using 
‘Reinhardt’s pungent brevities’ on painting (as noted in ‘ART IN ART IS ART AS ART, 
Art-as-Art Dogma, part three’ (1966)) ‘as a convenient way in[to]’ Hotere’s Black 
Paintings.53 Secondly, in its engagement with the koan-like, oppositional binaries of 
Reinhardt’s writing, Pound’s approach  demonstrates his familiarity with the 
structuralist/post-structuralist understanding that, in systems of signifying elements, 
meaning is not a matter of origins and essences but rather emerges by virtue of relations 
of difference. Thus, Pound organises his catalogue piece under the headings ‘Words/no 
words’, ‘Material/immaterial’, ‘Brushwork/no brushwork’, ‘Repetition/variety’, 
‘Gloss/matt’, ‘Circle/square’, and ‘Order/chaos’.54 Pound’s essay is the subject of further 
discussion in chapter six. 
 
 Wedde’s Landfall article, ‘Figure it Out’ (2006) commends itself as worthy of 
attention as a rare example of writing that, however briefly, summarises and reflects 
critically on Hotere discourse. Whilst, ostensibly, Wedde’s short essay is dedicated to 
reviewing Kriselle Baker’s The Desire of the Line: Ralph Hotere Figurative Works 
(2005), nevertheless, a substantial portion of its discussion addresses the ‘myths of 
reticence and absence of documentation’ as they operate in Hotere discourse.55 Indeed, I 
acknowledge that my denomination of the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’ is 
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indebted to Wedde who, on a number of occasions, specifically refers to Hotere’s 
‘reticence’ with the aim of subverting totalising and reductive rhetoric to the effect that 
(1) Hotere rarely or never spoke publicly, and (2) Hotere’s work is formally autonomous 
and, therefore, speaks entirely and only in and of itself.56 Wedde’s writing will merit 
further attention in chapter six, suffice to say that, in the present context, he observes that 
Hotere’s willingness to ‘use quotation and citation’ – whether poetry or (on the occasion 
of the Zero exhibition of 1967) the polemical writing of Ad Reinhardt – ‘would 
complicate and make paradoxical his apparent reticence’ insofar as this activity 
constitutes a mutually reciprocating discourse between art and ‘the world’s traffic of 
meanings’.57 
 
 0.4.3 Structuring a thesis: chapter summary 
 
 Having established where this project sits in relation to existing scholarship – 
particularly, the discourse surrounding McCahon and Hotere – it is timely to outline the 
thesis structure. This comprises six chapters bounded by a two part Introduction and a 
Prologue, and a series of Appendices. The six chapters are, as noted earlier, organised 
into three divisions, entitled Subjectivity, Painting, and Discourse, respectively – each 
division addressing one of three, primary, thesis questions. However, before presenting a 
more detailed outline of the main body of this project, it may be useful, briefly, to 
elaborate its frame. In the first place, the two part Introduction separates the tasks of 
placing this project within the context of existing scholarship and elaborating its structure 
from considerations of thesis motivation and methodology. This division of labour serves 
to underscore the importance, for this study, of the complex nature of desiring 
subjectivity and to introduce the reader to some key concepts by which Lacanian theory 
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negotiates this complexity – in particular, the understanding that, both ‘structurally’ and 
‘ethically’, the ‘end’ of analysis necessitates ‘traversing fantasy’. Secondly, the thesis 
Prologue presents a preliminary account of the so-called Lacanian ‘orders’ of imaginary, 
symbolic, and real – terms to which this study frequently refers. In particular, I devote 
special attention to an interpretation of the Lacanian real as the order of the impossible, 
synonymous with, yet inassimilable to, what I call ‘the function of 
representation/symbolisation’ (i.e., as noted earlier, the thinking in and as signs defining 
language-mediated expressions of subjectivity). This conception of the real is pivotal to a 
primary thesis theme – namely, the understanding of expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making in terms of the figuring of desire. Finally, the thesis 
Appendices contain elaborations of and complementary perspectives on theory (e.g., 
aspects of the thinking of Heidegger, Derrida, Freud, Saussure, etc.) and other matters 
(e.g., the question of Lacanian phallogocentrism, the myth of artistic ‘influence’) omitted 
from the main body of the thesis in order to preserve the flow and focus of discussion. 
Indeed, insofar as this material presents further exegeses included in order to maximise 
the potential readership of the thesis, engagement with it may be regarded as optional – 
useful for some scholars, unnecessary for others. 
 
 The first, main thesis section, Subjectivity, asks: what is subjectivity? From the 
perspective of arts discourse, this question concerns the nature of the creative ‘agency’ or 
‘motivating principle’ in expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making that are 
synonymous with art-making, and the writing and testimony surrounding art-making. In 
chapter one, I initiate this enquiry by way of a close inspection of McCahon’s Victory 
over Death 2 and Hotere’s Painting from “Malady” (1970, ref. 15, fig. 3), highlighting 
the ambiguities and contradictions these works enliven. I propose that the subjectivity 
expressed in these works is neither simply nor immediately reducible to a particular art 
subject called ‘McCahon’ or ‘Hotere’, respectively, but rather demands to be conceived 
in terms of a tension obtaining between the individual and a transindividual otherness 
synonymous with language-mediated, social and cultural reality. These propositions are 
elaborated through a consideration of a selection of ‘written paintings’ (of which Victory 
over Death 2 and Painting from “Malady” are examples) in order to underscore, further, 
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the impossibility of absolutely resolving the ‘other subjectivity’ expressed in these works. 
In light of this discussion, it is suggested that painting, as an expression of 
subjectivity/meaning-making, reflects the tension between one painting and/or one 
meaning and an other painting and/or an other meaning. In consequence, the works in 
question demand consideration as that to which, paradoxically, one gives meaning only 
insofar as meaning is given to one by an other (or, to be precise, an otherness) or, 
equivalently, as expressions of a subjectivity caught between agency and automatism. 
 
 In light of the discussion presented in chapter one, the first thesis question may be re-
stated as what is the nature of the subjectivity/meaning-making that manifests as 
ambiguity and contradiction? In chapter two, I seek to ameliorate this antinomy by 
appealing to the Lacanian understanding of subjectivity/meaning-making in terms of a 
tension between consciousness and the unconscious. From this standpoint, the first thesis 
question finally resolves as follows: what are the structures and laws governing 
language-mediated expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making such that these 
expressions evince a tension between consciousness and the unconscious? The remainder 
of the chapter presents an interpretation of these structures and laws in light of Lacan’s 
linguistically-inspired transformation of Freudian psychoanalysis. Thus, anticipating the 
formulation figuring of desire, I present a model of expressions of subjectivity/meaning-
making in terms of a ‘metaphoric’ structuring of a ‘metonymic’ structure – which is to 
say, the manner by which a synchronic metonymy that is unconscious metaphorically 
becomes as a diachronic metonymy in consciousness. The structure in question is 
elucidated with reference to the signifier and signifying chain such that expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making bear witness to a tension between a diachronic sequence of 
signifiers-as-meaning/forms unfolding in consciousness and a synchronic field of 
signifiers-as-potentials that are unconscious. The structuring of this structure is 
elaborated in terms of a psychical function of repression/overdetermination of meaning 
(or, equivalently, repression and the return of the repressed) in accordance with the laws 
of metaphor and metonymy. The chapter concludes with the presentation of a preliminary 
understanding of expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making in terms of the agent-like, 
metaphoric, precipitation and automatist, metonymic, perpetuation of points de capiton. 
 28 
 
 Having shed some light on the nature of the subjectivity/meaning-making that 
manifests as ambiguity and contradiction, in part two of the thesis, Painting, I ask: what 
is painting considered as an expression or sign of this ambiguous and contradictory 
subjectivity/meaning-making? In the process, two, basic questions are posed: how does 
the meaning of painting come into being? and how is the meaning of painting sustained? 
In pursuing these matters, I delve more deeply into what is involved in the precipitation 
and perpetuation of points de capiton with regard to what I refer to as the painted matter 
of Victory over Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, and related works. Thus, in chapter 
three, the question of how the meaning of painting comes into being is addressed by way 
of a more detailed exploration of the agent-like, metaphoric dimension of the 
precipitation of points de capiton in painting – which I call the figuring of painting. This 
account begins with a consideration of the stutters and negations by which conscious 
discourse bears witness to figuring as the ‘true’ ‘speaking’ of the so-called ‘subject of the 
unconscious’, the manifestations of which also are explained in terms of a writing in and 
of the psyche, the ‘materialisation’ of the signifier, and the ‘instance’ or ‘agency’ of the 
‘letter’. Drawing on a range of Lacanian texts, I interrogate the ‘materiality’ and ‘agency’ 
in question in order to show how figuring also defines, variously, the psychical function 
of meaning repression/overdetermination, writing in and of the real, 
lettering/tracing/differencing, and the function of ‘pure difference’ proper to the ‘essence 
of the signifier’ or ‘unary trait’. I apply this analysis to the self-contradictory figure AM I 
AM in Victory over Death 2 in order to demonstrate, firstly, that any posited signified or 
point de capiton is destined to ‘fade’ (i.e., evince ambiguity) in the face of the insistent 
return of repressed ‘identities-in-difference’ or (paraphrasing Žižek) ‘signifiers without 
signifieds’. Secondly, I show how painted matter defines a simultaneity of painting and 
writing, plastic and graphic such that grammatical ambiguity insists by virtue of a space 
of meaning and spatial ambiguity insists by virtue of a grammar of form. 
 
 In light of the suggestion that points de capiton precipitate only insofar as they are 
fading in the face of the insistent return of the repressed, chapter four engages with the 
problem of how the meaning of painting (or, indeed, any expression of 
 29 
subjectivity/meaning-making) can endure. The ‘solution’ advanced is that the meaning of 
painting is sustained by virtue of the automatist, metonymic dimension of the 
perpetuation of points de capiton in painting – which, in deference to Lacan’s assertion 
that ‘desire is a metonymy’, I call the desire of painting. Here, there is a double 
proposition to the effect that, firstly, the meaning of painting is perpetuated as automatist, 
metonymic, re-playing of existing meaning, and secondly, this automatism, metonymy 
and repetition expresses the structure of subjective desire. Addressing the first part of this 
assertion, I show how, always already, metonymy is conceivable as repetition and, 
applying this understanding to the painted matter of Painting from “Malady” and the 
Malady series, demonstrate that they admit consideration as signs of metonymy-as-
repetition that evince, so to speak, two ‘moments’ of repetition. That is to say, signs that 
mean as reiterations of the same and signs that mean only in their ambiguity as 
reiterations of the same that is not identical with itself – which is to say, signs that mean 
in the form of a serial movement among signifying alternatives. In the latter part of 
chapter four, I elaborate the structure of subjective desire as automatism, metonymy, 
repetition – which is to say as a repetitive movement among signifying alternatives or 
imaginary surrogates for the primordially lost and/or fundamentally irresolvable 
‘object...cause of desire’, objet petit a. With particular reference to Seminar IX, in which 
Lacan models subjectivity in terms of the topology of surfaces, I relate what I refer to as 
the figuring of desire (i.e., the reciprocity of metaphor and metonymy in language-
mediated expressions of subjectivity) to the so-called ‘formalisation’ of fantasy: $ ◊ a. In 
so doing, I show how, from a Lacanian perspective, expressions of subjectivity/meaning-
making define a structurally necessary counterpoise of possibility and impossibility – 
unconscious metonymy becoming as conscious metonymy defining the order of the 
possible, and the metaphoric ‘agency’ of this becoming defining the real as the order of 
the impossible. 
 
 In the third thesis division, Discourse, I ask: how may the preceding considerations of 
subjectivity and painting illuminate certain ambiguities and contradictions appearing in 
the discourse surrounding McCahon and Hotere? In consequence, the focus of my 
discussion shifts from painting and painted matter to related writing and testimony. In 
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chapter five, these deliberations are threefold. Firstly, I present an elaboration of the 
figuring of the written matter in that part of McCahon discourse addressing Victory over 
Death 2 and I one. Specifically, I address Zepke’s criticism of what he regards as 
logocentric and ontotheological thinking in Brown’s reading of Victory over Death 2 and 
Curnow’s reading of I one. Here, my intention is to illustrate how figuring (i.e., 
determinations of meaning sustained only insofar as they are fading before that which is 
repressed/returning) exhibits an open-ended logic such that critical analyses can make no 
claim to be definitive or final but rather are offered only as that which envisage their own 
analysis (i.e., re-reading and re-writing) in turn. Secondly, I engage with Hotere’s Malady 
series in order to show how, in accordance with the figuring of desire, Hotere discourse 
and the discourse of art history admit consideration as discourses of desire. In particular, 
I suggest that, insofar as the meaning of ‘the Malady series’ rests on nothing other than 
(in Žižekian parlance) the ‘radically contingent’ repetition of the name ‘Malady’, and to 
the extent that the discourse of art history concerns itself with the determination of this 
‘impossible object’, one finds an exemplary illustration of the status of the Malady series 
and the discourse of art history as desiring discourses – i.e., as symptoms of subjective 
desire paradoxically fulfilled through endlessly missing its aim. In the final part of 
chapter five, I define the parameters of the discussion in chapter six – namely, the 
consideration of the points de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’. In the 
first place, I acknowledge the limits of this analysis insofar as, necessarily and inevitably, 
it is a product of conscious idealisation and rationalisation of meaning. Secondly, with 
regard to the Lacanian model of subjectivity/meaning-making previously elaborated, I 
outline the contradictions proper to these points de capiton – namely, McCahon’s dual 
characterisation as a visionary and/or a doubter and Hotere’s dual characterisation as 
eloquent and/or as reticent. 
 
 Having described the general features of the points de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and 
‘Hotere’s reticence’, the final thesis chapter presents a more substantive discussion. Thus, 
in the first two sections of chapter six, I survey a range of texts in McCahon discourse 
and Hotere discourse, respectively. My analysis illustrates two basic claims I make in 
relation to the points de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’. In the first 
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place, I show how these figures testify to the repeated characterisation of McCahon as a 
visionary and a doubter, and of Hotere as eloquent and reticent. Secondly, I demonstrate 
that the perpetuation of the points de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ 
tends to privilege the individual art subjects called ‘McCahon’ and ‘Hotere’, respectively 
– where this privileging is expressed in the priority accorded to McCahon’s testimony 
and/or the visionary quality of his work, and to Hotere’s silence and/or the formal 
autonomy of his work. In the closing section of chapter six, I focus on two special cases 
of these points de capiton: firstly, McCahon’s presentation as a visionary insofar as he 
doubts, on which basis one may posit a contradictory vision of doubt, and secondly, 
Hotere’s presentation as eloquent insofar as he is reticent, on which basis one may posit a 
paradoxically eloquent reticence. I demonstrate, further, that these special cases arise in 
relation to presentations, in McCahon discourse and in Hotere discourse, respectively, of 
McCahon’s questioning faith or faith in and as a praxis of questioning, and Hotere’s 
effecting discursive silence or faith in and as a praxis of silent speech. Finally, I show 
how these praxes of contradiction are defined by leaps of faith or radically contingent 
affirmations by which there are sustained fantasisies of the revelation of reality and truth. 
I suggest that the impossibilty of objectively realising such fantasies testifies to subjective 
desire fulfilled in endlessly missing its aim and, by the same token, confronts the ‘one’ 
who is a ‘subject in becoming’ with the challenge of being in and as traversing fantasy. 
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0.5 Introduction: desiring a thesis, motivation and methodology 
 
0.5.1 Desiring a thesis 
 
 Given that the nature of subjective desire is a central concern of the thesis, it seems 
essential to acknowledge the desire(s) motivating this project, and the methodological 
approach thereby indicated. I have suggested that the primary objective of the thesis is 
the generation of some new perspectives on and potentials for the practice of art history 
and art criticism in Aotearoa/New Zealand. This aim reflects the fact that Aotearoa/New 
Zealand is where I have lived, it is where I have received my education, and it is where I 
have had some of my most fascinating experiences of art. To some degree, then, this 
project proceeds on the basis of a desire – even a sense of obligation – to contribute to the 
culture of the place where I am (albeit, a place that does not stand alone but is, itself, 
enmeshed in a wider, global system of artistic and scholarly exchanges) by developing a 
critical perspective on a part of this culture that is intended to be offered back to this 
culture. To this end, the thesis is a confluence of various preoccupations: the work of 
Colin McCahon and Ralph Hotere (and related writing and testimony), the nature of the 
practice of art history and art criticism (especially in the context of Aotearoa/New 
Zealand), and the philosophy of art (with particular emphasis on the twentieth century, 
Continental thinking informing the discourses of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism). 
 
 However, in light of the model of subjectivity/meaning-making this study espouses, it 
is apparent that any accounting of motivating desires is subject to two, key limitations. In 
the first place, it must be conceded that the disclosures or explanations I provide cannot 
be regarded as definitive or final. On the contrary, it is the position of this project that any 
assertions of this sort invite interpretation as conscious idealisations and rationalisations, 
whereby the revelation or fabrication of truth and meaning obtains only partially and 
ambiguously – only by virtue (it will be argued) of the ‘insistence’ or ‘return’ of ‘that’ 
which is concealed, repressed, or unconscious. This first proviso is a matter that will 
merit more substantive discussion in the main body of the thesis. At present, it suffices to 
say that it reflects the manner by which psychoanalysis places in question the privileged 
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status of the one that is conscious (i.e., the ‘I’ or ‘ego’). In ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ 
(1900), for example, this attitude is apparent in Sigmund Freud’s insistence that ‘It is 
essential to abandon the overvaluation of the property of being conscious before it 
becomes possible to form any correct view of the origin of what is mental... The 
unconscious is the true psychical reality’.58 In Seminar I, Lacan is even more blunt, 
characterising the ego as ‘a privileged symptom, the human symptom par excellence, the 
mental illness of man’ and ‘a master of errors, the seat of illusions’.59 
 
 Secondly, the suggestion that this study is motivated by a sense of duty or 
responsibility – to the place where I am, to the work of McCahon and Hotere (and related 
writing and testimony), to scholarly practice per se – is, in effect, an admission that, to 
some degree, the ‘desire of the thesis’ is driven ethically and politically. That is to say, 
the desire that animates and shapes this project is not to be conceived solely in terms of 
my desire – the desire of an individual. On the contrary, the desire of the thesis is to be 
defined in terms of an encounter or tension obtaining between my individual self and 
something other than myself: e.g., the desires of other people, the desires expressed in 
other works of scholarship – in short: the imperatives of culture and society. In Lacanian 
parlance, this complex, desiring, subjectivity expresses the tension obtaining between the 
individual one that is conscious and a ‘transindividual’ field synonymous with what 
Lacan refers to as the ‘big Other’ or ‘symbolic order’ – where this Other may be 
conceived as language-mediated, social and cultural reality, the greater part of which is, 
practically speaking, repressed from the perspective of consciousness and, therefore, 
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unconscious.60 Again, by way of anticipating matters for later discussion, this second 
factor also reflects one of Lacan’s well-known axioms: ‘man’s desire is the Other’s 
desire’.61 Among the possible interpretations this maxim invites are that, firstly, one 
desires to be what the other desires (i.e., one desires recognition or love from the other) 
and, secondly, one desires as an other (i.e., as if one were another person or adopting 
another person’s point of view).62 
 
 0.5.2 Fantasising a thesis and traversing the fantasy 
 
 On the basis of the preceding discussion, then, psychoanalysis (specifically, its 
Lacanian incarnation) would seem to insist that the fabrications of the conscious ego are 
prone to error and illusion and that, furthermore, its basic motivation – not to mention its 
very means of expressing this motivation (i.e., language) – is bestowed on it by an Other. 
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One speaks insofar as one is given to speech by the Other of language; one desires 
insofar as one is given to desire by the Other of desire.63 At first glance, these stipulations 
would seem to render impossible the fulfillment of a key demand of scholarship – 
namely, that one take responsibility for making an original contribution to the field of 
study. If ‘I am’ in error and illusion, and if ‘my’ desire is the Other’s desire, how can ‘I’ 
make an original, self-motivated contribution to scholarly discourse? What, precisely, is 
the nature of the contribution ‘I’ can make? Here, the question of methodology arises 
insofar as what is at stake is the very possibility of performing scholarship (i.e., 
determining truth and meaning) and of assigning responsibility for this performance to 
someone. Relevant, in this regard, is the Lacanian understanding of the ‘end’ of 
psychoanalysis and the nature of the subjectivity/meaning-making that emerges by virtue 
of this ‘ending’ – where, in this context, ‘end’ is most efficaciously conceived as 
‘purpose’ or ‘ideal’ rather than ‘terminus’ or ‘final resolution’. In seeking to elaborate 
this end or ending of analysis, two considerations commend themselves as worthy of 
attention: firstly, Lacan’s interpretation and transformation of Freud’s famous summation 
of the end of analysis as ‘Wo Es war, soll ich werden’ (generally translated, in English, as 
‘Where id was, there ego shall be’64), and secondly, the idea that the end of analysis 
involves ‘traversing fantasy’. These enigmatic formulae carry profound implications for 
the possibility of performing the thesis task (if not scholarship in general) and so, whilst 
not wanting to prematurely burden the reader with Lacanian arcana, it is necessary to 
unpack some of their complexity. Let us address each of these propositions in turn. 
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 In various contexts, Lacan insists that a more precise rendering of Freud’s phrase is     
‘ “Where it was... it is my duty that I come into being” ’ (The Freudian Thing (1955)) or  
‘ “Where it was, there must I come to be as a subject” ’ (Science and Truth (1966)).65 
Immediately, one is led to ask: why ‘it’ and not ‘id’? Why ‘I’ and not ‘ego’? In order to 
grasp Lacan’s meaning, it is necessary to tease out the subtleties of these terms. In the 
first place, then, I would point out that, in the context of the interpretation of Lacanian 
theory presented in this study, ‘it’ will bear various names: ‘subject of the unconscious’, 
‘lettering/tracing/differencing’, ‘function of pure difference’, ‘metaphoric function’, 
‘figuring’, and so forth. The key point, in this regard, is that ‘it’ is neither a metaphysical 
entity nor an expression of such. Rather, ‘it’ demands to be understood as ‘that’ which is 
synonymous with the aforementioned tension between the conscious one and the 
transindividual Other of language-mediated, social and cultural reality (the greater part of 
which is, as previously suggested, repressed and, therefore, unconscious). It is by virtue 
of this tension that I speak only insofar as I am given to speech (by the Other of 
language) and I desire only insofar as I am given to desire (by the Other of desire). From 
this perspective, ‘it’ also defines what is termed, in the parlance of psychoanalysis, the 
‘return of the repressed’ (the insistent repetition of which defines symptoms), 
‘unconscious desire’ or, indeed, from the perspective of the conscious one, the ‘Other’s 
desire’. In short, ‘it’ is the structuring of the structure of desiring subjectivity – the 
condition of possibility by virtue of which this field comes into being. 
  
 What then of ‘I’? In this regard, one of Lacan’s clearest statements may be found in 
Seminar VI where, as Lacan points out, in Freud’s epigram,  
 
...Ich... is not das Ich... is not the ego, which is an Ich, the Ich used as subject of the 
sentence... Where it speaks, namely where a moment before there was something 
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which is unconscious desire, I must designate myself there, there I must be this I 
which is the goal, the end, the term of analysis before it is named, before it is 
formed, before it is articulated, if indeed it ever is, because as well in the Freudian 
formula this... ‘it must be, this I must become’, is the subject of a becoming, of a 
duty which is proposed to you.66 
 
Here, with regard to the idea of the ‘end... of analysis’, Lacan makes two points of critical 
importance. Firstly, he suggests that, in a fundamental sense, analysis has no end: in the 
‘final’ analysis (so to speak), ‘I’ am an unattainable ideal – ‘the subject of a becoming’. 
However, secondly, and notwithstanding the impossibility of absolutely realising this 
objective, Lacan also maintains that, if the aims of psychoanalysis (i.e., the diagnosis and 
relief of symptoms; the promotion of a heightened awareness in subjects, by which they 
may be able to achieve practical accommodations with the exigencies of ‘their’ desire) 
are to be realised then the pursuit of this ideal impresses with ethical necessity. ‘I’ must 
speak where ‘it’ (i.e., ‘unconscious desire’) was. ‘I’ must take responsibility for ‘it’ – 
which is to say that ‘I’, in becoming, also must assume responsibility for what becomes 
as ‘my’ desire. 
 
 The idea that the end/purpose/ideal of analysis involves a creative act (or, better 
perhaps, continual process) of self-realisation, whereby one re-defines oneself in relation 
to the Other, also is implicit in the notion of traversing fantasy. In Lacanian theory, this 
term first appears in Seminar XI, where, with reference to the ‘subject who has traversed 
the radical phantasy’, Lacan suggests that ‘the experience of the fundamental phantasy 
becomes the drive.’67 What does Lacan mean? Let us begin with the term ‘fundamental’ 
or ‘radical’ fantasy. In Seminar VIII, Lacan defines the fundamental fantasy in terms of 
the subject’s investment in, or fixation on, a ‘privileged object’. Here, it should be 
understood at the outset that, insofar as the ‘object’ in question is imagined or fantasised 
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in consciousness (i.e., it is a conscious expression of language-mediated 
subjectivity/meaning-making), it also admits consideration, variously, as an objective, 
meaning, sign, symptomatic formation, or figure of discourse. Furthermore, Lacan 
suggests that, with reference to a fantasy ‘object’ of this kind, the subject halts the 
‘infinite slipping... that the signifying fragmentation brings of its own accord into the 
subject’ and, on this basis, fabricates or sustains an identity or sense of self.68 In this 
context, the term ‘signifying fragmentation’ invites interpretation as yet another metaphor 
for ‘Es’ or ‘it’ – i.e., the aforementioned tension between consciousness and the 
unconscious that is the structuring of the structure or enabling condition of the field of 
language-mediated subjectivity. The ‘halting’ of the ‘infinite slipping’ of this autonomic 
‘signifying fragmentation’ may be understood as being synonymous with the 
determination or precipitation of meaning. From this perspective, one may understand 
Lacan’s suggestion that, by virtue of investing in a ‘privileged... [fantasy] object’, it 
becomes possible to speak one’s desire: ‘desire as such takes on consistency and can be 
designated’ – albeit, a desire that is ‘rooted... in the unconscious’ and, in consequence, is 
inevitably ‘posed in the subject as desire of the Other’.69  
 
 In light of the above discussion, traversing the fantasy would seem to involve 
developing an awareness that, firstly, the privileged object(ive) of one’s desire is a 
fantasy, and secondly, it is a fantasy by which one is defined in terms of the desire of an 
Other. That is to say, one is only insofar as one is as divided by virtue of a tension 
between self and Other, consciousness and the unconscious. Hypothetically, then, the 
‘end’ of analysis would imply the completion of the traversing (or, perhaps, the 
elimination of the necessity for repeated traverses) and thus the consummation of the 
process of self-realisation. At the same time, however, insofar as ‘I’ am ‘the subject of a 
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 Ibid, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book VIII. Transference, 1960-1961, unpublished 
transcript in Gallagher (trans), Jacques Lacan in Ireland, Collected Translations and Papers, 
http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/THE-SEMINAR-OF-
JACQUES-LACAN-VIII-Draft-21.pdf, (17.08.12), Seminar 12, 1 March 1961, 145. 
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becoming’, the ultimate accomplishment of this goal would seem to be an unrealisable 
ideal. Indeed, in Seminar XI, Lacan suggests that this terminus – the ‘beyond of analysis’ 
– ‘has never been approached’ or has ‘been approachable only at the level of the analyst’ 
in the so-called ‘training analysis... a psycho-analysis that has... specifically traversed the 
cycle of the analytic experience in its totality... looped this loop to its end’, where ‘The 
loop must be run through several times.’70 In so doing, the training analysis expresses the 
imperative Lacan asserts in Seminar XV: ‘ “Where it was... I must become... a 
psychoanalyst” ’ – which is to say, the training analysis bears witness to the 
transformation of analysand into analyst.71 
 
 However, this is not to suggest that becoming an analyst involves the attainment of 
one’s fantasy objects (or objectives) – i.e., the complete realisation of one’s self or, 
equivalently, the acquisition of total knowledge, incontestable truth, final meaning. On 
the contrary, in Lacanian theory, it would seem to be the case that, in common with the 
idealised ‘I’, a subject perpetually ‘in becoming’, the analyst is forever ‘as arriving’ – 
and, moreover, arriving as a subjectivity divided, lacking, abnegated. In Seminar XV, this 
is evident from Lacan’s suggestion that 
 
The term of analysis consists in the fall of the subject supposed to know and his 
reduction to the arrival of this o-object, as cause of the division of the subject which 
comes in its place.72 
 
Here, it is necessary to elaborate the meaning of the ‘subject supposed to know’ and the 
‘o-object’. With regard to the former term, from the perspective of the analysand, the 
‘subject supposed to know’ is the analyst: analysis proceeds on the basis of the 
analysand’s belief that the analyst has the answer to the analysand’s question. More 
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generally, the subject supposed to know implies an investment, on behalf of the 
analysand, that, in principle and in possibility, there is an answer – an ‘end’ to the quest 
for knowledge, truth and meaning.73 The o-object is another name for objet petit a – the 
so-called ‘object... cause of desire’74 – a term that will merit more detailed discussion in 
chapter four. At this stage in the thesis, it suffices to say that, in Lacanian theory, objet 
petit a performs a role similar (although not exactly the same) to the aforementioned ‘Es’ 
or ‘it’. Objet petit a is a way of thinking the ‘cause’ of desiring subjectivity (i.e., a 
subjectivity that is defined in terms of a tension between self and Other, consciousness 
and the unconscious) in relation to a hypothetical object. In this regard, however, it is 
crucial to understand that objet petit a is not an ‘actual’ object or, indeed, any ‘thing’ at 
all. ‘It’ is ‘that’ which is posited in order to model the constitutive tension of subjectivity 
in terms of a desire to recover ‘that’ which is as primordially lost and/or to resolve ‘that’ 
which is as fundamentally irreducible (where, in this context, ‘that’ equally may 
designate an ‘object’, an ‘aim’, a ‘meaning’). The exemplary symptom of this tension is 
the investment of ones that are conscious in an endless series of privileged, fantasy 
objects – each of which functions, in effect, as an imaginary surrogate for the ineffable 
objet petit a.  
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 The term ‘the subject who is supposed to know (le sujet supposé savoir)’ is introduced in ibid, 
The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book IX. Identification, 1961 – 1962, unpublished transcript in 
Gallagher (trans), Jacques Lacan in Ireland, Collected Translations and Papers, 
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the Lacanian conception of the ‘subject supposed to know’ see Evans, 196-98. 
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 See, for example, ibid Seminar XI, ix, 168, 257. For further discussion of the various meanings 
of this instrumental, Lacanian term, see Evans, 124-26, and Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 83-97. 
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 On the basis of these brief definitions, Lacan’s comment implies that the ‘term of 
analysis’, by which the analysand becomes as an analyst, involves the ‘fall’ or ‘reduction’ 
of the ‘subject supposed to know’ (i.e., a subject defined in terms of the positive 
condition of knowing fully and absolutely) to the ‘arrival of the o-object... cause of the 
division of the subject which comes in its place’ (i.e., a subject defined negatively in 
terms of the ineffable cause of the tension/division between self/Other, 
consciousness/unconscious). Thus, Lacan remarks, further, that 
 
The analysand who has come to the end of analysis in the act, if there is one, which 
carries him to become a psychoanalyst... [has experienced] this passage... [that] 
only takes place in the act which puts back in its place the subject supposed to 
know. 
 
We now see this place where it is because it can be occupied. But it is only 
occupied in so far as this subject supposed to know... namely, the psychoanalyst... 
has become this residue, this o-object.75 
 
Equivalently, one may say that, in becoming an analyst, the analysand ceases to invest in 
privileged fantasy objects and, instead, invests in the ineffable ‘cause’ of divided 
subjectivity per se. Instead of seeking ‘the answer’ to the question of their desire (a 
seeking that presupposes the existence of an answer or privileged object), the analysand-
becoming-analyst seeks to invest in the very becoming of divided subjectivity – in the 
ineffable tension between self/Other, consciousness/unconscious that is condition of 
possibility for (or that drives) expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making. 
 
 In essence, this is the meaning of Lacan’s suggestion that, in traversing the ‘radical 
phantasy... the experience of the fundamental phantasy becomes the drive.’ With regard 
to this point, the Lacanian understanding of ‘drive’ may be elaborated by way of an 
illustrative contrast with the complementary and closely related concept of desire. As 
Dylan Evans points out, both the drives and desire are language-mediated – ‘they both 
belong to the field of the Other’. However, whereas desire is, in a sense, undifferentiated, 
unitary, or entire, the drives are, precisely, differentiated and multiple: ‘desire is one 
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whereas the drives are many... the drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a 
single force called desire’. Furthermore, whilst there is only a single ‘object’ (or, rather, 
object-cause) relevant to desire – objet petit a – ‘this is represented by a variety of partial 
objects in different partial drives.’76 Here, the ‘partial objects’, to which Evans refers, 
may be understood as being synonymous with the (potentially endless) series of 
privileged fantasy objects or imaginary surrogates for objet petit a posited in 
consciousness.77 
 
 In Seminar XI, the relationship between desire and drive is encapsulated in Lacan’s 
invocation of the punning phrase ‘la pulsion en fait le tour’ in order to explain the ‘place’ 
of ‘objet a cause of desire... in the satisfaction of the drive.’ As Lacan points out, ‘Tour is 
to be understood here with the ambiguity it possesses in French, both turn, the limit 
around which one turns, and trick.’78 Alan Sheridan, suggests that Lacan’s formula 
implies ‘a combination of (1) “the drive moves around the object” and (2) “the drive 
tricks the object”. ’79 In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that, from the 
perspective of consciousness, the ‘object’ in question is, in effect, a privileged fantasy 
object, partial object, or imaginary surrogate for objet petit a. Therefore, the implication 
of Lacan’s precept is that, firstly, the drive is ‘satisfied’ merely in the movement around 
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the posited object of desire without attaining it, and secondly, in so doing, the drive 
circumvents or compensates for the ineffability of objet petit a. 
 
 Let us summarise the preceding discussion. In the first place, given the constitutive 
tension (or structuring of structure) of divided, desiring subjectivity/meaning-making, ‘I’ 
– the ‘goal’ or ‘term’ of analysis – am a ‘subject in becoming’ or, indeed, an ‘analyst as 
arriving’. That is to say, ‘I’, as ‘end’ of analysis, am an unattainable ideal. Nevertheless, 
and notwithstanding the impossibility of achieving this aim, analysis proceeds in 
accordance with the imperative that ‘I must be’ as a subject of knowledge and meaning. 
From a Lacanian standpoint, the resolution of this antinomy resides in ‘traversing 
fantasy’ so that fantasy experience ‘becomes the drive’. Here, traversing fantasy implies 
developing an awareness that one’s privileged objects (or imaginary surrogates for objet 
petit a) (1) are fantasies and (2) are fantasies by which one is defined in terms of the 
Other’s desire. The suggestion that, in traversing fantasy, fantasy experience becomes the 
drive implies that the desire to attain fantasy objects (and, thereby, realise or sustain a 
sense of self) is sublimated into the satisfaction of ‘moving’ around them. In this regard, 
further clarity may be achieved if one bears in mind that the term fantasy ‘object’ also 
encompasses fantasised ‘objectives’ or ‘meanings’. In the context of discourse, traversing 
fantasy so that fantasy experience becomes the drive implies that satisfaction is achieved 
in the very way or means by which the objective is pursued or, equivalently, in the very 
activity or movement of analysis, interpretation, meaning-making. The corollary of desire 
so sublimated into drive is that the actual attainment of one’s objects or aims, the actual 
determination of meaning in a final or absolute sense and, thereby, the ultimate 
realisation of one’s self, are indefinitely suspended or deferred. To this extent, one may 
suggest that the ‘I’ endlessly ‘in becoming’ or the analyst forever ‘as arriving’ defines a 
mode of being in and as traversing fantasy.80 
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 What do these ruminations imply for the ‘desire of the thesis’ and the possibility of an 
‘I’ that might make an original and self-motivated contribution to scholarship? I would 
suggest that, from a psychoanalytic perspective, what is as stake is who or what functions 
as the analysand and who or what functions as the analyst. In this regard, three 
complications arise. Firstly, it should be conceded that the institutional settings, 
conventions, and aims of critical scholarship are not, precisely, synonymous with those of 
the analytic clinic. The relationship between the scholar and the field of scholarly 
discourse translates neither simply nor immediately onto the relationship between analyst 
and analysand. Secondly, on the basis of the previous discussion, the positions of 
analysand and analyst are rendered ambiguous by the Lacanian understanding that, in 
undergoing analysis, always already it is the case that the analysand is an analyst-in-
becoming who offers to supplant the analyst-that-was. Thirdly, the analyst-who-becomes 
does so by relinquishing an investment in the subject supposed to know (i.e., the impetus 
towards the acquisition of total knowledge, incontestable truth, final meaning), 
reconciling themselves, instead, to an identification with objet petit a (i.e., with ‘that’ 
which is implicated in the very becoming of subjectivity/meaning-making).  
 
 With these provisos in mind, as a first approximation, it may be proposed that, in the 
context of the thesis, ‘I’, as a critical writer, am analysing the discourse surrounding 
McCahon and Hotere. From this perspective, I am in the position of the analyst and the 
discourse (or, more precisely, perhaps, the collectivity of other subjects who have 
contributed to the discourse) is in the position of the analysand. Applying the Lacanian 
model of analysis still further, one could say that, in presenting a critique of the 
discourse, I catalyse the possibility of the analysand traversing fantasy. Here, however, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Deconstruction takes place, it is an event that does not await the deliberation, 
consciousness, or organization of a subject... It deconstructs it-self. It can be deconstructed. 
[Ça se déconstruit.] The “it” [ça] is not here an impersonal thing that is opposed to some 
egological subjectivity. It is in deconstruction (the Littré says, “to deconstruct it-self [se 
déconstruire]... to lose its construction”). And the “se” of “se déconstruire,” which is not 
the reflexivity of an ego or a consciousness, bears the whole enigma. (4) 
 
To this extent, one might speak of the mode of being in and as deconstruction as a post-
structuralist analogue to the psychoanalytic mode of being in and as traversing fantasy. 
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the analogy becomes strained insofar as (1) ‘the discourse’ is not precisely synonymous 
with ‘a clinical subject’ and (2) the presentation of a critique (even one resistant to the 
idea of final determinations of meaning) is not precisely synonymous with occupying the 
enigmatic position of objet petit a. These limitations notwithstanding, one may suggest 
that the traversing of fantasy is a possibility for those contributing to the discourse 
(‘contributing’, in this context, implying writing and reading the discourse, participating 
in discursive exchanges) who may be, to some degree, intrigued by the arguments ‘I’ 
present and, thereby, encouraged to re-evaluate their positions. 
 
 Conversely, it may be suggested that, in my engagements with the discourse, always 
already, ‘I’ am in the position of analysand-becoming-analyst, in relation to which it is 
now the discourse (or, rather, its contributors) that takes the position of ‘my’ analyst or 
analysts. In relation to the thesis task, this perspective has two implications. Firstly, in 
writing the thesis, ‘I’ am traversing ‘my’ fantasy. That is to say, I am engaged in 
developing an awareness of the manner by which I speak/desire only insofar as I am 
given to speech/desire by an Other. Arriving at this awareness involves the realisation 
that the factors motivating the writing of the thesis (i.e., the ‘desire of the thesis’) are not 
simply reflections of ‘my’ desire but rather desires defined by the tension obtaining 
between myself and the field of social, cultural, and institutional structures and 
imperatives within which I am enmeshed. Therefore, in becoming as an analyst, ‘I... 
must... come to be as a subject’ through questioning these structures and imperatives, 
identifying and critiquing the elements of fantasy therein. Secondly, as an analysand 
becoming an analyst, always already it is the case that my traversing fantasy is catalysed 
by an analyst or analysts in turn – namely, contributors to the discourse, to whom the 
thesis is addressed. In this regard, and in harmony with the status of the thesis as a 
gesture of a desiring ‘subject in becoming’, these analysts are (1) past contributors to the 
discourse of whom I have taken cognizance in writing the thesis (i.e., in effect, every 
artist and writer to whom I refer, directly or indirectly) and (2) future contributors to the 
discourse who will, subsequently, read and critically evaluate the thesis ‘I’ write.  
 
 46 
 0.5.3 Aiming a thesis: traversing the fantasies of the traditionalising mode 
of art history and art criticism 
 
 In light of the preceding discussion, the basic aim of the thesis may be defined as 
follows: to bring a Lacanian perspective to the elaboration and criticism of certain 
fantasies, symptomatic formations, or figures of discourse inherent in the discourse 
surrounding McCahon and Hotere and, by extension, the discourse of art history and art 
criticism as it is practised in Aotearoa/New Zealand and elsewhere. In so doing, ‘I’ 
become as an analyst through (1) catalysing Other traversing of fantasy (i.e., enlivening 
the possibility of changes of perspective in and of the discourse) and (2) being catalysed 
by the Other in traversing the fantasy I am given to speak/desire. Immediately, then, the 
question arises as to which fantasies, formations, or figures are to be traversed. As 
previously stated, this project concerns itself with the traversing of two fantasies in 
McCahon discourse and Hotere discourse, respectively – the various intricacies and 
inconsistencies of which are subsumed under the headings ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and 
‘Hotere’s reticence’. However, in so doing, the thesis also traverses fantasies intrinsic to 
what I will refer to as the traditionalising mode or methodology of art history and art 
criticism. In this regard, I should acknowledge that I am appropriating and, to some 
degree, extending the implications of this term as it is employed, for example, in Jeffrey 
Sissons’ essay ‘The Traditionalisation of the Maori Meeting House’ (1998). Here, among 
other things, Sissons defines ‘traditionalisation’ as  
 
...a process or set of processes through which aspects of contemporary culture come 
to be regarded as valued survivals from an earlier time. This assumes that there was 
a time when they were not so regarded – when they were either innovations or 
taken-for-granted features of daily life. 
 
In consequence, Sissons suggests that Māori meeting houses were not ‘invented as 
traditional’ but rather ‘were invented forms that became traditional’.81 That is to say, 
                                                 
81
 Jeffrey Sissons, ‘The Traditionalisation of the Maori Meeting House’, Oceania, v69, n1, 
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gratefully acknowledge Dr. Barbara Garrie, University of Canterbury Department of Art History 
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what is considered ‘traditional’ in the Māori meeting house is not the expression of an 
inviolable, immutable formula but rather a formula that, in its very implementation, is 
fabricated, adapted and revised. In other words, the relationship between the formula and 
the practice is not causal in one direction but rather a mutuality or reciprocity by which, 
paradoxically, the formula anticipates the practice and the practice retroactively 
determines the formula.82 Thus, the idea of a tradition is neither necessarily nor inevitably 
a precondition of cultural production but rather something that emerges in parallel with 
cultural production. In the context of Sissons’ essay, then, ‘traditionalising’ is the activity 
of fabricating traditions, lineages, temporal continua, developmental processes, etc. 
 
 Extending the term beyond its application in Sissons’ commentary, I would suggest 
that a traditionalising art history and art criticism involves two primary modes of fantasy 
or fabrication. Firstly, there is a privileging of particular art subjects (e.g., artists, art 
writers, art curators, art collectors, etc.) and particular art objects or artworks. That is to 
say, there is the formation of a canon or canons. Secondly, these privileged art subjects 
and art objects are arranged chronologically in order to illustrate the operation of chains 
of cause and effect, the transmission of ideas or influences over time, and the progressive 
development, from points of origin to apotheosis, of artistic oeuvres and art movements. 
That is to say, there is the formation of a tradition or traditions. Therefore, traversing the 
fantasies of a traditionalising art history and art criticism involves traversing the fantasies 
of canons and traditions of art. Here, I should reiterate that, in keeping with Lacanian 
theory, traversing fantasy involves relinquishing the (ultimately unrealisable) goal of 
absolute knowledge, incontestable truth, and final meaning. Instead, one invests in the 
way or becoming of meaning-making, interpretation, criticism, and self-realisation. In 
other words, being in and as traversing fantasy (or, from a post-structuralist perspective, 
being in and as deconstruction) is that which would tend to sustain discourse rather than 
closing it down. In traversing fantasy, ‘I’ becoming where ‘it’ was keeps the discourse 
open – accepting this open-endedness not only as a logical and structural inevitability but 
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also as an ethical necessity. From this perspective, then, traversing the fantasies of the 
traditionalising mode of art history and art criticism is not a purely negative operation by 
which the modus operandi of fantasising and fabricating canons and traditions of art is to 
be invalidated.83 Rather, traversing the fantasies of a traditionalising art history and art 
criticism involves elaborating and resisting applications of this methodology that tend to 
prematurely and precipitately close down the field of meaning. 
 
 As previously stated, from a Lacanian perspective, the fundamental fantasy, in 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making, is the privileging of ‘ones that are 
conscious’ and, as an important corollary to this privileging, the soliciting of the authority 
of the ‘subject supposed to know’ (i.e., the tacit appeal made to the idea of ultimate 
standards, principles, or guarantors of knowledge, truth, and meaning, on which basis, 
there is an investment in the possibility of acquiring total knowledge, incontestable truth, 
final meaning). Therefore, traversing the fundamental fantasy of a traditionalising art 
history and art criticism is a twofold endeavour that entails (1) traversing the fantasy of 
the one that is conscious and (2) traversing the fantasy of the subject supposed to know. 
In the former case, it is necessary to identify and critique understandings of artistic 
production and creativity that, excessively or exclusively, prioritise expressions of ones 
that are conscious and, thereby, tend to reify contestable notions of artistic originality, 
authenticity, and genius. In the latter event, it is necessary to identify and critique 
interpretations of art subjects and art objects that are excessively reductive, simplistic, 
absolutist, and totalising, and that, in consequence, tend to elide nuance, difference, and 
complexity.84 
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0.6 Prologue: the Lacanian orders 
 
 0.6.1 The psychoanalytic triad of imaginary, symbolic, and real 
 
 Given that the thesis makes frequent reference to the so-called Lacanian ‘orders’ of 
‘imaginary’, ‘symbolic’, and ‘real’, it seems appropriate to present some account of their 
significance in the form of a prologue rather than, perhaps, in the thesis appendices 
(where, originally, this material was located). Moreover, the following discussion devotes 
special attention to Lacan’s conception of the real given that this is of pivotal importance 
to one of the primary thesis themes – namely, the presentation of a model of subjectivity 
understood in terms of the figuring of desire. In general terms, then, it may be noted that 
Lacan’s characterisation of the terms imaginary, symbolic, and real as ‘orders’ in a triadic 
scheme of psychoanalytic classification first appears in 1953.85 Here, however, it should 
be appreciated that, throughout the course of Lacan’s writing, and like many other 
Lacanian concepts, the terms in question undergo shifts in sense and emphasis, and thus 
resist overly hasty or inflexible explanation. Indeed, before seeking to elucidate the 
distinctive features of the Lacanian orders, it is necessary to stress their interrelatedness. 
In Seminar XXII, Lacan makes this reciprocity explicit in his invocations of the figure of 
the Borromean knot.86 In consequence, and as commentators like Charles Shepherdson 
point out, it is untenable to accord ontological or temporal priority to any particular 
element of the triad. Rather, it is necessary to 
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...recognize that the imaginary, the symbolic and the real are mutually constitutive 
– like the rings in the Borromean knot, which provide us with a synchronic and 
equiprimordial structure linking the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real in a 
single set of relations.87 
 
The entanglement of the Lacanian orders also is emphasised by Ellie Ragland-Sullivan 
who asserts: 
 
In adult life the three Lacanian categories seem inseparable. They work together to 
coordinate acts of consciousness, a coordination emanating from the Imaginary 
order of representations that exists as the interpretative record of the outside 
world’s Symbolic data and of Real effects and events.88  
 
That is to say, on the level of consciousness and ego, meaning-making is, in essence, a 
function of the imaginary. However, the manner of this meaning-making is not arbitrary. 
On the contrary, it is subject to certain structural laws, certain permissions and 
prohibitions that are proper to the symbolic order. 
 
 0.6.2 Imaginary 
 
 As is implicit in the conventional usage of the term, the imaginary implies (1) 
potentially deceptive phenomenal appearances that do not, necessarily, accurately reflect 
noumenal reality and (2) a mode of meaning-making (i.e., an expression or dimension of 
subjectivity) that is, similarly, incompatible with reality and truth. As Evans points out, 
the ‘principal illusions of the imaginary are those of wholeness, synthesis, autonomy, 
duality and, above all, similarity.’89 In Lacanian theory, these illusions are particularly 
evident in the formation and functioning of the conscious ego. In this regard, the key 
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document is Lacan’s essay on ‘The Mirror Stage’ (1949). Here, Lacan contends that ego 
formation involves an imaginary (i.e., false, illusory) identification with an ‘imago’ (i.e., 
a mirror image of another human being that is perceived/conceived as a gestalt). On the 
basis of this misidentification or misrecognition (méconnaisance) with an other, the 
infant subject conceives of itself as an ‘ “ideal-I” ’ – i.e., in terms of a false image of self-
unity and self-sufficiency.90 To be more precise, the image of oneself that one sees in the 
mirror of the other or the mirror of the world may be called the ‘ideal ego’. On the basis 
of this image, one fabricates an imaginary ‘ego-ideal’ – the language-mediated idea of 
oneself as a self-sufficient unity.91 Notwithstanding the false or deceptive nature of the 
ego, Ragland-Sullivan stresses the importance of the imaginary function in expressions of 
subjectivity: ‘In Lacan’s picture the mind does not control imagination; rather, Imaginary 
processes are among those that structure the mind through formalizable laws, such as 
projection and absorption, introjection and expulsion, substitution and displacement...’92 
To be clear on this point, I would suggest that Ragland-Sullivan’s reference to 
‘formalizable laws’ implies that, in ‘structuring’ the mind, imaginary processes are 
amenable to symbolisation. As Evans puts it, this reflects that fact that ‘the imaginary is 
always already structured by the symbolic order.’93 In other words, subjective experience 
may be hypothesised in terms of an interweaving of imaginary and symbolic insofar as 
the rules and structures of the symbolic are immanent in the imaginary synthesis of 
phenomenal experience. For this reason, it will be convenient, throughout the thesis, to 
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refer to expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making in terms of the couple 
representation/symbolisation – that is to say, the function according to which language-
mediated expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making admit consideration in terms of a 
thinking in and of signs.  
 
 0.6.3 Symbolic 
 
 As stated above, in relation to expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making, the 
symbolic order defines the laws and structures that govern the imaginary ordering of 
phenomenal experience – in particular the cultural mores that structure social reality and 
the grammatical/syntactical structures of language. As Evans points out, the symbolic 
order is, therefore, synonymous with the realm of culture and the Law, and the linguistic 
domain of the signifier. In the former case, Lacan appeals to structural anthropology – 
particularly Claude Lévi-Strauss’ conception of the unconscious in terms of a ‘symbolic 
function’ that structures the giving of gifts and kinship relations. In the latter case, Lacan 
draws inspiration from the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure – specifically 
(1) the notion that language is a diacritical system of signs and (2) the conception of the 
linguistic sign as a bi-univocal unity of signified (concept) and signifier (sound image).94 
 
 Given that Lacan’s adaptation of Saussure’s linguistics is addressed in chapter two, 
and that the implications of Saussure’s conception of the linguistic sign and linguistic 
value are detailed in section 8.6, there is no necessity to reiterate this discussion here. 
However, it may be useful to present a brief account of Lévi-Strauss’ ‘symbolic function’ 
and Lacan’s references to it. Relevant, in this regard is the essay ‘The Effectiveness of 
Symbols’ (1949), where Lévi-Strauss draws parallels between shamanistic, ritual 
incantation and the methodology of psychoanalysis (i.e., the free-associated speech that is 
part of the psychoanalytic ‘talking cure’), arguing that ‘In both cases the purpose is to 
bring to a conscious level conflicts and resistances which have remained unconscious.’95 
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Lévi-Strauss goes on to propose that, to the extent shamanism and psychoanalysis are 
efficacious, they demonstrate how subjects experience trauma less as particular 
‘remembered situations’ than ‘immediately as living myth.’ That is, the manner by which 
trauma, in its ‘appropriate psychological, historical, and social context... is molded by a 
pre-existing structure’ which is ‘truly atemporal’ and constitutes ‘what we call the 
unconscious’.96 On this basis, in a fashion which has obvious implications for Lacanian 
theory, Lévi-Strauss suggests:  
 
The unconscious ceases to be the ultimate haven of individual peculiarities – the 
repository of a unique history which makes each of us an irreplaceable being. It is 
reducible to a function – the symbolic function, which no doubt is specifically 
human, and which is carried out according to the same laws among all men, and 
actually corresponds to the aggregate of these laws.97 
 
Moreover, in ‘Language and the Analysis of Social Laws’ (1951), Lévi-Strauss observes 
that structural linguistics understands ‘linguistic phenomena’ in terms of ‘systems of 
relations which are the products of unconscious thought processes’ and asks, rhetorically, 
whether  
 
...all forms of social life are substantially of the same nature – that is, do they 
consist of systems of behaviour that represent the projection, on the level of 
conscious and socialised thought, of universal laws which regulate the unconscious 
activities of the mind?98  
 
In support of this idea, Lévi-Strauss points out that laws governing various social mores 
(e.g., ‘changes in the styles of women’s dress’, ‘marriage rules and kinship systems’) 
cannot be determined empirically but rather ‘only by treating marriage regulations and 
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kinship systems as a kind of language’99 In his essay ‘The Function and Field of Speech 
and Language in Psychoanalysis’ (1953), Lacan specifically acknowledges Lévi-Strauss, 
remarking:  
 
Isn’t it striking that Lévi-Strauss – in suggesting the involvement in myths of 
language structures and of those social laws that regulate marriage ties and kinship 
– is already conquering the very terrain in which Freud situates the unconscious.100 
 
 0.6.4 Real 
 
 In seeking to elaborate the Lacanian order of the real, one might begin with the 
succinct formula given in Fink’s The Lacanian Subject. Here, Fink suggests that it is 
necessary to consider 
 
...two different levels of the real: (1) a real before the letter, that is, a presymbolic 
real, which, in the final analysis, is but our own hypothesis... and (2) a real after the 
letter which is characterised by impasses and impossibilities due to the relations 
among the elements of the symbolic order itself... that is, which is generated by the 
symbolic.101 
 
As Fink’s commentary implies, and regardless of how disconcerting this may be to 
commonsensical ways of thinking, in seeking to understand Lacan’s conception of the 
real, one must relinquish the idea that it is akin to a Kantian realm of ‘things-in-
themselves’ – a kind of fundamental, ‘material substrate’ that gives rise to the world of 
appearances, even if it cannot be known in and of itself. If one takes seriously Fink’s 
interpretation then, strictly speaking, pre-linguistic considerations of the real must be 
considered hypotheses, always already enlivened within the compass of language.  
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 A more technical account of the Lacanian real is presented in Tom Eyers’ Lacan and 
the Concept of the ‘Real’ (2012). Here, Eyers cautions against ‘reduc[ing] Lacan’s Real 
to any simple formulae or slogans’, stressing, instead, the ambiguity and heterogeneity of 
this idea within the complex field of Lacan’s teaching. This said, Eyers affirms that ‘The 
Real... must be distinguished from any broader concept of “reality” ’ or ‘biological 
“need” ’ and, indeed, emphasises that his understanding of the Lacanian real ‘locates it 
deep within the contours of... [Lacan’s] singular theory of language, an account that 
privileges the intervention of the sense-less and the “material” as constitutive of 
signification more generally.’102 For Eyers, then, the real is implicit in the ‘senseless’ 
‘materiality’ of language – in ‘the material signifier isolated from sense’ or, in Lacanian 
parlance, the ‘ “letter” ’ or ‘ “unary trait” ’.103 These enigmatic formulations will merit 
more detailed discussion in chapter three. For the time being, it suffices to say that, 
extending Fink’s approximation of the real as a product of the symbolic order, Eyers 
proposes that the real is implicated in the conditions of possibility for there being 
language-mediated expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making per se. 
 
 It may be observed that this understanding of the Lacanian real is, at least, implicit in 
its paradoxical characterisation as the ‘beyond’ of representation/symbolisation that is, 
nevertheless, logically and structurally ‘interwoven’ with representation/symbolisation – 
i.e., in the insistence or repetition of symptomatic disturbances. Consider, for example, 
Ragland-Sullivan’s suggestion that 
 
The ‘real’ Real is both beyond and behind Imaginary perception and Symbolic 
description. It is an algebraic x, inherently foreclosed from direct apprehension or 
analysis. The Real, therefore, is that before which the Imaginary falters, and over 
which the Symbolic stumbles.104  
 
More succinctly, Michael Lewis opines: 
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The real is the otherness which constitutes the symbolic and the imaginary but is 
irreducible to and exceeds both.105 
 
Similarly, Shepherdson suggests that the real is  
 
...an element that does not fit within the imaginary or symbolic structure, that is 
abjected for the order of images and words, but nevertheless persists in ‘presenting 
itself.’106 
 
Finally, in Žižek’s view, the ‘paradox of the Lacanian Real’ resides in its status as 
 
...an entity which, although it does not exist (in the sense of ‘really existing’, taking 
place in reality), has a series of properties – it exercises a certain structural 
causality, it can produce a series of effects in the symbolic reality of subjects.107   
 
These interpretations harmonise with what, in Seminar XI, Lacan considers proper to 
symptomatic phenomena – namely, the ‘tuché’ or ‘encounter with the real’, where ‘The 
real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs’ 
(i.e., what, in chapters two and four, is characterised as a prevailing metonymy or 
compulsion to repeat in expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making).108 Such an 
encounter is traumatic insofar as it marks a discontinuity in processes of meaning-making 
– i.e., where the real  
 
...form of the unconscious... must... be apprehended in its experience of rupture, 
between perception and consciousness, in that non-temporal locus... which forces 
us to posit what Freud calls... die Idee einer anderer Lokalität, the idea of another 
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locality, another space, another scene, the between of perception and 
consciousness.109 
 
 As Žižek suggests, the antinomies intrinsic to the Lacanian real invite interpretation in 
Hegelian terms as a ‘paradoxical coincidence of opposites’ or ‘the point of the immediate 
coincidence of... opposite poles... [where] each pole passes immediately into its opposite; 
each is already in itself its own opposite.’110 In making this observation, Žižek invokes 
Hegel’s Science of Logic (1812-16), wherein Being and Nothingness are considered to 
subsist in a paradoxical simultaneity of identity and difference.111 Relevant, in this 
regard, is Hegel’s assertion that, firstly, ‘pure Being... has no differentiation either within 
itself or relatively to anything external... It is pure indeterminateness and vacuity’ and 
thus ‘Being... is Nothing, neither more nor less.’ Secondly, ‘pure Nothing... is simple 
equality with itself, complete emptiness, without determination or content: 
undifferentiatedness in itself.’ In other words, ‘Nothing... is the same empty intuition or 
thought... as pure Being... [it is] the same determination (or rather lack of determination), 
and thus altogether the same thing, as pure Being.’112 On this basis, Hegel suggests that 
 
Pure Being and pure Nothing are, then, the same; the truth is, not either Being or 
Nothing, but that Being – not passes – but has passed over into Nothing, and 
Nothing into Being. But equally the truth is not their lack of distinction, but that 
they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet unseparated and 
inseparable, each disappearing immediately in its opposite. The truth is therefore 
this movement, this immediate disappearance of the one into the other, in a word, 
Becoming; a movement wherein both are distinct, but by virtue of a distinction 
which has equally immediately dissolved itself.113 
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 In other words, the Hegelian ‘real’ is neither Being nor Nothing; it is neither the 
absolute identity of Being and Nothing nor the absolute difference between Being and 
Nothing. Rather, the Hegelian real demands to be understood as the simultaneous identity 
and difference of Being and Nothing – logically speaking, an aporia or impossibility. To 
this extent, Hegel’s logic resonates with the Lacanian conception of the real in terms of 
what Žižek refers to as ‘nothing but... [the] impossibility of its inscription’. In 
consequence, Žižek denies that the real is a ‘transcendent positive entity’ or ‘Kantian 
“Thing-in-itself” ’ existing outside the symbolic order. On the contrary, the real is ‘in 
itself... nothing at all, just a void, an emptiness in a symbolic structure marking some 
central impossibility.’114 In light of this interpretation, and notwithstanding Eyers’ 
caution with regard to reducing the real to ‘simple formulae or slogans’, I would propose 
that, for the purposes of the present study, the real may be most efficaciously conceived 
as the structurally necessary order of the impossible, synonymous with, yet inassimilable 
to, the function of representation/symbolisation.115 Equivalently, one may say that the 
Lacanian real is to be conceived in logico-structural, as opposed to metaphysical, terms 
(where, by ‘metaphysical’, I mean that way of thinking reality in terms of substantial, 
material essences, first causes, or fundamental forces). 
 
 In works such as Seminar II and the ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” ’ (1957), this 
understanding of the real is implicit in the linguistically-inspired thought experiments 
Lacan employs in order to elucidate the structural logic of the signifying chain. Lacan’s 
discussion illustrates that the symbolic order, in being constituted in this way, is defined 
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in terms of certain permissions and prohibitions, possibilities and impossibilities. That is 
to say, subjective experience, insofar as it is a function of representation/symbolisation, 
necessarily emerges (or, better perhaps, demands to be conceived) as a structural 
simultaneity or counterpoise of possibility and impossibility. It is in this sense that the 
real, as the structurally necessary order of the impossible, is not prior to the function of 
representation/symbolisation (à la a material substrate) but rather synonymous with and 
inassimilable to it.116 
 
 In Seminar II, Lacan invokes the game of ‘heads and tails’ in order to emphasise that 
game-playing – even a game of chance – simply by virtue of being a game, is subject to 
symbolic structuring and conditioning. Choosing ‘heads’ or ‘tails’, and, thereby, winning 
or losing on the basis of the outcome of the coin toss – these possibilities make no sense 
unless there is a symbolically mediated enlivening of meaning: 
 
...just by the simple fact of dialogue, even the most blind, no pure game of chance 
exists, instead there is already the articulation of one word with another. This word 
is included in the fact that even when the subject plays by himself, his play only has 
any meaning if he says in advance what he thinks will come out. You can play 
heads or tails by yourself – there is already the articulation of three signs 
comprising a win or a loss, and this articulation prefigures the very meaning of the 
result. In other words, if there is no question, there is no game, if there is no 
structure there is no question. The question is constituted, organised by the 
structure.117 
 
In consequence, Lacan suggests that the human subject does not, as it were, formulate or 
determine the symbolic play of meaning but, on the contrary, always already, is 
enmeshed within it: 
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By itself, the play of the symbol represents and organises, independently of the 
peculiarities of its human support, this something which is called a subject. The 
human subject doesn’t foment this game, he takes place in it... He is himself an 
element in this chain which, as soon as it is unwound, organises itself in accordance 
with laws. Hence the subject is always on several levels, caught up in crisscrossing 
networks.118 
 
Still further, Lacan insists that the play of the symbol or the play of meaning (i.e., the 
syntax and grammar of the signifying chain or network) is not at all contingent, but rather 
subject to certain laws that determine the form in which it is expressed: 
 
Anything from the real can always come out. But once the symbolic chain is 
constituted, as soon as you introduce a certain significant unity, in the form of 
unities of succession, what comes out can no longer be just anything.119 
 
Lacan then briefly illustrates these ‘unities of succession’ by way of a consideration of a 
simple symbolic structure or network comprised of groups of threes of pluses and 
minuses: 
 
               (1)         (2)     (3) 
+ + +  + + -  + - + 
-  -  -  -  - +  - + - 
- + + 
+ -  - 
 
As Lacan points out, 1s, 2s and 3s cannot succeed each other in any order. A 1 can never 
follow a 3. That is to say, in a sequence of 3s, one cannot derive a 1; 1 is prohibited or 
impossible. Consider, for example, the sequence ‘+ - + + - + - + - + - +’. The successions 
in question obtain by virtue of reading this chain as a series of overlapping triplets. Thus, 
the first triplet, ‘+ - +’, is a 3, the second triplet, ‘- + +’, is a 2, as is the third triplet, ‘+ + -
’. The fourth triplet ‘+ - +’, is another 3, as are the remaining triplets. Clearly, one may 
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extract some  2s and 3s out of this series, but no 1s. Similarly, a 1 is possible only after an 
even number of 2s – e.g.: ‘+ + - - - +’ contains a 1. Lacan also notes that an indefinite 
number of 2s is possible between a 1 and a 3. Here, it is important to appreciate that (1) 
the defining of an ‘alphabet’ that contains only two letters: ‘plus’ and ‘minus’, (2) the 
determination of ‘words’ comprised of triples of pluses and minuses, and (3) the 
imposition of a reading rule requiring that chains of words be read as series of 
overlapping triplets are, in themselves, entirely contingent. The ‘alphabet’ could be 
extended to include ‘=’ (or any number of other symbols); the ‘words’ could be 
combinations of different numbers of ‘letters’; different reading rules might be imposed. 
Nevertheless, in combination, these contingencies precipitate a syntax and a grammar 
that determines what may be articulated. By means of this simple illustration, Lacan 
concludes that 
 
From the start, and independently of any attachment to some supposedly causal 
bond, the symbol already plays, and produces by itself, its necessities, its structures, 
its organisations.120 
 
 In the postface to the ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” ’, Lacan presents a rather 
more elaborate reiteration of this thought experiment. The precise details of Lacan’s 
argument need not concern us, suffice to say that, as Fink points out in ‘The Nature of 
Unconscious Thought or Why No One Ever Reads Lacan’s Postface to the “Seminar on 
‘The Purloined Letter’ ” ’ (1996), the impossibilities structurally implicated in the 
formation and operation of the symbolic order imply that there is 
 
...someThing that is not symbolised and in fact resists symbolization... something 
“above and beyond” structure, something “outside of” and radically different from 
or in excess of structure, and which nevertheless can be seen at work “within” 
structure itself. 121 
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Anticipating material to be presented in chapter two, it may be noted that Fink’s 
reference to ‘someThing’ is an allusion to Lacan’s discussion of ‘das Ding’ or ‘the 
Thing’ in Seminar VII, where das Ding is defined as ‘the beyond-of-the-signified’ or ‘the 
Thing’ in its ‘dumb reality’ – i.e., as an expression of the real.122 In the postface to the 
‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” ’, Lacan employs an equivalent term – the so-called 
caput mortuum of the signifying chain. Furthermore, that Lacan directly links the caput 
mortuum to the compulsion to repeat is evident from opening sentence to the main part of 
the essay: 
 
My research has led me to the realization that repetition automatism 
(Wiederholungszwang) has its basis in what I have called the insistence of the 
signifying chain.123 
 
That the possible configurations of the signifying chain (i.e., expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making) are, in a sense, predetermined by its structural 
impossibilities is evident from Lacan’s assertion that ‘the insistence which I take to be the 
essential characteristic of the phenomena of repetition automatism’124 is the result of a  
 
...subjective trajectory... grounded in the actuality which has the future anterior as 
its present. The fact that, in the interval of this past that it is already insofar as it 
projects, a hole opens up that is constituted by a certain caput mortuum of the 
signifier... suffices to make it depend on absence, obliging it to repeat its contour.125 
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Admittedly, Lacan’s prose is difficult to negotiate. However, by ‘subjective trajectory’, I 
would suggest that Lacan means the diachronic unfolding of expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making. Hence, to speak of a subjective trajectory that is ‘grounded 
in the actuality which has the future anterior as its present’ is to imply that, always 
already, meaning crystallises as that which will be what it was. To put the matter 
equivalently, one might say that, always already, meaning is only insofar as it is again – 
i.e., meaning is as reiterated. From this perspective, meaning emerges as normalised and 
naturalised, as necessary and inevitable – a somewhat counterintuitive idea that merits 
further discussion in chapters two and four. This is why Lacan suggests that the 
‘subjective trajectory’ is ‘already... the interval of this past... as it projects’. Moreover, 
this projection of subjectivity is synonymous with the opening of a ‘hole... constituted by 
a certain caput mortuum of the signifier’ – i.e., the structurally necessary real-as-
impossibility implicated in the functioning of the signifying chain. Again, this 
terminology anticipates the discussion in Seminar VII – specifically, Lacan’s appeal to 
Martin Heidegger’s essay ‘The Thing’ (1951) in order to illustrate that ‘the fashioning of 
the signifier and the introduction of a gap or a hole in the real is identical.’126 
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Part 1 Subjectivity 
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Chapter 1 An other painting: on the nature of the subjectivity   
     expressed in Victory over Death 2, Painting from    
     “Malady”, and related works 
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1.1 I declaimed and O exclaimed: differently ambiguous 
subjectivities in Victory over Death 2 and Painting from “Malady” 
 
 1.1.1 Victory over Death 2 
 
 ‘I AM; that is who I am’ the Judeo-Christian God announces to Moses in certain 
translations of Exodus (3: 14).127 ‘I think, therefore I am’ reasons René Descartes in the 
Discourse on Method (1637).128 ‘I AM’ Colin McCahon inscribes in the small, 
eponymous painting dated February 1954 (000828, ref. 16) – thus creating the earliest, 
surviving example of a trope to be writ large in the now-iconic Victory over Death 2 and 
Gate III (001186, November – December 1970, ref. 17). In the context of a study 
investigating the relationship between subjectivity, painting, and discourse, Victory over 
Death 2 is of especial interest. At first glance, its major text seems to function as an 
unequivocal assertion of selfhood or subjectivity: I AM it declaims, in black and white 
(or, at least, in light-toned pigment on a dark background), and in two-metre-tall, block 
capitals that entirely dominate the right-hand portion of the painting. However, on closer 
inspection, it is apparent that, to the left of the relatively brightly painted I AM, is 
another AM, barely distinguishable from its surroundings. It is as if, in the light of self-
consciousness, I AM reflects on the occluded and inchoate nature of its being (AM), and 
thereby poses an implicit question: AM I AM? Further compounding this ambiguity is 
the fact that AM I AM is, apparently, self-contradictory. Surely, it is given that, in the 
asking, there exists one who asks. How, then, can this ‘one’ doubt its own existence?  
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 ‘The Old Testament’ in Joint Committee on the New Translation of the Bible, The New 
English Bible with Apocrypha (London: Oxford University Press and Cambridge University 
Press, 1970), 63. 
 
128
 René Descartes, ‘Discourse on the Method for Conducting One’s Reason Well and for Seeking 
Truth in the Sciences’ in Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, 4th ed, trans 
Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998, originally 
published as Discours de la méthode, 1637), 18. 
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 In response to this conundrum, it may be suggested that there is not, in fact, any one 
that queries ‘its’ existence. That is to say, this enquiry emanates from, or is framed 
within, a field or context that exceeds and eludes considerations of the one. In this regard, 
it is apparent that the major script in Victory over Death 2 invites other readings in which 
the I of self-conscious and egocentric subjectivity is potentially elided from questions of 
being and existence. For example, what is being referred to as the letter I lacks the 
crossbars by which McCahon typically renders the first person pronoun. To this extent it 
invites interpretation as a rendering of the number ‘1’ or, indeed, as an alphanumeric 
slash or bar. In consequence, the major text of McCahon’s painting reads as a doubly 
stated AM and AM, mediated by a symbolic element that signifies, variously, (I) identity, 
(1) singularity, or (/) – a mark of punctuation (the slash, retronym, or virgule) that, in 
itself, ambiguously connotes (1) a difference-within-unity and/or a unity-that-is-
differentiated, (2) a space of joining and/or separation, or (3) a choice between 
alternatives.129 It is, therefore, unclear what, precisely, the construction AM (I, 1, /) AM 
implies. Is it a difference between two beings, one dark, one light? Is it a difference 
within a being – or, indeed, a difference within being per se? That is, for example, the 
difference between being nothing and being something?  
 
 Furthermore, one might extend considerations of Victory over Death 2’s I-motif 
beyond the realm of what is conventionally graphic into that which seems more ‘purely’ 
figurative or plastic. From this perspective, one may observe that, in locating a stridently 
vertical, central form within a sweeping, horizontal picture space, McCahon’s painting 
excites various anthropomorphic and environmental resonances: the human figure 
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 The manner by which Victory over Death 2’s central motif plays on the ambiguity between ‘I’ 
and ‘1’ is reminiscent of paintings such as I one (001358, 27 August 1959, ref. 18, fig. 4) and One 
(000418, May-July 1965, ref. 19). In particular, I one’s conjunction of ‘I’, ‘one’, and ‘one’ echoes 
Victory over Death 2’s conjunction of ‘I’, ‘AM’, and ‘AM’. In both works, there is a 
juxtaposition of singularity and duality such that the singular ‘I’ ‘presides over’ and/or ‘mediates 
between’ a doubly-stated ‘AM’ and ‘AM’, or ‘one’ and ‘one’. Whilst it is unclear, precisely, what 
these constructions imply, the very existence of ambiguity encourages the interpretation of these 
paintings as explorations of the idea that the singular is dual: the one is two. In the context of the 
present study, this possibility is of particular significance given that, by way of appeals to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, subjectivity will be considered in terms of a dialectical tension between 
self and other; consciousness and the unconscious; possibility and impossibility. I one will merit 
further discussion in chapter five. 
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standing erect in the landscape. These figurative/environmental associations are further 
enlivened in view of the fact that Victory over Death 2’s centre-piece also resembles the 
geometric shapes disposed in the Gate paintings of the early 1960s – works that 
McCahon refers to as syntheses of Auckland’s urban landscape.130 Moreover, given 
McCahon’s further characterisation of The Second Gate Series (001001, 1962, ref. 24) as 
‘a large-scale statement on Nuclear warfare’ wherein ‘by...“GATE”... I mean a way 
through’,131 one may be tempted to interpret Victory over Death 2’s pre-eminent motif 
(insofar as it functions as a barrier/portal between the left and right portions of the 
painting) as symbolising existential dilemmas and the possibility of transcending them or, 
indeed, as representing a zone of annihilation or transformation in which matter becomes 
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 Thus, in McCahon and R.N. O’Reilly, Colin McCahon: a survey exhibition, exh. cat. 
(Auckland: Auckland City Art Gallery, 1972), 29, McCahon refers to three Gate series works that  
 
...touched on a usable image based on the South Kaipara Head landscape. The 
compositions all come from a tree outside our bedroom window, and inner city roofs. The 
shaped panels come from thinking how good it would be to paint the walls of the Auckland 
Town Hall. Gates all round. 
 
The three works in question correspond to catalogue numbers 42, 43 and 44. These comprise 
Upper corners off, the second large gate (001017, April 1961, ref. 20) (titled Gate on this 
occasion: for corroboration, refer to the Colin McCahon Online Catalogue, 
http://www.mccahon.co.nz/cm001017, (11.06.14)), Gate, Waioneke (001041, March-May 1961, 
ref. 21) and Waioneke (001040, May 1961, ref. 22). All three paintings are of a similar size 
(~1500mm-1800mm by ~1200m). The right-hand extremities of Upper corners off and Waioneke 
are occupied by large, dark, semi-circular forms. The allusion to shaped panels is a feature of 
Upper corners off and Gate, Waioneke. An earlier allusion to the influence of the forms of the 
urban Auckland environment on the Gate paintings and similar works is made in McCahon, ‘All 
the paintings, drawings & prints by Colin McCahon in the gallery’s collection’, Auckland City Art 
Gallery Quarterly, n44 (double number), 1969, 13. Here, in the entry for Here I give thanks to 
Mondrian (000676, March 1961, ref. 23), McCahon recalls: 
 
The picture reflects the change I felt in shifting from Titirangi with its thick native bush 
and the view of French Bay to that of the urban environment. This picture belongs to a 
whole lot of paintings that were, believe it or not, based on the landscape I saw through the 
bedroom window. This also applies to the Gate paintings and it shows the remarkable 
change that happened in my paintings from what I had been doing in Titirangi to what I did 
in town. 
 
131
 Ibid in a letter to John Caselberg dated 10 August [1961] and reproduced in Peter Simpson, 
Answering hark: McCahon/Caselberg, painter/poet (Nelson: Craig Potton Publishing, c.2001), 
87. As Simpson points out (101, n179), an early reference to this letter is made in Gordon H. 
Brown, ‘With my left hand, I write: A consideration of Colin McCahon’s word paintings,’ 
Ascent, v1, n4, November 1969, 25. 
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energy or spirit. As an illuminated form, oriented vertically, Victory over Death 2’s white 
oblong excites yet another pictorial parallel with the Waterfall paintings of the mid 1960s 
– works that McCahon describes, poetically, as ‘still silent falls of light’.132 In these 
paintings, the falls of water that are also falls of light enliven the idea of elemental 
transubstantiation and, on this basis, offer to symbolise the intercourse between matter 
and spirit, earthly and divine, life and death (or, perhaps, life and afterlife). In the Judeo-
Christian context, the juxtaposition of water and light also recalls the imagery of Genesis 
(the first light breaking over the waters) and thus lends itself, further, to the evocation of 
divine power and creativity. 
  
 1.1.2 Painting from “Malady” 
 
 In many (if not, in fact, the majority) of McCahon’s paintings of the 1970s, the I-form 
(or its truncated, tau T variant) is pre-eminent.133 In Hotere’s oeuvre, a similarly 
prominent place may be accorded to the annular O or zero form.134 In view of this fact, I 
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 McCahon and O’Reilly, Colin McCahon: a survey exhibition, 31. The formal resonance is 
clearly apparent if one compares Victory over Death 2 with a Waterfall series painting like 
(Waterfall) (000452, November 1964, ref. 25) wherein the cascade of pigment takes the form of a 
diffuse, Newman-esque, vertical strip. The pictorial trope of ‘falls of light’ is reiterated in various 
works of the 1970s – notably the trio of paintings bearing the series title The Days and Nights in 
the Wilderness (1971) and works associated with the Necessary Protection series (1971-72). The 
titles/inscriptions bestowed on some pictures further reinforce the visual association. Consider, 
for example, The days and nights in the wilderness showing the constant flow of light passing into 
a dark landscape (001226, April-June 1971, ref. 26) or Light falling through a dark landscape 
(001250, October 1971, ref. 27). 
   
133
 For example, in addition to the aforementioned The Days and Nights in the Wilderness and 
Necessary Protection series, I- or T-forms are prominent in the Cross paintings of 1971, the 
Jump paintings of 1973-74, the Urewera mural (001411, March-July 1975, ref. 28), the Noughts 
and Crosses series of 1976, the Angels and Bed paintings of 1976-77, and the series entitled Truth 
from the King Country: Load bearing structures (1978-79). The tau cross is prominent in late 
works like A Letter to Hebrews (001038, October 1979, ref. 29) and implicit in the dashed lines 
separating blocks of text in some of McCahon’s final paintings reproducing text from 
Ecclesiastes – e.g., Is there anything of which one can say, look this is new? (001300, March 
1982, ref. 30). 
 
134
 It should be noted that the annulus is one of a number of fundamental forms that recur in 
Hotere’s painting. Other noteworthy compositional structures include the cruciform or sign of 
addition, the X-shape, and the vertical strip – or series of such, in parallel, to form bands. In many 
works, the annulus is also repeated to produce a series of concentric circles. An early example is 
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would suggest that the differently ambiguous subjectivities expressed, respectively, in 
Victory over Death 2 and Painting from “Malady” admit consideration in terms of the 
difference between declaiming ‘I’ and exclaiming ‘O’. It may be observed that, regardless 
of how these assertions miscarry or are exposed as illusory, declaiming ‘I’ is the 
characteristic expression of self-empowerment and self-possession. Exclaiming ‘O’, on 
the contrary, exemplifies the involuntary expression of awe or surprise that testifies 
precisely to the loss or absence of power and possession.135 The I declaimed bears 
witness to an idea of the self as a positive presence from which speech issues. The O 
exclaimed testifies to the idea of the self as a void or negativity from which speech is 
taken from without. The I declaimed speaks in and of itself; the O exclaimed is spoken 
by that which is external to or other than itself. Hence, if Victory over Death 2 is 
ambiguous to the extent that it asserts and places in question the privileged status of the I 
or the one as ground of subjectivity then Painting from “Malady” is paradoxical insofar 
as it admits consideration as an expression of subjectivity that has no I and has no 
ground. That is to say, the O exclaimed testifies to the speaking of no one or, 
equivalently, the speaking of an other by virtue of which one is silent. 
 
 Thus, one also might characterise the contradictory nature of the subjectivity 
associated with Painting from “Malady” in terms of the expression of someone or 
something who or that is, at the same time, no one or no thing. The positive aspect of this 
subjectivity is implicit in the way Painting from “Malady”’s sanguineous circle 
dominates and structures its picture space – a tangible, plastic form that echoes the pride 
                                                                                                                                                 
Untitled (1967, ref. 31). The annulus, whether stated singly or multiply inscribed, subsequently 
appears in many Black Paintings between 1968 and 1977. Consider, for example, Black Painting 
(1969, ref. 32), Black Painting (1970, ref. 33), Port Chalmers Painting No.10 (1972, ref. 34), 
Requiem for Tony (1974, ref. 35), and the large-scale Godwit/Kuaka (1977, ref. 36). In the 1980s, 
the circle-form (usually in a single iteration) is prominent in works such as No Ordinary Sun 
(1984, ref. 37) and several Mururoa series paintings (1984-85). Indeed, one also might include 
the stencilled Os present in the text of the Sangro and Polaris paintings created between 1962 and 
1964. 
 
135
 Here, I should acknowledge that the status of O as the exemplary sign of exclamation is noted 
in O’Brien’s writing on Hotere. See, for example, O’Brien, Hotere, Out The Black Window, 90, 
and ibid, ‘Miserere Mitimiti, a meeting place, some reflections on Ralph Hotere and Out the 
Black Window’ in Taberner and Brownson, Hotere, Seminar Papers from Into the Black, 16. 
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of place Victory over Death 2 accords its central I. These positive associations are further 
reinforced by the status of the circle as a symbol for that which is entire and sufficient 
unto itself – perfect, continuous, and eternal.136 Moreover, in a fashion similar to the 
geometric centre-piece of Victory over Death 2, Painting from “Malady”’s pre-eminent 
motif excites associations with the human figure. This resonance is particularly evident in 
two small works on paper (apparently produced after the fact of Painting from 
“Malady”): Portrait – Bill Manhire (1971, ref. 38) and Portrait – Bill Manhire (1971, 
ref. 39, fig. 5). In these two ink and wash drawings, Painting from “Malady”’s circle 
form is transmogrified into a semi-abstract representation of Manhire’s head, within 
which, in the form of zig-zags ranked on what invites interpretation as the ruled page of 
the writer’s ‘mental notebook’, is enclosed a similarly abstracted speech or script.137 In 
light of these works, one is encouraged to consider Painting from “Malady” as a portrait 
of subjectivity in the abstract – its almost fleshy, blood-red discus defining the vessel or 
field in which subjectivity finds expression (i.e., the cross-section of a head full of words 
or the O of a mouth full of song). In either event, it is significant that what is encountered 
is not a self-present ego or I but rather an impersonal soliloquy. Thus, within Painting 
from “Malady”’s annular horizon, mediated by the normalising and homogenising 
function of the stencil, unfolds a fifteen-fold reiteration of the ‘same’ MELODY – a 
continuous music that takes place apart from considerations of ‘selfhood’ and that, 
moreover, seems to possess neither a beginning nor an end. To this extent, Painting from 
“Malady” seems to express a vision of subjectivity that exists apart from first and final 
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 As noted in ibid, ‘Miserere Mitimiti’, 16, in the context of Catholicism, the status of the circle 
as a symbol of unity and perfection is also evident from its association with the Eucharist. 
 
137
 One of these ink and wash images (ref. 38) is reproduced, in black and white, as a frontispiece 
in Manhire and Ralph Hotere, The Elaboration (Wellington: Square and Circle, 1972), 8. A brief 
account of the provenance of these pictures is given in O’Brien, ‘Some Paintings I Am Frequently 
Asked About’, 27. Here, Manhire recalls that Hotere produced two portraits – ‘a standard dreamy 
young poet line drawing... then he did this much wilder, murkier, messier image’ – the latter 
version being that actually employed. O’Brien observes that the line drawing, Drawing of Bill 
Manhire (1972, ref. 40), later appeared on the cover of Manhire, The Old Man’s Example 
(published privately, 1990). A black and white reproduction of Portrait – Bill Manhire (ref. 39, 
fig. 5) appears in O’Brien, Hotere, Out The Black Window, 32, whilst colour reproductions of this 
work feature on the front cover of Landfall 191, new series, v4, i1, March 1996 and the 
frontispiece to Manhire, Selected Poems (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2012), 2. That 
this work specifically relates to the Malady series paintings is suggested by the inscription 
‘MALADY’ at its lower right.  
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causes: a subjectivity that neither passes in and out of being nor proceeds from one state 
of being to another, but rather subsists in and as an endless reiteration of the same. 
 
 Indeed, in a fashion that further echoes the dual function of Victory over Death 2’s 
centre-piece as both a barrier and ‘a way through’, as much as Painting from “Malady”’s 
ruby orb positively evokes material presence, it is also a negative non-entity – a conduit 
or passageway that is, in itself, empty and nothing. This latter aspect is implicit in the 
way the work’s slender annulus truncates several iterations of MELODY and thus invites 
interpretation as an opening onto a background vista of indeterminate extent. The manner 
by which Painting from “Malady”’s primary motif engenders an ambiguous and 
paradoxical interplay of positive and negative, being and nothingness, also follows from 
its potential to represent an empty set ‘( )’ or ‘0’ – a zero form. In this case, the 
prominence Painting from “Malady” accords its glowing circle resonates with a 
comment Hotere made in relation to the Zero series works of 1966 and 1967. Here, 
Hotere implies that the path to self-realisation lies in reflecting on or being nothing: ‘The 
series ZERO may be called an object of visual meditation, the essence of meditation 
being a personal discovery in a seeming void.’138 
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 Ralph Hotere, Zero, an exhibition of paintings, exh. cat. (Auckland: Barry Lett Galleries, 
1967), np, courtesy of Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki, E.H. McCormick Research Library, 
Artist Files: Ralph Hotere, Folder 4, Exhibition Catalogues, 1960-1974, accessed 6- 8.11.13. 
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1.2 Subjectivity as transindividual otherness 
 
 1.2.1 The transindividual and other discourse of painting   
 
 In seeking to illuminate the nature of subjectivity, painting, discourse, and their 
interrelationships, the unravelling of the aforementioned ambiguities is a major aim of the 
thesis. In the context of the present study, and as noted in the thesis Introduction, three, 
fundamental questions arise, each of which defines one of the main divisions of the 
thesis: (1) what is the nature of the subjectivity/meaning-making that manifests as 
ambiguity and contradiction?, (2) what is painting considered as an expression of this 
ambiguous and contradictory subjectivity?, and (3) how may these considerations of 
subjectivity and painting illuminate the discourse surrounding McCahon and Hotere? 
The thesis privileges Victory over Death 2 and Painting from “Malady” insofar as these 
works conveniently ‘illustrate’ the complexities these questions enliven (which is not to 
deny that any number of other paintings might serve equally as well). Consider, for 
example, the second part of the thesis, where I present an understanding of painting as a 
language-mediated expression of subjectivity/meaning-making. In this context, the slash 
or retronym comprising Victory over Death 2’s central I-form might be understood as a 
sign for what will be referred to as the metaphoric function of pure difference (or 
figuring) that is intrinsic to the precipitation of meaning yet, also, an impossibility 
fundamentally excluded from the frame of reference of meaning. Analogously, the 
annulus comprising Painting from “Malady”’s O-form admits consideration as a sign for 
what will be referred to as the metonymic function of repetition (or desire) that is 
intrinsic to the perpetuation of meaning yet, also, symptomatic of meaning sustained only 
in its ambiguity in the form of an endless movement among signifying alternatives.  
 
 Victory over Death 2 and Painting from “Malady” also provide a way to visualise the 
concerns of the third part of the thesis, where I propose that, in the discourse surrounding 
McCahon and Hotere, one may discern two ‘symptomatic formations’ (or points de 
capiton), the intrinsic ambiguities and contradictions of which are subsumed under the 
rubrics ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’. In this context, the AM I AM of 
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Victory over Death 2, which both asserts and places in question the privileged status of 
the I as ground of subjectivity, admits consideration as an affirmation of the efficacy of 
what may be referred to as a ‘praxis of questioning’. Analogously, the O of Painting from 
“Malady”, which expresses a subjectivity that has no I and has no ground (or, 
equivalently, the speaking of an other by virtue of which one is silent) invites 
interpretation as an affirmation of the efficacy of what may be referred to as a ‘praxis of 
silent speech’. The ostensible aim of the praxes in question is the revelation of reality and 
truth (e.g., of the self, of the relation between self and world, of the being and meaning of 
the artwork, and so on). However, insofar as the investment in these praxes admits no 
objective justification, they proceed on the basis of what is, in effect, a radically 
contingent affirmation or leap of faith. To this extent, Victory over Death 2 bears witness 
to the status of ‘McCahon’s doubt’ as a seeing the unseeable or, indeed, as a vision of 
doubt, and Painting from “Malady” bears witness to the status of ‘Hotere’s reticence’ as 
a speaking the unspeakable or, indeed, as an eloquent reticence. 
 
 At this point in the thesis, these ideas may seem enigmatic. However, by way of 
elucidating the conceptual framework within which they sit, I propose to begin with a 
more detailed elaboration of a key idea introduced in the previous section. Namely, the 
possibility that expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making are neither simply nor 
immediately synonymous with the expressions of particular individuals or subjects. From 
this perspective, expressions of subjectivity may be said to define an intersection or 
tension between the individual and a domain or field that, in the parlance of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, is termed transindividual. With regard to the subjectivity expressed in 
Victory over Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, and related works, the efficacy – if not 
the necessity – of taking into account this transindividual dimension may be usefully 
illustrated by attending to the difficulties that arise if one attempts to attribute this 
subjectivity exclusively to a particular individual or individuals. These difficulties – and 
what they imply for considerations of the relationship between subjectivity and painting – 
form the basis of the following discussion. 
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 In seeking to justify the idea that expressions of subjectivity admit a transindividual 
dimension, it may be noted that no painting is created in a vacuum. Always already, 
artists who paint operate within a wider context of others or, to be more precise, an 
otherness. This otherness encompasses the cosmos of other painters, paintings, 
fabricators of art media, techniques of painting, schools of painting, dealers in painting, 
consumers of painting, public and private collections of painting, histories and criticism 
of painting, theories about painting, and so forth. This is not a new idea. In the context of 
art theory and art criticism, it is exemplified by Arthur Danto’s contention, in ‘The 
Artworld’ (1964), that ‘To see something as art requires something the eye cannot 
de[s]cry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld’ 
where, moreover, ‘the role of artistic theories, these days as always... [is] to make the 
artworld, and art, possible.’139 Danto’s ideas are revisited and extended in the writing of 
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 Arthur Danto, ‘The Artworld,’ Journal of Philosophy, v61, n19, 1964, 580, 581. 
 
 By way of anticipating matters for discussion in later chapters, it may be noted that, in the 
final analysis, Danto suggests that art is defined by nothing other than the ‘is of artistic 
identification’ (576-77). Danto illustrates this idea with reference to Andy Warhol’s Brillo boxes 
(1964), suggesting that the distinction between Brillo boxes in the artworld and in the real world 
‘is but a matter of choice... and the Brillo box of the artworld may be just the Brillo box of the 
real one, separated and united by the is of artistic identification’ (582). In other words, art is what 
we say it is. Nevertheless, Danto also observes that, whilst, in the first instance, these acts of 
designation may be entirely contingent, they engender various permissions and prohibitions. 
Danto elaborates this idea in two ways. Firstly, he refers to two, identical, hypothetical artworks 
entitled Newton’s First Law and Newton’s Third Law (both of which comprise rectangular fields 
divided by a central, horizontal line). As Danto points out, the title of the first work requires one 
to consider its horizontal feature as the path of an isolated particle in empty space, whilst the title 
of the second work demands one to conceive its horizontal line as a boundary between two 
opposing masses. In Danto’s view, this demonstrates  
 
...how one artistic identification engenders another artistic identification, and how, 
consistently with a given identification, we are required to give others and precluded from 
still others... (578) 
 
Secondly, Danto makes reference to a so-called ‘style matrix’ constructed from ‘art-relevant 
predicates’, the choice of which is entirely fortuitous. As Danto points out, the rows of this style 
matrix, composed of chosen art-relevant predicates and their opposites, enliven that which, at a 
particular time, it is possible to call ‘art’ (even if, as Danto relates, some of these possibilities may 
be unacknowledged and unrealised). Thus, defining ‘G’ as ‘ “is representational” ’ and ‘F’ as ‘ “is 
expressionist” ’, Danto finds: 
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George Dickie – notably Dickie’s book, Aesthetics: an introduction (1971), where it is 
suggested that  
 
A work of art... is 1) an artifact 2) upon which some person or persons acting on 
behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld) has conferred the status of 
candidate for appreciation.140 
                                                                                                                                                 
F   G 
+   + 
+   - 
-   + 
-   - 
 
such that + + = ‘representational expressionistic (e.g., Fauvism)’, + - = ‘representational 
nonexpressionistic (Ingres)’, - + = ‘nonrepresentational expressionistic (Abstract 
Expressionism)’, - - = ‘nonrepresentational nonexpressionistic (hard-edge abstraction)’. Danto 
observes, further, that ‘as we add art-relevant predicates, we increase the number of available 
styles at the rate of 2n.’ Whilst Danto allows that what may be chosen as an art-relevant predicate 
is difficult to predict in advance, if 
 
...an artist determines that H shall henceforth be artistically relevant for his paintings... 
Then, in fact, both H and non-H become artistically relevant for all painting, and if his is 
the first and only painting that is H, every other painting in existence... [retroactively] 
becomes non-H, and the entire community of paintings is enriched... (583)   
 
Danto’s commentary resonates with the concerns of the present study on several levels. Firstly, to 
the extent Danto’s ‘is of artistic identification’ expresses sheer contingency, it parallels what, in 
Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 97, is termed the ‘radical contingency of naming’. 
Secondly, insofar as Danto’s ‘is of artistic identification’ engenders various permissions and 
prohibitions, it harmonises with Lacan’s elucidation of the structural logic of the signifying chain 
in terms of a structurally necessary counterpoise of possibility and impossibility (see the thesis 
Prologue). Thirdly, Danto’s illustration of the ‘retroactive enrichment of the entities in the 
artworld’ (ibid) bears comparison with what, in Lacanian terms, is characterised as the temporally 
complex anticipation and retroactive determination of meaning associated with the precipitation 
of points de capiton. That is to say, the manner by which the emergence of meaning is 
synonymous with a complete reconfiguration of the field of meaning (where, practically 
speaking, the greater ‘part’ of this field is repressed and, therefore, unconscious). This aspect of 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making will merit more detailed discussion in chapters two 
and four.  
 
140
 George Dickie, ‘Art as a Social Institution’ in Aesthetics: an introduction (Indianapolis: 
Pegasus, 1971, Dickie’s essay reworks ideas originally presented in Dickie, ‘Defining Art’, 
American Philosophical Quarterly, v6, n3, July 1969, 253-56), 101. Of particular relevance for 
this project is the ambiguity that, in Dickie’s account, surrounds the powers and prerogatives of 
the individual art subject. Thus, Dickie admits that ‘There is, of course, no guarantee that one can 
always know whether something is a candidate for appreciation’ (102, my italics) and yet, also, 
contends that ‘only one person is required to act... as an agent of the artworld and to confer the 
status of candidate for appreciation’ (103). I would suggest that the ambiguity in question may be 
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The respective oeuvres of McCahon and Hotere, with their various thematic and formal 
features, are enmeshed within this ‘artworld’ – an encompassing, transindividual field, 
which also may be termed the discourse of painting. Considered in their transindividual 
aspect, then, the expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making that constitute the discourse 
of painting invite interpretation as expressions of an other painting and/or an other 
meaning.  
 
 Here, it may be noted that Lacanian theory is not alone in positing a transindividual 
dimension of human experience. In the context of literary criticism, one of the most 
familiar presentations of the transindividual standpoint is Barthes’ insistence, in ‘The 
Death of the Author’ (1968), that ‘it is language which speaks, not the author; to write is, 
through a prerequisite impersonality... to reach that point where only language acts, 
“performs” and not “me”.’ Barthes contends that this ‘suppressing... [of] the author in the 
interests of writing’ is ‘to restore the place of the reader’.141 However, from Barthes’ 
perspective, it would seem that the ‘reader’ thus reinstated is neither a fullness nor a self-
sufficiency but, on the contrary, merely a function of language – a ‘subject’ that is ‘empty 
outside of the very enunciation which defines it’ and which ‘suffices to make language 
“hold together”, suffices, that is to say, to exhaust it’ (i.e., the Barthesian ‘subject’ or 
‘reader’ names nothing more than the ‘place’ or ‘field’ within which the possibilities of 
language are materialised or through which, as it were, language speaks).142 Barthes 
concludes, therefore, that ‘The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make 
up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost’ so that 
                                                                                                                                                 
ameliorated if the locus of knowledge and agency is understood to reside in the intersection 
between the individual and the artworld. That is to say, if the artworld is considered to be that 
transindividual field of subjectivity in relation to which the knowledge that something is a work 
of art – and, indeed, the power to confer on something the status ‘candidate for appreciation’ – is 
given to one. 
 
141
 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author,’ Image-Music-Text, trans Stephen Heath (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1977, originally published as ‘La mort de l’auteur,’ Manteia n5, 1968), 
143. 
 
142
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...a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. Yet this destination cannot 
any longer be personal: the reader is without history, biography, psychology; he is 
simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the 
written text is constituted.143 
 
In light of these deliberations, the subjectivity expressed in Victory over Death 2, 
Painting from “Malady”, and related works would appear to be neither simply nor 
immediately synonymous with the expressions of particular individuals but rather defined 
in terms of a tension obtaining between the individual and a transindividual otherness. 
The transindividual and other dimension of subjectivity defines the transindividual 
discourse of ‘other painting’ and ‘other meaning’ taking place within the field of 
language-mediated, social and cultural reality. Barthes conceives of this transindividual 
otherness in terms of ‘language which speaks’ in the impersonal ‘space’ of the ‘reader’ 
whilst, in Lacanian parlance, this transindividual field is termed, variously, the ‘big 
Other’, ‘symbolic order’, or ‘signifying chain’ – the greater part of which is, practically 
speaking (i.e., from the perspective of the conscious individual), repressed and, therefore, 
unconscious.144  
 
 1.2.2 Reference and resemblance 
 
 As previously suggested, the efficacy or necessity of taking into account the 
transindividual and other dimension of expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making may 
be illustrated through a consideration of the manner by which there miscarries any 
attempted delimitation of the discourse of painting exclusively in terms of the actions or 
intentions of individuals. In the context of a traditionalising art history, these 
determinations are implicit in the positing of artistic ‘sources’ or ‘influences’. To recall 
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 Whilst a more nuanced consideration of this matter must await a future project, I would 
suggest that certain, illuminating resonances also obtain between the Lacanian conception of the 
‘big Other’, ‘symbolic order’, or ‘signifying chain’, and Derrida’s psychoanalytically flavoured 
conception of the ‘archive’. For further discussion of this point, see section 8.2. 
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the discussion in the thesis Introduction, particularly relevant, in this regard, is Simmons’ 
essay ‘ “after Titian” ’. Here, Simmons suggests that art history has inadequately 
understood the ‘intertextuality’ of artworks and that, in consequence: 
 
Art History, until recently, has almost always proceeded by attempting to identify a 
painting’s intertext(s) through the bugbear of influence or by examining 
relationships with other works, other texts, of the same artist in terms of a chain of 
cause and effect.145 
 
Conjectures of this sort appeal to the idea that particular works and artists under 
consideration relate to and reference other particular works and artists. Given that 
painting is a visual medium, in the first instance, referencing typically involves an appeal 
to formal, plastic, stylistic and figurative resemblances where, to a greater or lesser 
degree, works created at a later time are considered to reproduce elements visible in 
works created earlier.146 For example, from this perspective, the close correspondence 
between Vincent Van Gogh’s oil-on-canvas painting Flowering Plum Tree (1887, ref. 41) 
and Utagawa Hiroshige’s ukiyo-e, woodblock print The Plum Garden in Kameido (1856-
58, ref. 42) implies that, in some sense, Hiroshige’s print influenced (i.e., caused the 
creation of) Van Gogh’s painting. On this basis, one might be inclined to posit Hiroshige 
as the particular, other subject who finds expression in Van Gogh’s painting. However, 
questions of sources and influences then arise in relation to Hiroshige’s print. 
Notwithstanding the dubious status of the notion of a ‘chain of artistic causes’, the 
implication is that Hiroshige’s print cannot be the ‘first cause’ of Van Gogh’s painting. 
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 Simmons, ‘ “after Titian” ’, 100. See section 8.3 for further discussion of the problematic 
nature of artistic ‘influence’ – particularly in relation to the discourse surrounding McCahon and 
Hotere. 
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 It should be noted that (in keeping with many dictionary definitions) the resemblances in 
question are typically conceived exclusively in positive terms as relations of similarity. However, 
more rigorously, it is evident that the very idea of ‘resemblance’ implies a relation of similarity 
that is not identical – i.e., a relation of similarity that is, at the same time, a relation of difference. 
To reiterate a distinction made in the thesis Introduction, it may be apparent that, in seeking to 
absolutely determine meaning on the basis of ‘positive’ resemblances or identifications, the 
former conception of resemblance bears the taint of ontotheological and/or logocentric prejudices. 
The latter, ‘negative’, conception of resemblance is more in keeping with the perspectives of 
Derridean post-structuralism and Lacanian psychoanalysis – i.e., by way of the lessons of 
structural linguistics, meaning is understood to be a function of relations of difference. 
 81 
Rather, Hiroshige’s print must be regarded merely as the most proximate cause in a series 
that extends into the past in an indefinite regression. Hence, the subjectivity that finds 
expression in Flowering Plum Tree would appear to be neither solely Van Gogh’s nor 
solely Hiroshige’s but rather a collective subjectivity that resists precise determination. 
 
 Compounding this point is the fact that the degree of pictorial abstraction present in 
Victory over Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, and related works would appear to 
preclude the possibility of defining precise resemblances per se. It is certainly the case 
that Victory over Death 2’s un-stretched canvas, expansive, panoramic scale, near-
monochromatic tonality, and incorporation of a prominent, central, geometric motif 
resonates with, respectively, the scroll paintings of Tomioka Tessai, certain Abstract 
Expressionist works by the likes of Mark Rothko or Barnett Newman, or variations on 
cubism in the paintings of Piet Mondrian. In a similar fashion, Painting from “Malady”’s 
uniform black ground, prominent (circular), geometric form, passages of expressive 
brushwork, and incorporation of stencilled text excites comparisons with, respectively, 
the Black Paintings of Ad Reinhardt, certain Suprematist works by Kasimir Malevich, the 
use of circular ‘targets’ and stencilled text in the paintings of Jasper Johns, and even the 
imagery of autumnal moons in nineteenth century, ukiyo-e, woodblock prints. However, 
the fact remains that these correspondences are far from exact and, moreover, countered 
by significant differences (e.g., there is no equivalent for Victory over Death 2’s 
extensive painted calligraphy in the work of artists like Rothko and Newman; Painting 
from “Malady”’s pre-eminent annulus and stencilled text has no equivalent in the work 
of Reinhardt). Indeed, it is clear that, in the realm of abstract painting, the game of 
drawing comparisons admits such a degree of latitude as to be extended indefinitely. In 
other words, even restricting one’s field of reference only to formal resemblance, the 
array of possible candidates that may be ‘implicated’ in the creation of Victory over 
Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, and related works is, potentially, without limit. Hence, 
the effort to determine particular other artists and paintings that might qualify as ‘first 
causes’ or ‘grounds’ for the works in question is confounded by the intractable 
complexity of a field that, in the final analysis, resists any definitive reduction or 
discrimination. 
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 In seeking to limit the field of possible correspondences, one might extend 
considerations further than what is visibly manifest in artworks and appeal to artists’ 
testimony or other documentation in which gestures are made towards artistic ‘sources’. 
Consider, for example, those of McCahon’s paintings titled in acknowledgement of other 
artists: Entombment (after Titian), Here I give thanks to Mondrian, Jump E19, To 
Tomioka Tessai (000946, 1974, ref. 43) – not to mention those references to Titian, 
Mondrian, and many other artists in autobiographical accounts of McCahon’s work.147 
Although there exists no Hotere painting with a title like Here I give thanks to Reinhardt, 
the catalogue accompanying Hotere’s exhibition Zero (1967) does reproduce a substantial 
excerpt from Reinhardt’s Art-as-art-dogma lecture of 1964.148 Moreover, as Pound 
observes, much later, Hotere presented his dealer, Sue Crockford, with a copy of a 
Reinhardt exhibition catalogue annotated with references to the US Masters Golf 
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 See, for example, McCahon, ‘Beginnings, 10. Colin McCahon,’ Landfall, i80, v20, n4, 
December 1966, 361-62 (cubism, Mary Cockburn-Mercer, Russell Flint, Laura Knight, Frances 
Hodgkins), 364 (Toss Woollaston, R.N. Field) and ibid, ‘All the paintings, drawings & prints by 
Colin McCahon’, 13-14 (Mondrian). See also McCahon and O’Reilly, Colin McCahon: a survey 
exhibition, 18 (Titian), 21 (Mary Cockburn-Mercer), 23 (Turner), 27 (Van Gogh), 28 (Mondrian, 
Bellini, Michelangelo), 29 (Mondrian), 31 (William Hodges, ‘Japanese and Chinese painting’), 
32 (Richard Killeen), 33 (Van Gogh), 37-38 (Mondrian). 
 
148
 Hotere, Zero, an exhibition of paintings. Hotere reproduces a substantial excerpt from Ad 
Reinhardt, Art-as-art-dogma, lecture presented at the ICA Gallery, London, 28 May 1964. The 
piece in question derives from Ad Reinhardt, Who Is Responsible For Ugliness, lecture presented 
at the First Conference of Aesthetic Responsibility in New York City, American Institute of 
Architects, 3 April 1962. For references to the provenance of this text see Barbara Rose, Art-as-
Art, The Selected Writings of Ad Reinhardt (New York: The Viking Press, 1975, 164-65, and 
Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution, Ad Reinhardt papers, 1927-1968, Series 3: 
Writings and Notes, circa 1953-1966 (Box 2, Folder 34), 
http://www.aaa.si.edu/collections/container/viewer/Draft-Writings-and-Notes--250395, 
(30.05.13). 
 
 Moreover, in Pound, ‘Tiger Country’, 15, n5, it is suggested that Hotere’s ‘first exhibition of 
black paintings’ (Black Paintings/68 at the Barry Lett Galleries, Auckland, 19-30 August 1968) 
also was accompanied by a ‘Reinhardt statement’ in the form of a ‘hand-out and wall-text’ – 
although Pound is unable to provide any material evidence for this gesture beyond an appeal to 
the recollection of a collector of Hotere’s work: Bill Cocker. In the context of Hotere’s career, 
these presentations of what amount to artistic manifestos, largely constructed from the writings of 
another artist, are unrepeated. This said, the general strategy of expressing ‘oneself’ in the words 
of ‘another’ is the very modus operandi operating in those of Hotere’s paintings incorporating 
text composed by New Zealand poets. 
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Tournament of 1997.149 Whilst it would be precipitate to discount this evidence out of 
hand, this study takes the position that, in according these gestures special priority, 
individual artists are privileged as the exemplary points of reference that ground 
definitive understandings of their work. Indeed, this tendency to seek a definitive ground 
or basis for understanding by way of appeals to ‘ultimate authorities’ exemplifies the 
traditionalising mode of art history.   
 
 Instead, in the context of the present discussion, I would suggest that what is of more 
immediate significance, vis à vis appeals to the testimony and documentation surrounding 
artworks, is the demonstration of the fact that references are, neither necessarily nor 
sufficiently, conceivable only in plastic or pictorial terms. That is to say, the very idea of 
‘reference’ implies a resemblance of meaning as well as a resemblance of form. In 
consequence, one is encouraged to understand reference as that which operates in a field 
wherein forms mean and meanings form. By way of anticipating discussion in later 
chapters, one may say that reference operates in a field of meaning/forms or, in the jargon 
of structural linguistics, signs or signifiers.150 Equivalently, reference is that which 
                                                 
149
 For details of Hotere’s modification of a Reinhardt catalogue (thus transforming it into a 
Hotere ‘readymade’), see ibid, ‘Tiger Country’, 10-11, 15. The catalogue in question comprises a 
copy of Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles and Museum of Modern Art, New York, Ad 
Reinhardt, exh. cat. (New York: Rizzoli, 1991), annotated, in silver ink, with references to the US 
Masters Tournament held at the Augusta National Golf Club in April 1997. 
  
150
 I should acknowledge that the expression ‘meaning/form’ is employed in Derrida, The Truth in 
Painting, trans Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, 
originally published as La vérité en peinture (Paris: Flammarion, 1978)). Derrida employs this 
term in order to expose a ‘conceptual opposition which has traditionally served to comprehend 
art’ – namely, ‘the opposition between meaning, as inner content, and form’ (21). Derrida’s point 
is that, always already, questions concerned with the ‘origin’ or ‘meaning’ of art or artworks 
presuppose an absolute separation of meaning and form. In consequence, in seeking to answer the 
question ‘ “What is the meaning of art?”... one would be seeking a one-and-naked meaning [un 
sens un et nu] which would inform from the inside, like a content, while distinguishing itself from 
the forms which it informs’ (21-22). Derrida goes on to suggest that 
 
In order to think art in general, one thus accredits a series of oppositions (meaning/form, 
inside outside, content/container, signified/signifier, represented/representer, etc.) which, 
precisely, structure the traditional interpretation of works of art. One makes of art in 
general an object in which one claims to distinguish an inner meaning, the invariant, and a 
multiplicity of external variations through which, as though through so many veils, one 
would try to see of restore the true, full, originary meaning: one, naked. (22) 
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operates in a field of meaning/forms as a function of representation/symbolisation 
wherein there obtains an inextricable entanglement of the plastic/pictorial and the 
linguistic/symbolic.  
 
 Consider, for example, a painting of a cat. This is, at the same time, a pictorial, 
mimetic, phenomenal representation of a cat and a symbol that means ‘this cat’ (or ‘cats 
in general’ – or, possibly, a great many other things such as ‘cute creature’, ‘family pet’, 
furry feline’, ‘nocturnal carnivore’, and so on, ad nauseum). Here, it may be objected 
that, in the case of a ‘purely’ abstract or non-objective painting, there is neither mimesis 
nor symbolisation: a work of this kind neither represents phenomena nor conveys 
meaning. This is, precisely, the position of those who subscribe to the notion of the 
formal autonomy of the artwork – the idea that, entirely and sufficiently, the artwork is in 
and of itself. In consequence, the artwork ‘means’ nothing beyond the fact of its 
existence. Relevant, in this regard, is Clive Bell’s well-known proposition that ‘to 
appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its 
ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions.’151 Also noteworthy is the ideal that 
Clement Greenberg characterises as the avant-gardist ‘search of the absolute’, wherein: 
 
The avant-garde poet or artist tries in effect to imitate God by creating something 
valid solely on its own terms... something given, increate, independent of meanings, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
In the context of The Truth in Painting, the retronym placed between ‘meaning’ and ‘form’ 
signifies their absolute opposition or separation. However, as previously suggested, in the context 
of the present study (and in a fashion that is entirely in harmony with the impetus of Derrida’s 
argument), I will use the retronym to signify a difference-within-unity and/or a unity-that-is-
differentiated. That is say, by way of anticipating matters for further discussion in chapter three, 
to signify the different aspects of an ‘identity-in-difference’ (whether this identity-in-difference is 
a duality or a higher order multiplicity) that does not admit divisibility on the basis of this 
differentiation. In Derridean terms, this identity-in-difference corresponds to what might be called 
a ‘trace structure’ or ‘field of pure difference’ – something that, quite literally, exceeds and eludes 
linguistic determination, always already, presencing as absence, appearing as disappeared. Hence, 
my employment of expressions like ‘meaning/form’ is merely illustrative – intended as an 
allusion to the structure of traces, on which basis is enlivened the very possibility of determining 
problematic (and, ultimately, unsustainable) oppositions such as ‘meaning’ vs ‘form’. 
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 Clive Bell, Art (London: Chatto & Windus, 1914), 25. 
 
 85 
similars, or originals. Content is to be dissolved so completely into form that the 
work of art or literature cannot be reduced in whole or part to anything not itself.152 
 
 However, it should be evident that, in seeking to understand artworks as (1) 
expressions of subjectivity, where (2) the subjectivity in question admits consideration in 
terms of a transindividual otherness, this study rejects the idea of formal autonomy. On 
the contrary, as an expression or sign of subjectivity, painting per se demands to be 
considered as a form of meaning-making (or, as I shall propose in Part 2 of the thesis, a 
figuring of desire). On the basis of this definition, there is no painting, however abstract, 
that means nothing or refers to nothing. Always already, considerations of particular 
paintings imply subjective investments of meaning ‘into’ the work from positions ‘other 
than’ or ‘outside’ the work. Indeed, to anticipate matters for later discussion, the activity 
of painting, insofar as it expresses the transindividual and other dimension of subjectivity, 
would appear to be that which exceeds and eludes metaphysical categories and 
oppositions such as ‘inside/outside’, ‘subject/object’. Therefore, the question is not 
whether but rather how and what painting means – although, this is not to suggest that the 
question admits any final resolution. 
 
 Moreover, it may be apparent that taking cognizance of the signifying dimension of 
painting only further compounds the difficulty in determining precise references on the 
basis of resemblance. How is this so? Firstly, in the field of painting, abstract or 
otherwise, it is necessary to identify or define those features that are symbolic. In 
principle, anything potentially qualifies as such – either ‘in’ the materiality or space of a 
painting per se, or bearing some relation between that which is material and/or pictorial 
and a wider context. Here, the suggestion is that which qualifies as a symbol potentially 
transcends what is ‘in’ and ‘of’ a painting. For example, one may identify as symbolic or 
meaningful the relationship obtaining between a painting and its frame, between a 
painting and the space of its installation, between a painting and an oeuvre or selection of 
other paintings – in fact, between a painting and anything at all. Secondly, having 
selected some feature or concatenation of features that might qualify as a symbol, one is 
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challenged to determine what the symbol represents, refers to, or means. With regard to 
the works under consideration, the ambiguity of meaning already encountered vis à vis 
the I- and O-motifs suggests that, even limiting considerations to what is ‘in’ particular 
paintings, the referential possibilities (i.e., meanings) are, potentially, endless. In general, 
then, whether one appeals to resemblances of form or meaning, the determination of 
precise references would appear to be precluded. On this basis, it would seem that the 
positing of resemblance is, in and of itself, insufficient to absolutely or definitively 
determine grounds for Victory over Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, and related works 
in the form of particular other paintings and/or other artists. Equivalently, one might say 
that the transindividual and other dimension of expressions of subjectivity/meaning-
making resists absolute determination. Still further, this also is to affirm that appealing to 
a resemblance (i.e., a relation of similarity and/or difference in form and/or meaning) is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for making a reference. Indeed, by way of anticipating 
discussion in following chapters, it is apparent that, ultimately, making a reference 
depends on nothing more than what Žižek terms the ‘radical contingency of naming’.153 
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 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 97. 
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1.3 Sourcing the script of subjectivity 
 
 1.3.1 Painted texts 
 
 Let us test these propositions a little further. It may be noted that one of the most 
striking features of Victory over Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, and related works is 
that they exhibit painted text. Unlike ‘purely’ plastic symbols that, by virtue of being 
abstract or non-objective, might mean ‘anything’ and ‘everything’, the meaning of 
graphic symbols (i.e., the letters, numbers, words, phrases, punctuation, etc. that 
constitute writing) seems relatively constrained – even if this ‘constraint’ is, ultimately, 
nothing more than a ‘radical contingency’ enshrined in convention. In consequence, one 
may be encouraged to entertain the possibility that the works under consideration contain 
symbols whose meaning is not entirely indeterminate – on which basis, one might 
interpret these symbols as references to particular, grounding other artworks and/or other 
art subjects (i.e., as references to ‘source texts’ in which, in principle, there may be 
inscribed ‘originating’ ‘voices’ or ‘subject positions’). To be clear on this point, this 
study takes the position that, in the final analysis, no such determinations are possible: in 
relation to graphic symbols (or, indeed, any meaning/form), the semblance of meaning 
constraint is, ultimately, illusory (or, in the jargon of Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
imaginary). To put the matter in equivalent terms: the determination of the ‘ground’ of 
meaning is an impossible ideal. Hence, neither symbols nor material particulars secure or 
capture meaning absolutely. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion, it will be 
illuminating to engage with the painted script, in the works in question, in order to 
demonstrate that any attempt to determine grounds for the subjectivity they express is 
destined to miscarry. 
 
 At first glance, it seems trivial to determine the textual sources (and, hence, the 
particular, other, originating expressions of subjectivity) to which McCahon and Hotere, 
respectively, make recourse in the creation of Victory over Death 2, Painting from 
“Malady”, and their siblings. As Gordon Brown observes, McCahon’s word paintings of 
1969 and 1970 incorporate text from three primary sources: The New English Bible 
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(1961), Matire Kereama’s The Tail of the Fish: Maori memories of the Far North (1968), 
and Peter Hooper’s Journey Towards an Elegy & Other Poems (1969).154 With regard to 
Painting from “Malady” and related works, matters appear even more straightforward. 
Thus, in O’Brien’s Landfall article ‘Some Paintings I Am Frequently Asked About’, 
Manhire asserts authorship of the ‘concrete/pattern poem’ Malady, whose ‘three 
articulations: malady...melody...my lady’ feature in the stencilled text of the Malady 
paintings, and recalls that Malady (1970) was ‘published in a limited edition to coincide 
with the exhibition opening’ of the Malady series paintings.155 
 
 Notwithstanding the apparent ease with which these texts are identifiable, in seeking 
to resolve or determine particular, other subjects who are originally inscribed in these 
sources subsequent to being ‘translated’ into the paintings under consideration, matters 
are, nevertheless, complicated by the following, three factors. Firstly, some paintings 
incorporate text from multiple sources and/or in multiple languages (i.e., the subjectivity 
that finds expression in these works is, at the outset, a collective or assemblage of others). 
Secondly, particular sources express multiple subject positions (i.e., several characters 
‘speak’ within the space of a single, cited text). In either event, it is apparent that these 
multiple subject positions are enlivened and sustained by the formal and/or pictorial 
disposition of the painted texts in question. That is to say, by virtue of textual 
fragmentations, embellishments, elisions, repetitions, spatial composition, style of 
execution (e.g., freehand versus stencilled lettering, variations in font type, case, size, 
colour), and so forth. Thirdly, the texts cited are, themselves, merely instances in a field 
of textual reproductions, translations and revisions, the limits of which resist precise 
determination. Let us address each of these considerations in turn. 
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 Brown, Colin McCahon: Artist (Auckland: Reed, 1993, originally published Wellington: 
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exhibition to which Manhire refers is, evidently, Black Paintings 1970 – Malady Series, held at 
Dawsons Ltd Exhibition Gallery, Dunedin, July 1970. A more detailed summation of the Malady 
series paintings is given in chapter four. 
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 1.3.2 Many texts in one painting  
 
 With regard to Victory over Death 2 et al, a good illustration of the first point is 
afforded by those works combining Māori language text from The Tail of the Fish with 
English language text drawn from the New English Bible and/or Journey Towards an 
Elegy. For example, in If a man walks after nightfall (001525, April 1969, ref. 44), the 
upper part of the picture space is dominated by a four line declamation from John (11: 9-
10): ‘If a man walks after nightfall he stumbles because the light fails him’.156 That is to 
say, misfortune befalls those who turn away from the light of heaven or who disobey the 
divine Law. The citation from Kereama takes the form of a single line of diminutive, 
capitalised lettering running along the lower left edge of the work: ‘E KORE E MAU I A 
KOE, HE WAEKAI PAKIAKA’, which is translated as: ‘A foot accustomed to running 
over roots makes the speediest runner.’157 Here, in contrast to the quote from John, the 
proverb in Māori language implies that it is precisely through a willingness to continually 
transgress (i.e., test one’s limits, take risks) that one best learns the rules. 
 
 Also noteworthy is The Lark’s Song (a poem by Matire Kereama) (001360, August – 
October 1969, ref. 45, fig. 6). In this work, most of the painted script derives from 
Kereama’s account of the words traditionally associated with ‘lark singing’ – a game she 
recalls from her childhood in the early twentieth century, Māori community of Hauturu. 
The greater part of the picture space (comprised of two hinged, wooden doors) presents, 
in painted, cursive script, a double round of the waiata from Kereama’s book.158 
However, right of centre, along the bottom edge of the work, McCahon inscribes in block 
capitals ‘CAN YOU HEAR ME ST. FRANCIS’ – a phrase that, as Brown observes, 
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 Matire Kereama (Matire Hoeft), The Tail of the Fish: Maori memories of the Far North 
(Auckland: Oswald-Sealy, 1968), 14. 
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 Ibid, 60-61. 
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heads the ninth poem, in the ‘Notes in the Margin’ sequence, in Hooper’s poetry 
anthology.159 According to the well known story recounted in chapter XVI of Fioretti di 
San Francesco (Little Flowers of St Francis ) (c.1390), the sonorous preaching of St 
Francis of Assisi compelled the close attentiveness of even the birds.160 However, in 
McCahon’s painting, the ‘direction’ of speech is reversed so that St Francis becomes the 
object, as it were, of the lark’s entreaty or demand.  
 
 In both If a man and The Lark’s Song, it is evident that the separation of opposing 
‘voices’ is sustained by virtue of contrasts in language (English vs Māori), calligraphy 
(lowercase or cursive script vs uppercase, block capitals), and by the spatial disposition 
of these voices. Thus, in If a man, the text from John, writ large, is implicitly undermined 
by the diminutive, marginal riposte from Kereama; in The Lark’s Song the line from 
Hooper’s book functions to emphasise the declamatory status of the twinned waiata 
preceding it. Further to this idea of ‘marginal’ asides and emphases, it is evident that, in 
common with many of McCahon’s paintings, The Lark’s Song exhibits several peripheral 
inscriptions comprising, in this case, a dedication to Kereama, the painting title, and an 
artist signature combined with a date. These textual elements are distinguished from the 
‘main text’ of the painting by virtue of being enclosed within light-toned, geometric 
shapes and/or being executed in a more diminutive script that reverses the light-on-dark 
relationship of the calligraphy citing Kereama and Hooper. It would, appear therefore, 
that these inscriptions are not integral with the painting’s major text but rather extraneous 
elements that serve to frame and qualify this text. In this capacity, they offer to ‘speak’ in 
a voice that is, ostensibly, McCahon’s ‘own’. Even in this case, however, ambiguities 
arise. For example, in The Lark’s Song, in a fashion echoing the repetition of the waiata 
from Kereama’s book, there is, along the bottom edge of the work, a double inscription of 
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 Roger Hudleston (trans), The little flowers of Saint Francis of Assisi (New York: Limited 
Editions Club, 1930), ‘Chapter XVI’, 41-44 (see especially, 43). 
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McCahon’s signature and a date.161 One gets the impression that McCahon’s 
autobiographical gesture is, in effect, a speaking of two minds or a speaking that evinces a 
change of mind in response to the irruption of second thoughts. 
 
 What of Victory over Death 2? Whilst this painting seemingly ‘speaks’ a single 
language mostly drawn from a solitary source (i.e., The New English Bible: John 12: 27-
30, 35-36 and 14: 4, 6), other ‘loci’ of speech are, nevertheless, evident. The most 
extensive textual assemblage does indeed comprise those verses from John 12 that make 
up the main body of the painted script in the work. However, at least two other categories 
may be defined. The most immediately striking of these comprises the monumental 
capitals forming the phrase ‘AM I AM’ – the precise provenance of which is, in fact, 
ambiguous (and which will, therefore, merit further discussion below). In a manner 
echoing the disposition of texts in The Lark’s Song, the latter group comprises a trio of 
marginal inscriptions running along the bottom edge of the painting, wherein one finds 
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 In The Lark’s Song, the dedication to Kereama is located in a narrow, sky-blue rectangle 
located along the upper edge of the painting, about one third the way from the left extremity of 
the work. In diminutive capitals, McCahon writes: 
 
FOR MATIRE KEREAMA... POET. 
 
The title of the work is located in a light-toned, horizontal lozenge occupying the lower left 
corner of the painting. Here, in flowing, lowercase calligraphy, McCahon writes: 
 
The lark’s song. 
 
Along the lower edge of the painting, there are two sets of artist signatures and dates. The first of 
these is located immediately to the right of the titular inscription. McCahon writes: 
 
Colin McCahon August – October – ’69. 
 
The second signature and date is located in a horizontal, grey oblong occupying the lower right 
corner of the painting. Here, McCahon writes (somewhat less legibly): 
 
Colin McCahon 
Aug Oct ‘69  
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the title of the work, the location of the artist’s studio, an artist’s signature and date, and 
phrases from John 14.162 
 
 Whilst Painting from “Malady”  and related works exclusively employ English 
language text, this is not to suggest that Hotere’s paintings only ever ‘speak’ a single 
language. For example, Māori and English language text features in many of the Te Whiti 
works and, specifically, in one painting that appears to combine the formal and thematic 
concerns of the Te Whiti and Port Chalmers series: Darkness Settles Down (1972, ref. 46, 
fig. 7). Thus, as O’Brien points out, ‘Virtually all the “Te Whiti” works incorporate 
English translations alongside the original Māori. These are paintings to be read, listened 
to and understood by both Māori and Pākehā.’ O’Brien observes, further, that ‘In the 
manner of a bibliographer, Hotere goes so far as to detail, at the foot of each work, book 
references and page numbers of his sources.’163 Here, however, even a brief inspection of 
Te Whiti works in reproduction reveals that adherence to this protocol is not, in fact, 
universal. Consider, for example, Me Tangi Ko Te Mate I Te Marama  (1972, ref. 47), 
                                                 
162
 The title of Victory over Death 2, inscribed in small uppercase script along the extreme, lower 
left edge of the work, echoes the capitalised subheading, employed in the 1961 edition of The 
New English Bible, to that section of the scriptures containing the final few verses of John 10, and 
encompassing the entirety of John 11 and John 12: 
 
VICTORY OVER DEATH. 2. 
 
The second marginal element comprises a two-line block of similarly-scaled uppercase text 
disposed beneath the legs of the brightly painted ‘A’ in the right half of the painting. In this 
inscription, McCahon modifies Christ’s proclamation, in John 14: 6, transforming it into a sub-
titular preliminary to autobiographical details such as the location in which the work was created, 
the date of its completion and the artist’s signature: 
 
THE WAY THE TRUTH & LIFE. 
MURIWAI. FEB. ’70 McCAHON. 
 
The third marginal element, positioned between the legs of the off-white ‘M’ along the lower-
right boundary of the canvas, modifies John 14: 4, where Christ reassures his followers with the 
statement: ‘ “and my way there is known to you” ’; McCahon writes: 
 
‘My way is known to you.’ 
 
163
 O’Brien, ‘Ploughing Ralph Hotere’s Te Whiti Series’ in Te Miringa Hohaia, Gregory O’Brien 
and Lara Strongman (eds), Parihaka, The Art of Passive Resistance, exh. cat. (Wellington: City 
Gallery, Wellington and Victoria University Press, 2001), 151. 
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where the prominent incorporation of an annular form resonates visually with several 
Malady series paintings. In this ink and acrylic work on paper, ‘ME TANGI’ is 
prominently inscribed in the space above the annulus and just below the upper boundary 
of the work. Below the circle-form, in a band of violet-toned wash running along the 
lower boundary of the painting, are three lines of text that include the following 
inscriptions: 
 
ME TANGI 
KAPA KO TE MATE I TE MARAMA 
We weep tonight for the death of the moon (whakatauki) 
 
The term whakataukī simply refers to those ‘proverbs’ or ‘sayings’ that are proper to the 
oral domain of expressions of Māori culture. Thus, where, precisely, Hotere encountered 
this saying is unclear. Indeed, any absolute determination of its ‘source’ would seem to 
be problematic, if not, impossible.164 
 
 It may be instructive to compare Hotere’s employment of this proverb with 
McCahon’s incorporation of it in his four panel painting O let us weep (001590, April 
1969, ref. 48) – the ostensible source of which is The Tail of the Fish.165 In Hotere’s Me 
Tangi, the Māori language text is rendered in upper case – conveying, thereby, a sense of 
the formal and the impersonal in expressions of authority, objectivity, truth and law. By 
contrast, the English translation, relegated to the lower edge of the work, is presented in a 
diminutive, lower case script, that is more obviously a ‘handwritten’, personal, informal 
aside. Considered in their entirety, it does not appear that the Te Whiti paintings 
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 For a reference to the written provenance of this whakataukī see, for example, Hirini Moko 
Mead and Neil Grove, Ngā Pēpeha a ngā Tīpuna, The Sayings of the Ancestors (Wellington: 
Victoria University Press, 2001), 302. Here, acknowledgement is made of the listing in George 
Grey, Ko nga whakapepeha me nga whakaahuareka a nga tipuna o Aotea-roa, Proverbial and 
popular sayings of the New Zealand race (Cape Town: Trübner and Co, 1857), 70. 
 
165
 Thus, in Kereama, 50, the whakataukī in question is presented like so: 
 
Me tangi kapa ko te mate e te marama. 
(Let us weep, for his is not the death of the  
             moon) 
–A proverb emphasising the finality of death. 
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specifically privilege either language. Indeed, some works are almost entirely presented 
in English (e.g., Hone Tuwhare’s ‘Not by Wind Ravaged’ (1972, ref. 49) or Te Whiti: 
From John Caselberg’s ‘The Voice of the Maori’ (1972, ref. 50). However, it does appear 
to be case that, when both Māori and English are employed, Hotere preserves their 
distinctiveness by virtue of differences in font size, font style, and disposition in the 
picture space. In Me Tangi, the sense of differentiation is further enforced by the 
disposition of textual elements outside the perimeter of the annulus – a symbol that 
signifies an ideal of unity or a void in which difference is annihilated. 
 
 Compared with Hotere’s Me Tangi, McCahon’s O let us weep sustains an approximate 
equivalence between Māori and English text insofar as words in both languages are 
rendered in the same cursive calligraphy. However, the phrase from Kereama’s book 
appears only on the second panel (although its English translation is presented on both 
subsequent panels). In McCahon’s painting, then, the English language takes precedence 
– even if the first and final words (the latter in translation) are Māori. Moreover, in 
contrast with Me Tangi, which sustains a certain difference between Māori and English 
expressions, in O let us weep, one encounters a contrapuntal play of voices that proceeds 
towards an ambiguous rapprochement. Thus, the first panel contains no text apart from 
small-scale inscriptions, along the top and bottom edges, detailing title, date and artist 
signature. Analogous inscriptions are present on the three companion panels. The next 
two panels incorporate the phrase from Kereama’s book – first in Māori, then in English. 
In the fourth panel, McCahon combines text from John (11: 25-27) with The Tail of the 
Fish, to produce a continuous stanza that is, quite literally, at odds with itself: 
 
and he said: I am the 
resurrection and I am 
life if a man has faith 
in me, even though he die 
he shall come to life, 
and no one who is alive 
and has faith shall ever 
die. Do you believe 
this? O let us weep. Ours 
is not the death of the 
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      moon 
 
In St John’s gospel, Christ’s challenge to Martha (the sister of Lazarus): ‘Do you believe 
this?’ is followed by her affirmation of her faith in Christ as ‘ “the Messiah, the Son of 
God” ’ (John 11: 27). However, as noted in The Tail of the Fish, ‘Let us weep, for his is 
not the death of the moon’, is a ‘proverb emphasising the finality of death’. That is to say, 
the death of the moon is always followed by a rebirth – unlike the end of an individual 
human life. In McCahon’s painting, then, the text from John, inviting the spectator to 
momentarily entertain the possibility of an afterlife, is immediately countermanded by 
Kereama’s lament.  
 
 This said, it might be hasty to read the line from Kereama as O let us weep’s ‘final 
word’. For, whilst ‘Ours is not the death of the moon’ appears to be an unambiguous 
statement of finality, the repetition of this phrase invests it with an insistent rhythm and 
sense of continuity akin to those very cycles of nature (the phases of the moon) to which 
it is, seemingly, opposed. The repetition of the words ‘Ours is not the death of the moon’ 
is a device that potentially contradicts the ostensive content of the statement (thereby 
attesting to a split or multiple subjectivity). Hence, it is tempting to read, in O let us 
weep, a subtext whereby the formal expression of a mournful reflection on human 
mortality invites interpretation as an expression of hope or longing for the continuation of 
life after death. It should be noted that the trope of repetition also is evident in Hotere’s 
Me Tangi – in the incorporation of the circle or annulus, in the doubling of the phrase 
‘ME TANGI’, and in the standardisation and stylisation of the Māori language script.166 
 
 As noted earlier, another noteworthy example of Hotere’s use of text in Māori and 
English is Darkness Settles Down – a work that O’Brien characterises as a ‘hybrid of 
Hotere’s abstract “Port Chalmers” series and the “Te Whiti” series’.167 Here, as indicated 
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 As noted in O’Brien, ‘Ploughing Ralph Hotere’s Te Whiti Series’, 152, the ‘hollow lettering’ 
indicates where Hotere intended to use stencils in a series of more elaborate Te Whiti paintings on 
canvas that, in the event, did not materialise. 
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 Ibid, 152. 
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in a diminutive line of capitalised lettering at the bottom right-of-centre of the painting, 
Hotere draws on a chant reproduced in John White, The Ancient History of the Maori 
(1887).168 It is significant that, in common with the aforementioned Me Tangi, Hotere’s 
painting employs a range of formal devices (font size, font style, tonality of inscribed 
                                                 
168
 For a reference to the text employed in Darkness Settles Down see John White, The Ancient 
History of the Maori, His Mythology and Traditions, Horo-Uta or Taki-Tumu Migration, v2 
(New Zealand Electronic Text Collection Te Pūhikotuhi o Aotearoa: Victoria University, 2007, 
originally published Wellington: George Didsbury, 1887), 
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-corpus-WhiAnci.html, (16.07.13)), 102 (Māori 
version), 108 (English version). In Hotere’s painting, the text is disposed as follows. 
Equidistantly disposed around the circumference of a crossed, magenta-toned, double-annulus (so 
that, in fact, the four text blocks define the corners of an implied square within which the double 
annulus is enclosed), Hotere inscribes the following lines in stencilled, coloured (red, grey, 
magenta), capitalised text: 
 
TENA TE PO KA WHIWHI 
 
TENA TE PO KA TATAU 
 
TENA 
TE PO 
HIRA 
ATU NA  
 
AUA TE NGARO 
 
HE NGARO TAKI TAWHITO 
 
At bottom-right of centre, in smaller, white-toned, free-hand capitals, Hotere inscribes the 
translation: 
 
DARKNESS SETTLES DOWN 
AND NEARER DRAWS AND DEEPENS 
YES, DARKNESS NOW ENVELOPS ALL 
AND HIDES FROM SIGHT, AND ANCIENT 
GODS AND PRIESTS ARE HID 
 
Below this, in a single line of even more diminutive capital lettering, Hotere writes 
 
FROM ‘THE ANCIENT HISTORY OF THE MAORI’ JOHN SMITH VOL II P.102 
(MAORI) P.108 (ENGLISH) 
 
At the extreme lower right, Hotere inscribes a signature and a date: 
 
Hotere 
Port Chalmers 
         71 -72. 
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text, use of stencils versus handwriting, spatial positioning of script) in order to 
accentuate the differences between text in Māori language and that in English. Thus, the 
script in Māori is toned or coloured whilst that in English is white. The script in Māori 
speaks, as it were, from all four points of the compass (omni-presently, universally), 
whilst that in English is confined to a small area at the lower right of centre. The Māori 
text is rendered in stencils and disposed on parallel lines – thus evincing a degree of 
order, balance, regularity, and (relative) stylistic invariance. This is in keeping with the 
sense that it represents the voice of an eternal authority or the air of a solemn ritual. By 
contrast, the English script, whilst neat and legible, has the appearance of a swiftly 
written, free-hand note. Indeed, the slight, rightwards tilt imparted to the letters and the 
disposition of words on lines that are not parallel accentuates the sense that, within a 
Māori space or territory of meaning, the English script functions as a transient interloper 
or afterthought. 
 
 1.3.3 Many subjects in one text  
 
 The second consideration noted earlier (i.e., that the same textual source enlivens 
multiple subject positions) is illustrated well by the likes of Practical Religion – a work 
that extensively cites St John’s gospel as given in The New English Bible (John 10: 40 – 
11: 44). Reading its painted calligraphy from left to right, the first subject position one 
encounters is that of John, himself, as narrator. Thus, the upper left of Practical Religion 
brandishes John’s opening declamation: ‘JESUS WITHDREW AGAIN ACROSS THE 
JORDAN...’ (John 10: 40). Speaking about his own baptismal activities in the third 
person (i.e., a subject position other than or apart from himself), John refers to the 
anonymous ‘crowds’ who flocked to Christ and attributes to them the following, general 
sentiment that, in McCahon’s painting, is reproduced with a stuttering repetition:              
‘ “JOHN – JOHN GAVE US NO MIRACULOUS SIGN, BUT ALL HE SAID ABOUT 
THIS MAN WAS TRUE” ’ (John 10: 41-42). As with the doubled inscriptions in The 
Lark’s Song, the reiteration of John’s name generates a sense of equivocation or second-
guessing. John’s testimony next refers to the illness of Christ’s friend Lazarus, and the 
supplication sent to Christ by Lazarus’ sisters, Mary and Martha. In McCahon’s painting, 
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the relevant passage is, again, reproduced with a stutter – this time, in the form of a 
spelling mistake: ‘ “SIR, YOU SHOUD [sic] KNOW THAT YOUR FRIEND LIES  
ILL” ’ (John 11: 4). Christ’s initial response is reproduced in Practical Religion as           
‘ “THIS SICKNESS WILL NOT END IN DEATH, IT HAS COME FOR THE GLORY 
OF GOD” ’ (John 11: 4). Moreover, in the space to the left of the prominent, green 
trapezoid depicting ‘Mount Martha’, McCahon presents a double rendition of Christ’s 
resolution:   ‘ “LET US GO BACK TO JUDEA” ’ (John 11: 7-8) – one iteration near the 
top part of the canvas, the other running along the lower boundary of the work. Here, the 
effect is to make Christ speak from two subject positions – almost as if to suggest that 
Christ is in two minds about his decision. John’s testimony then brings into play Christ’s 
disciples, who question the wisdom of their leader’s resolution to return to a place where 
he has, lately, been under threat of public stoning. McCahon renders their anxious 
enquiry in lower case italics as: ‘ “are you going there again?” ’ (John 11: 8-9). Practical 
Religion’s remaining calligraphy is, subsequently, dominated by the ‘voices’ of John as 
narrator, Christ, Mary, and Martha. The exception is an aside that McCahon inscribes in 
two lines of diminutive, bracketed, upper-case text inserted near the lower right of the 
painting. This presents the aggrieved response of some of Mary’s Jewish companions 
who cannot understand why Christ had allowed Lazarus to perish: ‘[COULD NOT THIS 
MAN WHO HAD OPENED THE BLIND MANS EYES HAVE DONE SOMETHING 
TO HAVE KEPT LAZARUS FROM DYING]’ (John 11: 37). Bracketed from the 
surrounding script, and further differentiated by virtue of font size and capitalisation, this 
text block effectively functions to qualify or undermine the primary narrative (i.e., as 
previously suggested, evinces a change of mind or second thoughts). 
 
 At first glance, Victory over Death 2 seems to present less of a ‘cacophony’ than 
Practical Religion – nevertheless, on closer inspection, it is evident that, in the styling 
and disposition of its calligraphy, the later work similarly accentuates the degree to which 
John’s testimony is, to some degree, a speaking of others – namely, Christ, God and a 
group of onlookers. In terms of scriptural context, the text reproduced in Victory over 
Death 2 finds Christ, en route to Jerusalem, following the miraculous Raising of Lazarus. 
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The opening statement is contained within the block of lower case script situated beneath 
the arch of the crepuscular ‘M’ in the left third of the painting, where Christ declaims: 
 
‘Now my soul  
is in turmoil  
and what have  
I to say?  
Father, save  
me from this  
      hour. 
No, it was for this  
that I came to  
this hour.’ (John 12: 27-28) 
 
Aware of his story’s impending climax, Christ experiences a crisis of faith and appeals to 
the heavens for surcease. Almost immediately, however, Christ answers his own 
question, accepting the inevitability and necessity of his sacrifice (i.e., the doubting 
Christ performs what is, in effect, a double-take, and thereby negates his doubt). He then 
petitions God to validate his faith – a statement McCahon disposes in a line of text 
located above the ‘M’, along the top edge of the painting: 
 
‘Father, glorify your  
         name’.  
 
Here, John, as third person narrator, intercedes with the comment that McCahon renders 
as follows:  
 
a voice sounded from  
            heaven,  
 
The next subject position to be introduced is that of the Judeo-Christian God, whose 
response to Christ’s entreaty McCahon expresses in bold capitals immediately to the left 
of the central I-form (thus mirroring or anticipating the subjectivity expressed in the 
major text of the work, ‘AM I AM’):  
 
‘I HAVE  
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GLORIFIED  
IT, AND I WILL  
GLORIFY IT  
  AGAIN.’ (John 12: 28-29) 
 
The narrator then details the reaction of the astounded onlookers, and Christ’s reply – 
which, in Victory over Death 2, is located in the space between the central ‘I’ and the ‘A’ 
of the rightward ‘AM’ :  
 
The crowd standing  
by said it was  
thunder, while  
others said, ‘An  
angel has spoken  
to him.’ Jesus  
replied, ‘This  
voice spoke for  
your sake,  
   not mine.’ (John 12: 29-30) 
 
At this point, McCahon omits those lines of text where Christ alludes to his looming 
sacrifice, jumping ahead to the response Christ makes to the crowd’s protestations (in 
John 12: 34) that he ‘must be lifted up’. In a kind of retrogressive see-sawing that 
demonstrates to what degree McCahon both fragments and re-orders John’s testimony in 
the space of his painting, this inscription is placed against the lower-left edge of the 
central I-motif:  
 
‘The light  
is among you  
still, but not  
for long. Go  
on your way  
while you  
have the light  
so that darkness  
may not over- 
take you. He  
who journeys  
in the dark  
does not know  
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where he is  
going. (John 12: 35) 
 
Approximately parallel to its initial instating, the phrase 
 
         the light 
is among you 
 
is reiterated in a spatial transposition to the right of the central ‘I’ and, beneath this 
repetition, is inscribed Christ’s final admonishment: 
 
While you have  
the light, trust  
to the light,  
that you may  
become men of  
light.’ (John 12: 36) 
  
These tactics, whereby the text from John 12 is fragmented, repeated, and spatially 
dispersed, reinforce the impression that Christ speaks from multiple subject positions or 
evinces a ‘split’ subjectivity. 
 
 On initial inspection, it may not seem obvious how, in Painting from “Malady” et al, 
Hotere’s deployment of Manhire’s text enlivens multiple subject positions. After all, 
these paintings exhibit nothing more than stencilled, capitalised iterations of the English 
words MELODY and MALADY (and, in a few works, the phrase MY LADY). However, 
I would remind the reader that, in the paintings under consideration, multiple subject 
positions are not only enlivened by the incorporation of multiple scripts in multiple 
languages, or single scripts in which several ‘characters’ are given voice, but also by the 
formal and pictorial disposition of these scripts in the aforementioned works. In other 
words, in the Malady paintings, multiple subject positions are enlivened by the formal 
and pictorial translation of what is proper to Manhire’s concrete poem. That is to say, the 
disposition of the typewritten words MELODY and MALADY, and the phrase MY 
LADY, in accordance with various compositional strategies that include (1) pages 
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entirely omitting text, (2) the isolation of single words on, otherwise, empty pages, (3) the 
repetition of words in vertical columns or in irregular arrays, (4) the juxtaposition of 
different textual elements on the same page (e.g., towards the end of Manhire’s book, one 
finds a page in which a vertical column of MALADYs, at left, parallels a vertical column 
of MELODYs to its right), and (5) the juxtaposition of textual elements with more 
‘purely’ pictorial elements (e.g., Hotere’s vertical lines and bands, executed in ink and 
watercolour wash). 
 
 What this implies for the Malady series paintings (if not, in fact, for any painting 
utilising textual elements or more purely ‘plastic’ forms – which is to say, painting in 
general) is that, potentially, the subjectivity expressed admits infinite subdivision. Even 
limiting considerations only to textual features, this partitioning may operate on the level 
of word groups, solitary words, letters, or infinitesimal parts thereof – differences of this 
kind being sustained on the basis of criteria that are, similarly, limitless.169 In any 
painting, then, the most elementary attribution of subjectivity inheres in the positing of a 
single subject position. In the case of Painting from “Malady”, this would involve 
attributing to a single subject the fifteen-fold reiteration of the word MELODY (i.e., the 
painting represents one ‘voice’ intoning ‘MELODY’ fifteen times). Potentially, however, 
it is possible to group the MELODYs (or any part thereof) in accordance with an infinity 
of other, possible, classificatory criteria, on which basis an infinity of other subject 
positions may be defined. For example, if one chooses ‘spatial positioning’ as such a 
criterion then it is possible to attribute different subject positions to the vertical column of 
four MELODYs near the upper right perimeter of the annulus, or the pair of MELODYs, 
one light, one dark, disposed bottom centre of the circle form, or the MELODYs located 
in the lower right quadrant of the annulus as opposed to those located in the upper left 
quadrant – or, indeed, any other combination of textual elements. If one chooses 
‘tonality’ as a criterion then it is possible to attribute different subject positions to those 
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 To anticipate matters for further discussion in chapters two and four, the possibility of so 
subdividing the subjectivity expressed in Painting from “Malady” follows from what, in Roman 
Jakobson and Morris Halle, Fundamentals of Language (The Hague: Mouton & Co, 1956), 60, is 
characterised as the metonymical combination and contexture of signs. That is to say, always 
already, any sign (i.e., expression of subjectivity) may be understood as a combination of simpler 
‘linguistic units’ and admits being combined with other signs to form more complex units.  
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MELODYs that are, relatively speaking, rendered in light-toned pigment as opposed to 
those executed in darker shades. One might even choose ‘degree of truncation by the 
bounding annulus’ as a criterion and, on this basis, attribute different subject positions to 
the group of five MELODYs that are so curtailed and the group of ten MELODYs that 
are inscribed in full. 
 
 In Painting from “Malady”, the seemingly random spatial distribution of the fifteen 
MELODYs, combined with variations in their execution, contributes to the ease with 
which multiple subject positions may be posited. Notwithstanding the presence of a 
powerfully unifying, annular enclosure, the subjectivity thus defined seems to encompass 
a multiplicity of different perspectives – which is, precisely, to say that it is a multiple 
subjectivity or a subjectivity divided. This tension between the singular and the multiple 
is also present in other Malady series works that are, perhaps, more compositionally 
regimented and austere – notably, Black Painting XII from “Malady” (1970, ref. 51, fig. 
8) and Black Painting XV from “Malady” (1970, ref. 52, fig. 9). In these two paintings, it 
is not the annulus/disk that formally mediates or determines the placement of stencilled 
text, but rather, respectively, a cruciform/rectangular frame, and an X-shape. In both 
these paintings, the close confinement of textual elements within embracing geometric 
shapes, in combination with an execution that, relatively speaking, admits minimal 
variation in tone or density of pigment, encourages the attribution of a singular subject 
position. At the same time, however, the sheer number of stencilled words (over sixty in 
each painting) enlivens the possibility of any number of subdivisions and, hence, the 
positing of any number of subject positions. Indeed, it may be suggested that the 
subjectivity expressed in Black Painting XII from “Malady” and Black Painting XV from 
“Malady” defines a veritable ‘cross-talk’ – a subjectivity that is ‘at crossed purposes’ or 
at odds with itself. In the former work, this is particularly evident in the vertical and 
horizontal disposition of stencilled MALADYs, thereby defining a cruciform array. 
Moreover, the corners of the painting bear witness to less obvious ‘crossings’ wherein 
meet the vertically and horizontally oriented lines of MALADYs defining the boundary 
of the work. Finally, whilst not a ‘cross-talk’ per se, another obvious opposition obtains 
between the dark grey MALADY stencils disposed in the cruciform, and the blue-violet 
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MALADY stencils that constitute the rectangular frame. In the latter case, it should be 
noted that Black Painting XV from “Malady” defines a subcategory of the Malady 
paintings in which there is reiteration of MALADY and MELODY. Immediately, then, 
there is, at least, enlivened the possibility of a double subjectivity. Even more striking, 
however, is the manner by which, in the upper centre of the painting, opposing, diagonal 
axes of stencilled text intersect and intermingle. Here, the two-fold subjectivity 
accumulates a further quotient of ambiguity insofar MALADY and MELODY run 
together in a region of mutual superposition and annihilation. Out of the ensuing hubbub, 
there emerges a field of fragmentary voices stuttering on the edge of sense: ‘MALADY 
LODY’, ‘MALMELODY’, ‘MALADY DY’, ‘MMELODY’, ‘MMALADY’, ‘MELODY 
DY’, ‘MELMALADY’, ‘MELODY LADY’... 
 
 1.3.4 Texts in translation 
 
 In seeking to resolve or determine a particular subject who is ‘originally’ inscribed in 
a ‘source’ text, subsequent to being ‘translated’ into the paintings under consideration, 
the third consideration mentioned at the outset of the present section arises in view of the 
fact that, invariably, the texts cited are not, in fact, ‘originary’ but rather, instances in a 
field of textual reproductions, translations and revisions, the limits of which resist precise 
determination. Consider, for example, the provenance of the painted calligraphy 
employed in The Lark’s Song (and, hence, the possibility of relating the text to an 
originating subject). With regard to the Māori language text derived from The Tail of the 
Fish, Kereama acknowledges the traditional ‘origins’ of the words to The Lark’s Song: 
‘All Maori children knew the song in those days and many of the elders remember some 
of the words even now.’170 Indeed, it is apparent that the waiata or karakia, to which 
Kereama refers, is an almost ubiquitous expression of Toi Māori that exists in many 
different forms throughout Aotearoa/New Zealand.171 Moreover, references to this 
                                                 
170
 Kereama, 60. 
 
171
 For some references to variations on the waiata presented in Matire Kereama (Matire Hoeft), 
The Tail of the Fish: Maori memories of the Far North (Auckland: Oswald-Sealy, 1968), 61, see, 
for example, Elsdon Best, ‘The Diversions of the Whare Tapere: Some Account of the various 
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traditional chant tend to stress its resistance to translation. Indeed, in The Tail of the Fish, 
Kereama suggests that 
 
In order to translate these words into English one must imagine the thoughts of 
children lying lazily on the river bank, looking up into the blue sky where the lark 
circles and flutters, while they sing the words they think the lark is saying.172   
 
The validity of Kereama’s impressionistic ‘translation’ (and thus the status of The Lark’s 
Song as an impasse to any straightforward or definitive transcription in English) is reified 
                                                                                                                                                 
Games, Amusements, and Trials of Skill practised by the Maori in Former Times’ in 
Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New Zealand 1868-1961, v34, 1901, 54-55, 
Hōne Apanui and Nuki Takao (trans), ‘Ka Tahi Tī’ in New Zealand Ministry of Education, Te 
Tāhuhu O Te Matauranga, Hei Waiata, Hei Whakakoakoa, Waiata to support teaching and 
learning of Te Reo Māori in English-medium schools: Years 1-8 (Wellington: Learning Media, 
2008 (1992)), 
http://www.google.co.nz/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=ka%20tahi%20ti&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved
=0CCkQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Ftereomaori.tki.org.nz%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F907%
2F4852%2F&ei=KrDQUamUKo7VkQXZsYGgAg&usg=AFQjCNGjyPICvsWOMINGiB0KW
moJQ-ifJA&bvm=bv.48572450,d.dGI, (01.07.13), 63, and Mervyn McLean & Margaret Orbell, 
Songs Of A Kaumatua (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2002), 231. In accessing these 
sources, I gratefully acknowledge the guidance of Lynne-Harata Te Aika (Kāi Tahu, Ngāti Awa), 
University of Canterbury, Aotahi: School of Māori and Indigenous Studies. 
 
 It may be noted that a similar indeterminacy of textual origin attaches to the closing script in 
The Lark’s Song: ‘CAN YOU HEAR ME ST. FRANCIS.’ In Hooper, 6, it is acknowledged that 
some of the poems were published previously in various periodicals and/or included in radio 
broadcasts. 
 
172
 Kereama, 61. See also ‘Ka Tahi Tī’ in New Zealand Ministry of Education, Te Tāhuhu O Te 
Matauranga, Hei Waiata, Hei Whakakoakoa, Waiata to support teaching and learning of Te Reo 
Māori in English-medium schools: Years 1-8, trans Hōne Apanui and Nuki Takao (Wellington: 
Learning Media, 2008 (1992)), 
http://www.google.co.nz/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=ka%20tahi%20ti&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved
=0CCkQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Ftereomaori.tki.org.nz%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F907%
2F4852%2F&ei=KrDQUamUKo7VkQXZsYGgAg&usg=AFQjCNGjyPICvsWOMINGiB0KW
moJQ-ifJA&bvm=bv.48572450,d.dGI, (01.07.13), 63, where it is suggested that ‘This traditional 
chant isn’t easily translated because it is symbolic and metaphorical’, and McLean & Orbell, 
Songs Of A Kaumatua, 231, where it is stated that ‘Although some expressions in this karakia can 
be recognised, its language is highly cryptic. Without further information, it cannot be translated.’ 
This said, in Best, 54, it is noted that the waiata in question was, at once, a ‘doggerel... repeated 
by children, the object being to see who could go through it in one breath’ and a ‘tatai whetu’ 
(i.e., recitation or counting of the names of stars or constellations) that was ‘performed in former 
times in order to kill a frost... thus saving crops.’ Best’s interpretation is among the alternatives 
presented in Apanui and Takao, and in McLean and Orbell. 
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in Curnow’s essay, ‘McCahon and Signs’. Moreover, Curnow also observes that ‘There 
is no reference to a lark in the text of McCahon’s painting, nor, of course, in the song 
Matire Kereama’s children sang.’173 Indeed, on the basis of McCahon’s recollection, in 
Colin McCahon: a survey exhibition, that ‘finally the little lark took off up the painting 
and out of sight’, evidently, the lark (the ostensive subject ‘speaking’ in the work) is 
‘present’ only in the form of the sign of its passing: i.e., the vertical line of finely 
inscribed dashes that ‘ascend’ through the horizontal midpoint of the work.174 
 
 Similar difficulties arise in relation to those word paintings from 1969 and 1970 that 
cite St John’s gospel as presented in The New English Bible. Even leaving aside the status 
of the bible as a veritable chorus of gospels, the precise authorship of which is not always 
certain, it may be noted that (as its very title suggests) The New English Bible is scarcely 
an original statement but rather the latest in a long series of translations (and, hence, re-
writings, re-interpretations) of the scriptures.175 Indeed, The New English Bible, itself, 
appeared in two editions – the New Testament was published in 1961 and a second 
edition of the New Testament, in conjunction with the Old Testament (including the 
Apocrypha), in 1970. Apparently, McCahon drew from both versions. That, in the word 
paintings of 1969 and 1970, McCahon utilises text from the 1961 edition of The New 
English Bible is corroborated in a letter from the artist to John Caselberg, dated 4 June 
(c.1969). Here, McCahon specifically mentions ‘the New English Bible (Oxford-
                                                 
173
 Curnow, ‘McCahon and Signs’, 54. In the name of accuracy, it may be noted that Kereama 
does not attribute ‘Lark Singing’ to her children, as Curnow’s wording implies, but rather refers 
to it as a game in which she participated as a child. In McCahon discourse, the challenge to 
English translation that the Māori language text of The Lark’s Song presents also is evident from 
its characterisation as ‘cryptic’ in O’Brien, ‘Nouns and Verbs, a poetics of painting; Colin 
McCahon’ in Taberner, Colin McCahon, A Question of Faith, papers from a seminar, 45.  
 
174
 McCahon and O’Reilly, Colin McCahon: a survey exhibition, 36. 
 
175
 In the ‘Introduction’ to The New English Bible, New Testament, vii-x, the lineage of the text is 
acknowledged. Its immediate predecessors are identified as the so-called Authorised Version of 
the King James Bible (1611) and its Revised Version (1881). Moreover, also acknowledged are 
the challenges involved in creating a translation in English from archaic Greek – a process that, 
inevitably, results in what is an interpretation, as opposed to an exact counterpart, of the source 
text. 
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Cambridge 1961)’.176 At the same time, however, Brown suggests that certain of 
McCahon’s late word paintings, employing Old Testament text from Ecclesiastes cite the 
1970 edition of The New English Bible.177  
 
 The major script of Victory over Death 2 further exemplifies the difficulty in 
determining an originary text as a preliminary to determining an originary subjectivity. I 
have already noted how Victory over Death 2’s ‘AM I AM’ resonates with the ‘I AM; 
that is who I am’ of the Old Testament God speaking to Moses in Exodus and the 
wording of the Cartesian cogito. To these possible sources, one also might add John 14: 
6: ‘I am the way; I am truth and I am life’ (my italics). Indeed, to the extent that Victory 
over Death 2’s ‘I AM’ distils the triplicate in-stating of John 14: 6 into the form of a 
single utterance, it echoes other abbreviations McCahon promulgates in his painted 
script. These include, for example, the contraction of John’s phrase to ‘THE WAY THE 
TRUTH & LIFE.’ (which, itself, involves the substitution of the ampersand ‘&’ for 
‘and’), the condensation of the date to ‘FEB. ‘70’, and the truncation of the artist’s 
signature to McCahon’s surname. 
 
 In light of these ambiguities, it is striking how several prominent McCahon scholars 
have seized upon Exodus 3 as the ‘source’ of this painted text – even though, in every 
case, the attribution is unsubstantiated. Indeed, it is the position of this study that no 
definitive corroboration ever could be forthcoming. If it is tenable to conceive of 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making in terms of the tension obtaining between the 
individual and a transindividual otherness then the posting of Exodus 3 as a textual 
‘source’ cannot be secured by appealing to the assertions of any particular individual – 
whether the art subject called ‘McCahon’ or otherwise. In view of this state of affairs, the 
repeated positing of Exodus 3 as a textual source for the major script of Victory over 
Death 2 exemplifies what was previously suggested in section 1.2: in the final analysis, 
                                                 
176
 McCahon in a letter to John Caselberg dated 4 June 1969), cited in Simpson, Answering hark, 
99. 
 
177
 Brown, ‘ “The Speaker”, The Painter, The Discursive Dialoguer’ in McCahon, Pound, and 
Brown, Colin McCahon, The Last Painting (Auckland: Peter Webb Galleries Ltd., 1993), 13. 
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reference depends on nothing more than a ‘radical contingency of naming’. Moreover, it 
is also significant that, even in locating the ‘origin’ of this statement in Exodus 3, many 
of these same writers acknowledge that, in the context of McCahon’s painting, the nature 
of the subjectivity thus enlivened is multiple or ambiguous. For example, in the untitled 
essay, in the catalogue to the exhibition I will need words: Colin McCahon’s word and 
number paintings, Curnow asserts, of the ‘AM I AM’, that ‘The text is from Exodus...’ 
and yet also concedes, on the basis of the qualifying, crepuscular ‘AM’ at the left of the 
work, that there is some doubt as to who, precisely, is speaking: ‘The painting is at once 
God’s assertion of his being, Jesus’s of his, and (inescapably) McCahon’s assertion of 
his.’178 In a contemporaneous, critical review of Curnow’s essay, Green reiterates this 
point:  
 
The shadowy AM that, half-seen, precedes the white I AM is taken as signifying 
doubt, as contrasted with the assertion of being (visibility=presence) of the light-
painted inscription. But whose doubt is the question. It is not simply a matter of 
equating every statement with the text inscription with a statement of the of the 
personal I of the artist. 
 
Nevertheless, Green allows that ‘The text drawn on is likely as not the I AM THAT I AM 
of Exodus III’ and then proposes that the doubting subject implied might well be Moses 
who, as Green points out, ‘continually asks “Who am I?” as in III, 11: “Who am I that I 
should go unto Pharoah...?’179 In Colin McCahon: artist (1993, 1984), Brown also relates 
the ‘AM I AM’ to Exodus, whilst acknowledging its consonance with the phrase ‘I am 
the Alpha and the Omega’ in the Book of Revelations (1: 8, 21: 6, 22: 13).180 As a final 
example, Pound, in the concluding paragraph of ‘McCahon, Skies, Stars, Writing’ 
(1990), acknowledges that ‘The word “I” is one of those words referred to by linguists as 
a “shifter” – a vagabond word, one with no fixed address, which shifts constantly from 
                                                 
178
 Curnow, untitled essay included in McCahon, I will need words. As observed in Green, 
‘Review: I Will Need Words’ in Bulletin of New Zealand Art History, v9, 1985, 65, Curnow’s 
essay contains a misprint: it refers to Exodus (3: 4) instead of (3: 14). 
 
179
 Green, ‘Review: I Will Need Words’, 62. 
 
180
 Brown, Colin McCahon: Artist (1993), 148-49, n17, 229. 
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one speaker to another.’ On this basis, Pound asserts that, in Victory over Death 2, this ‘I’ 
is 
 
...inextricably and indeterminately – the ‘I’ of the biblical God’s ‘I am that I am’... 
the ‘I’ of painting in general, and the ‘I’ of this particular painting, and the ‘I’ of the 
painter himself.181 
                                                 
181
 Pound, ‘McCahon, Skies, Stars, Writing,’ 164. See, also, ibid, ‘Colin McCahon and the 
language of Practical Religion’, 13, where Pound asserts, of Victory over Death 2 and Gate III, 
that  
 
McCahon’s ‘I AM’ is certainly the ‘I AM THAT I AM’ of the biblical God; it is also the I 
AM’ which announces the artist’s presence. 
 
 In the context of a study exploring subjectivity from the perspective of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, Pound’s linguistic allusion to ‘I’ as a ‘shifter’ is worthy of further elucidation. In 
referring to the first person pronoun as a shifter, Pound correctly acknowledges the ambiguous 
status of the subjectivity thus enlivened. However, from a Lacanian standpoint, it is also 
necessary to understand that this subjectivity is neither simply nor wholly conceivable in 
metaphysical terms. The subjectivity saying ‘I’ is ambiguous not because it is multiple but rather 
insofar as ‘it’ exceeds the metaphysical framework within which ‘individual’ subjects are posited 
as such. 
 
 In relation to Lacanian theory, the key reference, in this regard, is Jakobson, ‘Shifters, Verbal 
Categories, and the Russian Verb’ in Selected Writings, Volume II, Word and Language (The 
Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1971, originally prepared for the  Department of Slavic Languages and 
Literature project ‘Description and Analysis of Contemporary Standard Russian’ (Harvard 
University, 1957)), 130-47. Here, Jakobson introduces a distinction between message and code by 
way of reframing the distinction between speech and language (or, in the French, parole and 
langue) made in Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, edited by Charles Bally 
and Albert Sechehaye in collaboration with Albert Reidlinger, trans, with an introduction and 
notes by Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966, originally published as Cours de 
linguistique générale, Paris: Payot, 1916), 13-14. Crucially, Jakobson proposes that the message 
(that which is encoded by addressers and decoded by addressees) and the code (the medium of 
language or collection of signifiers by virtue of which this coding is enabled) are not irrevocably 
separate but rather overlap (130). In Jakobson’s view, the first person pronoun exemplifies such 
an undermining or dissolving of distinctions between speech acts and language codes. After Otto 
Jespersen, Language: Its Nature, Development and Origin (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
1922), 123, Jakobson characterises ‘I’ as a shifter insofar as its ‘general meaning’ (i.e., coding in 
the transindividual, symbolic structure) ‘cannot be defined without a reference to the message’ 
(i.e., the particular subject uttering ‘I’). Moreover, Jakobson classifies the first person pronoun as 
an indexical symbol insofar as ‘I’ combines the function of an index (i.e., ‘I’ is a sign that points 
to or indicates a particular, existing, speaking subject and thus defines a relation of presence) and 
a symbol (i.e., ‘I’ is a sign that, in general, always represents ‘the subject uttering “I” ’ and thus 
defines a relation of absence) (131-32). Jakobson’s formulation implies that the subjectivity 
saying ‘I’ is a speaking (message-sending) that is, at the same time, a being-spoken (encoding). 
Hence, the subjectivity saying ‘I’ cannot be wholly or simply identical to the ego as an ideal of 
self-unity, self-presence and self-empowerment. On the contrary, the subjectivity saying ‘I’ 
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 As far as the Malady series paintings are concerned, the determination of a source text 
in which, in principle, there may be inscribed an original and singular subject position 
evinces various complications. In the first place, Manhire’s ‘concrete/pattern poem’ 
exists in at least three, distinct iterations, each of which is significantly different from its 
siblings. These differences complicate the endeavour to determine a source text in which 
there may be inscribed a singular, originating subject position. For, notwithstanding the 
chronological order of their production, it is unclear which version of Malady is to be 
considered ‘complete’, ‘final’, or ‘definitive’. Indeed, the question arises as to whether 
each distinct iteration of the Malady book deserves to be considered a separate artwork or 
even, in fact, whether the ‘concrete/pattern poem’ Malady (and thence the subjectivity of 
which it is a sign) is simply or immediately synonymous with any material instantiation. 
Thus, according to Manhire’s recollection, the initial printed iteration of Malady took the 
form of a hand-assembled, ‘typewritten booklet – pages of word patterns.’ Manhire 
continues: ‘I must have given a copy of the Malady book to Ralph at some stage. He 
presumably flicked through it and started making the paintings which became the Malady 
                                                                                                                                                 
would appear to be precisely that in relation to which are undermined absolute metaphysical 
distinctions between inside and outside, presence and absence, agent and automaton. 
 
 To anticipate matters for discussion in chapter two, Lacan, in effect, carries out a 
psychoanalytic transformation of Jakobson’s linguistics through a consideration of message and 
code in light of the unconscious. On this basis, the message signifies that which is ‘truly’ or 
‘really’ speaking – i.e., an unconscious subjectivity or what Lacan terms the ‘subject of the 
unconscious’. The code signifies that in relation to which speech is given – i.e., that which may 
be termed, variously, the constellation of signifiers with their accompanying rules of syntax and 
grammar, the symbolic order, or the system of language as the Other’s discourse. In this regard, it 
is important to understand that, from a Lacanian perspective, neither the subject of the 
unconscious nor the system of language admit determination in metaphysical terms – i.e., as 
‘contained within’, ‘emanating from’ or, otherwise, signifying beings-present and/or essences of 
selfhood. 
 
 For an example of where Lacan specifically refers to Jakobson’s essay in relation to the 
message/code distinction, see Lacan, ‘On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of 
Psychosis’ in Écrits (2006) (originally written as ‘D’une question préliminaire à tout traitement 
possible de la psychose’, December 1957 – January 1958, and originally published in La 
Psychanalyse, v4 (1959), 1-50), 450, 485 (n1). For further accounts of Lacan’s employment of 
Jakobson’s message/code distinction see Grigg, Lacan, Language, and Philosophy (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2008), 12, 172 (n15), Chiesa, 41-43, Evans, 182, and Fink, The 
Lacanian Subject, 37-38, 183 (n3).  
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series.’182 As noted previously, Malady (1970) was published, subsequently, in an edition 
of 150 copies, to coincide with the exhibition Black Paintings 1970-Malady Series. A 
second edition of Malady (1997), in a print run of 500 copies, was published to coincide 
with Hotere’s major touring exhibition Hotere – out the black window (1997).183 
 
 On Manhire’s account, the first, hand-assembled version of Malady evidently contains 
only pages of patterned text (i.e., as Manhire puts it, the ‘three articulations... 
malady...melody...my lady’). By contrast, Malady (1970) and Malady (1997) comprise 
pages of patterned typescript interleaved with (mostly) monochrome reproductions of ink 
and watercolour wash drawings. Whilst both published texts preserve a strict separation 
of textual and pictorial elements (i.e., at no point are print and pictorial features presented 
on the same page, although it is frequently the case that the two features are disposed on 
opposing pages), they are, nevertheless, different in several important respects. In the first 
place, the only pictorial element the latter two versions have in common is the very first 
ink and wash drawing opposing a solitary ‘malady’ centred on the left margin of the 
facing page. Moreover, in the 1970 edition of Malady, the repetition of ‘MALADY’ and 
‘MELODY’ in two vertical columns on a single page is followed by a page that is empty. 
However, in the 1997 version, this empty page is replaced by a single, colour 
reproduction of an ink and wash drawing. There is also a slight variance in the disposition 
of Malady’s textual dénoument: ‘my lady’. In the 1997 edition, this is shifted forward a 
page so that it is no longer located on the back of a leaf (as in the 1970 edition – where it 
opposes the page featuring a final illustration and book design credit) but rather on a new 
leaf.184 
                                                 
182
 Manhire quoted in O’Brien, ‘Some Paintings I Am Frequently Asked About’, 22. 
 
183
 In Manhire and Hotere, Malady (Wellington: Wedge Press, 1997), np, one finds an insert on 
brown card that acknowledges the preceding edition of 1970, details the print run of the 1997 
edition as ‘500 copies’, and states explicitly that ‘This new edition is published in association 
with the City Gallery exhibition HOTERE: OUT THE BLACK WINDOW.’ 
 
184
 A further complication is introduced by Hone Tuwhare’s poetry collection Sap-wood & Milk, 
poems by Hone Tuwhare (Dunedin: Caveman Press, c.1972). In addition to the front cover 
graphic, this book contains six reproductions of ink and watercolour wash drawings by Hotere 
(facing pages 1, 7, 10, 23, 26, 32) that are similar in style to those executed for Malady (1970). 
The illustrations in Sap-wood & Milk may be distinguished by virtue of the smaller, more 
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 Further compounding the material and compositional differences, by which the three 
instantiations of the Malady book are distinguished, are their differing authorial 
attributions. Thus, Manhire claims sole authorship of the initial, hand-crafted iteration – 
although, it may be noted, this is not to suggest, necessarily, that Manhire ‘invented’ the 
forms and compositional strategies of ‘concrete/pattern’ verse.185 Hence, even in relation 
to the first, hand-made version of Malady, the subjectivity expressed is neither simply nor 
immediately synonymous with a particular art subject called ‘Manhire’. In Malady 
(1970), the poem is prefigured by a title and author page on which, in handwritten script, 
is inscribed: 
 
Malady 
 
Bill Manhire 
 
At the end of the book, one finds a page in which a final ink and wash drawing is 
accompanied by another credit, in a different hand, that reads: 
 
DESIGN: Ralph Hotere186  
 
Hence, Malady (1970) accords authorial priority to Manhire, whose name ‘comes first’. 
Hotere’s name ‘comes after’ or ‘follows’ Manhire’s – almost in the nature of an 
afterthought or (more charitably, perhaps) a consummation. Insofar as ‘Manhire’ comes 
                                                                                                                                                 
approximately square format of Tuwhare’s book, the fact that five drawings are reproduced in 
colour, by their greater degree of pictorial complexity, and by the fact that, compared with the 
understated illustrations in Malady (1970), those in Sap-wood & Milk tend to dominate the spaces 
of the pages on which they are disposed. 
 
185
 The existence of carmina figurata (poems in which there is evinced a pictorial disposition of 
words and/or letters) in Renaissance texts provides some indication of the longstanding practice 
of ‘concrete’ poetry, at least, in Western literature. A noteworthy, early twentieth century 
collection of concrete verse is Guillaume Apollinaire, Calligrammes, poèmes de la paix et de la 
guerre 1913-1916 (Calligrams, Poems of Peace and War 1913-1916) (Paris: Mecure de France, 
1918). 
  
186
 Manhire, Malady (Dunedin: Amphedesma Press, 1970), np. 
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before the poem and ‘Hotere’ comes after the poem, implicitly, Hotere’s status as 
‘designer’ is strictly subsidiary to Manhire’s status as ‘poet’; poetry takes precedence 
over design; writing takes precedence over painting (here, reduced in status to ‘design’ or 
‘illustration’). Reflecting on the creation of Malady (1970) over two decades later, it is 
evident that Manhire still conceives of the work in terms of a bifurcation of authorial 
roles: 
 
The first thing we did together was called Malady – though that’s the wrong way of 
putting it, because we’ve never exactly collaborated. I don’t think Ralph works as a 
collaborator. He has friendships and people he works with; he brings things to life 
in the gaps and spaces and accidents that other people – and circumstances – make 
available.187 
 
 Here, however, it is striking to what degree Manhire’s assessment of the 
‘collaborative’ nature of Malady (1970) contradicts the presentation (i.e., designation or 
naming) of Malady (1997). This later edition features a single title and author page that 
reads: 
 
MALADY 
 
 
Bill Manhire 
 
Ralph Hotere188  
 
In other words, the authorial separation maintained in Malady (1970) is relaxed. 
Notwithstanding Manhire’s reification of authorial individuality in his account of the 
creation of Malady (1970), in Malady (1997), any absolute resolution of the subjectivity 
expressed in terms of particular subject positions or particular art subjects is precluded. 
On the contrary, the subjectivity expressed in Malady (1997) invites interpretation as a 
duality that resists further differentiation. That is to say, it no longer demands to be 
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 Manhire quoted in O’Brien, ‘Some Paintings I Am Frequently Asked About’, 22. Manhire’s 
qualification is acknowledged in O’Brien, Hotere, Out The Black Window, 55. 
 
188
 Manhire and Hotere, Malady, np. 
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considered, by necessity, as a collaboration between or working in parallel of the 
individual art subjects ‘Manhire-the-poet’ and ‘Hotere-the-painter’ but rather offers to 
express the fundamentally ambiguous subjectivity enlivened by the dual figure of the 
poet/painter Manhire/Hotere.189 In consequence, there is a similar disappearing of firm 
distinctions between poetry and painting – between that which is ‘purely’ textual, 
graphic, or writing and that which is ‘purely’ pictorial, plastic, or drawing/painting. 
Despite Manhire’s characterisation of Malady as a ‘concrete/pattern poem’, the divided 
authorship of Malady (1970) preserves distinctions between poetic patterning and 
painterly patterning, and thus invites interpretation as an ‘illustrated poem’. By contrast, 
in the vanishing of absolute distinctions between authorial roles, Malady (1997) admits 
consideration as a ‘poem-painting’ in which there is, perhaps, a fuller realisation of the 
possibilities of the medium – a more explicit presentation of writing-as-painting and 
painting-as-writing, graphic-as-plastic and plastic-as-graphic. 
 
                                                 
189
 Here, I should acknowledge that the possibility of so representing the complex subjectivity in 
question draws inspiration from the title of Simpson, Answering hark: McCahon/Caselberg, 
painter/poet. 
 115 
1.4 Painting the gift of meaning  
 
 1.4.1 The gift of meaning 
 
 By way of concluding this opening discussion, it may be observed that, if the 
subjectivity/meaning-making expressed in Victory over Death 2, Painting from 
“Malady”, and related works admits consideration in terms of a tension obtaining 
between the individual and a transindividual otherness (i.e., a subjectivity that resists 
determination exclusively in terms of particular artist individuals or art subjects) then the 
works in question are that to which one gives meaning only insofar as, always already, 
meaning is given to one by an other (or, better perhaps, an otherness). Particularly 
relevant, in this regard, is the fact that the texts employed in the works under 
consideration were gifts. As Brown relates, Anne McCahon presented McCahon with a 
copy of The New English Bible, Kereama’s book was given to McCahon following its 
discovery by his daughter, Catherine, and Hooper’s book of poetry was a gift from 
Caselberg.190 As previously noted, Manhire presented Hotere with a copy of the first, 
hand-fabricated version of the Malady book. Insofar as their ‘source texts’ were gifts, it is 
apparent that the meaning content of Victory over Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, and 
related works does not exclusively emanate from somewhere ‘in’ McCahon or ‘in’ 
Hotere or, indeed, ‘in’ the particular artworks and texts under consideration, but rather 
emerges in relation to a wider and pre-existing field of symbolic exchanges. Re-stating a 
point made earlier, this field is equivalent to language-mediated, social and cultural 
reality – what Lacan terms the ‘big Other’ or symbolic order. 
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 Brown, Colin McCahon: Artist (1993), 145-46. See also Brown, ‘Colin McCahon. Can you 
hear me St Francis, 1969’, 161, and Simpson, Answering hark, 98-99. Simpson’s account is, 
apparently, based on a document held in the Hocken archives. It is worth noting that there is 
another letter dated 4 June and addressed ‘Dear John’ in the McCahon Archives of the E.H. 
McCormick Research Library, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki, Folder 1, item 32, that 
contradicts Simpson’s account in some respects. For example, in this document, McCahon seems 
to be introducing Caselberg (if, indeed, Caselberg is the ‘Dear John’ to whom the missive is 
addressed) to Hooper’s poetry. 
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 Here, what is at issue transcends the banal recognition that Victory over Death 2, 
Painting from “Malady”, and their siblings appropriate or incorporate fragments of pre-
existing texts. The critical point to recognise is that, however novel these word paintings 
may be in their particulars, in their creation, neither McCahon nor Hotere formulates an 
entirely new manner of speaking and communicating. On the contrary, rather than 
painting some kind of ‘original speech’, both artists employ (or, better perhaps, realise 
certain meaning potentials inherent in) the symbols, syntax and grammar of a pre-existing 
system of language. That is to say, by virtue of the system of language, McCahon and 
Hotere speak only insofar as they are spoken: the subjectivity expressed in Victory over 
Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, and related works is neither wholly nor simply the 
subjectivity of a particular being or art subject called, respectively, ‘McCahon’ or 
‘Hotere’ but rather a subjectivity that defines a relation of tension obtaining between the 
individual and the transindividual otherness of language per se. 
 
 The prominence thus far accorded to the determination of source texts should not 
obscure the fact that language (considered as the system within which, by virtue of the 
function of representation/symbolisation, are given meaning/forms or forms of meaning) 
necessarily encompasses writing and painting, graphic and plastic. Here, however, it may 
be objected that painting, even before it is representation/symbolisation – even before it 
figures or means – is simply mark-making. In a manner that recalls autonomic functions 
or instinctual acts, one might conceive of a mark-making that occurs entirely 
independently of subjectivity/meaning-making. How, then, is it tenable to claim that 
painting admits consideration as an expression of a pre-existing language, in relation to 
which, in the creation of Victory over Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, and related 
works, McCahon and Hotere are, respectively, given voice? In seeking to resolve this 
conundrum, I propose to draw a distinction between mark-making and painting proper. 
The term painting will be reserved for the mark-making that is also a meaning-making 
(or, rather, the actualisation of certain potentials that, in accordance with the function of 
representation/symbolisation, manifest as meaning/forms). It is on the basis of this 
distinction that one may conceive of a language of painting, in relation to which painting 
is a sign of subjectivity. 
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 However, this is not to suggest that, in marking a surface with paint, the artist 
necessarily knows in advance (i.e., in the sense of being conscious of) what these marks 
mean. Indeed, for some artists (particularly those favouring the automatist mode of art-
making associated with Dada and Surrealism, Abstract Expressionism, Gutai, Fluxus, 
etc.) the process of creation seems to proceed precisely from a position of un-knowing – 
at least, on the level of consciousness. Hence, Paul Klee’s oft-cited suggestion to the 
effect that the ‘primordial movement’ of creativity ‘knows’ or ‘is’ nothing beyond its 
own activity:  
 
The primordial movement, the agent, is a point that sets itself in motion… A line 
comes into being…It goes out for a walk, so to speak, aimlessly for the sake of the 
walk.191  
 
Also relevant (especially in view of certain definitions of the unconscious that will be 
discussed presently) are statements made by artists associated with Abstract 
Expressionism. For example, consider William Baziotes’ characterisation of the subject 
matter of his painting as that which, at the outset, he does not know he knows – i.e., a 
subject disclosed to consciousness only after the fact of its expression in painting:  
 
There is always a subject that is uppermost in my mind. Sometimes I am aware of 
it. Sometimes not. I work on my canvas until I think it is finished. Often I recognize 
my subject at completion and again I may wait a long time before I know what it is 
about.192 
 
Baziotes’ observation harmonises with Jackson Pollock’s assertion that 
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When I am in my painting, I’m not aware of what I’m doing. It is only after a sort 
of “get acquainted” period that I see what I have been about. I have no fears about 
making changes, destroying the image, etc., because the painting has a life of its 
own. I try to let it come through.193 
 
 The commentary above bears comparison with certain of McCahon’s remarks in Colin 
McCahon: a survey exhibition. In relation to Practical Religion, McCahon recalls: 
 
I spent weeks painting my way over this story, more and more involved realising 
the great need for a new kind of painting to happen.194 
 
Leaving aside the question of whether Practical Religion really was a genuinely ‘new 
kind of painting’, it is significant that McCahon characterises its creation in terms of an 
unfolding realisation of the imperative for such. In other words, the creation of Practical 
Religion is presented as a journey towards the articulation of desire. To this extent, it 
constitutes a voyage of discovery towards knowledge and meaning that proceeds from an 
initial position of un-knowing. Also noteworthy is the entry accompanying The Lark’s 
Song. Here, McCahon insists (implicitly addressing non-Māori language speakers) that 
one can understand and appreciate the work without knowing, necessarily, the precise 
meaning of its Māori text. Indeed, McCahon goes so far as to suggest that this innocent 
perspective is, precisely, how The Lark’s Song ought to be appreciated:  
 
The words must be read for their sound, they are signs for the lark’s song. 
 
...Please don’t give yourself the pain of worrying out a translation of the words but 
try for the sound of the painting.195 
 
Significantly, however, McCahon adds a qualifying note: ‘But never forget that these are 
the words of a poet too. Some people can read them.’196 In other words, the validity or 
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efficacy of approaching the painting from a ‘naive’ standpoint is secured by the inference 
that, in the final analysis, its painted text means for someone. Finally, one may observe 
the obvious resonance, in this context, of Hotere’s artist statement included in the 
pamphlet accompanying the exhibition of Zero series paintings: 
 
The series ZERO may be called an object of visual meditation, the essence of 
meditation being a personal discovery in a seeming void. I have provided for the 
spectator a starting point, which, upon contemplation may become a nucleus 
revealing scores of new possibilities. No object and certainly no painting is seen in 
the same way by everybody, yet most people want an unmistakable meaning which 
is accessible to all in a work of art. It is the spectator who provokes the change and 
the meaning in these works.197 
 
Here, it is significant that, firstly, Hotere takes responsibility only for providing the 
journey of meaning with its initial impetus. Secondly, Hotere insists that meaning-
making is a process whose resolution is not only a matter of ‘possibilities’ but also, 
explicitly, possibilities to be realised in accordance with the desires and determinations of 
others.  
 
 1.4.2 Painting in principle and in possibility 
 
 In these examples, it is evident that the commentary offered by McCahon and Hotere 
echoes suggestions made by the likes of Baziotes or Pollock that, whilst one may not 
know the meaning of painting initially, that painting (i.e., the activity of painting) is 
meaningful (at least, potentially) is not in dispute. Hence, that painting means is not 
generally in question – even if what merits the appellation painting may come into being 
or be known as painting only after the fact of mark-making as the result of acts of 
meaning-making (i.e., determinations of meaning potentials) made by various art subjects 
(the artist, art viewers, art critics, etc.). In other words, prior to the attribution of meaning, 
one might say that the artist has not actually made a painting, only painted marks. Indeed, 
prior to the giving of meaning, the marked canvas does not even bear consideration as an 
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expression of subjectivity (for example, the canvas may have been marked by a leak in 
the roof of the artist’s studio or some other accidental process). To be sure, for an artist 
like Jean/Hans Arp, for whom the arbitrary fall of paper fragments validly might 
constitute a collage, an accidentally marked canvas, precisely, would be admissible as 
painting. However, the fact remains that the status of this marking as painting depends on 
a later subjective determination – the same kind of determination implicit in Marcel 
Duchamp’s exhibiting of a prefabricated, porcelain urinal as Fountain (1917). Therefore, 
the meaning of painting is guaranteed in the sense that it is a meaning that one does not 
know one knows but that one will come to know and/or a meaning that is already known 
for one by an other. To anticipate points for later discussion, from the perspective of 
psychoanalysis, these two perspectives are functionally equivalent. That which one does 
not know one knows and that which is known for one (in the sense of being inscribed, 
recorded or remembered in an other ‘place’ or ‘field’ – i.e., language-mediated, 
intersubjective, social and cultural reality, the big Other, the symbolic order) are implicit 
in the notion of the unconscious.198 
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 The idea that ‘unconscious knowledge’ is that which is known for one is expressed with 
particular clarity in Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 23:  
 
The unconscious is not something one knows, but rather something that is known. What is 
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whilst savoir refers to ‘the foundation of what is known... precisely insofar as it is not known’ but 
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 Evidently, then, mark-making is a necessary but not sufficient condition for painting. 
Equivalently, one might say that mark-making is potentially painting – but the realisation 
of this potential requires a retroactive act of meaning-making. Such a retroactive making 
of meaning reconstitutes and naturalises what is called ‘the meaning of the work’ within 
the province of a pre-existing system of language. Hence, that which comes to be known 
about painting admits consideration as that which is always already known, insofar as this 
meaning is an actualisation of the incipient potentials of the system of language, of which 
the language of painting is part. In consequence, what may be termed the ‘language of 
painting’ does not come forth from particular acts of painting as a purely original and 
authentic creation but rather demands to be considered as pre-existing this by virtue of 
the meaning potentials enlivened within the wider context of the discourse of painting. 
Therefore, in relation to this wider field, the language of painting is, evidently, no less 
given to McCahon and Hotere than the language of words. Indeed, to the extent a pre-
existing system of language enables McCahon and Hotere to speak, write, or paint (that 
is, to find expression and communicate meaning as subjects), one simply reaffirms that 
the subjective field encompassing the particular art subjects called ‘McCahon’ and 
‘Hotere’ is the transindividual otherness of language per se. 
 
 This proposition has some far-reaching implications for the nature of the relationship 
between subjectivity and painting. By way of anticipating matters for further discussion 
in later chapters, the question arises: if a pre-existing linguistic structure secures the 
possibility of speaking meaningfully then to what degree does speaking genuinely create 
or originate meaning, as opposed to merely parroting (or, perhaps, actualising, realising) 
meaning potentials already encoded within the possibilities of language? In other words, 
as previously noted, to what extent, in Victory Over Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, 
and related works, are McCahon and Hotere, respectively, speaking as opposed to being 
spoken? Paradoxically, it appears as if both conditions obtain. In the first place, both 
artists select and, invariably, edit texts, and dispose them in their paintings. That is to say, 
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as previously noted, their painterly reproductions of pre-existing elements of language are 
not exact replications of source texts but rather manifest as repetitions that introduce 
differences. To this extent, McCahon and Hotere seem to behave like creative agents. At 
the same time, however, it is evident that, whatever ‘editorial’ revisions either artist 
makes in their word paintings, their texts inevitably play within the constellation of 
possibilities the system of language affords. Hence, the manner by which subjectivity is 
expressed in and through language is not absolutely free but rather subject to linguistic 
structures and the laws governing the disposition of those structures. Indeed, in relation to 
this latter point, one might view language as a system of permissions and prohibitions 
where, strictly speaking, that which is prohibited or impossible does not actually merit 
the label ‘bearer of meaning’ in the first place. It is by virtue of falling within the 
permissible parameters of language and meaning (even if these parameters are not known 
explicitly or consciously in advance) that painting may be distinguished from mark-
making and speech from inarticulate noise. From this perspective it would appear that, in 
Victory over Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, and related works, even when there is a 
deviation from the script of The New English Bible, The Tail of the Fish, Journey 
Towards an Elegy, or the various iterations of Malady – or, indeed, a transgressing of the 
boundaries of what may be considered permissible as painting – to the extent these 
deviations and transgressions (come to) bear meaning they are expressed within the 
compass of language, always already inscribed there in principle and in possibility. 
 
 Let us summarise the discussion thus far. It has been suggested that the ambiguous and 
contradictory subjectivity evinced in Victory over Death 2, Painting from “Malady”,  and 
related works is neither simply nor immediately synonymous with the particular art 
subjects called ‘McCahon’ and ‘Hotere’, respectively, but rather demands to be 
considered in terms of the intersection or relation of tension obtaining between the 
individual and the transindividual otherness equivalent to the discourse of painting as it 
functions within language-mediated, social and cultural reality. Within this discourse, 
then, painting, as an expression or sign of subjectivity/meaning-making, admits 
consideration in terms of the tension between one painting and/or one meaning and an 
other painting and/or an other meaning. In consequence, the works in question demand 
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consideration as that to which, paradoxically, one gives meaning only insofar as, always 
already, meaning is given to one by an other (or, to be precise, an otherness). To put the 
matter in equivalent terms, contradiction arises insofar as this complex subjectivity seems 
caught between agency (i.e., there is a creative reconfiguration of pre-existing, language-
mediated structures) and automatism (i.e., these reconfigurations nevertheless remain 
within the compass of language, in principle and in possibility).  
 
 In seeking to unravel (or, at least, fruitfully re-state) this antinomy, it may be useful to 
consider that the term ‘an other meaning’ admits two interpretations. Firstly, ‘an other 
meaning’ implies ‘meaning that is made or given by an other’. That is to say, the ‘locus’ 
of meaning is ‘situated in’ or ‘enlivened by’ language per se, where language, thereby, 
admits consideration as an ‘other discourse’. Insofar as Victory over Death 2, Painting 
from “Malady”, and their siblings merely reiterate or remain within the structural 
imperatives of this other discourse, they seem to be the expressions of an automatism. 
Secondly, however, playing on the ambiguity between an other and another, ‘an other 
meaning’ also may imply the susceptibility of meaning to being supplemented or 
succeeded. Here, the inference is that, ultimately, meaning may be neither determinable 
nor immutable but rather, always already, inherently ambiguous and evanescent. To the 
extent works like Victory over Death 2 and Painting from “Malady” involve a 
reconfiguration of given meaning (even if this re-making is inevitably subsumed within 
the structures and laws of language), they admit consideration as expressions of agency – 
albeit, an agency neither simply nor immediately synonymous with the ‘conscious ones’ 
called ‘McCahon’ and ‘Hotere’, respectively. In the following chapter, I seek to clarify 
the theoretical basis of the thesis as a whole by exploring the implications of this 
ambiguous mode of subjectivity/meaning-making in light of Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
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Chapter 2 An other meaning: subjectivity, the unconscious,  
     and  language 
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2.1 An other meaning: the unconscious and language 
 
 2.1.1 An other meaning: subjectivity as agency and automatism 
 
 The efficacy of adopting Lacanian psychoanalysis in order to explore the ambiguous 
subjectivity that seems caught between agency and automatism may be illustrated 
through a consideration of what is implicit in the notion that language is an otherness in 
relation to which individual subjects are given voice. Here, it is evident that, in saying one 
is given voice or spoken by an other, the implication is that one is not sovereign over 
oneself – not the captain of one’s own ship, so to speak. The idea that something else is 
pulling one’s strings immediately raises the possibility that there is more to subjectivity 
than the sense ‘one’ has of ‘consciously’ exercising choice and agency. That is to say, 
what is placed in question is the notion that, necessarily and sufficiently, subjectivity is 
the expression of ‘ones that are conscious’ – which is precisely to place in question the 
conceptual prejudices inherent in the very notions of ‘oneness’ and ‘consciousness’ 
insofar as they relate to subjectivity. How is this so? In the first place, by definition, the 
‘origin’ or ‘locus’ of the subjectivity that finds expression by virtue of a relation to 
otherness is not simply contiguous with, identical to, or contained within, a singular 
being or essence of self. On the contrary, the ‘centre’ or ‘essence’ of this subjectivity 
would appear to be, paradoxically, located ‘outside’ the self considered as a determinate, 
bounded entity. Equivalently, one may conceive of a self that is not identical to, or 
coincident with, itself – i.e., a self, in itself, alienated from itself. In various contexts, 
Lacan employs terms like ‘ex-centric’, ‘decentred’, ‘extimacy’ and ‘ex-sistence’ to define 
this aspect of subjectivity. Secondly, as a corollary to the self conceived as decentred, 
alienated, or non-self-identical, the subjectivity obtaining in the form of a relation with 
otherness also is, evidently, incompatible with models of the psyche according to which 
psychical phenomena are conceived entirely in terms of ‘perception-consciousness’ (i.e., 
a metaphysical relation of outside-inside obtaining between external world and inner 
self), where ‘consciousness’ is, itself, understood purely as ‘immediate presence-to self’ – 
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i.e., as simply and immediately equivalent to self-consciousness, the consciousness one 
has.199 
 
 2.1.2 The unconscious  in consciousness: ‘discontinuity’ and ‘vacillation’ 
 
 In relation to what, then, is the subject (or, rather, subjectivity) to be thought if it is (1) 
given voice by the other of language and thereby (2) not simply a ‘one that is conscious’? 
The response of Lacanian psychoanalysis is the unconscious or, to be more precise, the 
relationship of tension between consciousness and the unconscious. This immediately 
begs two further questions that will be of primary concern in this chapter: (1) what is the 
unconscious? and (2) what is the relationship between the unconscious and language 
such that language-mediated expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making evince a 
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sistence’ see, for example, Lacan, ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” ’, 6, where ‘ex-sistence’ is 
characterised as ‘the eccentric place... in which we must necessarily locate the subject of the 
unconscious’. The term ‘ek-sistence’ is also widely employed in ibid, Seminar XXII. Here, for 
example, in the context of a discussion devoted to the manner of the ‘knotting’ or interface 
between the orders of the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic, Lacan asserts: ‘ek-sistence is... 
only this outside which is not a not-inside’ (Seminar 3, 14 January 1975, 49). 
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tension between consciousness and the unconscious? With regard to the first of these 
considerations, the critical point to bear in mind is that ‘what’ might be termed ‘the 
Lacanian unconscious’ shares with ‘the Lacanian subject’ the property of resisting 
objective or metaphysical determination. That is to say, the Lacanian unconscious is 
neither a metaphysical entity nor an aspect of such amenable to conscious acts of 
measurement and delineation – for example, as is implicit in the notion of the conscious 
ego: an autonomous, irreducible kernel of self-presence.  
 
 Relevant, in this regard, are various statements Lacan makes in Seminar II and 
‘Position of the Unconscious’ (1960). In the former case, Lacan emphasises to what 
degree he considers the unconscious to be of a completely different order than the ego. 
Thus Lacan asserts: ‘The unconscious completely eludes that circle of certainties by 
which man recognises himself as ego’ and insists: ‘not only is there an absolute 
dissymmetry between the subject of the unconscious and the organisation of the ego, but 
also a radical difference.’200 Lacan also refers to the ‘decentred subject’ as ‘the subject 
beyond the subject, the subject of the unconscious.’201 In ‘Position of the Unconscious’, 
Lacan reiterates that the unconscious is, strictly speaking, neither a substrate of beings 
nor of consciousness (i.e., in the sense of being an inverse, obverse or polar opposite). 
Hence, Lacan asserts: ‘The unconscious is a concept founded on the trail [trace] left by 
that which operates to constitute the subject’ and ‘The unconscious is not a species 
defining the circle of that part of psychical reality which does not have the attribute (or 
the virtue) of consciousness.’202 Indeed, by way of a brief discussion of what might be 
signified by the term ‘ “un-black”... namely the set of what could be classified according 
to the various meanings of the word “black,” by dint of its refusal of the attribute (or 
virtue) of blackness (whether physical or moral)’203, Lacan implies that the unconscious 
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is precisely ‘that’ which escapes metaphysical determinations such as ‘is’ and ‘is not’, 
‘being’ and ‘non-being’. 
 
 As Sean Homer aptly puts it, the concept of the unconscious presents the following 
conundrum: 
 
According to Lacan we cannot know what the unconscious is. Indeed, it is not a 
thing as such but a hypothesis; we cannot know the unconscious, but only deduce it 
from a subject’s speech.204 
 
Such a characterisation of the unconscious is evident in ‘Function and Field’. Here, 
Lacan asserts: 
 
The unconscious is that part of concrete discourse qua transindividual, which is not 
at the subject’s disposal in reestablishing the continuity of his conscious 
discourse.205 
 
This pithy statement expresses three crucial (and, indeed, interrelated) ideas. Firstly, the 
unconscious is a ‘transindividual... part of concrete discourse’ – that is, an aspect of 
subjects’ speech (or, more generally, of language-mediated expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making) transcending subjects considered as particular beings or 
individuals. Secondly, by virtue of its transcendental status, the unconscious is ‘not at the 
subject’s disposal’ – i.e., it exceeds the power and awareness of ‘ones that are conscious’. 
Thirdly, in characterising the unconscious as a dimension of subjectivity unavailable to 
the subject seeking to recuperate ‘the continuity of... conscious discourse’, Lacan infers 
that the unconscious manifests as a discontinuity in consciousness. This is, precisely, to 
affirm that language-mediated expressions of subjectivity evince a tension between 
consciousness and the unconscious. 
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 That the unconscious ‘manifests’ in the form of a discontinuity or, indeed, 
symptomatic disturbance, in conscious expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making is 
particularly clear from Lacan’s comments in Seminar XI: 
 
I have spelt out to you point by point the functioning of what was first produced for 
us by Freud as the phenomenon of the unconscious. In the dream, in parapraxis, in 
the flash of wit – what is it that strikes one first? It is the sense of impediment to be 
found in all of them. 
 
Impediment, failure, split. In a spoken or written sentence something stumbles. 
Freud is attracted by these phenomena, and it is there that he seeks the unconscious. 
 
On this basis, Lacan suggests: 
 
Discontinuity, then, is the essential form in which the unconsciousness first appears 
to us as a phenomenon – discontinuity in which something is manifested as a 
vacillation.206 
 
‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ provides an apposite illustration of the Freudian basis of 
Lacan’s thinking. Here, Freud asserts that ‘the dream... [is] only the first member of a 
class’ of ‘psychoneurotic symptoms’ which ‘are to be regarded as fulfilments of 
unconscious wishes’207 and that, furthermore, there is a ‘complete identity between the 
characteristic features of the dream-work and those of the psychical activity which issues 
in psychoneurotic symptoms’ – namely, the expression of ‘an unconscious wish, derived 
from infancy and in a state of repression’.208 In Freud’s view, ‘these unconscious wishes 
are always on the alert, ready at any time to find their way to expression when an 
opportunity arises for allying themselves with an impulse from the conscious and for 
transferring their own great intensity on to the latter’s lesser one.’209 Consequently, with 
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reference to his first psychical ‘topography’ of unconscious, preconscious, and conscious 
‘systems’, Freud proposes that ‘we may speak of an unconscious thought seeking to 
convey itself into the preconscious so as to be able then to force its way through to 
consciousness’ – although he cautions, further, that, strictly speaking, the so-called 
unconscious and preconscious ‘systems’ are ‘not in any way psychical entities 
themselves and can never be accessible to our psychical perception’.210 This is to reiterate 
that, in both Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, the unconscious and the 
preconscious are, strictly speaking, hypotheses invoked to explain certain symptomatic 
phenomena registered in consciousness. Notwithstanding this important qualification, 
Freud suggests that ‘the unconscious... is found as a function of two separate systems... 
one of them, which we term the Ucs., is also inadmissible to consciousness, while we 
term the other the Pcs. because its excitations... are able to reach consciousness.’ Hence, 
‘the system Pcs. stands like a screen between the system Ucs. and consciousness.’211 
  
 2.1.3 The unconscious as the Other’s discourse and the unconscious as 
structured like a language 
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239, 255-59, where it is proposed that similarly disruptive unconscious processes are involved in 
slips of the tongue and other parapraxes, and ibid, ‘Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious’ 
(1905) in SE, v8, 165-170, where parallels are drawn between the unconscious phenomena 
characteristic of dreams and those manifest in jokes.  
 
 I would point out that Freud’s allusions to unconscious psychical processes seem incompatible 
with his parallel characterisations of the unconscious as an atemporal and, indeed, indestructible, 
psychical structure or system. This ambiguity (which also is present in Lacan’s writing) is 
discussed in section 8.4. For the purposes of the present study, I would suggest that references to 
unconscious psychical processes ought to be taken figuratively, as opposed to literally. In chapter 
three, the idea of unconscious psychical processes will be superseded by a more nuanced 
understanding of subjectivity in terms of a ‘real writing’ or ‘writing in the real’. 
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references to Freud’s positing of the unconscious and the preconscious as psychical ‘systems’ 
mediating between perception and consciousness, see ibid, 536-42. See section 8.5 for further 
discussion of Freud’s psychical topography of Ucs., Pcs., and Cs. ‘systems’, and the disposition 
of these systems in a psychical homeostasis maintained by the mediation of the primary process 
(or pleasure principle) by the secondary process (or reality principle). 
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 That Lacan posits a resonance between the unconscious and language is already 
implicit in his claim that the unconscious manifests as an inaccessible part of ‘concrete 
discourse’ or as a discontinuity in conscious expressions of meaning-making.212 On this 
basis, the second consideration noted previously is enlivened, namely: what is the 
relationship between the unconscious and language such that language-mediated 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making evince a tension between consciousness and 
the unconscious? How Lacan approaches this question is implicit in the two, well-known 
aphorisms by which he summarises his conception of the relationship between the 
unconscious and language – namely, ‘the subject’s unconscious is the other’s 
discourse’213 and ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’.214 Let us, briefly, 
elaborate each of these constructions in turn. 
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 The reference to ‘conscious expressions of meaning-making’ exposes a certain ambiguity in 
this project that demands further clarification. Often, it will be convenient to speak of meaning 
made, determined, or posited in consciousness. Taken literally, this wording would appear to 
imply that consciousness enjoys a degree of agency and/or self-sufficiency. Indeed, one may be 
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what is termed ‘the unconscious’ are conceptual abstractions that, strictly speaking, cannot be 
isolated apart from their reciprocal entanglement within the field of expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making. More rigorously, then, what is ‘primary’ is ‘subjectivity’ or 
‘subjective experience’ per se, within which meaning is posited/determined and subject to 
ambiguity. What is proper to this subjectivity is the process or function of 
representation/symbolisation – a thinking in and as signs. Insofar as subjective experience 
precisely involves making determinations that, at the same time, evince discontinuities, 
ambiguities, and contradictions, it may be hypothesised, variously, in terms of (1) a ‘tension’ 
between ‘consciousness’ and ‘the unconscious’, (2) a tension between the individual ‘one that is 
conscious’ and the transindividual otherness of language-mediated, intersubjective social and 
cultural reality, the greater part of which is, practically speaking, repressed and, therefore, 
unconscious, or, indeed, (3) a primordial, real, material force. Qua hypotheses, however, it should 
be apparent that, always already, that which is posited as grounding or engendering subjective 
experience is abstracted from subjective experience. 
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 Lacan, ‘Function and Field’, 219. For some other contexts, in which Lacan refers to the 
unconscious as the other’s discourse, see ibid, Seminar II, 89, ibid, Seminar III, 112, and ibid, 
‘The Instance of the Letter’, 436. 
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 For some references to the claim that ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’, see ibid, 
Seminar III, 166-67 and ibid, Seminar XI, 149, 203. 
 
 I should point out that, in the 1970s, Lacan’s claim that ‘the unconscious is structured like a 
language’ is superseded by the idea that ‘the unconscious is structured like lalangue’. Here, by 
way of anticipating discussion in chapters three and four, one might say that lalangue is the ‘real’ 
trace structure or lettering of language, the manifestation of which, in the emission of inchoate 
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 Of particular relevance to the idea that ‘the subject’s unconscious is the other’s 
discourse’ is the distinction between ‘little other’ and ‘big Other’ Lacan introduces in 
Seminar II: 
 
We must distinguish two others... an other with a capital O, and an other with a 
small o, which is the ego. In the function of speech, we are concerned with the 
Other.215 
 
As Evans points out, the term ‘little other’ encompasses both the ego and the mirror 
image in which the ego sees itself reflected (or, equivalently, the counterpart onto which 
the ego projects itself), thereby fabricating and sustaining an illusory or imaginary sense 
of self-unity and self-sufficiency. By contrast, ‘The big Other designates radical alterity, 
an other-ness which transcends the illusory otherness of the imaginary because it cannot 
be assimilated through identification’ and, on this basis, is equivalent to what Lacan 
terms the symbolic order: the ‘transindividual’, law-governed structure of language-
mediated, social and cultural reality.216 Also relevant is Lacan’s commentary in Seminar 
III, where one finds a reference to the ‘big Other of intersubjectivity... the Other of... the 
stable system of the world, of the object, and, between the two, speech, with its three 
stages of the signifier, meaning, and discourse.’217 On the basis of this distinction 
between little other and big Other, then, it should be apparent that, in the present context, 
a more precise expression of Lacan’s aphorism is: ‘the unconscious is the Other’s 
discourse’. 
 
 Whilst not stated explicitly, the claim that ‘the unconscious is structured like a 
language’ is clearly implicit in several observations Lacan makes in ‘Function and Field’. 
In the first place, the linguistic orientation of Lacan’s thinking is immediately evident 
                                                                                                                                                 
and/or nonsensical sounds, testifies to the aforementioned tension between consciousness and the 
unconscious. For discussion of lalangue see, for example, Lacan, Seminar XX, 138-39. 
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when he refers to Freud’s ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ as providing a salutary 
reminder that ‘a dream has the structure of a... rebus – that is, of a form of writing’, the 
‘telling’ of which (e.g., in a clinical setting) is characterised by two primary features: 
‘syntactical displacements’ and ‘semantic condensations’.218 Secondly, Lacan asserts that 
‘a symptom is... structured like a language’ and (employing the terminology associated 
with Saussure’s linguistics) that ‘A symptom... is the signifier that has been repressed 
from the subject’s consciousness.’219 Hence, the idea that the unconscious is structured 
like a language follows from the characterisation of symptoms as (1) structured like a 
language and (2) repressed from consciousness – i.e., unconscious. 
 
 The suggestion that ‘the subject’s unconscious is the other’s discourse’ (or, 
equivalently, that the unconscious dimension of expressions of subjectivity is 
‘transindividual’) implies that the unconscious is an absolutely ‘outside’ alterity 
manifesting ‘inside’ subjects (or, to be more precise, in conscious expressions of 
subjectivity), in relation to which subjects are, therefore, decentred. From a Lacanian 
perspective, the force of this evident antimony illustrates how the fields of subjectivity 
and the unconscious resist determination in metaphysical terms. However, 
notwithstanding this ‘anti-metaphysical’ tenor, Lacan’s second formula, ‘the unconscious 
is structured like a language’, clearly implies that the unconscious is, nevertheless, law-
governed in such a way that its effects, as manifest in consciousness, are amenable to 
analysis. On this basis, the question raised above admits the equivalent formulation: what 
are the structures and laws governing language-mediated expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making such that these expressions evince a tension between 
consciousness and the unconscious? 
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2.2 Structuring the dream-work: condensation and displacement of 
representatives of the representation 
 
 2.2.1 Vorstellungsrepräesentanz: the word, the thing, and the signifier 
 
 In his works of the mid to late 1950s, Lacan seeks to explicate the aforementioned 
structures and laws, according to which language-mediated expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making are governed, by recasting Freudian psychoanalysis in light 
of the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson. In the first 
place, then, Lacan identifies what, in Freud’s essays ‘Repression’ (1915), and ‘The 
Unconscious’ (1915), is termed Vorstellung or Vorstellungsrepräesentanz with what, in 
Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (1916), is referred to as the signifier. Secondly, 
Lacan identifies what, in Freud’s ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, is termed condensation 
and displacement with what, in Jakobson’s essay ‘Two Aspects of Language and Two 
Types of Aphasic Disturbances’ (1956), is referred to as metaphor and metonymy.220 By 
way of setting the stage for the discussion in sections 2.3 and 2.4, let us briefly examine 
each of these identifications in turn. 
 
 What, then, does Freud mean by Vorstellung and Vorstellungsrepräesentanz? 
Notwithstanding a certain degree of ambiguity surrounding these terms, Vorstellung may 
be said to connote a mental or psychical phenomenon that, in the form of an idea or 
image, represents what Freud defines as Trieb – i.e., instincts or, better perhaps, 
instinctual drives.221 These are the animating principles of the organism, which, in 
                                                 
220
 It may be noted that, in Jakobson, ‘Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic 
Disturbances’ in Jakobson and Halle, Fundamentals of Language, 81, there is also an appeal to 
the Freudian concepts of condensation and displacement. Here, however, Jakobson’s attribution 
differs from Lacan’s. Metonymy is associated with condensation and displacement, whilst 
metaphor is related to Freudian ‘identification’ and ‘symbolism’. 
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 The degree to which Freud’s ‘Trieb’ is insufficiently translated as ‘instinct’ is addressed in 
Lacan, Seminar XI, 49. In Lacan’s colourful language, ‘Trieb gives you a kick in the arse, my 
friends – quite different from so-called instinct.’ That is to say, in contrast to the relatively 
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Freudian theory, also are characterised in terms of the so-called primary process or the 
pleasure principle. Thus, in ‘Repression’, Freud defines an ‘instinctual representative’ as 
‘an idea... [Vorstellung] or group of ideas which is cathected [i.e., affectively or 
emotionally charged or invested] with a definite quota of psychical energy (libido or 
interest) coming from an instinct.’222 Moreover, in ‘The Unconscious’, Freud draws a 
Kantian distinction between the instinct and its psychical representative such that the 
instinct takes on the aura of an objectively real, yet unknowable, ‘thing-in-itself’, whilst 
the idea, as a subjective, psychical representation, is precisely that which may become an 
object of knowledge.223 Finally, Freud suggests that if one follows the psychical 
topography of unconscious, preconscious and conscious systems (i.e., Ucs., Pcs., and Cs.) 
then ‘the Cs. phase of an idea implies a fresh registration of it, which is situated in 
another place’.224 Consciousness, then, is conceived by Freud as that which contains 
‘fresh registrations’ of Vorstellung – that is to say, representations of unconscious ideas 
that are, themselves, representations of instincts. In consequence, what is encountered in 
consciousness, by way of the mediation of the preconscious, is a second order 
representation – and thus merits the appellation representative of the representation: 
Vorstellungsrepräesentanz.  
 
 Subsequently, Freud suggests that what is experienced in consciousness can be 
separated into ‘word-presentations’ or Wortvorstellungen and ‘thing-presentations’ or 
                                                                                                                                                 
passive, autonomic, stimulus-response character of instincts, Trieb connotes a driving force 
characterised by a much greater degree of urgency and activity. 
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 Freud, ‘Repression’ (1915) in SE, v14, 152. 
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 For a reference to the distinction Freud makes between instincts and ideas, see, for example, 
ibid, ‘The Unconscious’ (1915) in SE, v14, 177, where Freud asserts: 
 
 ...the antithesis of conscious and unconscious is not applicable to instincts. An instinct can 
never become an object of consciousness – only the idea that represents the instinct can. 
Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an 
idea... When we... speak of an unconscious instinctual impulse... We can only mean an 
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Sachevorstellungen. On this basis, Freud makes the following distinction between 
conscious and unconscious presentations: 
 
...the conscious presentation is the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of 
the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of 
the thing alone.225 
 
Hence, 
  
The system Ucs. contains the thing cathexes of the objects, the first and true object-
cathexes; the system Pcs. comes about by this thing-presentation being 
hypercathected through being linked with the word presentations corresponding to 
it.226 
 
Here, it may be observed that, firstly, the term hypercathected seems to imply a re-
cathecting or over-cathecting, thus reiterating that what presents in consciousness by 
virtue of the preconscious are not merely Vorstellungen but Vorstellungsrepräesentanzen. 
Secondly, these hypercathexes result in dualistic, psychical formations that are, in effect, 
‘thing-words’ or ‘word-things’ – that is to say, forms that mean, forms of meaning, 
meaning/forms. 
 
 In a critical passage in Seminar VII, Lacan states explicitly that these meaning/forms 
are, in linguistic terms, synonymous with the signifier. Thus, Lacan characterises as 
unconscious those 
 
...thought processes insofar as they regulate by means of the pleasure principle the 
investment of the Vorstellungen, and the structure in which the unconscious is 
organised... And it is this which makes the small curds of representation, that is to 
say, something which has the same structure as the signifier – a point on which I 
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insist. That is not just Vorstellung, but as Freud writes later in the same article on 
the unconscious, Vorstellungsrepräesentanz...227 
 
Notwithstanding certain ambiguities in Lacan’s phrasing, it is crucial to appreciate that 
Vorstellungen are unconscious and thus, strictly speaking, inadmissible to consciousness. 
Vorstellungsrepräesentanzen, by contrast, are preconscious and thus, potentially, able to 
be registered in consciousness. That Lacan preserves this distinction would appear to be 
implicit in his insistence that ‘we must distinguish the effective articulation of a 
discourse, of the gravitation of the Vorstellungen, in the form of the 
Vorstellungsrepräesentanzen of these unconscious articulations.’228 Where, however, 
Lacan departs from Freud is in the problematic opposition of Wortvorstellung and 
Sachevorstellung implicit in Freud’s suggestion that the Pcs. and Cs. contain these 
presentations in combination, whilst the Ucs. contains thing-presentations alone. Clearly, 
Freud’s conception of the Ucs., as a system of ‘pure forms’ entirely divorced from 
meaning is, prima facie, incompatible with Lacan’s thesis that the unconscious is 
structured like a language – a ‘problem’ or ‘impasse’ Lacan attributes to ‘the state of 
linguistics in... [Freud’s] time.’229 By way of ameliorating the difficulty, Lacan highlights 
the difference between the two words, in German, for ‘thing’ – namely die Sache (i.e., 
matter, content, substance) and das Ding (i.e., condition of possibility, enabling principle, 
structuring rule or law).230 In Lacan’s view, it is by invoking this distinction that one 
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 Lacan, Seminar VII, 61. On other occasions, Lacan also refers to ‘the system of the 
Vorstellungsrepräesentanzen, or in other words, of the signifying elements in the psyche’ (103), 
and ‘the signifying network... the network of Vorstellungsrepräesentanzen’ (118). 
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expression ‘distinguish the effective articulation of a discourse’ means: ‘define the dimension of 
discourse that is, ultimately, expressed in consciousness by virtue of the filtering or mediation of 
the preconscious’. 
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 As noted in ibid, 43-44, there is only one word in French for ‘thing’: ‘ “la chose”... which 
derives from the Latin word “causa”. Its etymological connection to the law suggests to us 
something that presents itself as the wrapping and designation of the concrete.’ Lacan affirms 
that, ‘in German, too, “thing” in its original sense concerns the notion of a proceeding, 
deliberation, or legal debate.’ That said, Lacan suggests that ‘Das Ding may imply not so much a 
legal proceeding itself as the assembly which makes it possible, the Volksversammlung’ (43). By 
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might reconcile Freud’s faulty terminology with his, otherwise, praiseworthy 
understanding and formulation of the  
 
...distinction to be made between the operation of language as a function – namely, 
the moment when it is articulated and, in effect, plays an essential role in the 
preconscious – and the structure of language, as a result of which those elements 
put in play in the unconscious are organized.231 
 
 Subsequently, Lacan conceives of the unknowable force or structuring principle, in 
accordance with which the Vorstellungen ‘gravitate’, in terms of das Ding. In Seminar 
VII, das Ding is defined as ‘the beyond-of-the-signified’ or ‘the Thing’ in its ‘dumb 
reality’ – i.e., as an expression of the real.232 Strictly speaking, then, das Ding expresses 
the structuring of structure and thus exceeds and eludes (in the sense of being impossible 
to include in the terms of reference of) that which is so structured.233 That is to say, the 
‘real’ structuring principle of the unconscious that is structured like a language is 
precisely that which utterly transcends linguistic determination. To this extent, das Ding 
harmonises with Lacan’s assertion in Seminar I: ‘the real, or what is perceived as such, is 
                                                                                                                                                 
contrast, ‘Sache is the thing that is juridically questioned or, in our vocabulary, the transition to 
the symbolic order of a conflict between men’ (44). 
  
231
 Ibid, 44-45. 
 
232
 Ibid, 54, 55. Here, I would suggest that, notwithstanding certain ambiguities in Lacan’s 
terminology, the ‘real’ associated with the account of das Ding in Seminar VII may be usefully 
understood in the context of the elaboration of the structural logic of the signifying chain in 
Seminar II and the ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” ’. As noted in the thesis Prologue, this 
implies that the Lacanian real is neither simply nor immediately to be conceived in metaphysical 
terms as a ‘material substrate’ akin to a Kantian realm of ‘things-in-themselves’. Rather, Lacan’s 
discussion of das Ding ushers in the conception of what, in the thesis Prologue, has been 
characterised as the structurally necessary order of the impossible synonymous with, yet 
inassimilable to, the function of representation/symbolisation. 
 
233
 Considered as a ‘real’ ‘structuring of structure’, Lacan’s employment of the term das Ding 
resonates with the Derridean conception of trace and différance, and also Heidegger’s 
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what resists symbolisation absolutely.’234 In effect, Lacan transforms the Freudian 
distinction between Ucs. and Pcs., Vorstellungen and Vorstellungsrepräesentanzen, into 
the difference between a ‘real’ structuring or conditioning of possibility and a signifying 
structure that is, thereby, rendered possible. The instrumental point is that, within the 
signifying structure subsequently enlivened, this ‘real’ structuring or conditioning of 
possibility is, ‘in itself’, an impossibility. Hence, from the perspective of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, there is no possibility of separating Sachevorstellungen and 
Wortvorstellungen, let alone conceiving of a psychical substrate or system in which there 
are produced Vorstellungen that are only Sachevorstellungen. In the first instance, 
consciousness, as the ‘default’ perspective of subjectivity, simply is experience of a field 
of inextricably entangled meaning/forms, or signs, and certain discontinuities or 
disturbances in this field (i.e., the aforementioned tension between consciousness and the 
unconscious). What Freud calls Sachevorstellung must be regarded as an abstraction of 
conscious experience and thus, in common with the conceptions of the unconscious and 
the real, a hypothesis invoked to account for certain symptomatic phenomena 
encountered in consciousness. As Lacan puts it:  
 
The straw of words only appears to us as straw insofar as we have separated it from 
the grain of things, and it was first the straw which bore that grain.235 
 
 2.2.2 Condensation and displacement; metaphor and metonymy  
 
 In Lacanian theory, the manner by which das Ding testifies to a structuring of 
structure is articulated, further, via a linguistic transformation of the Freudian tropes of 
condensation and displacement into the Jakobsonian tropes of metaphor and metonymy. 
For example, in Seminar VII, Lacan suggests that, by virtue of conceiving of the 
preconscious as a realm of Vorstellungsrepräesentanzen, Freud 
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...thus turns Vorstellung into an associative and combinatory element. In that way 
the world of Vorstellung is already organized according to the possibilities of the 
signifier as such. Already at the level of the unconscious there exists an 
organization that, as Freud says, is not necessarily that of contradiction or of 
grammar, but the laws of condensation and displacement, those that I call the laws 
of metaphor and metonymy.236 
 
Lacan’s comment resonates with the succinct definition Freud provides in ‘The 
Unconscious’. Here, with regard to the ‘mobility’ of ‘cathectic intensities [in the Ucs.]’ 
(i.e., the manner by which psychical charges pass among Vorstellungen – which is to say, 
in Lacan’s parlance, the laws or processes governing their ‘exchanges’, ‘gravitation’, or 
‘modulation’), Freud asserts: 
 
By the process of displacement one idea may surrender to another its whole quota 
of cathexis; by the process of condensation it may appropriate the whole cathexis of 
several other ideas. I have proposed to regard these two processes as distinguishing 
marks of the so-called primary psychical process.237  
 
With regard to Lacan’s subsequent linguistic transformation of it, two features of Freud’s 
conception of condensation and displacement are particularly relevant. Firstly, Freud 
conceives of condensation and displacement as sub-processes or ‘distinguishing marks’ 
of the ‘primary psychical process’. That is to say, condensation and displacement are 
aspects of that which ‘really’ or ‘primordially’ structures the system Ucs. ‘before’ or 
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dreams, there is a ‘representation’ that, as 
 
...Freud tells us... overlooks that structure, that most profound gravitation, which is 
established at the level of the Vorstellungen. And he affirms that these Vorstellungen 
gravitate, operate exchanges and are modulated according to the laws that you will 
recognise, if you have followed my teaching, as the fundamental laws of the signifying 
chain. (62) 
 
That is to say, condensation and displacement; metaphor and metonymy.  
 
 For some other contexts in which Lacan asserts this equivalence, see, for example, ibid, 
Seminar III, 221, and ibid, ‘The Instance of the Letter’, 425. 
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‘apart from’ language. Secondly, with regard to the form of the linguistic operations of 
metaphor and metonymy, Freud suggests that condensation involves a superposition of 
cathexes from an indefinite number of Vorstellungen, whilst displacement involves a 
transfer or passage of cathexis from one Vorstellungen to another.  
 
 Freud’s succinct definition of condensation and displacement in ‘The Unconscious’ 
follows the more comprehensive account presented in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’. 
Here, Freud characterises condensation and displacement as psychical processes 
governing the transfers of cathexes among latent dream-thoughts (i.e., by implication, 
primary processes that obtain in the system Ucs.). Subsequently, the filtering, censoring, 
mediation of the secondary process determines which latent dream-thoughts are 
transmuted into manifest dream-content (i.e., which latent dream-thoughts are admitted to 
the system Pcs. and thus, potentially, able to become conscious). In the first place, then, 
Freud invokes the term condensation to account for the fact that ‘Dreams [or, to be 
precise, their manifest content] are brief, meagre and laconic in comparison with the 
range and wealth of the [latent] dream-thoughts.’238 Indeed, with reference to his ‘Dream 
of the Botanical Monograph’, Freud suggests that the manifest dream-content comprises 
a relatively small number of elements that constitute 
 
...‘nodal points’ upon which a great number of the dream-thoughts converged... 
each of the elements of the dream’s content turns out to have been 
‘overdetermined’ – to have been represented in the dream-thoughts many times 
over.239 
 
Freud thereby concludes that the relationship between manifest dream-content and latent 
dream-thoughts is such that 
 
Not only are the elements of a dream determined by the dream-thoughts many 
times over, but the individual dream-thoughts are represented in the dream by 
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several elements. Associative paths lead from one element of the dream to several 
dream-thoughts, and from one dream-thought to several elements of the dream.240 
 
Here, it is worth noting that Freud’s account of the ‘overdetermination’ of dream-
thoughts anticipates the Lacanian conception of what, in section 2.3, is characterised as 
the ‘psychical function of meaning repression/overdetermination’. Similarly, Freud’s 
conception of dream elements that function as ‘ “nodal points” ’ for the compositing of 
densities of meaning anticipates the Lacanian understanding of what, in section 2.4, is 
characterised as the ‘precipitation’ of symptomatic formations or points de capiton. 
 
 Secondly, Freud observes that an important ‘corollary’ of the overdetermination 
intrinsic to condensation is that no univocal relationship obtains between particular 
elements of the manifest dream-content and the latent dream-thoughts.241 In consequence, 
Freud suggests that ‘The dream is, as it were, differently centred from the dream-thoughts 
– its content has different elements as its central point.’242 Displacement, then, is defined 
as that which constitutes this ‘shift’ of the centre of the dream – a shift that defines the 
difference between the latent dream-thoughts and the manifest dream-content, and which, 
in consequence, is a fundamental feature of the dream-work per se. The ‘corollary’ to 
which Freud alludes implies that condensation and displacement are, in effect, 
simultaneous or reciprocal processes in the dream-work. Hence, the overdeterminations 
intrinsic to condensation displace the ‘centre’ of the dream – i.e., perturb or change its 
meaning. By the same token, the dream centre thus displaced constitutes a new ‘nodal 
point’ (or collection of nodal points), on which basis further condensations and 
overdeterminations may proceed. This simultaneity of or reciprocity between 
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condensation and displacement is evident in Freud’s assessment that the dream-work 
involves the functioning of a psychical force 
 
...which on the one hand strips the elements which have a high psychical value of 
their intensity, and on the other hand, by means of overdetermination, creates from 
elements of low psychical value new values, which afterwards find their way into 
the dream-content. If that is so, a transference and displacement of psychical 
intensities occurs in the process of dream-formation, and it is as a result of these 
that the difference between the text of the dream-content and that of the dream-
thoughts comes about.243 
 
 It may be recalled that, in ‘The Unconscious’, Freud states that condensation and 
displacement are ‘distinguishing marks’ of the ‘primary process’ (i.e., that which 
functions in the system Ucs.). However, in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, Freud 
specifically identifies the ‘psychical force’ that ‘manifests itself in the facts of dream-
displacement’ with ‘the censorship which is exercised by one psychical agency in the 
mind over another’244 – i.e., the mediation of the Ucs. by the Pcs. Notwithstanding the 
evident ambiguity, it is apparent that, in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, Freud, precisely, 
invokes condensation and displacement to explain the difference between the latent 
dream-thoughts and the manifest dream-content – i.e., the difference between that which 
is, strictly speaking, of the system Ucs. and that which, by virtue of the system Pcs., is 
subsequently able to become part of the conscious discourse of a dream analysis. This is 
simply to reiterate that, in accordance with the secondary process, effects of the primary 
processes of condensation and displacement can register in consciousness. Moreover, as 
previously noted, the effects of condensation and displacement register simultaneously. 
In section 2.4, this simultaneity will be similarly observed in the operation of metaphor 
and metonymy such that, in consciousness, always already it is the case that agent-like, 
metaphoric irruptions are encountered as sutured into a prevailing, metonymic 
automatism. In other words, each metaphoric irruption ‘produces’ (or, better perhaps, ‘is 
structurally synonymous with’) a metonymic displacement. The metaphoric function will 
be characterised as that which enables the production of new meaning. The metonymic 
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function will be characterised as that which preserves existing meaning and thus sustains 
the appearance of an enduring, intersubjective, social and cultural reality.  
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2.3 Meaning-in-the-making: the signifier and the signifying chain; 
meaning repression/overdetermination 
 
 2.3.1 Sign, signifier, signified: Lacan’s subversion of Saussure’s 
linguistics 
 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the implications of Lacan’s linguistic 
transformation of Freudian theory in order to illuminate the following propositions: (1) 
expressions of subjectivity or meaning-making evince a tension between consciousness 
and the unconscious, (2) the tension between consciousness and the unconscious admits 
equivalent interpretation as a tension between one’s meaning and an other meaning, (3) 
in consequence, subjectivity demands to be understood in terms of a paradoxical 
simultaneity of agency and automatism. This discussion will fall into two main areas. In 
the current section, I present a Lacanian conception of the structure by virtue of which, in 
language, meaning emerges. That is, the field of the linguistic sign or, to be more precise, 
the signifier and signifying chain. In keeping with the structuralist or Saussurean impetus 
of Lacanian theory, I take the signifier/signifying chain to be defined by the relationship 
of tension obtaining between a conscious field of meaning/forms and an unconscious 
field of potentials. Briefly, I summarise Lacan’s understanding of how this structure is 
articulated in terms of a psychical function of repression/overdetermination. In section 
2.4, I address Lacan’s conception of metaphor and metonymy as exemplars of the 
structural laws according to which, in the making of meaning, signs are governed – that is 
to say, in accordance with the terminology proposed in section 2.2, the metaphoric 
structuring of a metonymic structure. This aspect of the discussion highlights the 
equivalence between the psychical function of repression/overdetermination, and the 
counterpoise of metaphor and metonymy implicated in the production of what Lacan 
refers to as points de capiton. 
 
 As a preliminary to the following discussion, it may be useful to specify how this 
study understands the distinctions obtaining between signs, signifieds, and signifiers. This 
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clarification seems necessary given that these terms are subject to various ambiguities – 
both in Lacan’s writing, and in the literature generally. In the first place, then, and in 
accordance with the function of representation/symbolisation, signs are to be considered 
as meaning/forms that are apprehended in and as conscious experience. That is to say, 
consciousness simply is sensing/thinking signs. Secondly, signifieds are to be understood 
as the meanings of signs or, to be more precise, meanings emerging by virtue of relations 
between signs established through conscious acts of naming or identification (where, 
always already, relations between signs are, themselves, signs). In other words, meaning 
does not subsist in isolation from signs nor do signs signify in and of themselves. On the 
contrary, the meaning one consciously determines defines a relation of tension with a 
field of meaning/forms (equivalent to what Lacan terms the big Other, symbolic order, or 
signifying chain), the greater part of which is, practically speaking, repressed and, 
therefore, unconscious.  
 
 At this point, by way of anticipating the discussion in this and later chapters, it may be 
useful to elaborate this understanding of the signified (which is to say, meaning and the 
manner of its emergence) in greater detail. In the first place, then, it is proposed that the 
signified emerges in consciousness by virtue of a relation of identity established between 
signs of the form A = B (such that, for example, in accordance with Jakobson’s 
linguistics, A and B may be metaphorically substituted for one another). Furthermore, in 
accordance with Jakobson’s understanding of the metonymic ‘combination’ and 
‘contexture’ of signs, always already, identities between signs are, themselves, signs – the 
meaning of which obtains (in a wider context, so to speak) by virtue of further relations 
of identity established with other signs. Thus, the identity A = B is, itself, a sign ([A = B], 
say), the meaning of which emerges by virtue of further identities such as [A = B] = C. 
Let us qualify these formulae in anticipation of the discussion in chapters three and four. 
Let A = ‘Victory over Death 2’, let B = ‘major painted calligraphy AM I AM’, and let C 
= ‘McCahon’s written paintings of 1969 and 1970’. On this basis, A = B expresses the 
identity ‘Victory over Death 2 is the painting distinguished by its inclusion of the major, 
painted calligraphy AM I AM’, A = C expresses the identity ‘Victory over Death 2 is the 
painting distinguished by its membership of McCahon’s written paintings of 1969 and 
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1970’, and [A = B] = C expresses the identity ‘[Victory over Death 2, the painting 
distinguished by its inclusion of the major, painted calligraphy AM I AM,] is 
distinguished by its membership of McCahon’s written paintings of 1969 and 1970’. 
Similarly, let A = ‘Painting from “Malady”’, let B = ‘sanguineous annulus’, and let C = 
‘Hotere’s Malady series paintings of 1970’. From this perspective, A = B expresses the 
identity ‘Painting from “Malady” is the painting distinguished by its inclusion of a 
sanguineous annulus’, A = C expresses the identity ‘Painting from “Malady” is the 
painting distinguished by its membership of Hotere’s Malady series paintings of 1970’, 
and [A = B] = C expresses the identity ‘[Painting from “Malady”, the painting 
distinguished by its inclusion of a sanguineous annulus,] is distinguished by its 
membership of Hotere’s Malady series paintings of 1970’. 
 
 Still further, however, it is necessary to understand that conceiving of ‘the’ meaning 
emerging by virtue of ‘an’ identity of the form A = B is valid only as a first 
approximation. Two aspects of this approximation demand more precise elaboration: (1) 
the notion that meaning emerges by virtue of a relation of identity and (2) the notion that 
meaning may be conceived in the singular (i.e., as ‘a’ meaning or ‘a’ signified). With 
regard to the first point (and as the discussion in subsection 2.3.3 illustrates), in 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making, the so-called tension between consciousness 
and the unconscious is considered to be synonymous with a psychical function of 
repression/overdetermination of meaning. From this perspective, ‘the’ signified, 
emerging in consciousness by virtue of an identity of the form A = B is, at the same time, 
sustained on the basis of a forgetting, suppressing, or repressing of the difference 
between A and B, or A ≠ B. To anticipate matters for further discussion in chapter three, 
insofar as, always already, this unconscious, repressed difference is insisting or returning 
(i.e., as that which, for the sake of argument, will be referred to as an ‘identity-in-
difference’ of the form A/B), the identity A = B unravels or, to employ Lacan’s 
terminology, ‘fades’ – which is to say that the signified or meaning evinces ambiguity. 
 
 Here, it should be noted that, notwithstanding the inevitability of consciously 
representing/symbolising the difference between A and B or, indeed, the 
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repressed/returning identity-in-difference, as signs (i.e., [A ≠ B] and [A/B], respectively), 
strictly speaking, these are neither entities nor expressions of such and, indeed, 
fundamentally exceed and elude determination in language. That is to say, ‘in 
themselves’, [A ≠ B] and [A/B] are, quite literally, inconceivable. To anticipate matters 
for further discussion in chapter three, it may be suggested that the ‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ 
difference between A and B attests to a function of pure difference or a 
lettering/tracing/differencing synonymous with the function of psychical 
repression/overdetermination of meaning. To the extent that this pure difference or 
lettering/tracing/differencing is impossible to represent/symbolise, it demands to be 
thought as a function of what will be termed the ‘real-as-impossibility, synonymous with, 
yet inassimilable to, the function of representation/symbolisation’. 
 
 Secondly, to reiterate the point made above, always already, the meaning one 
consciously determines defines a tension with a field of meaning (equivalent to what 
Lacan terms the big Other, symbolic order, signifying chain), the greater part of which is, 
practically speaking, repressed and, therefore, unconscious. Indeed, if one applies with 
rigour the implications of Lacanian theory then the very idea of determining ‘a’ meaning, 
in the singular, would appear to be precisely that which defines consciousness as a 
domain of imaginary idealisations and rationalisations of meaning. Therefore, to be more 
precise in one’s terminology, one ought to say that, in consciousness, one sustains an 
imaginary ideal of ‘a’ determined and enduring meaning by virtue of the repression of an 
infinity of differences. Insofar as, always already, this repressed infinity of differences is 
returning, ‘the’ meaning one sustains in consciousness is sustained only in its ambiguity. 
To anticipate matters for discussion in chapter four, I seek to explain this ambiguity in 
terms of meaning that is as reiterated (i.e., presenting as necessary, inevitable, normal, 
and natural) and is as fading (i.e., becoming ambiguous). 
 
 As a final, preliminary observation regarding the distinctions obtaining between signs, 
signifieds, and signifiers, it is worth noting that, in Lacan’s writing and elsewhere, one 
often finds signs and signifiers referred to interchangeably – something admissible as a 
first approximation or a convenient shorthand. Up to a point, then, the signifier invites 
 149 
interpretation as the conscious apprehension of a meaning/form (or a field of 
meaning/forms) – albeit, apart from any particular meaning. However, it is also important 
to appreciate that, from the perspective of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the manner by which 
the signifier means apart from any particular meaning is precisely that which defines the 
tension obtaining between consciousness and the unconscious. From this standpoint, the 
signifier demands a more rigorous definition as a function of ‘pure difference’, producing 
a field of differences that constitute what may be termed a ‘trace structure’. Thus 
conceived, the signifier resonates with the Lacanian understanding of das Ding in terms 
of a ‘structuring of structure’. These matters will merit further elaboration in chapter 
three. In the present context, the instrumental point is that ‘the’ signifier fundamentally 
exceeds and eludes conscious determination as either a ‘positive entity’ or a ‘being 
present’. Strictly speaking, then, in consciousness, it is not ‘the’ signifier per se that is 
apprehended or determined so much as ‘its’ effects. These effects are registered as 
discontinuities or symptomatic disturbances in a field of differences (i.e., the signifier 
conceived negatively as nothing other than the differences between signifiers) that is 
positively determined as a field of different things (i.e., objects or, rather, signs). 
 
 In Seminar III, this conception of the signifier as nothing but a sign of the relations of 
difference obtaining between signifiers is evident from Lacan’s discussion of the 
distinction between signifiers and material traces. Lacan points out that a material trace 
(like a footprint in the sand, for example) is a sign that refers to an absent object. 
However, 
 
...the signifier is a sign that doesn’t refer to any object, not even to one in the form 
of a trace, even though the trace nevertheless heralds the signifier’s essential 
feature. It, too, is the sign of an absence. But insofar as it forms part of language, 
the signifier is a sign which refers to another sign, which is as such structured to 
signify the absence of another sign, in other words, to be opposed to it in a 
couple.245 
 
Lewis reiterates this point with particular clarity: 
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Signifiers as such are nothing besides their references to other signifiers. This 
means that signifiers are nothing besides the differences between signifiers. Each 
signifier is composed of traces which mark the absence of other signifiers.246 
 
Still further, Lacan characterises the ‘existence of signifiers as such’ (my italics) as ‘a 
complex relationship of totality to totality... of entire system to entire system, of universe 
of signifiers to universe of signifiers.’247 That is to say, signifiers must be conceived as 
nothing apart from the ‘complex relationship... of universe of signifiers to universe of 
signifiers.’ In other words, all references to the signifier as a meaning/form or potential 
(i.e., in the singular), whilst inviting one to entertain the prospect of the actual or 
potential materialisation of an entity, must be considered as a discursive shorthand for the 
infinity of differential relations that constitutes the ‘universe of signifiers’. Always 
already, then, ‘the’ signifier is a ‘universe’ of such. 
 
 Support for this interpretation may be found across the breadth of Lacan’s Seminar. In 
Seminar I, for example, Lacan observes: 
 
The symbolic system is extraordinarily intricate, marked as it is by this 
Verschlungenheit, property of criss-crossing... Verschlungenheit designates 
linguistic criss-crossing – every easily isolable linguistic symbol is not only at one 
with the totality, but is cut across and constituted by a series of overflowings, of 
oppositional overdeterminations which place it at one and the same time in several 
registers.248 
 
Similarly, in Seminar II, Lacan affirms that the ‘domain proper to the human order’ is a 
‘symbolic’ ‘totality’ or ‘universe’. Moreover, this totality ‘isn’t constituted bit by bit. As 
soon as the symbol arrives, there is a universe of symbols.’ Although, here, Lacan allows 
that, practically speaking, it remains to be seen ‘how many symbols... constitute the 
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symbolic universe’, in potentia, this number is clearly infinite.249 Still further, in Seminar 
XX, one finds the rhetorical question: 
 
Does the signifier “One” derive from the fact that a signifier as such is never 
anything but one-among-others, referred to those others, being but its difference 
from the others? 
 
In response to which, Lacan asks ‘What does “There’s such a thing as One” mean?’ and, 
answering his own question, ‘From the one-among-others... arises... a signifying swarm’. 
On this basis, Lacan concludes:  
 
The signifier “one” is not just any old signifier. It is the signifying order insofar as 
it is instituted on the basis of the envelopment by which the whole of the chain 
subsists.250 
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 By way of anticipating the discussion presented in chapter three, this understanding of ‘the’ 
signifier as a ‘universe’ of such is complicated by assertions made in ibid, Seminar IX, Seminar 4, 
6 December 1961, 32. Here, Lacan defines the ‘essence of the signifier’ as the ‘unary trait’. 
However, it is important to appreciate that this ‘essence of the signifier’ is neither simply nor 
immediately a metaphysical entity or an expression of such. On the contrary, Lacan describes the 
signifier, in its ‘essence’ as a ‘one as difference’ or a function of ‘pure difference’. 
 
 In this regard, I should acknowledge that the difference between the ‘essence of the signifier’ 
as the ‘unary trait’ and ‘the’ signifier that is, always already, a ‘universe’ of signifiers resonates 
with definitions presented in Eyers. Here, Eyers proposes a ‘novel typology of the “signifier-in-
isolation” and the “signifier-in-relation” ’, where 
 
The ‘signifier-in-isolation’ designates the signifier as it exists as a material mark, isolated 
from networks of relational meaning. The ‘signifier-in-relation’, by contrast, designates the 
signifier in its better-known state, differentially related to all other signifiers and productive 
of meaning, as insisted upon in Saussure’s structural linguistics. (5) 
 
Eyers emphasises that these are ‘potential “states” for any signifier, rather than... different 
signifiers or fundamentally different modalities of signification.’ By way of further elaborating 
the notion of the signifier-in-isolation, Eyers defines it as the ‘Real-in-the-Symbolic’ and 
associates it with various Lacanian terms such as the ‘ “letter”, “unary trait”, “phallic signifier”, 
“empty signifier” ’ (38). Eyers’ reference to the ‘materiality’ of the signifier will merit further 
discussion in chapter three. 
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 Having established the complex nature of ‘the’ signifier, we may now turn to Lacan’s 
conception of ‘it’ as the primary structural element implicated in expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making. This may be illustrated by considering the implications of 
his so-called ‘subversion’ or ‘destruction’ of the Saussurean sign – a process by which 
Lacan amplifies or exploits certain ambiguities in Saussure’s linguistics.251 What are 
these? In the first place, Saussure’s conception of the linguistic sign seems paradoxical 
insofar as it is posited as a ‘concrete’ psychical or psychological ‘entity’ or ‘reality’ that, 
nevertheless, resists precise determination. Secondly, on the basis of this ambiguity, there 
is engendered, in Saussure’s linguistics, a further tension between the sign, considered 
‘positively’, as an identity of signified and signifier, and the degree to which, on closer 
inspection, identities of this kind appear only as potentials enlivened within language 
conceived, ‘negatively’ or diacritically, as a ‘system of pure values’ or relations of 
difference.252  
 
 Thus, in ‘The Instance of the Letter’, Lacan, firstly, elides, from the Saussurean sign, 
its bounding oval and reciprocating side arrows – diagrammatic features that, in the 
Cours, would appear to reinforce the status of the sign as a genuinely ‘real’ and 
‘concrete’ (albeit, psychical) self-sufficiency or totality in which there obtains (to 
paraphrase Saussure) an ‘intimate unity’ or identity of signified (concept or meaning) and 
signifier (sound-image or phenomenal representation).253 Indeed, Lacan refers to his re-
writing of the Saussurean sign as an ‘algorithm’ or ‘formalization’ – thus emphasising its 
status as an abstraction or idealisation.254 Secondly, Lacan repudiates Saussure’s posited 
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bi-univocal relation between signified and signifier. Hence, in Seminar III, Lacan asserts 
that ‘the relationship between signifier and signified is far from being... one-to-one.’255 
Similarly, in ‘The Instance of the Letter’, Lacan insists on rejecting ‘the illusion that the 
signifier serves [répond à] the function of representing the signified, or better, that the 
signifier has to justify [répondre de] its existence in terms of any signification 
whatsoever.’256 Here, the liberation of the signifier from its purely representative or 
auxiliary function in relation to the signified amplifies what is, already, more or less 
acknowledged in Saussure’s linguistics: the sign – in principle, an identity that offers to 
express a determinate meaning – nevertheless resists absolute delimitation or 
determination. In other words, the sign is revealed, ultimately, to be an ideal of meaning 
rather than an objectively real expression of meaning. In Seminar III, the conception of 
meaning as both ideal and unstable would appear to underpin comments like ‘meaning is 
by nature imaginary... always in the end evanescent’ and ‘The relationship between the 
signified and the signifier always appears fluid, always ready to come undone.’257 
Thirdly, in keeping with his understanding that the absolute determination of meaning is 
an unrealisable or unsustainable ideal, Lacan turns the Saussurean sign on its head, 
insisting on the priority of the signifier over the signified. Consequently, in ‘The Instance 
of the Letter’, Lacan (1) explicitly presents what he terms the ‘algorithm that grounds... 
linguistics’ as ‘S/s... signifier over signified’, (2) redefines the Saussurean line of unity 
between signified and signifier as a ‘barrier resisting signification’, and (3) links the 
construction S/s to the ‘topography’ of the unconscious such that ‘f(S) 1/s’.258 In relation 
to this latter point, Bruce Fink interprets Lacan’s formula as ‘ “The signified (s) is a 
function of the signifier (S).” ’259 Support for Fink’s reading may be found in Seminar III, 
where Lacan contends: 
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The signifier doesn’t just provide an envelope, a receptacle for meaning. It 
polarizes it, structures it, and brings it into existence.260 
 
 2.3.2 Meaning/forms and meaning in potentia: the signifier and the 
signifying chain 
 
 In chapter one, I suggested that, from a Lacanian perspective, expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making define a tension between the individual and a 
transindividual Otherness. As previously stated, this transindividual Otherness is 
synonymous with what Lacan calls, variously, the big Other, symbolic order, or 
signifying chain – the greater part of which is, practically speaking (i.e., from the 
perspective of the conscious individual), repressed and, therefore, unconscious. In the 
present chapter, I have suggested, additionally, that, (1) in expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making, the tension between consciousness and the unconscious 
manifests in symptomatic disturbances, (2) symptomatic disturbances admit 
consideration as effects of the signifier, and (3) always already, ‘the’ signifier is a 
‘universe’ of such. Reconciling these propositions, it may be suggested that (1) the 
‘universe’ of ‘the’ signifier corresponds to the signifying chain, (2) symptomatic 
disturbances define a tension between the individual one that is conscious and a (mostly) 
repressed transindividual Otherness, and (3) symptomatic disturbances also define a 
tension between conscious and unconscious dimensions of the signifying chain. 
 
 It may be noted that the signifying chain is another concept Lacan appropriates from 
Saussure’s linguistics. In so doing, Lacanian theory reflects Saussure’s understanding of 
discourse as a structure of syntagmatic and associative relations.261 Thus, in the Cours, 
Saussure defines syntagmatic relations as the linear combination of ‘elements... arranged 
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in sequence on the chain of speaking’, in accordance with rules of grammar and syntax, 
and which, thereby, obtain in discourse. By contrast, associative relations obtain outside 
discourse insofar as they define the ‘host of other words’, whose ‘seat is in the brain’, that 
a particular utterance will ‘unconsciously call to mind’ from the ‘inner storehouse that 
makes up the language of each speaker.’ In consequence, Saussure asserts: ‘The 
syntagmatic relation is in praesentia. It is based on two or more terms that occur in an 
effective series. Against this, the associative relation unites terms in absentia in a 
potential mnemonic series.’262 On this basis, Saussure goes on to suggest that ‘A 
particular word is like the center of a constellation; it is the point of convergence of an 
indefinite number of co-ordinated terms’.263 
 
 Evidently, then, the conscious dimension of the Lacanian signifying chain is 
equivalent to the Saussurean sequence of syntagms. Analogously, the unconscious 
dimension of the Lacanian signifying chain corresponds to the Saussurean constellation 
of associations that each syntagm expressed in consciousness ‘unconsciously call[s] to 
mind’. In ‘The Instance of the Letter’, this understanding is implicit in Lacan’s 
characterisation of the ‘chain of discourse’ as a ‘horizontal axis... in the direction in 
which it is oriented in time’, along which resounds a ‘polyphony... aligned along the 
several staves of a musical score’, and his suggestion that ‘Indeed, there is no signifying 
chain that does not sustain – as if attached to the punctuation of each of its units – all 
attested contexts that are, so to speak, “vertically” linked to that point’.264 The 
unconscious aspect of the signifying chain also seems implicit in Lacan’s allusion to the 
‘synchronic system of differential couplings... necessary to discern vocables in a given 
language [langue]’ and his explicit illustration of the ‘ “signifying chain” ’ with reference 
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to the ‘links by which a necklace firmly hooks onto a link of another necklace made of 
links.’265 
 
 However, in saying this, it is important to distinguish between Saussurean and 
Lacanian conceptions of the unconscious. In effect, Saussure conceives of the 
unconscious as an ‘inner storehouse’ of pre-fabricated signs by which language subsists 
in the memory of an individual. Lacan repudiates this understanding in two crucial 
respects. Firstly, Lacanian theory proposes that the unconscious is not simply language 
but rather structured like a language. Secondly, Lacanian theory rejects the notion that 
the unconscious is a function of individual memory. Thus in the ‘Seminar on “The 
Purloined  Letter” ’, Lacan asserts that ‘the remembering [mémoration] at stake in the 
unconscious – and I mean the Freudian unconscious – is not related to the register that is 
assumed to be that of memory, insofar as memory is taken to be a property of a living 
being.’266 Similarly, in ‘Position of the Unconscious’, Lacan tacitly denies that the 
unconscious is equivalent to ‘the learned and even integrated reserves of memory’.267 
 
  This said, the Lacanian unconscious does reflect the Saussurean understanding that 
‘the associative relation unites terms in absentia in a potential mnemonic series’. That is 
to say, as previously suggested, the Lacanian unconscious admits consideration as a field 
of pure potentials per se. Support for this idea may be found in Seminar III where, for 
example, Lacan observes: 
 
If we admit the existence of the unconscious as Freud elaborates it, we have to 
suppose that this sentence, this symbolic construction, covers all human lived 
experience like a web, that it’s always there, more or less latent... [my italics]268 
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That the unconscious is the field of latent or potential forms of meaning is also implicit in 
Lacan’s appeal to the Freudian notion of ‘overdetermination’ in characterising the 
‘conflict’ or meaning ambiguity underlying symptomatic expressions.269 It is on this basis 
that, as noted earlier, Lacan proposes: ‘symptoms... are always based on the existence of 
signifiers as such, on a complex relationship of totality to totality... of entire system to 
entire system, of universe of signifiers to universe of signifiers.’ Hence, in conscious 
expressions of subjectivity, symptoms manifest when  
 
The material linked to... [an] old conflict is preserved in the unconscious as a 
potential signifier, as a virtual signifier, and then captured in the signified of the 
current conflict and used by it as language’ [my italics].270 
 
 In proposing symptoms to be equivalent to the ‘capture in the signified’ of ‘a potential 
signifier... preserved in the unconscious’, it should be clear that this signifier, qua 
potential, neither exists as a positive entity nor designates any determinate meaning. 
Considered as effects of ‘the’ signifier that is a ‘universe’ of signifiers, symptoms may be 
said to define the tension obtaining between (1) that which, in consciousness, is ‘actually’ 
apprehended or determined (i.e., a field of signs or meaning/forms), in relation to which 
particular meanings emerge (i.e., signifieds), and (2) an infinite field of potentials that is 
synonymous with the unconscious.271 More concisely (albeit, with some loss of rigour), 
the Lacanian conception of the signifier may be said to define the tension obtaining 
between its conscious aspect as a meaning/form and its unconscious aspect as a potential. 
Further supporting the idea that the Lacanian unconscious is conceivable in terms of 
potentials is, for example, Ragland-Sullivan’s observation that 
 
                                                 
269
 Ibid, 119. 
 
270
 Ibid, 119-120. 
 
271
 It may be noted that the understanding of the Lacanian unconscious as a field of pure 
potentials again resonates with aspects of Heideggerian philosophy. Relevant, in this regard, is 
Heidegger’s definition of Dasein in terms of potentials and possibilities, and his conception of the 
temporality of Dasein in terms of ekstasis. These matters merit further discussion in section 8.2. 
 
 158 
...we can sum up the Lacanian unconscious as a structural (ordered), signifying 
(meaningful) delimitation of conscious thought and behavior, made up of all that 
one is, as well as of the potential for what one may become... What any analysis of 
an unconscious will reveal is a nonsubstantial, dialectical ‘language’ of 
becoming...272 
 
Also relevant, in this regard, is Lorenzo Chiesa’s suggestion that 
 
...according to Lacan, the unconscious can be considered as a ‘potential’ signified... 
Unconscious meaning is therefore nothing but signification in potentia.273 
 
 2.3.3 The psychical function of meaning repression/overdetermination 
 
 Having presented a Lacanian conception of the signifier in terms of (1) a negative 
structure of relations of difference wherein, always already, ‘the’ signifier is a ‘universe’ 
of such, and (2) the relationship of tension obtaining between its conscious aspect as a 
meaning/form and its unconscious aspect as a potential, it is now possible to specify how, 
in expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making, the signifier is articulated in accordance 
with a psychical function of repression/overdetermination. In this regard, Lewis provides 
a particularly lucid summary. In the first place, Lewis affirms that a signifier encountered 
in consciousness (e.g., in the form of a spoken or written sign) means by virtue of its 
reference to the field of signifiers that ‘in their infinity constitute the unconscious.’274 
However, as Lewis relates, further, it is necessary to efface this infinity of differences ‘in 
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order to render present to consciousness the signified of the signifiers one is using... What 
is elided in consciousness is thus the signifier as such, in favour of the signified.’ Indeed, 
Lewis observes that ‘It is the elision of this infinity of differences which constitutes 
repression.’275 From the perspective of finite consciousness (i.e., the perspective of the 
ego), meaning-making demands that the infinity of differences, characteristic of the field 
of signifiers, be repressed in favour of an imaginary idealisation of meaning – a meaning 
that, on the basis of an idealisation of this kind, can be particular, determinate and present 
to one (where this ‘one’ or ego is, itself, an imaginary ideal of self-unity, self-presence 
and self-sufficiency).  
 
 However, because the conscious determination of meaning is, precisely, an imaginary 
idealisation, the infinite field of differences, constitutive of signifiers that are 
unconscious, is not simply negated. On the contrary, a fundamental hypothesis of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is that disturbances in meaning-making (i.e., symptoms), whilst 
registered entirely in consciousness, may be attributed to the continuing insistence of a 
repressed field of potentials that are unconscious. Consequently, as Lacan asserts in 
Seminar II, ‘The discovery of the unconscious... is that the full significance of meaning 
far surpasses the signs manipulated by the individual’ (i.e., ‘one that is conscious’). 
Hence: ‘Man is always cultivating a great many more signs than he thinks.’276 
Acknowledging Lacan’s claim, Lewis appropriates Freud’s terminology and identifies 
this overabundance of meaning as ‘a signified’s “overdetermination” by signifiers. There 
is always more than one thing that a signifier could signify’ – on which basis, ambiguity 
of meaning is, therefore, inherent to the signifier.277 As Lewis relates, further, ‘It is by 
means of this overdetermination that the repressed can return, that the unconscious can 
make its absence felt within language.’ This is, precisely, what is inherent in symptoms 
such as parapraxes and other discontinuities in meaning-making. The signifier as 
‘linguistic overdetermination of meaning... becomes manifest in its very repression.’ In 
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making this suggestion, Lewis affirms that the signifier, in its unconscious aspect, is not 
conceivable as a metaphysical entity or expression of such: 
 
It is not as if the unconscious reveals itself; rather it is revealed that there is an 
unconscious. The repressed returns in the symptom, but it returns as repressed... 
What returns is not that which is repressed, but the very event of repression 
itself...278 
 
In support of this idea, Lewis refers to Seminar III, where Lacan asserts: 
 
What comes under the effect of repression returns, for repression and the return of 
the repressed are just the two sides of the same coin. The repressed is always there, 
expressed in a perfectly articulate manner in symptoms and a host of other 
phenomena.279 
 
 Let us summarise the discussion thus far. What is being proposed is that, in 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making, the tension between consciousness and the 
unconscious admits consideration in terms of the expression, articulation or structuring of 
the signifying chain in its conscious and its unconscious aspects. The conscious 
dimension of the signifying chain comprises a diachronic sequence of signifiers-as-
meaning/forms. The unconscious dimension of the signifying chain comprises a 
synchronic constellation of signifiers that, to employ  Chiesa’s parlance, exists or, rather, 
insists, ‘in potentia’. The connexion between the conscious and the unconscious 
dimensions of the signifying chain is articulated in accordance with a psychical 
‘mechanism’ or ‘function’ that represses signifiers (i.e., expels signifiers from 
consciousness and reifies the infinite field of potential signifiers that are unconscious) 
and, at the same time, by virtue of the ‘return’ of these repressed signifiers, over-
determines signifieds in consciousness. These signifieds are, ostensibly, determinate 
meanings that, in the final analysis, are revealed to be indeterminate and ideal. Moreover, 
an important consequence of the psychical phenomenon of repression/overdetermination 
is that, in language-mediated expressions of subjectivity, discontinuities in meaning-
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making do not evince a lack or absence of meaning but, on the contrary, testify to an 
overabundance of meaning – at least, in potentia. Hence, in expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making, the tension between consciousness and the unconscious 
admits interpretation as a tension between one meaning and an other meaning in the 
sense that any signified emerging is not merely determined but, always already, 
overdetermined and thus susceptible to being replaced and re-written. Indeed, the notion 
of meaning overdetermination would appear to imply that signifieds are not merely 
vulnerable to being overwritten – rather, always already it is the case that this is taking 
place.  
 
 This latter conclusion simply reiterates Lacan’s insistence that ‘meaning is by nature 
imaginary... always in the end evanescent’ – i.e., the manner by which the signified, as an 
ideal of meaning, as a product of fabrication and rationalisation, legislates only 
contingently rather than absolutely. The sense one has that meaning is both articulated 
and effective is, precisely, the illusion of consciousness and ego. Nevertheless, even if 
this state of affairs obtains, it still seems necessary to explain in greater detail the 
apparent prevalence and persistence of these illusions. That is to say, how is it that there 
is the appearance of an entrenched panoply of longstanding cultural mores and prejudices 
permeating and structuring every human endeavour? How is it that there is the 
appearance of an intersubjective, social and cultural reality, wherein meaning emerges 
and endures long enough to be communicated? In the following section, I seek a 
preliminary unravelling of these conundrums by appealing to Lacan’s understanding of 
the laws of metaphor and metonymy, in relation to which the field of meaning is 
configured by points de capiton. 
 
 162 
2.4 The meaning that is made: metaphor, metonymy and the point 
de capiton 
 
 2.4.1 Metaphors and metonyms 
 
 In Seminar III and ‘The Instance of the Letter’, Lacan’s elaboration of the functioning 
of the signifying chain in terms of metonymy and metaphor explicitly refers to Jakobson’s 
essay ‘Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances’.280 Here, it 
may be useful to recall that Jakobson’s account of metonymy and metaphor is, in essence, 
a reframing of Saussure’s understanding of discourse in terms of syntagmatic and 
associative relations. Thus, Jakobson attributes to the linguistic sign ‘two modes of 
arrangement’, which he terms ‘Combination’ and ‘Selection’, and which, he 
acknowledges, are analogous to the relations Saussure understood as holding, 
respectively, ‘in presentia’ (i.e., syntagyms) and ‘in absentia’ (i.e., associations). 
Combination implies that ‘Any sign is made up of constituent signs and only occurs in 
combination with other signs’, between which there obtain relations of ‘contiguity’. 
Selection implies ‘the possibility of substituting one... [sign] for the other, equivalent to 
the former in one respect and different from it in another’, on which basis ‘signs are 
linked by various degrees of similarity’ – that is to say, relations of similarity and 
difference.281 Jakobson goes on to elaborate two forms of aphasia wherein, respectively, 
relations of similarity and relations of contiguity are ‘suppressed’, thereby positing that 
‘Metaphor is alien to the similarity disorder, and metonymy to the contiguity disorder.’282 
 
 I would argue that Lacan’s allusions to metaphor and metonymy are potentially 
confusing unless one distinguishes between their application as (1) literary figures (i.e., 
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metonyms and metaphors that are, necessarily, encountered in consciousness) and (2) 
structural laws or operators (i.e., the metonymic relationships of combination/contiguity 
and the metaphoric relationships of selection/substitution that define the tension obtaining 
between conscious and unconscious dimensions of the signifying chain). This distinction 
may be illustrated with reference to Lacan’s employment of the two phrases ‘thirty sails’ 
and ‘love is a pebble laughing in the sun’.283 Structurally speaking, relations of 
metonymy and metaphor obtain in both expressions. Metonymic relationships obtain 
insofar as each phrase chains two or more words in series. Metaphoric relationships 
obtain insofar as each phrase involves substitutions. In the first example, ‘sail’ is 
substituted for ‘ship’; in the second example, ‘a pebble laughing in the sun’ is substituted 
for ‘love’. In the literary or poetical sense, however, ‘thirty sails’ is a metonym whilst 
‘love is a pebble laughing in the sun’ is a metaphor. As Lacan points out, this distinction 
reflects the fact that, in the former case, ‘The part is taken for the whole’ (i.e., the figure 
of synecdoche, which is often considered to be a form of metonymy) whilst, in the latter, 
there is a stating of ‘One word for another’.284 Consequently, the metonym ‘thirty sails’ 
expresses an already extant relation between ‘sail’ and ‘ship’ such that the expression 
‘thirty sails’ is equivalent to ‘thirty ships’ – i.e., they mean the same. This is precisely to 
say that no new meaning is produced or, as Lacan puts it, there is a ‘resistance of 
signification’. Contrarily, in the metaphor ‘love is a pebble laughing in the sun’, no pre-
existing relation obtains between ‘love’ and ‘a pebble laughing in the sun’. On this basis, 
it is apparent that, in substituting one for the other, new meaning is created or, in Lacan’s 
words, there is ‘emergence of signification.’285 
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 Having clarified the distinction between the metaphor and the metonym, considered as 
literary figures, and metaphor and metonymy, considered as structural laws or operators, 
it is now possible to specify, more precisely, how the latter configure the signifying chain 
in such a way that expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making evince a tension between 
consciousness and the unconscious. That is to say, the manner by which, in accordance 
with what may be termed a metaphoric structuring of a metonymic structure, a 
synchronic metonymy that is unconscious metaphorically becomes as a diachronic 
metonymy in consciousness. As previously noted, the tension in question reflects Lacan’s 
understanding of the signifying chain as obtaining both in consciousness and in the 
unconscious. On this basis, metonymy defines the combinational ordering of the 
signifying chain in terms of (1) a diachronic sequence of signifiers-as-meaning/forms in 
consciousness and (2) a synchronic constellation of signifiers-as-potentials that are 
unconscious. Metaphor, by contrast, can be understood as the operation according to 
which the emergence of signifieds involves substituting signifiers-as-potentials that are 
unconscious for signifiers-as-meaning/forms in consciousness. In this way, metaphor 
would appear to be synonymous with the aforementioned psychical function of 
repression/overdetermination – by virtue of which meaning-making expresses a relation 
of tension between consciousness and the unconscious. The meaning ideal that 
precipitates or crystallises by virtue of this metaphoric structuring of a metonymic 
structure also corresponds to the production of what Lacan refers to as a point de capiton. 
 
 2.4.2 The point de capiton 
 
 Lacan introduces this idea in Seminar III, suggesting that the point de capiton marks 
‘the point at which signified and signifier are knotted together’.286 Further elaborations 
are made in ‘The Instance of the Letter’, where Lacan (1) refers to the manner by which, 
in the making of meaning, ‘the signifier... enters the signified’ and (2) characterises the 
structure of metaphor as a ‘crossing of the bar’ between signifier and signified such that 
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there is a ‘passage of the signifier into the signified’.287 Finally, in ‘The Subversion of the 
Subject’, Lacan affirms that ‘metaphor’ corresponds to the ‘hidden... synchronic 
structure’ of the point de capiton (i.e., the constellation of potential signifiers that are 
unconscious).288 In seeking to understand these characterisations, it is crucial to 
appreciate that, notwithstanding the seemingly positive and metaphysical inferences of 
Lacan’s terminology, the wider logic and context of Lacanian theory evidently precludes 
literally interpreting the point de capiton as a localised union of discrete entities. On the 
contrary, the point de capiton must (1) reflect the manner by which signifiers are not to 
be conceived as positive entities but rather demand to be considered in negative terms as 
structures of differences (i.e., as a field of meaning/forms or potentials), and (2) the status 
of the signified as contingent and ideal. 
 
 The non-metaphysical status of the point de capiton also follows from the fact that, 
insofar as it operates on or configures the signifying chain, it must, by necessity, 
encompass synchrony and diachrony.289 Here, it may be useful to reiterate that, from a 
literary or poetical standpoint, the point de capiton is a metaphor associated with the 
creation of new meaning (i.e., the emergence or precipitation of a signified – albeit, 
contingent and ideal). Structurally speaking, however, the point de capiton possesses a 
synchronic/metaphoric dimension and a diachronic/metonymic dimension. To put the 
matter equivalently, in conscious discourse, the (structurally synchronic/metaphoric) 
‘moment’ of the ‘precipitation’ of meaning is a (structurally diachronic/metonymic) 
function of both the anticipation and retroactive determination of meaning. In her essay, 
‘Time and Interpretation’ (1996), Colette Soler provides a useful elaboration of the 
complex temporality proper to expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making. Soler 
observes that the ‘temporality of the subject’ is neither the abstract temporality of ‘clock 
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time’ nor the pathologically conditioned temporality of ‘living beings’ but rather ‘the 
temporality of the signifier’ and ‘signifying chain’, which Soler characterises as 
‘reversible time... a twofold temporality between anticipation and retroaction’. As Soler 
puts it: 
 
...the temporality of speech is a time shared between the anticipation, while you are 
speaking, of the moment of conclusion (the moment at which you can grasp what 
you meant), and retroaction, for when you arrive at the anticipated end point, all 
previous speech takes on new meaning, that is to say, new meaning emerges 
retroactively.290 
 
 Support for Soler’s account of the ‘reversible’ temporality of the subject may be found 
in Seminar III, Seminar V, and ‘The Instance of the Letter’. In the former case, Lacan 
addresses the opening line of Jean Racine’s tragic play Athaliah (1691): ‘ “Yes, I come 
into his temple to worship the Eternal Lord” ’, proposing that, as this phrase unfolds, its 
‘meaning’ is inherently ambiguous – floating, as it were, within a mass of unresolved 
meaning potentials. The possibility of determining the meaning of the opening line only 
crystallises, in hindsight, on its conclusion:  
 
The sentence only exists as completed and its sense comes to it retroactively. We 
need to have got to the end, that is to say, to this famous Eternal Lord.  
 
We are, here, in the order of signifiers, and I hope I have made you feel what the 
continuity of the signifier is. A signifying unit presupposes the completion of a 
certain circle that situates its different elements.291 
 
Here, the anticipatory dimension of expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making resides 
in the presupposition of a ‘completion’; the retroactive dimension of expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making resides in the characterisation of this completion as a 
‘certain circle that situates its different elements’. 
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 One finds a particularly clear account of the anticipatory and retroactive dimensions of 
meaning-making in Seminar V. Here, Lacan defines the ‘structure of discourse’ in terms 
of a chain of signifiers (i.e., S1, S2...Sn) and a chain of signifieds (s1, s2...sn). Lacan goes 
on to suggest that the ‘significations... produced according to the law of the signifying 
chain’ involve  
 
...an anticipation of the signifying succession, every signifying chain opening out 
before it the horizon of its own completion, and at the same time... a retroaction, 
once there has come naturally the signifying term which, as one might say, 
overtakes the sentence, which means that what it produced at the level of the 
signified always has what one might call this retroactive function. Here S2 already 
takes shape once S1 has started, and is only completed when S2 retroacts on S1. 
 
In consequence, Lacan suggests that the signifier and the signified are ‘always out of 
phase to a certain degree’ – this phase difference bestowing on any emerging meaning or 
signified ‘something which is essentially metonymical’. To this extent, there is an evident 
resonance with Freud’s aforementioned suggestion, in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, to 
the effect that condensations displace the ‘centre’ of the dream (i.e., perturb or change its 
meaning) – where the dream centre thus displaced constitutes a new centre, on which 
basis further condensations may proceed. Condensation and displacement, metaphor and 
metonymy are thus to be conceived as reciprocal functions – each implies the other. 
Therefore, whilst characterising ‘every signification’ (i.e., meanings emerging in 
consciousness) as ‘essentially metonymical’, Lacan also suggests that this essence of 
metonymy also obtains by virtue of  
 
...what links the signifying chain in itself to what constitutes it as such, to those 
links... those knots which we can here precisely call momentary...namely this 
beyond of the signifying chain to which we attempt to reduce it...292 
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Here, I would suggest that Lacan’s allusion to the ‘momentary... knots’ that are, at once, 
‘constitutive’ and ‘beyond’ the signifying chain is, in effect, a reference to the ‘hidden’, 
metaphoric structure of the point de capiton, implicated in the metonymical ‘linkages’ of 
signs in chains whilst, ‘in itself’, resisting determination as a metaphysical entity or 
expression of such.  
 
 Finally, in ‘The Instance of the Letter’, Lacan suggests: 
 
...the signifier, by its very nature, always anticipates meaning by deploying its 
dimension in some sense before it. As is seen at the level of the sentence when the 
latter is interrupted before the significant term: ‘I’ll never...,’ ‘The fact remains...,’ 
‘Still perhaps...’ Such sentences nevertheless make sense, and that sense is all the 
more oppressive in that it is content to make us wait for it... 
 
Whence we can say that it is in the chain of the signifier that meaning insists, but 
that none of the chain’s elements consists in the signification it can provide at that 
very moment.293 
 
In this case, the anticipatory dimension of expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making 
resides in the so-called insistence of the signifying chain – i.e., in what has been termed 
the tension between the conscious aspect of the signifier as a field of meaning/forms and 
the unconscious aspect of the signifier as a field of potentials. The retroactive dimension 
of expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making is implicit in Lacan’s next few comments: 
 
The notion of an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier thus comes to 
the fore – which Ferdinand de Saussure illustrates with an image resembling the 
wavy lines of upper and lower Waters in miniature from the manuscripts of 
Genesis. It is a twofold flood in which the landmarks – fine streaks of rain traced by 
vertical dotted lines that supposedly delimit corresponding segments – seem 
insubstantial.294 
 
Lacan’s reference is to the well-known, diagrammatic representation, in Saussure’s 
Cours, of the field of ‘thought-sound’ (i.e., abstract concepts and phenomenal 
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representations).295 At first glance, precisely what Lacan means with regard to the ‘notion 
of an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier’ may seem enigmatic (although 
the aforementioned reference, in Seminar V, to the ‘metonymical’ ‘phase’ difference 
between signifier and signified, provides a clue). Fink, however, provides a particularly 
lucid interpretation to the effect that, for the sake of argument, Lacan momentarily 
entertains the idea that, in discourse, signifieds are temporally contiguous with signifiers. 
From this perspective, one might conclude that, in the progression of signs, meaning 
simply builds step by step, additively or accumulatively.296 However, Lacan immediately 
rejects this conjecture, asserting, on the contrary, that 
 
All our experience runs counter to this, which made me speak at one point in my 
seminar on the psychoses of the ‘button ties’ [points de capiton] required by this 
schema to account for the dominance of the letter in the dramatic transformation 
that dialogue can effect in the subject.297 
 
 What Lacan means by the ‘letter’ will merit further discussion in chapter three. At this 
point, it suffices to say that the ‘dominance of the letter’ is synonymous with the 
‘insistence’ of the signifying chain. The import of Lacan’s comment is that, in conscious 
experience, the presence of points de capiton demonstrates that meaning is not, so to 
speak, literally a function of an ‘incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier’ (i.e., 
in the form of a continuum of additions and accumulations) but rather crystallises or 
precipitates in the form of a discontinuity or punctuation. In the process, there is effected, 
retroactively, a complete reconfiguration of the field of meaning (i.e., a ‘dramatic 
transformation... in the subject’). That the precipitation of the point de capiton is 
equivalent to a punctuation in ‘signification’ immediately resonates with the 
aforementioned suggestion that the unconscious manifests as a discontinuity in conscious 
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processes of meaning-making and the idea that meaning-making is meaning-disturbance. 
However, notwithstanding the necessity for there to be a punctuation or discontinuity in 
signification in order to precipitate the point de capiton, Lacan’s reference to a 
‘signifying unit’ that ‘situates its different elements’ affirms, further, that the point de 
capiton is not conceivable as the precipitation of a meaning but, more precisely, 
designates the crystallisation and/or reconfiguration of a field of meaning. 
  
 A particularly apposite illustration of this point is given in Žižek’s The Sublime Object 
of Ideology (1989). Here, Žižek refers to the ‘Lacanian point de capiton’ as that which 
‘creates and sustains the identity of a given ideological field’.298 Still further, Žižek 
characterises the point de capiton as an ‘ideological anamorphosis’ insofar as it is 
equivalent to the insistence of a particular perspective on a field of meaning, wherein that 
which is merely ideal and contingent is misconceived as real and determinate. In other 
words, as Žižek suggests, the point de capiton is, in effect, an ‘ “error of perspective” ’ 
arising from its misrecognition as  
 
...a point of supreme density of Meaning, a kind of Guarantee which, by being itself 
excepted from the differential interplay of elements, would serve as a stable and 
fixed point of reference.299 
 
In this way, the point de capiton bears witness to a certain privileging in meaning-
making. Indeed, one might conceive of the point de caption in terms of the imposition of 
a distorting lens that not only renders visible but, in fact, generates stress fractures in the 
field of meaning thereby ‘crystallized’. In itself, however, this ‘distorting lens’ is a purely 
formal feature that is and means nothing. In consequence, the point de capiton that 
masquerades, ostensibly, as a fully determined meaning or meaning-that-is-made is 
revealed to be merely a gesture towards meaning: the form of meaning or, better perhaps, 
the form of meaning-in-the-making. As Žižek puts it, the point de capiton is 
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...nothing but a ‘pure difference’: its role is purely structural, its nature is purely 
performative – its signification coincides with its own act of enunciation; in short it 
is a ‘signifier without the signified’.300 
 
 Žižek’s understanding of the point de capiton harmonises well with Lacan’s 
conception of meaning as that which dissimulates as fully determined, essential, present, 
real, etc., but that is, in fact, ‘by nature imaginary’ and ‘always in the end evanescent’. 
Moreover, thus formulated, the point de capiton provides a way to resolve the question 
raised previously in relation to the seeming prevalence and persistence of these imaginary 
and illusory structures of meaning. Ultimately, that which is enduring and effective, in 
intersubjective, social and cultural reality (the greater part of which, it should be recalled, 
is, practically speaking, unconscious), is not a set of signifieds (i.e., determinate 
meanings) but rather a field of signifiers defined by the tension obtaining between the 
conscious aspect of the signifier as meaning/form and the unconscious aspect of the 
signifier as potential. It is precisely the misapprehension of a point de capiton as a 
determinate meaning or signified that gives rise to the illusion that a set of determinate 
meanings exists and endures above and beyond meaning/forms and meaning potentials. 
As Žižek observes, on the basis of these misrecognitions, 
 
...the element which represents within the field of Meaning, the agency of pure 
signifier – the element through which the signifier’s non-sense erupts in the midst 
of Meaning – is perceived as a point of extreme saturation of Meaning, as the point 
which ‘gives meaning’ to all others and thus totalises the field of (ideological) 
meaning.301 
 
In chapter three, what Žižek terms the ‘agency of pure signifier’ will merit further 
attention in relation to the Lacanian conception of the ‘materialisation of the signifier’ 
and the ‘instance of the letter’. In the present context, however, I merely observe that 
Žižek’s characterisation of the point de capiton as ‘the element through which the 
signifier’s non-sense erupts in the midst of Meaning’, where it is ‘perceived as a point of 
extreme saturation of Meaning’, clearly resonates with the aforementioned suggestion 
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that, in accordance with the psychical function of repression/overdetermination, 
discontinuities in conscious expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making evince an over-
abundance of unconscious meaning – at least, in potentia. 
 
 It also may be observed that the Lacanian conception of expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making in terms of the emergence of figures of discourse or points 
de capiton (where such a precipitation of meaning is structured in accordance with the 
laws of metaphor and metonymy) permits a more nuanced elucidation of the antinomy 
outlined in sections 1.4 and 2.1. In relation to the subjectivity expressed in Victory over 
Death 2, Painting from “Malady”, and related works, this conundrum resided in the 
apparent simultaneity of agency and automatism – or, equivalently, their expression of an 
other meaning, where this idea carried the dual implication: (1) meaning given by an 
other and (2) meaning made only insofar as it is susceptible to being re-made. On the 
basis of Lacan’s formulations in ‘The Instance of the Letter’, the metaphoric function, 
insofar as it is implicated in the production of new meaning, would appear to be 
synonymous with (1) creativity and agency and, therefore, (2) meaning made only insofar 
as it is susceptible to being re-made. By contrast, the metonymic function, insofar as it is 
implicated in the resistance to the production of new meaning, would appear to be 
synonymous with (1) an automatist reification and reiteration of existing meaning and, 
therefore, (2) meaning given by an other. 
 
 The critical point to grasp is that, insofar as works like Victory over Death 2 and 
Painting from “Malady” come to signify, they bear witness to the precipitation and 
perpetuation of points de capiton that, ‘in themselves’, are structured metaphorically and 
metonymically. Given that the metaphoric structure of the point de capiton eludes 
metaphysical determination (i.e., ‘it’ is ‘hidden’), the ‘agency’ to which it corresponds 
has no existence other than as a stutter within a metonymically structured automatism. 
That is to say, always already, the ‘agent-like’, metaphoric discontinuity, associated with 
the production of ‘new’ meaning, is encountered as subsumed within the seemingly 
‘automatist’, metonymic reiteration of existing meaning. To put the matter in equivalent 
terms, one might say that the metaphorically structured meaning-in-the-making (i.e., the 
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meaning discontinuity or disturbance that accompanies the fleeting irruption of the 
symptom or signifier) is immediately subsumed within the metonymically structured 
meaning-that-is-made (i.e., the, ostensibly, fully determined signified or point de 
capiton). In consequence, the metonymic continuity of discourse admits consideration as 
a sequence of subsumings or suturings, in accordance with which metaphoric 
discontinuities or disturbances subsist or insist as traces (i.e., as that which testifies to the 
so-called ‘return’ of repressed signifiers). From the perspective of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, then, ‘agency’ exists only in the form of fleeting discontinuities within a 
prevailing ‘automatism’. The ‘agent-like’ and metaphorical aspect of the point de capiton 
bears witness to the precipitation of (new) meaning. However, necessarily and inevitably, 
this precipitation is encountered in retrospect – as sutured into the ‘automatist’ and 
metonymic dimension of the point de capiton that bears witness to the perpetuation and 
transmission of meaning (i.e., that which sustains the imaginary appearance of an 
enduring, intersubjective, social and cultural reality). 
 
 Let us summarise the discussion in this second, thesis chapter. I have elaborated 
Lacan’s linguistic transformation of Freudian psychoanalysis in order to present a general 
understanding of the ambiguous and contradictory nature of subjectivity/meaning-
making. In so doing, I have considered expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making in 
terms of a tension between consciousness and the unconscious (specifically, the 
conscious dimension of the signifier as a meaning/form and the unconscious dimension of 
the signifier as a potential). This tension has been explained, further, in terms of the 
operation, on the field of signifiers (or signifying chain), of a psychical function of 
meaning repression/overdetermination (or, equivalently, repression and the return of the 
repressed; the insistence of a signifier without a signified) in accordance with the 
structural laws of metaphor and metonymy. In other words, in expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making, there obtains a reciprocity between metaphor and 
metonymy that admits consideration as a structuring of structure, by virtue of which a 
synchronic metonymy that is unconscious metaphorically becomes as a diachronic 
metonymy in consciousness. In keeping with Lacanian theory, I have suggested that these 
operations are implicated in the precipitation and perpetuation of points de capiton.  
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 Having shed some light on the nature of the subjectivity/meaning-making that 
manifests as ambiguity and contradiction, in the second part of the thesis, the focus shifts 
to an elaboration of the nature of painting, considered as an expression of this ambiguous 
and contradictory subjectivity. In pursuit of this aim, I present a more detailed elaboration 
of what, precisely, is involved in the precipitation and perpetuation of points de capiton 
with regard to what I will refer to as the painted matter of Victory over Death 2, Painting 
from “Malady”, and related works. In so doing, I pose two, basic questions. In chapter 
three, I ask how does the meaning of painting come into being? That is to say, I elucidate 
the ‘agent-like’, metaphoric dimension of the precipitation of points de capiton in 
painting – which I propose to call the figuring of painting.302 In chapter four, I ask how is 
the meaning of painting sustained? That is to say, I elucidate the ‘automatist’, metonymic 
dimension of the perpetuation of points de capiton in painting – which I propose to call 
the desire of painting. These considerations will set the stage for the third part of the 
thesis, where the focus shifts from painting to discourse – i.e., the writing and testimony 
surrounding painting (notwithstanding the fact that, as language-mediated expressions of 
subjectivity, always already, paintings and painted matter demand to be understood as 
part of the discourse on painting and painted matter). Here, with regard to the discourse 
surrounding McCahon and Hotere, I propose that (1) the structuring of structure or 
reciprocity of metaphor and metonymy admits the equivalent formulation figuring of 
desire (thereby defining McCahon discourse and Hotere discourse as discourses of 
desire), and (2) this figuring of desire may be articulated in relation to the seeming 
prominence and persistence of two, inherently ambiguous, points de capiton: 
‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’. 
 
                                                 
302
 Given the equivalence between metaphors and symptomatic formations, this chapter may well 
have been titled ‘The symptom of painting’. Indeed, this terminology would be more in accord 
with Lacan, ‘The Instance of the Letter’, 439, where it is asserted that ‘the symptom is a 
metaphor... desire is a metonymy.’ See, also, ibid, Seminar V, Seminar 1, 6 November 1957, 
Seminar 26, 18 June 1958, 346, where Lacan asserts that ‘a symptom... is a signification. A 
symptom is a signified’. The term figure is preferred insofar as it conveys, more readily, perhaps, 
the manner by which painting (like any expression of subjectivity) is a meaning-forming and a 
forming-meaning that involves something akin to a writing in and of the psyche. 
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 However, before proceeding with the following discussion, the terms ‘painted matter’ 
and ‘figuring’ demand further explanation. In the first place, I should point out that, by 
painted matter, I do not mean to privilege the physical reality of painted objects in any 
naïvely materialistic or metaphysical sense. By way of anticipating matters for 
consideration in chapter three, the term ‘painted matter’ refers to the manner by which, in 
accordance with the function of representation/symbolisation, and in common with any 
expression of subjectivity, painting is a forming-meaning and a meaning-forming. Always 
already, then, paintings are encountered as fields of forms that mean and meaning/forms: 
painted matter constitutes a field of signs, signifiers, or figures. On this basis, figuring 
refers to the manner by which expressions of subjectivity (of which painting is one 
example) give rise to meaning/forms or fields of such – a process or function that, as 
noted above, is synonymous with the precipitation of points de capiton. Hence, to ask: 
‘how does the meaning of painting come into being?’ is, precisely, to ask: ‘how does the 
meaning of painting form?’ Likewise (looking ahead to chapter four) to ask ‘how is the 
meaning of painting sustained?’ is, precisely, to ask: ‘how are there sustained forms of 
meaning in painting?’ Moreover, in view of these considerations, it also should be clear 
that ‘painted matter’ and ‘figuring’ imply an inextricable entanglement of plastic and 
graphic, pictorial and symbolic, painting and writing. 
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Part 2 Painting 
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Chapter 3 The figuring of painting 
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3.1 I believe, but don’t believe: the ‘true’ enunciation of painting 
 
 3.1.1 Painting negation 
 
 In chapter two, the agent-like, metaphoric dimension of the point de capiton was 
characterised in terms of the so-called ‘return of the repressed’ – i.e., as a fleeting 
irruption or discontinuity in discourse that is encountered as sutured into a prevailing, 
automatist metonymy, where ‘it’ subsists/insists as trace. In the first two sections of the 
present chapter, then, the questions of ‘in what’ the meaning of painting consists and 
‘how’ this meaning comes into being will be elaborated by way of a deeper investigation 
into the nature of this ‘trace-like’ ‘agency’. In pursuing this objective, I propose to 
engage with the figure AM I AM in the painted matter of Victory over Death 2. In 
chapter one, I observed that this figure (and, hence, the nature of the 
subjectivity/meaning-making of which it is a sign) is distinguished not merely by 
ambiguity of meaning but, indeed, by self-contradiction. This kind of an interpretation is 
consistent with the note linking the entries for Practical Religion and Victory over Death 
2 in the catalogue accompanying Colin McCahon: a survey exhibition. Here, McCahon 
states: 
 
The next also belongs to the Practical Religion series – a simple I AM at first. But 
not so simple really as doubts do come in here too. I believe, but don’t believe.303 
 
‘I believe, but don’t believe’ is the phrase by which McCahon characterises what is, 
implicitly, expressed in the major, painted calligraphy of Victory over Death 2: ‘a simple 
I AM at first. But not so simple really as doubts do come in here too.’ That is to say, the 
manner by which ‘I AM’ is ultimately revealed also to be ‘AM I AM’. In chapter six, I 
will suggest that ambiguous figures of this kind (in McCahon’s painting, and in related 
testimony and writing) are proper to the point de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ in 
McCahon discourse. However, in the context of an elaboration of the ‘agency’ manifest 
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in the painted matter of Victory over Death 2, what is more immediately relevant is the 
self-contradictory form of these statements. In both cases, within the broader context of 
existential and eschatological questions of faith and being, one encounters an assertion 
that is contradicted in the assertion. Hence, ‘I believe’ but, at the same time, ‘I don’t 
believe’; AM I AM, to reiterate the observation made in chapter one, is clearly self-
contradictory insofar as it would appear to be a given that, in the asking, there exists one 
who asks. How, then, can this one doubt its own existence? 
 
 Also as suggested in chapter one, it is apparent that the antinomies, to which these 
formations ‘give voice’, proceed on the basis that the attitudes expressed are of or for one 
– specifically, a one that is conscious. However, in light of psychoanalytic theory, if the 
possibility is allowed that these contraries characterise a subjectivity that is not merely 
synonymous with an individual subject or self-sufficiency, but rather a subjectivity 
emerging in the form of a discontinuity or relation of tension between what is called 
consciousness and the unconscious, then the simultaneity of states of belief and unbelief, 
certainty and uncertainty, knowing and unknowing, poses no intractable, logical 
contradiction. From this perspective, the paradoxical form of these declarations where, 
within the space of a breath, something is asserted in concert with its opposite, admits 
consideration as what was previously termed a speaking of two minds or a speaking that 
evinces a change of mind in response to the irruption of second thoughts. 
 
 Indeed, on the basis of the discussion in chapter two, it would appear that assertions of 
this kind precisely admit consideration in terms of the precipitation/perpetuation of 
symptomatic formations or points de capiton. That is to say, the phrases ‘AM I AM’ and 
‘I believe, but don’t believe’ constitute metonymic continua, within which inherent 
ambiguities or contradictions testify to a tension between consciousness and the 
unconscious – i.e., the subsistence/insistence of traces of the metaphoric stutters 
implicated in their formation. Hence, an investigation of the ‘agency’ involved in these 
expressions is commensurate with an investigation of these ‘traces’. In this regard, 
notwithstanding the primary impetus of this chapter to elucidate the manner by which 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making manifest in and as painted matter, I propose 
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to begin with an analysis of the trace of agency subsisting/insisting in the statement ‘I 
believe, but don’t believe’. This preliminary investigation will pave the way for an 
elaboration of the analogous, metaphoric stutter inherent in the painted figure AM I AM. 
 
 In the statement, ‘I believe, but don’t believe’, the word but is, evidently, the fulcrum 
on which equivocation pivots. As Bruce Fink observes, in English, the preposition ‘but’ 
fulfils a function similar to that, in French, of the so-called ‘expletive ne’.304 Here, Fink 
alludes to the commentary in works like ‘Remarks on Daniel Lagache’s Presentation: 
“Psychoanalysis and Personality Structure” ’ (1958) and Seminar VII, where Lacan 
pursues Freud’s assertion, in the essay ‘Negation’ (1925), that 
 
...the content of a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, on 
condition that it is negated. Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is 
repressed...305 
 
As Freud points out, in a clinical setting, negation takes the form of blurted admissions 
that are immediately retracted – the psychoanalytic interpretation being that what is 
denied on the plane of consciousness is, in fact, the ‘true speech’ of the unconscious. In 
keeping with this Freudian perspective, in ‘Remarks on Daniel Lagache’s Presentation’, 
Lacan suggests that, in turns of phrase employing ne, there is expressed ‘the subject of... 
desire’ or ‘the subject of the enunciation’, the ‘ambivalence’ of which is ‘characteristic of 
the unconscious’. This unconscious subjectivity or subject of the unconscious is to be 
distinguished from the conscious ‘ “I” of discourse’ or ‘the subject of the statement’.306 
Similarly, in Seminar VII, Lacan asserts that negation (or Verneinung)   
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...is the privileged means of connotation at the level of discourse for whatever is 
verdrängt or repressed in the unconscious. Verneinen [to deny, to negate] is the 
paradoxical way in which what is hidden, verbogen, in the unconscious is located in 
spoken, enunciated discourse... verneinen is the manner in which what is 
simultaneously actualised and denied comes to be avowed. 
 
Still further, Lacan reiterates that the seemingly superfluous ‘little “ne”... points to a 
discordance between the levels of enunciation and of the enunciated’ and that, in 
consequence, the ‘negative particle “ne” only emerges at the moment when I really 
speak, and not at the moment when I am spoken, if I am on the level of the 
unconscious.’307  
 
 3.1.2 Painting, speaking, writing 
 
 Here, however, it may be objected that, in seeking to elaborate the nature of the 
agency in McCahon’s written testimony and painted calligraphy, I am appealing to 
Lacan’s notion of an unconscious subjectivity enunciating. In other words, I am eliding 
distinctions between speaking, writing, and painting – as if these differing expressions of 
subjectivity are, in effect, equivalent or functionally isomorphic. That a vanishing of 
distinctions between different modes of subjectivity may be potentially problematic is 
evident from the dissimilarities obtaining between the clinical setting of psychoanalysis 
and the setting of the present study – i.e., the academic world of art history, theory, and 
criticism. The characterisation of the subject of the unconscious in terms of a subject 
enunciating reflects the fact that, in the space of the clinic, the analyst primarily addresses 
analysands’ speech. Indeed, to be precise, in a clinical situation, psychoanalysis, via free 
association, addresses parapraxes and other disturbances that, as a first approximation, 
admit consideration as the spontaneous expression of speech – i.e., speech acts. Strictly 
speaking, however, this study would appear not to engage with subjective acts, 
spontaneous or otherwise, but rather with recordings or traces of such in objects – i.e., 
paintings and texts – that function, thereby, as signs of subjectivity. In view of this state 
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of affairs, a further question arises: is it legitimate to psychoanalyse paintings and texts 
given that they carry only traces of the subjectivity that, in the spontaneous expression of 
speech, might appear to be fully and immediately present? 
 
 In response to these questions, it may be observed that, firstly, from the perspective of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, the elision of distinctions between speaking, writing, and 
painting is justified insofar as the unconscious subjectivity enunciating is considered to 
be the ‘true’ basis or origin of expressions of subjectivity in general. This perspective 
underscores the distinction Lacan makes, in ‘Function and Field’, between the ‘empty 
speech’ of conscious ego discourse and the ‘full speech’ that is unconscious308, and his 
claim, in Seminar III, that the unconscious is the domain of ‘true speech... something that 
speaks within the subject, beyond the subject, and even when the subject doesn’t know 
it’.309 Secondly, the legitimacy of psychoanalysing paintings and texts is secured insofar 
as, in both Freudian and Lacanian theory, unconscious speech is, itself, a metaphor for a 
writing in and of the psyche. By way of anticipating the following discussion, it may be 
noted that, conceived as effects of writing, expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making 
are neither simply nor immediately synonymous with the spontaneous expressions of 
beings-present but, on the contrary, testify to that which, necessarily and inevitably, is 
encountered in retrospect – always already presencing as absence, appearing as 
disappeared. Therefore, in conceiving of expressions of subjectivity as that which is 
written, as opposed to that which speaks, one is challenged to relinquish the metaphysical 
thinking evident in the privilege accorded to ‘ones that are conscious’ – where 
consciousness is considered to be equivalent to self-consciousness: immediate presence-
to-self.310 
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 By way of amplifying points made in the thesis Introduction, I should acknowledge that, with 
specific reference to the major, painted script of Victory over Death 2, the distinction between 
‘saying “I” ’ and ‘writing “I” ’ forms the basis of discussion in Smythe. In harmony with the 
present study, Smythe observes that ‘In saying “I” it is as if, during the brief instant of my 
utterance, I deliver myself wholly intact into the space of language’ (27) – even if, as Smythe 
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concedes, the ‘apparent experience of self-presence or “pure” auto-affectivity’ is not, ‘in any 
sense inviolate’ (49, n2). Smythe goes on to suggest that  
 
In writing ‘I’, by contrast, it is as though the ‘I’ of my speech had, in the midst of its 
transposition to writing, abruptly withdrawn its ties to my identity and selfhood... so that 
insofar as my written “I” retains a voice, it is a voice that can no longer be identified as my 
own... [or] attributed to a determinate speaking subject at all... (27-28) 
 
Subsequently, Smythe appeals to Blanchot’s literary theory in support of the idea that, in relation 
to the (written/painted) ‘I’ of Victory over Death 2, 
 
...there is only one speaker whose voice might be faintly discerned at the heart of 
McCahon’s painting, that of language itself, understood as a strange and endless 
murmuring onto which – according to Blanchot – literature always opens, a phenomenon 
that he refers to as the ‘voiceless’ speech of ‘the neuter.’ (29) 
 
In referring to ‘The voice of the neuter’ (46), Smythe makes particular reference to Blanchot’s 
‘The Narrative Voice (the ‘he,’ the neuter)’ in George Quasha (ed), The Station Hill Blanchot 
Reader: fiction and literary essays (Barrytown, New York: Station Hill Press, 1999), 459-69. I 
refer to slightly different translation of this essay in Blanchot, ‘The Narrative Voice (the “he,” 
the neutral)’ in The Infinite Conversation, 379-87. From the perspective of this project, it is 
striking to what degree Blanchot’s conception of the ‘narrative voice’ or ‘neutral voice’ resonates 
with what, in Lacanian terms, corresponds to the order of the real-as-impossible, synonymous 
with, yet inassimilable, to language-mediated expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making (i.e., 
that which, in the present chapter, will be referred to as the ‘lettering/tracing/differencing’ proper 
to the function of ‘pure difference’, the ‘unary trait’ or the ‘essence’ of the signifier). Hence, 
Blanchot asserts that 
 
The narrative... voice... has no place in the work, but neither does it hang over it; far from 
falling out of some sky under the guarantee of superior Transcendence... [it is] rather a kind 
of void in the work... the narrative voice... neutral voice that speaks the work from out of 
this place without a place, where the work is silent. (385) 
 
Still further, in a footnote (to which Smythe also refers, 47), Blanchot defines the narrative voice 
as that which 
 
...does not simply take the place traditionally occupied by a subject, a mobile 
fragmentation; it modifies what we mean by place: a fixed location, unique or determined 
by its placement... 
 
and, furthermore, that which 
 
...designates “its” place as both the place from which it will always be missing and that will 
thus remain empty, but also as a surplus of place, a place that is always too many: 
hypertopia. (462, n2) 
 
Blanchot’s conception of the narrative voice as a ‘mobile fragmentation’ that ‘modifies what we 
mean by place’ resonates with the (somewhat Heideggerian) interpretation I will offer (in section 
3.2) of the way of being or modality of the Lacanian letter-as-lettering, trace-as-tracing. Still 
further, the idea that the narrative voice names ‘ “its” place as both the place from which it will 
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 In ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ (1895), Freud’s model of memory formation 
and recall exemplifies the idea that expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making admit 
consideration in terms of a writing in and of the psyche. Here, Freud hypothesises that the 
nervous system is comprised of two classes of neurones that, in accordance with the 
functioning of ‘contact-barriers’, mediate the transmission of excitations or quantities of 
cathexis (i.e., psychical energy or Qἠ): 
 
...those which allow Qἠ to pass through as though they had no contact-barriers and 
which, accordingly, after each passage of excitation are in the same state as before, 
and... those whose contact-barriers makes themselves felt, so that they only allow 
Qἠ to pass through with difficulty or partially. The latter class may, after each 
excitation, be in a different state from before and they thus afford a possibility of 
representing memory.’311  
 
In consequence, Freud suggests that  
 
...there are permeable neurones (offering no resistance and retaining nothing), 
which serve for perception, and impermeable ones (loaded with resistance, and 
holding back Qἠ), which are vehicles of memory and so probably of psychical 
processes in general.312  
 
Freud proposes to designate the system of permeable neurones ϕ and the system of 
impermeable neurones ψ. Memory inheres in the amenability of the ψ neurones (or, more 
precisely, the disposition of their contact-barriers) to being ‘brought into a permanently 
altered state... by the passage of an excitation.’ That is to say, neurones of this kind 
posses the capacity to be written and to preserve the trace of writing. Indeed, Freud 
suggests that the phenomenon of ‘relearning on the basis of memory’ implies that 
                                                                                                                                                 
always be missing... [and] as a surplus of place’ harmonises with what may be termed the ‘trace-
like’ nature of the Lacanian letter or essence of the signifier as ‘that’ which presences as absence, 
appears as disappeared – even as it enlivens the infinite field of differences or trace structure, by 
virtue of which, always already, ‘the’ signifier is a ‘universe’ of such.  
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alterations result in ‘the contact-barriers... [of the ψ neurones] becoming more capable of 
conduction, less impermeable, and so more like those of the ϕ system.’ This state of the 
contact barriers becoming more conductive, Freud terms their ‘degree of facilitation 
[Bahnung]’ such that ‘Memory is represented by the facilitations existing between the ψ 
neurones.’ Still further, Freud observes that if the degree of facilitation among ψ 
neurones was invariant (i.e., if all ψ neurones offered equal resistance to the passage of 
excitations)  
 
...then the characteristics of memory would evidently not emerge. For, in relation to 
the passage of an excitation, memory is evidently one of the powers which 
determine and direct its pathway, and, if facilitation were everywhere equal, it 
would not be possible to see why one pathway should be preferred. We can 
therefore say still more correctly that memory is represented by the differences in 
the facilitations between the ψ neurones.313 
 
On the basis of Freud’s model of the psyche, it should be apparent that, contrary to 
information storage in computers (i.e., in flash memory or on hard disc), memories are 
neither determinate properties of particular, material elements (i.e., neurones) nor even in 
the connections between them (i.e., the neuronal network or system). Rather, in response 
to repeated passages of excitations, memory inheres in the manner by which the contact-
barriers between ψ neurones become more conductive differentially such that certain 
passages of excitation are ‘preferred’. Here, it is crucial to appreciate that, on Freud’s 
account, memory is not identical with the preferred path or passage of excitation. The 
difference between ‘memory’ and ‘preferred path’ is analogous to the distinction between 
an immaterial force and the matter bearing its imprint – or, perhaps, the difference 
between an immaterial process of writing and its material products: i.e., written marks. 
Memory, considered as a psychical process of path-making or writing, would seem to be 
that which, fundamentally, exceeds and eludes any material instantiation. 
 
 The operation of memory in terms of writing is even more explicit in Freud’s short 
essay ‘A Note upon the “Mystic Writing Pad” ’ (c.1924-25). The so-called ‘ “Mystic 
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Writing Pad” ’ is invoked to circumvent a difficulty arising from the fact that memory-as-
writing makes two, apparently incompatible, demands. Firstly, the space of memory 
inscription must possess ‘an unlimited receptive capacity’, and secondly, it must retain 
‘permanent traces’. As Freud points out, writing in chalk on a slate meets the first 
condition – but only at the expense of the second (one loses one’s ‘memories’ when one 
wipes the slate clean). Conversely, writing in ink on paper fulfils the second condition but 
cannot meet the first (the paper eventually fills up with writing so that the recording of 
further memory traces requires a clean sheet – in effect, a brand-new psychical 
apparatus).314 Freud explains that the ‘Mystic Pad’ avoids the mutually excluded 
‘functions’ of unlimited receptivity and permanent tracing ‘by dividing them between two 
separate but interrelated component parts or systems.’315 Notwithstanding the limitations 
of this illustration, Freud suggests that the two ‘systems’ in question are analogous to (1) 
perception-consciousness, which ‘receives stimuli... [but] forms no permanent traces’, 
and (2) the ‘foundations of memory’ in the ‘unconscious mnemic systems’.316 
 
 In his essay ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’ (1966), Derrida highlights the resonance 
between the Freudian conception of bahnung and a psychical writing, tracing, 
differencing (indeed, différancing). Thus, Derrida suggests that, between the ‘Project’ 
and ‘A Note upon the “Mystic Writing Pad” ’, Freud’s work follows ‘a strange 
progression: a problematic of breaching [i.e., bahnung] is elaborated only to conform 
increasingly to a metaphorics of the written trace.’317 Derrida goes on to draw parallels 
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between Freud’s account of bahnung and the two moments proper to the operation of the 
trace or the movement of différance in opening up and sustaining the space in which 
meaning is made – namely, differencing and deferring.318 What is crucial to appreciate, in 
Derrida’s essay, is that there is no question of taking literally Freud’s ‘neurological 
fable’.319 For Derrida, Freud’s conception of memory in terms of a writing in and of the 
psyche is of interest insofar as it highlights the manner by which the ‘trace’ exceeds and 
eludes metaphysical determination – such that différance demands to be considered as ‘a 
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We then must not say that breaching without difference is insufficient for memory; it must 
be stipulated that there is no pure breaching without difference. Trace as memory is not a 
pure breaching that might be reappropriated at any time as simple presence; it is rather the 
ungraspable and invisible difference between breaches. 
 
Derrida also proposes: 
 
All these differences in the production of the trace may be reinterpreted as moments of 
deferring. In accordance with a motif that will continue to dominate Freud’s thinking, this 
movement is described as the effort of life to protect itself by deferring a dangerous 
cathexis, that is, by constituting a reserve (Vorrat). The threatening expenditure or presence 
are deferred with the help of a breaching or repetition. 
 
 Here, Derrida is referring to Freud, ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ (1895) in SE, v1, 
296-97, where a distinction is made between a ‘primary function of the nervous system’, which 
seeks to fully discharge Q, and a ‘secondary function’ that preserves ‘a store of Qἠ sufficient to 
meet the demand for a specific action’ – e.g., to relieve hunger. Nevertheless, Freud maintains 
that, in general, the ‘trend persists... to keep the Qἠ as low as possible and to guard against any 
increase of it – that is, to keep it constant.’ On this basis, and in a fashion that clearly anticipates 
his later models of the psyche in terms of a homeostasis maintained by virtue of the mediation of 
the primary process by the secondary process (or, equivalently, by virtue of the mediation of the 
pleasure principle by the reality principle), Freud concludes: ‘All the functions of the nervous 
system can be comprised either under the aspect of the primary function or of the secondary one 
imposed by the exigencies of life.’ In other words, the differences in facilitations, by virtue of 
which memory is as writing and tracing, do not produce a complete discharge of cathexis but, on 
the contrary, and in accordance with the mediating activity of the ‘secondary function’, defer this 
kind of a total release in order to maintain sufficient Q for the preservation of the life of the 
organism. 
 
319
 Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, 251. 
 
 188 
non-origin which is originary... determined outside any teleological or eschatological 
horizon.’320 
 
 Throughout Lacan’s work, one also finds acknowledgements and elaborations of 
Freud’s conception of unconscious psychical processes as a form of writing. For 
example, in Seminar II, Lacan proposes that ‘The best thing we’ve found for giving an 
image of the phenomenon of memory is the Babylonian wax seal... what we call an 
engram.’ On this basis, Lacan suggests that the functioning of human memory is 
analogous to a ‘homeostat’ – a ‘machine’ in which a ‘message’ circulates, ‘turning back 
on itself... indefinitely’ in a fashion that ‘comes very close to what we can conceive of as 
Zwang, the compulsion to repeat.’321 Indeed, discussing Freud’s conception of memory 
formation in the ‘Project’, Lacan invokes the phrase ‘play of writing’ to characterise 
Freud’s understanding of ‘memory... as a succession of engrams, as the sum of a series of 
facilitations.’322 Moreover, in Seminar VII, with reference to Freud’s so-called letter 52 to 
Wilhelm Fliess (in which Freud begins to elaborate his theory of unconscious psychical 
processes), Lacan observes that Freud’s ‘whole theory of memory has to do with the 
sequence of Niederschriften, of inscriptions’, where a 
 
...Niederschrift... [is] something that presents itself not simply in terms of Prägung 
[i.e., stamping, embossing] or of impression, but in the sense of something which 
makes a sign and which is of the order of writing.323  
 
However, that the manifestation of the subject of the unconscious exhibits (in Derridean 
parlance) the trace structure proper to writing, painting or, indeed, all differencing, is, 
perhaps, more evident from Lacan’s suggestion, in Seminar XI, that ‘the one that is 
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introduced by the experience of the unconscious is the one of the split, of the stroke, of 
rupture.’324 Indeed, properly speaking, the subject of the unconscious has no existence 
prior to the advent of this discontinuity but, on the contrary, is synonymous with it. 
Hence, as Lacan suggests, the subject of the unconscious manifests in the form of a 
discontinuity or differencing where 
 
...the stroke of the opening makes absence emerge – just as the cry does not stand 
out against a background of silence, but on the contrary makes the silence emerge 
as silence.325 
 
The ‘trace-like’ nature of the subject of the unconscious is further reiterated in Lacan’s 
characterisation of it as being ‘situated’ ‘in the dimension of a synchrony’ in which ‘it 
loses itself as much as it finds itself again’326 and in terms of the ‘rhythmic... pulsation 
of... [a] slit’, the opening and closing of which is not chronologically real but rather 
defines a hypothetical interval within a purely ‘logical time’.327  
 
 On the basis of Lacan’s account, then, the subject of the unconscious clearly resists 
metaphysical determination. As a writing/tracing/differencing – a structure of differential 
traces – ‘it’ would demand to be considered as a ‘being’ that finds itself as lost, presences 
as absence, appears as disappeared. Insofar as it is implicated in the figuring of painting, 
this writing/tracing/differencing (equivalent to the irruption/subsuming of the subject of 
the unconscious in consciousness or the agent-like, metaphoric dimension of the 
precipitation of points de capiton) demands further investigation. In the following 
section, this will involve an elucidation of what Lacan considers synonymous with the 
manifestation of the subject of the unconscious – namely: (1) the ‘materialisation’ of the 
signifier, (2) the ‘instance’ or, better perhaps, ‘agency’ or ‘insistence’, of the ‘letter’, and 
(3) the manner by which the strange or ambiguous ‘materiality’ of the letter defines the 
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trace-like ‘essence of the signifier’ or ‘unary trait’. These considerations will clarify how 
‘materiality’, ‘mark-making’, and ‘painting’ relate to ‘figuring’ and will thus serve to 
illuminate the figuring of painting in that part of McCahon discourse encompassing the 
painted matter of Victory over Death 2 et al – in particular, the painted matter of the 
figure AM I AM. 
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3.2 The figuring of painting 
 
 3.2.1 The materialisation of the signifier 
 
 In ‘The Subversion of the Subject’, Lacan suggests that the subject of the unconscious 
manifests in 
 
...the very place at which the transparency of the classical subject divides, 
undergoing, as it does, the effects of fading that specify the Freudian subject due to 
its occultation by an ever purer signifier.328  
 
Whilst undoubtedly laconic, this statement provides an exemplary launching point from 
which to consider the relationship between the subject of the unconscious and the 
materialisation of the signifier. Let us unpack some of its complexity. In the first place, in 
speaking of the ‘transparency of the classical subject’, I take Lacan to be referring to the 
immediate auto-affection or presence-to-self that characterises the Cartesian ego – a 
subject that, by virtue of its limpid pellucidity, knows itself immediately and absolutely 
as a ‘one that is conscious’. By contrast, the term ‘Freudian subject’ may be understood 
as the dialectical successor of the ‘classical subject’ when it is re-conceived as (1) 
decentred in relation to the Other of language or the symbolic order, and (2) expressing a 
relation of tension between consciousness and the unconscious (i.e., where the 
‘transparency of the classical subject divides’).329 Secondly, by referring to the ‘effects of 
fading’, I take Lacan to imply that the contradictory speaking of two minds that 
characterises manifestations of the subject of the unconscious in consciousness is not 
only characterised by the expression of negation (e.g., ne/but) but, more literally, admits 
consideration as self-negation. That is to say, the corollary of the fleeting manifestation 
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of the subject of the unconscious (or the ‘return’ of repressed signifiers) is the equally 
transitory nullification or occlusion of the self-conscious subject or ego.  
 
 Support for this interpretation may be found in Seminar II, where Lacan provides a 
more comprehensive account of the manner by which the Freudian subject ‘fades’. Here, 
Lacan characterises consciousness as  
 
...a polar tension between an ego alienated from the subject and a perception which 
fundamentally escapes it, a pure percipi. The subject would be strictly identical to 
this perception if there weren’t this ego which... makes it emerge from out of itself 
in a relation of tension.330 
 
The ego is ‘alienated’ insofar as it is neither entirely nor sufficiently ‘in’ and ‘of’ itself 
but rather that which emerges by virtue of a dialectical relation with an other – an identity 
with a mirror image that, inevitably, miscarries. The ‘pure perception’, to which Lacan 
refers is, in effect, ‘the experience of the unconscious subject as such, concerning which 
we no longer know who or what it is’ and, indeed, when the ‘subject is precipitated into a 
confrontation’ with this unconscious subjectivity (i.e., where these confrontations 
manifest in the form of parapraxes or the seeming changes-of-mind that ne/but signify), 
the ‘imaginary relation’, on which basis is conceived the ego’s self-certainty, ‘reaches its 
own limit, and the ego fades away, dissipates, becomes disorganised, dissolves.’331 
 
 However, what is of particular interest, in Lacan’s terse formula, is the suggestion that 
the manifestation of the subject of the unconscious occurs in conjunction with a ‘fading’ 
of the conscious subject ‘due to its occultation by an ever purer signifier’. Philippe Van 
Haute suggests that the term ‘ “pure” signifier’ refers to ‘the operation of the order of 
signifiers independent of its possible meaning effects... in its sheer materiality.’332 From 
this perspective, Lacan’s statement would appear to imply that the manifestation of the 
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subject of the unconscious is synonymous with the materialisation of the signifier. 
Leaving aside, for the moment, a consideration of the precise nature of this materiality, 
Lacan’s testimony implies that, in expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making, 
symptomatic disturbances are equivalent to, or occur in concert with, the production or 
precipitation of the forms or elements from which these expressions are constituted – i.e., 
signifiers. Support for this interpretation can be found in Seminar VII and Seminar XI 
where, in both cases, Lacan locates that which is to be attributed to the unconscious 
‘between’ consciousness and perception.333 Thus, in the passage from Seminar VII 
previously encountered in chapter two, Lacan asserts: 
 
...between perception and consciousness... is inserted... The thought processes 
insofar as they regulate... the structure in which the unconscious is organised, the 
structure in which the underlying unconscious mechanisms are flocculated. And it 
is this which makes the small curds of representation... something which has the 
same structure as the signifier...334 
 
Similarly, in Seminar XI, Lacan characterises the ‘locus where the affair of the subject of 
the unconscious is played out’ as being ‘situated between perception and consciousness’ 
where, in the ‘interval that separates them... the place of the Other is situated, in which 
the subject is constituted’, and in which, moreover, that which Freud terms ‘traces of 
perception... Wahrnehmungszeichen’ can be given ‘their true name of signifiers.’335 
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 3.2.2 The instance of the letter 
 
 At this point, one encounters an evident difficulty: if signifiers are nothing apart from 
their negative relations of difference then how may one coherently conceive of ‘a pure 
signifier’ in ‘its’ ‘sheer materiality’? In what does the ‘materiality’ of the signifier 
consist? Relevant, in this regard, are Lacan’s references to the letter in works ranging 
from the ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” ’ to Seminar XVIII. Notwithstanding certain 
ambiguities in Lacan’s testimony, I would argue (in common with various commentators) 
that the ‘materiality’ of the signifier, most efficaciously conceived, is neither simply nor 
immediately synonymous with a substantial, physical, empirical reality. By way of 
elaborating this position, I suggest that, firstly, it is necessary to distinguish between (1) 
the letter (i.e., as some kind of material mark or metaphysical entity) and (2) the letter-as-
lettering (i.e., the way of being of the letter as a writing/tracing/differencing synonymous 
with what has been termed the ‘real’ ‘structuring of structure’, the psychical function of 
repression/overdetermination, or the insistence of a signifier without a signified). 
Secondly, insofar as the letter may be defined as a ‘real writing’ or ‘writing in the real’, it 
is necessary to distinguish between metaphysical and logico-structural conceptions of the 
real. That is to say, one must distinguish between the real conceived as (1) hypothetical 
material substrate of and (2) structurally necessary impossibility implicated in the 
function of representation/symbolisation (where this understanding of the real as the 
order of the impossible is precisely what is proper to the letter-as-lettering – the essential 
‘matter’ of the signifier). In keeping with the ‘anti-metaphysical’ tenor of the model of 
Lacanian theory presented in this study, in what follows, I will prioritise the second 
options in the two couples above. 
 
 Thus, in ‘The Instance of the Letter’, Lacan suggests, firstly, that the letter is to be 
taken ‘Quite simply, literally [à la lettre]’, and secondly, may be defined as the ‘material 
medium [support] that concrete discourse borrows from language.’336 In the first part of 
this succinct formula, the suggestion that the letter may be ‘taken literally’ immediately 
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invites its conception as that which, entirely and sufficiently, ‘is’ in and of ‘itself’ – i.e., a 
real essence. Addressing the latter part of the formula, Fink observes that, by ‘concrete 
discourse’, Lacan means ‘speech’ and that, moreover, what speech ‘borrows’ from 
language are ‘its signifiers and grammatical rules’.337 In consequence, the letter would 
appear to denote the material medium of signifiers and their associated grammar – where, 
moreover, ‘material medium’ implies ‘real’. To this extent, as Evans puts it, ‘The letter 
is... connected with the real, a material substrate that underpins the symbolic order.’338 
 
 However, I would argue that a more nuanced and complete understanding of the 
nature of the letter’s ‘material reality’ challenges one to appreciate that the instance (i.e., 
‘agency’, ‘insistence’) of the letter, synonymous with the materialisation of the signifier, 
defines a writing, tracing, or differencing. This may be inferred from Lacan’s Saussurean 
allusion to the ‘synchronic system of differential couplings... necessary to discern 
vocables in a given language [langue]’, which 
 
...allows us to see that an essential element in speech itself was predestined to flow 
into moveable type which... renders validly present what I call the “letter” – 
namely, the essentially localized structure of the signifier.339 
 
Lacan’s prose is characteristically challenging. However, by ‘synchronic system of 
differential couplings’, I take Lacan to mean the temporally instantaneous constellation of 
signifiers-as-potentials that are unconscious. In suggesting that an ‘essential element in 
speech... was predestined to flow into moveable type’ (my italics), I take Lacan to imply 
that something in speech is, always already, ‘typed’ or ‘type-set’ – i.e., always already, 
the product or form of marking or impressing. Thus, the essential element in speech (or, 
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indeed, any expression of subjectivity) is this marking or impressing – although, by way 
of anticipating the following discussion, this is not to suggest, necessarily, that the 
‘essential element’ in question is a metaphysical entity or expression of such.  
 
 Moreover, by virtue of this mark-making, Lacan suggests that the letter is rendered 
‘validly present’ as the ‘essentially localized structure of the signifier.’ Fink’s analysis of 
Lacan’s essay highlights the ambiguity of this phrase. In Fink’s view, the expression 
‘essentially localized structure of the signifier’ refers to the ‘micro- or nanostructure of 
the signifier’. At the same time, however, the ‘letter’ rendered ‘validly present’ ‘seems to 
lie somewhere between the signifier and its microstructure (which is materialised or re-
presented by type or printed characters without being equated with them)’. By 
‘microstructure’, I take Fink to be alluding to those differential traces in relation to which 
signifiers mean. Support for this interpretation is provided by Fink’s illustrative 
contrasting of the words ‘nipple’ and ‘nibble’. Fink observes that, in this case, their 
‘differential coupling’ resides in the difference between ‘p’ and ‘b’. In other words, ‘in 
itself’, the ‘essentially localized structure of the signifier’ is not a ‘positive’ or ‘present’ 
‘entity’ but rather a trace (i.e., a presencing as absence; an appearing as disappeared). On 
this basis, Fink asks: ‘But is this the meaning of the letter? Or is that the wrong question: 
Is this the direction or directionality (sens) of the letter?’ In consequence, Fink concludes 
that, whilst type or printed characters ‘ “render validly present” or embody what Lacan 
calls the letter’, the letter thus ‘materialised would not seem to be material itself.’340 
 
 Broadly speaking, Fink’s analysis harmonises with the understanding of ‘materiality’ 
presented in Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Title of the Letter, A 
Reading of Lacan (1973). Here, for example, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe anticipate 
Fink’s observation that to ‘render validly present’ the letter is to ‘embody’ it by way of a 
reference to ‘Function and Field’, where Lacan suggests that ‘Speech is in fact a gift of 
language, and language is not immaterial. It is a subtle body, but body it is.’341 As Nancy 
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and Lacoue-Labarthe affirm, ‘materiality’, thus conceived, reflects the psychoanalytic 
insight that words may elicit symptoms expressed somatically. Implicitly, then, the 
‘materiality’ of the signifier would appear to be that which undermines absolute 
distinctions between mind and body, the ideality of meaning and the corporeality of 
matter.342 Furthermore, resonating with Fink’s suggestion that the letter thus ‘materialised 
would not seem to be material itself’, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe refer to the ‘Seminar 
on “The Purloined Letter” ’, where Lacan stresses, firstly, that the ‘relations with 
location’ evinced by the misplaced letter in Poe’s story and by the signifier are 
encapsulated in the notion of ‘ “nullibeity” ’ – a localisation that inheres in the condition 
or state of being nowhere. Secondly, Lacan defines the ‘materiality of the signifier’ as 
‘singular in many ways, the first of which is not to allow of partition. Cut a letter into 
small pieces and it remains the letter it is’.343 Whilst Lacan’s meaning is somewhat 
oblique, it may be suggested that the properties of nullibeity and indivisibility imply that 
the letter – the ‘real’ and ‘essential’ ‘matter’ of the signifier – defines a materiality that 
exceeds and eludes absolute distinctions between presence and absence, part and whole, 
identity and difference.344 In consequence, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe observe that 
‘This localisation and indivisibility... lend an odd materiality to the signifier. This 
materiality is itself odd in that it is unquantifiable’.345 Still further, Nancy and Lacoue-
Labarthe conclude that the letter (or, to paraphrase Fink, ‘the material medium of 
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signifiers and their associated grammar’) resists any kind of naïvely materialistic or 
metaphysical determination:  
 
If it is a question... of a materiality of language as well as of the unconscious, this 
materiality is not to be conceived as a substantial materiality, at least according to 
what classical materialism is said to claim. The letter is matter, but not substance. 
This unqualifiable term, apparently irreducible to any of the oppositions of 
traditional philosophic conceptuality, will assume the “major place”... in what, 
since Freud, is called “the unconscious.”346 
 
 3.2.3 Writing in the real: the letter and the unary trait 
 
 Notwithstanding the ‘oddness’ of the letter’s ‘material reality’, Lacanian theory also 
implies that the equivalence obtaining between the ‘manifestation’ of the subject of the 
unconscious and the ‘materialisation’ of the signifier encompasses the ‘instance’ of the 
letter as a ‘real writing’ or ‘writing in the real’. Support for this reading may be found in 
Seminar XVIII, where Lacan flourishes what he describes as ‘a little jingle’: ‘Writing, the 
letter, is in the real, and the signifier, in the symbolic.’347 However, the particular setting 
in which this statement is made suggests that the real thus invoked is not a ‘material 
substrate’ underlying appearances, in which letter-like ‘entities’ come into being. This, I 
would suggest, is implicit in Lacan’s rhetorical challenge: ‘is not the letter the literal 
because it is founded on the littoral?’ – where the littoral is defined as ‘something that 
posits a domain, as being entirely making with another, if you wish, a frontier, but 
precisely because they have absolutely nothing in common, not even a reciprocal 
relation.’ In other words, the littoral signifies an alterity so radical that ‘what’ one 
confronts, strictly speaking, is not a difference or a relation between entities but rather 
‘pure difference’ – ‘in itself’, fundamentally impossible to represent/symbolise. To this 
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extent, the letter as the littoral precisely would appear to express the real-as-impossibility 
that, as structural necessity, is at once synonymous with and inassimilable to the function 
of representation/symbolisation: ‘The edge of the hole in knowledge that psychoanalysis 
designates precisely, when it tackles it, from the letter’.348 
 
 That the letter is not to be conceived as any kind of primeval real underlying the 
function of representation/symbolisation becomes further apparent where Lacan suggests 
that, insofar as the ‘agency of the letter’ is implicated in metaphor and metonymy, the 
letter 
 
...easily symbolises... all the effects of signifiers, but this does absolutely not 
require that the letter, in these effects, for which it serves me as an instrument, 
should be primary. An examination is required less about this primary character, 
which is not even to be supposed, but about what in language calls the littoral to the 
literal.349 (my italics) 
  
Finally, that the real writing of the letter is not to be conceived in naïvely materialist or 
metaphysical terms is also apparent where, notwithstanding his earlier testimony in 
Seminar VII (specifically, the reference to the ‘sequence of Niederschriften’ that are ‘of 
the order of writing’), Lacan now finds fault with Freud’s invocation of writing as a 
metaphor for facilitation: ‘Writing is not an impression... [i.e., the inscribing of a 
‘substrate’ – whether psychical or physical], despite everything that is being said in terms 
of a blah-blah about the famous Wunderblock.’350 On the contrary, Lacan suggests that 
the instance of the letter is fundamentally  
 
...distinguished by and from the fact that it effaces... I said it in connection with the 
unary stroke, it is from the effacing of the stroke that the subject is designated. This 
is noticed then in two phases. It is necessary therefore that erasing should be 
distinguished from it.351 
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 Lacan’s allusion to the ‘unary stroke’ invokes his account of ‘identification’ as 
presented in Seminar IX. Here, the ‘essence of the signifier’ is related to the ‘letter’ or 
‘unary trait’. In relation to considerations of materiality, the real, and writing, this 
discussion is noteworthy insofar as the unary trait is posited as neither a metaphysical 
entity nor an expression of such but rather as a ‘pure difference’ or differencing – the 
functioning or expression of which, moreover, is characterised by effacement. That is to 
say, the unary trait is not apprehensible ‘in itself’ but, rather, must be hypothesised on the 
basis of ‘its’ effects – namely, the production of a field of differences. To this extent, the 
Lacanian unary trait clearly anticipates features of the Derridean trace.352 Thus, with 
reference to Saussure’s linguistics, Lacan asserts:  
 
...unlike the sign... what distinguishes the signifier... is simply being what the others 
are not; that which, in the signifier, implies this function of the [linguistic] unit, is 
precisely to be simply difference. It is qua pure difference that the unit, in its 
signifying function, structures itself, constitutes itself.353 
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...the value of the transcendental arche [archie] must make its necessity felt before letting 
itself be erased. The concept of arche-trace must comply with both that necessity and that 
erasure... The trace is not only the disappearance of origin... it means that the origin did not 
even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, 
which thus becomes the origin of the origin. (61) 
 
That is to say, as tracing, the ‘originary’ writing, inculcating or enabling the field of signifiers 
always already is re-tracing – effacing itself in its very operation, thereby producing no positive 
presences but rather a legacy of absences, of traces. 
 
 The conception of the signifier as essentially or elementarily a self-effacing trace appears 
elsewhere in Lacan’s writing. For example, in Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book X. 
Anxiety, 1962-1963, ed. Miller, trans A.R. Price (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014, originally 
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Seuil, 2004)), 62, it is affirmed that ‘The signifier... is a trace, but an effaced trace.’ 
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Lacan observes that this pure difference ‘is not a single trait’ (i.e., an essence) but, on the 
contrary, demands to be considered dialectically: 
 
...nothing in the [signifying] function is properly speaking thinkable, unless it starts 
from the following which I formulate as: the one as such is the Other. It is starting 
from... this fundamental structure of the one as difference that we can see appearing 
this origin from which one can see the signifier constituting itself...354 
 
 Lacan then seeks to illustrate ‘in the letter precisely this essence of the signifier 
through which it is distinguished from the sign’ (i.e., the manner by which the signifier, 
in its essence, is a ‘one as difference’ or ‘pure difference’ as opposed to a ‘one’ that is, 
entirely and sufficiently, ‘in-itself’).355 The illustration takes the form of two examples of 
Chinese calligraphy made by Lacan himself – one, apparently, more technically 
accomplished than the other. As Lacan points out, the ‘two series are perfectly 
identifiable and at the same time they do not resemble one another at all.’ Indeed, 
 
...it is in the clearest fashion in so far as they do not resemble one another at all that 
there are quite obviously from top to bottom on the right and on the left, the same 
seven characters, even for someone who has no idea not alone about Chinese 
characters, but no idea up to now that there were things which were called Chinese 
characters.356  
 
In other words, even though they are not plastically identical, one readily identifies 
Lacan’s two series of calligraphs with each other – i.e., one understands that they ‘are’ or 
‘mean’ the same. Lacan’s point is that structures of difference (i.e., the field of the 
signifier) enliven the very possibility of making identifications (in relation to which there 
emerge signifieds). Hence, Lacan contends that, fundamentally, it is the ‘one as... the 
Other... the one as difference’ that ‘constitutes the essence of the signifier’, which ‘in its 
simplest form... is... the einziger Zug [single train or single trait]’ or ‘unary trait’.357 To 
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appropriate and slightly modify a term Lacan employs in Seminar I, one also might 
characterise this ‘one as difference’ – the identity that is different from itself – as an 
‘identity-in-difference’.358 As Lacan insists, further, the notion of ‘pure difference’ eludes 
and exceeds considerations of differences obtaining between elements in a hypothetically 
real, physical, or substantial, material substrate: ‘the signifier... is... that [which] 
introduces difference as such into the real, and precisely in the measure in that what is 
involved are not at all qualitative differences.’359 In consequence, Lacan affirms that ‘the 
unary trait... is the support as such of difference’.360  
 
 3.2.4 The figuring of painting 
 
 On the basis of the preceding discussion, it would appear that an equivalence obtains 
between the ‘letter’, the ‘essence of the signifier’, and the ‘unary trait’. These terms 
define the fundamental nature of the ‘signifying function’ (i.e., that which is implicated in 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making) as an expression of ‘pure difference’ or 
differencing. ‘In itself’, as an expression of the structurally necessary, real-as-
impossibility implicated in the function of representation/symbolisation, this differencing 
eludes and exceeds determination. Considered as this pure difference or differencing, the 
instance, agency, or insistence of the letter (i.e., the way of being of the letter; the letter as 
lettering) is thus precisely that which resists determination as an entity or even as an 
element of meaning. In Seminar XVIII, Lacan underscores this point with the following 
remark: 
 
What I inscribed with the help of letters about the formations of the unconscious 
does not authorise making a signifier of the letter and of granting it, what is more, a 
primacy with regard to the signifier.361 
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 This understanding of the instance of the letter permits clarification of what was 
previously asserted in chapter one in relation to mark-making and painting. Recall, that 
mark-making was proposed as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for painting: in 
order for the painted mark to become painting per se there must be a retroactive 
attribution of meaning. Meaning-making necessitates a prior mark-making, but these 
marks and their making are not, in themselves, necessarily meaningful. The attribution of 
meaning to mark-making merely demonstrates after-the-fact, as it were, the potential-to-
mean these marks possess or excite. In light of the discussion above, however, it is 
apparent that the original statement of the relationship between mark-making and 
painting pre-supposes the physical reality or substantial, material existence of a mark-
making prior to painting and on which painting depends. From Lacan’s perspective, this 
is precisely to (1) make a signifier of the letter (i.e., lettering as mark-making constitutes 
the form and meaning of painting) and (2) grant the letter primacy with regard to the 
signifier (i.e., lettering as mark-making is pre-requisite for if not, indeed, the 
transcendental ground of, painting).  
 
 In order to more rigorously define the relationship between mark-making and painting, 
it is necessary to appreciate that, from the perspective of Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
subjective experience is considered to be neither simply nor immediately an effect of 
physically, substantially, or materially real causes to which, subsequently, meaning is 
attributed (i.e., the position of a naïve materialism or pragmatic realism). On the contrary, 
first and foremost, Lacanian psychoanalysis accords priority to subjective experience per 
se (although this experience is neither simply nor immediately that of a metaphysically 
grounded ‘one that is conscious’). Moreover, from this perspective, Lacanian theory 
proposes that subjective experience is meaningful by definition. That is to say, in the first 
instance, subjective experience is neither simply nor immediately experience of a real but 
rather experience in and of a field of meaning. It is from this perspective that all 
hypothetical determinations of ‘reality’, ‘physicality’, ‘materiality’, ‘causality’, etc., 
proceed. 
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 In consequence, all conscious determinations of subjective experience bear meaning – 
whether in actuality or in potentia. Hence, always already it is the case that what is 
encountered, in consciousness, is painting as opposed to mark-making (even if the 
meaning of this painting is indeterminate). That is to say, always already, there is an 
encounter with marks-as-painting or painted marks. These are marks of which, in 
consciousness, meaning has been made (albeit, contingent and ideal) or marks of which, 
in relation to the unconscious, meaning remains to be made (i.e., meaning that 
subsists/insists in potentia). Strictly speaking, then, always already, the question of how 
painting figures is posed from the perspective of painting. Here, what is called ‘painting’ 
is a field defined in accordance with the function of representation/symbolisation, within 
which, by virtue of post hoc abstractions and rationalisations, it is possible to speak of 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making, and discontinuities in such, in terms of a 
tension between consciousness and the unconscious. Within this field of 
subjectivity/meaning-making, it is not physically or substantially real, material marks that 
are confronted, but rather figures (i.e., meaningful marks: marks of which meaning is in 
actuality or in potentia). In short, from the perspective of the conscious one, there is a 
confrontation with signs, in relation to which emerge signifieds or points de capiton. 
 
 Therefore, the question introduced in section 3.1 – namely, how does the meaning of 
painting come into being? (which is to say, the elucidation of the agent-like, metaphoric 
dimension of the precipitation of points de capiton in painted matter) – ultimately 
resolves into a question of how painting figures by virtue of a function of pure difference. 
This pure difference (or differencing) also is conceivable as an ‘originary’ 
tracing/lettering that, as an expression of a structurally necessary real-as-impossibility, is 
both synonymous with and inassimilable to representation/symbolisation. In other words, 
the letter/trace (i.e., the ‘essence’ of the signifier that secures the possibility of the 
‘materialisation’ of the signifier) is, ‘in itself’, unfathomable and inconceivable. Within 
the frame of reference of the function of representation/symbolisation, lettering/tracing is 
an impossibility that ‘manifests’ as effaced, as excluded. In consequence, expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making evince neither differencing ‘in its essence’ nor pure 
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difference per se. Rather, the function of pure difference is that which gives rise to the 
trace structure or field of differences (i.e., the field of signifiers conceived negatively as 
differences between signifiers), on which basis is enlivened the possibility of positively 
determining a field of different things (i.e., objects or, to be more precise, signs, in 
relation to which emerge signifieds). 
 
 Here, it is important to reiterate that the signifieds in question are of the order of the 
ideal and the possible as opposed to the (physically) real and the actual. In light of the 
psychical function of repression/overdetermination, the ultimate contingency and ideality 
of the field of signifieds ‘overdetermined’ in consciousness is synonymous with the 
insistence or ‘return of repressed’ signifiers that are unconscious. Indeed, to employ 
Lacan’s terminology, the ‘evanescence’ of signifieds demonstrates that, in the final 
analysis, the imaginary determination of a field of different things ‘fades’ before an 
encounter with a field of differences defined by the tension obtaining between a field of 
forms of meaning apart from any determined meanings (i.e., the conscious dimension of 
the signifier) and a field of potentials (i.e., the unconscious dimension of the signifier). 
To recall a point made in chapter two, in Žižek’s parlance, this is the encounter with the 
point de capiton as a ‘ “pure”, meaningless “signifier without the signified” ’.362 This is 
simply to emphasise that, in accordance with the function of 
representation/symbolisation, always already, what is apprehended in consciousness is 
neither purely nor absolutely formal or conceptual but rather a field of meaning/forms 
that are only insofar as they figure (i.e., a field of meaning/forms that are only as 
meaning-forming and forming-meaning: that gesture towards or express a potential for 
such). 
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 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 97, 99. 
 206 
3.3 Figuring painted matter 
 
 3.3.1 Figuring the space of meaning 
 
 Having outlined a theoretical basis for the figuring of painting in the previous two 
sections, it is now timely to apply this theoretical understanding to a specific example of 
painted matter – in this case, the figure AM I AM in Victory over Death 2. With 
reference to the questions posed in section 3.1, the aim is to clarify in what the 
ambiguous meaning of Victory over Death 2’s AM I AM consists (i.e., what is the form 
of this meaning?) and how it comes into this contradictory state of being (i.e., how does 
this meaning form?). Here, it is important to bear in mind that the figure AM I AM in 
Victory over Death 2 is a writing/painting evincing a confluence of graphic and plastic, 
symbolic and pictorial. As a matter of convenience, the following discussion begins with 
a consideration of Victory over Death 2’s AM I AM as written matter that exhibits 
ambiguity of meaning, before proceeding onto a consideration of it as painted matter that 
exhibits ambiguity of form (or, to be more precise, spatial construction). However, it 
should be understood that, strictly speaking, these aspects are inextricably entangled. 
Hence, whilst it may be expedient, for example, to speak either of the grammatical 
ambiguity or the spatial ambiguity of the figure AM I AM, this terminology makes sense 
only if one recognises that, always already, grammatical ambiguity insists by virtue of a 
space of meaning and spatial ambiguity insists by virtue of a grammar of form. 
 
 With regard to Victory over Death 2’s AM I AM ambiguity of meaning, the crucial 
point to appreciate is that, in common with any posited meaning/form, that this sign is 
ambiguous simply is a consequence of the possibility of metaphorically substituting, for 
it, a potentially infinite number of signifying alternatives. For example, one might say 
that the sign ‘AM I AM’ means or stands for the sign ‘major painted calligraphy of 
Victory over Death 2’. But is this all it means? Evidently not – at least, in potentia. 
Clearly, one might substitute, for ‘major painted calligraphy of Victory over Death 2’, 
‘sequence of painted words and letters’, or ‘group of five, large, painted forms’, or ‘field 
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of contrasts between light and dark, figure and ground, surface and depth’, and so on, ad 
nauseum. The figure AM I AM means all these things, which is precisely to say that its 
meaning (like that of any signified emerging by virtue of a relation of identity between 
signs) is fundamentally ambiguous or, in Lacanian parlance, imaginary, evanescent. 
 
 Indeed, with regard to the Lacanian conception of meaning 
repression/overdetermination, the figure AM I AM means not solely by virtue of any 
positive determination or relation of identity – rather, these determinations or 
identifications are sustained by virtue of the repression of an infinity of other possible 
meanings. That is to say, the very possibility of the precipitation of a signified, precisely, 
is equivalent to the repression of an infinite and negative field of differences. By the same 
token, however, the inherent ambiguity of any emergent signified testifies to the 
subsistence, insistence, or return of that which is repressed. In consequence, the emerging 
signified is overdetermined and thus ‘fades’ before the insistence of an infinite field of 
meaning/forms or forms of meaning apart from any particular meaning (i.e., the 
insistence of Žižek’s aforementioned ‘signifier without the signified’). Relevant, in this 
regard, is Lacan’s linguistic elaboration of the psychical function of meaning 
repression/overdetermination, on which basis points de capiton are precipitated and 
perpetuated in accordance with the structural laws of metaphor and metonymy. In 
keeping with this model, and like any signified, the meaning of the figure AM I AM 
precisely admits consideration as a point de capiton insofar as it defines a metonymic 
continuum (i.e., a combination of elements in a sequence, chain, or field) within which 
meaning ambiguities bear witness to traces of engendering, metaphoric stutters and 
discontinuities that are encountered as sutured into metonymy.  
 
 In light of the particular reading presented in section 3.1, the metonymic continuum in 
question bears interpretation as a sequence of three words ‘AM’, ‘I’, and ‘AM’ that, 
implicitly, states a question of being: ‘AM I AM?’ Meaning ambiguity arises insofar as 
this statement is self-contradictory (i.e., it seems given that, in the asking, there exists one 
who asks. How, then, can this one doubt its own existence?). On the basis of this reading, 
the figure AM I AM resists absolute determination insofar as it testifies to the 
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contradictory and simultaneous insistence/repression/return of traces of two identities 
implicated in its formation – namely: ‘AM I AM’ = ‘I AM’ and ‘AM I AM’ = ‘I AM 
NOT’. Here, the use of the term ‘trace’ implies that ‘what’ is repressed/returning is 
neither a metaphysical entity nor an expression of such. To recall Lewis’ succinct 
expression of this point: ‘The repressed returns in the symptom, but it returns as 
repressed... What returns is not that which is repressed, but the very event of repression 
itself’. Always already, insofar as they are written or spoken, the identities ‘AM I AM’ = 
‘I AM’ and ‘AM I AM’ = ‘I AM NOT’ are objects of conscious discourse – i.e., posited 
signifieds. Strictly speaking, ‘that’ which is repressed/returning is the ‘pure difference’ 
on which basis signification is even possible. This pure difference is not any kind of ‘in 
itself’, ‘being’, or ‘entity’ but rather a self-effacing trace-as-tracing, letter-as-lettering. 
Moreover, it also is crucial to grasp that, in accordance with the function of 
repression/overdetermination, the figure AM I AM means, in its ambiguity, not merely by 
virtue of the repression/return of the traces of the identities ‘AM I AM’ = ‘I AM’ and 
‘AM I AM’ = ‘I AM NOT’ but rather by virtue of an infinity of repressions and returns. 
Ipso facto, the determination of this infinite field is impossible. Hence, the question of ‘in 
what’ the meaning of the figure AM I AM consists is fundamentally unanswerable. 
Nevertheless, this state of affairs precludes neither the investigation of the form of this 
infinite field of potentials nor the manner of its formation – that is to say, what is proper 
to figures (meaning/forms and fields of such) and figuring (the activity that gives rise to 
meaning/forms and fields of such). 
 
 In this regard, the questions of the form and formation of the figure AM I AM in the 
painted matter of Victory over Death 2 resolve into questions regarding the form of 
‘what’ is repressed/returning and ‘how’ this repression/return takes place. In light of the 
discussion in section 3.2, it would appear that the form of what is repressed/returning is 
precisely pure difference and that the manner of repression/return is equivalent to 
differencing – i.e., the lettering/tracing implicated in the production of a field of 
differences (i.e., signifiers), on which basis is enlivened the possibility of determining a 
field of different things (i.e., determining signs, in relation to which there emerge 
signifieds). Always already, then, that which is encountered in consciousness is a sign 
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(e.g., the figure AM I AM in the painted matter of Victory over Death 2), in relation to 
which is posited a signified or point de caption. Insofar as it is an effect of 
repression/overdetermination or pure differencing, always already, this signified is 
‘fading’ before a field of differences defined by the tension obtaining between a field of 
forms of meaning apart from any determined meanings (i.e., the conscious dimension of 
the signifier) and a field of potentials (i.e., the unconscious dimension of the signifier). 
For the sake of convenience, and notwithstanding a certain loss of rigour, one might say 
that the posited signified/point de capiton fades before the insistence of a signifier 
without a signified. 
 
 As previously noted, insofar as it is an expression of pure difference or of the 
structurally necessary, real-as-impossibility, synonymous with, yet inassimilable to, the 
function of representation/symbolisation, the ‘signifier without a signified’ that, in the 
painted matter of Victory over Death 2, so insists in the fading of the signified/point de 
capiton attributed to the figure AM I AM is, precisely, that which eludes and exceeds 
conscious determination. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the veritable impossibility of 
this schema, for the sake of argument, I propose to represent/symbolise this ‘signifier 
without a signified’ as ‘I AM/I AM NOT’. In accordance with the terminology Lacan 
employs in Seminar IX, ‘I AM/I AM NOT’ serves to convey, inasmuch as this is 
possible, the manner by which ‘the essence of the signifier’ implies a ‘fundamental 
structure of the one as difference’ – a ‘one that is different from itself’ or, as I suggested 
in section 3.2, an ‘identity-in-difference’.363 Here, it should be understood that there is no 
question of ‘decomposing’ the figure AM I AM into ‘constituent elements’ ‘I AM’ and ‘I 
AM NOT’. Always already, that which is posited in consciousness is the figure AM I 
AM in its meaning ambiguity. This meaning ambiguity is equivalent to the 
repression/return or insistence of the signifier without a signified I AM/I AM NOT. The 
form of this signifier without a signified is that of an identity-in-difference or, indeed, a 
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duality insofar as it defines different aspects of a same that does not admit divisibility on 
the basis of this differentiation. 
 
 Here, the term ‘duality’ is somewhat ambiguous and thus demands clarification. 
According to some definitions, duality signifies ‘two independent principles or powers’, a 
‘binary opposition’, or a ‘twofold division’. However, for the purposes of the present 
discussion, I propose a more restrictive qualification whereby duality is to be 
distinguished from divisibility per se.364 On this basis, I define that which is divisible as 
an assemblage of component parts where these components are able to exist 
independently. Duality, by contrast, refers to a same composed of different aspects such 
that these aspects cannot exist ‘outside of’ or ‘apart from’ this same. Hence, to suggest 
that the meaning ambiguity of the signified AM I AM attests to the insistence of the 
identity-in-difference or duality I AM/I AM NOT is precisely to affirm that AM I AM 
does not, on the basis of this differentiation, admit division into the components ‘I AM’ 
and ‘I AM NOT’. Furthermore, it is worth noting that a duality is merely the most 
elementary form of an identity-in-difference. In principle, nothing prevents the form of 
identities-in-difference being conceived in terms of multiplicities. For example, the 
determination of Victory over Death 2’s central figure as ‘I’ can be understood in terms 
of the repression of the threefold identity-in-difference ‘I’ / ‘1’/ ‘/’.  
 
 It may be observed that, precisely, this kind of an appeal to a duality or identity-in-
difference is implicit in Lacan’s aforementioned suggestion, in Seminar XI, that the 
subject of the unconscious manifests where ‘the stroke of the opening makes absence 
emerge – just as the cry does not stand out against a background of silence, but on the 
contrary makes the silence emerge as silence.’ The implication is that, prior to the 
utterance of the cry, there is neither cry nor silence: in accordance with the function of 
representation/symbolisation, these categories emerge in the form of an indissoluble 
duality cry/silence. The manner by which, retrospectively, ‘cry’ and ‘silence’ may appear 
to exist and mean independently exemplifies the contingency and idealisation attending 
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the positing of signifieds and, in consequence, the tendency to imagine that things are and 
mean in and of themselves. However, on the basis of the repression/return of the duality 
or identity-in-difference cry/silence, these determinations are sustained only insofar as, 
always already, they are fading (i.e., becoming ambiguous). 
 
 In accordance with the function of representation/symbolisation, the experience of the 
ambiguous figure AM I AM in the painted matter of Victory over Death 2, precisely, 
implies a repression/return of the duality ‘opening stroke’/‘ground’. The term duality 
applies insofar as, clearly, it is nonsensical to suggest that the painted matter of Victory 
over Death 2 involves, for example, combining ‘strokes’ and ‘grounds’ – as if these were 
discrete ‘elements’ enjoying a prior and independent existence. On the contrary, it is 
evident that the ‘differends’ in question cannot exist apart from their relations of 
difference. The indissoluble and irreducible nature of this identity-in-difference is readily 
illustrated. On the canvas support of McCahon’s painting, a dense structure of 
brushstrokes traces the letters ‘AM I AM’. In consciousness, one determines these strokes 
or tracings as substantially ‘real’ or ‘material’ things. However, this is not to imply that 
they can exist apart from the relationships of difference between individual brushstrokes, 
and between the brushstrokes and the canvas ground, by virtue of which the letters are 
materialised.  
 
 This may not be immediately obvious. Let us simplify matters and imagine that the 
letters of the figure AM I AM are the products of single strokes deposited by a broad 
brush. Is it not, then, conceivable that, once dry, the letters might be peeled away from 
the support – in a manner similar to the removal of a layer of tempera pigment in fresco 
conservation? In this event, one might be forgiven for thinking that the letters of the 
figure AM I AM are determinable as real, material ‘things-in-themselves’. On reflection, 
however, this is, evidently, not the case. The possibility of discriminating the letters ‘AM 
I AM’ continues to depend on relations of difference. For example, a relation of 
difference now obtains between the ‘detached’ letters and a more general background 
space or environment. Indeed, in the very act of peeling pigment from a support, does not 
a relation of difference insist between the material film of detached paint and the tactile 
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surface of one’s fingers? This simple example demonstrates how misleading is the 
metaphysical notion of an isolable ‘thing-in-itself’. In accordance with the psychical 
function of repression/overdetermination or pure difference, any determination of the 
meaning of an entity or a figure (i.e., a sign) is destined to fade before the insistence of 
structures of traces, relations of difference, signifiers without signifieds. 
 
 3.3.2 Figuring the grammar of form 
 
 Given that the precipitation of a signified or point de capiton implies the 
repression/return of an infinite field of differences, it should be clear that the particular 
duality or identity-in-difference I AM/I AM NOT is only one of an infinity of 
possibilities from which one might choose in seeking to characterise the insistent signifier 
without a signified implicated in the fading of the signified or point de capiton of the 
figure AM I AM.365 Moreover, in seeking to illustrate some of these possibilities, one 
ought not to be constrained by the apparently linguistic tenor of the preceding discussion, 
on which basis, at the expense of the plastic or pictorial, there has been a privileging of 
the graphic or symbolic aspects of the figure AM I AM in the painted matter of Victory 
over Death 2. Indeed, in the present context, it should be apparent that, in so 
privileging/determining the figure AM I AM as graphic/symbolic, among the infinity of 
differences repressed are those which might be characterised (i.e., privileged, determined 
in turn) as plastic/pictorial.  
 
 By way of clarifying this point, consider, for example, what is implicit in determining 
the central element of the figure AM I AM as ‘I’. Recalling the discussion in chapter one, 
it should be apparent that, in so doing, one represses an infinity of other possibilities. 
Some of these may seem ‘primarily’ graphic or symbolic – e.g., ‘1’, ‘/’. Others may seem 
‘primarily’ plastic or pictorial – e.g., ‘erect figure in a landscape’, ‘inner city roofs’, 
‘waterfall’, ‘fall of light’, ‘barrier’, ‘portal’, or ‘gate’. However, the degree to which 
priority is accorded to ‘graphic/symbolic’ or ‘plastic/pictorial’ is, itself, a determination 
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that involves repressions and which, in accordance with the return of the repressed, is 
fading. To the extent figures determined as ‘purely’ graphic/symbolic or ‘purely’ 
plastic/pictorial are ambiguous, they testify to the insistence of identities-in-difference or 
dualities of the form graphic/plastic, symbolic/pictorial, writing/painting. This is simply 
to reiterate that, in consciousness, the nature of the insistent signifier without a signified 
is, fundamentally, to be a meaning/form – a duality or identity-in-difference of the 
symbolic and the representational. In consequence, the meaning-forming or figuring of 
AM I AM in the painted matter of Victory over Death 2 emerges as an inextricable 
entanglement of plastic and graphic, pictorial and symbolic, painting and writing.   
 
 Therefore, and notwithstanding the limitations inherent to this endeavour, in seeking 
to more fully elaborate the figuring of Victory over Death 2’s AM I AM (i.e., to illustrate 
other possibilities for the form of the insistent signifier without a signified implicated in 
the fading of the signified or point de capiton of the figure AM I AM), one might 
observe, for example, that its ambiguity extends beyond its grammatical construction 
(i.e., the graphic/symbolic) and also, in fact, encompasses its spatial construction (i.e., the 
plastic/pictorial). From this perspective, the ambiguity intrinsic to Victory over Death 2’s 
AM I AM may be just as validly attributed to the insistence of an identity-in-difference 
like ‘surface/depth’ as of ‘I AM/I AM NOT’. In this regard, however, it is crucial to 
appreciate that there is no suggestion that ‘surface/depth’ is ‘purely’ 
‘formal/plastic/painting’ and ‘I AM/I AM NOT’ is ‘purely’ 
‘conceptual/symbolic/writing’. At risk of belabouring the point, always already, the 
determinations ‘formal/plastic/painting’ and ‘conceptual/symbolic/writing’ are, 
themselves, sustained on the basis of repressions such that they evince ambiguity and 
fade before the return of that which is repressed – namely, aforementioned identities-in-
difference such as graphic/plastic, symbolic/pictorial, writing/painting. Hence, the 
suggestion that, in the painted matter of Victory over Death 2, the ambiguity of the figure 
AM I AM is an effect of the insistence of an infinite field of identities-in-difference 
encompassing ‘I AM/I AM NOT’ and ‘surface/depth’ is precisely not to assert that there 
are isolable ambiguities of meaning and isolable ambiguities of form. Still less is it to 
suggest that meaning ambiguities are grounded in essences of form or that formal 
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ambiguities are grounded in essences of meaning. To reiterate the point made at the 
outset of this discussion, whilst it may be convenient to speak either of the grammatical 
ambiguity or the spatial ambiguity of the figure AM I AM, this terminology makes sense 
only if one recognises that, always already, grammatical ambiguity insists by virtue of a 
space of meaning and spatial ambiguity insists by virtue of a grammar of form. 
 
 By way of providing an illustration, let us examine the insistence of the identity-in-
difference ‘surface/depth’ in the painted matter of Victory over Death 2 and the manner 
by which this contributes to the ambiguity of the painting’s major calligraphy. What is 
relevant, in this regard, is that, in the initial encounter with Victory over Death 2, one 
may neglect to notice that there is anything beyond the billboard-like disposition of light-
toned letters and words on a flat surface, uniformly painted matt black. That is to say, one 
makes determinations such as ‘light-toned letters and words’, ‘flat surface painted matt 
black’. These determinations are sustained on the basis of an infinity of repressions (e.g., 
identities-in-difference such as light/dark, painting/writing, surface/depth, figure/ground, 
pictorial/symbolic, plastic/graphic, etc.). In light of the return of the repressed, always 
already, these determinations are fading (i.e., they are determined only in their meaning 
ambiguity). In coming to recognise this ambiguity (i.e., in effect, to make further 
determinations sustained by further repressions) one may observe that, in several places, 
dark areas of the support are populated with cloudy masses and other understated forms. 
These features invest the painting with an illusory depth: dark, flat surfaces being 
transformed into atmospheric voids.  
 
 In Victory over Death 2, these misty, blue-grey masses are particularly prominent in 
the gap between the leftward AM and the central I, and above the right half of the M 
chevron located at the extreme right of the painting. Nevertheless, to the extent that these 
indistinct masses are typically juxtaposed with, if not over-painted by, more sharply 
defined blocks of text, intimations of atmospheric space evidently exist in an ambiguous 
counterpoise with reaffirmations of the two-dimensionality of the painted surface. In 
Victory over Death 2, for example, the misty region occupying the space between the 
leftward AM and central I is mostly obscured with script citing John 12: 28 and 12: 35. 
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These textual superimpositions seem disposed on flat, transparent surfaces through which 
the spectator gazes into an implied background space. The effect is precisely analogous to 
McCahon’s well-known recollection of seeing the letters ‘HAIRDRESSER AND 
TOBACCONIST’ being painted on a shop window.366 However, still further inspection 
reveals that, in themselves, these blocks of painted calligraphy also give rise to spatial 
ambiguities. The impression that they are traced on surfaces akin to flat panes of glass is 
undermined by subtle inflexions in paint tone, density and definition (not to mention 
variations in font size and case – particularly obvious in a work like Practical Religion). 
The relative uniformity of the printed, block capitals from John 12: 28 reinforces the 
impression that it defines a surface, whilst the more overtly handwritten text from John 
12: 35 evidently constitutes a calculus of variations in tonal brightness, degrees of 
transparency and opacity, and letters whose delineation ranges from well-defined to fuzzy 
around the edges. In consequence, the impression of cursive script, handwritten on a 
transparent page, tends to be superseded by a sense of letters and words suspended in 
space – scintillating like starlight glimpsed through a turbulent atmosphere or swimming 
like reflections viewed on an undulating water surface. 
 
 This spatial ambiguity is also manifest in the treatment of Victory over Death 2’s 
major text. The placement and delineation of the capital letters in the picture space, 
combined with variations in tonal brightness, enlivens a variety of conflicting spatial 
cues. In the first place, in both renditions of the word AM, the M slightly overlaps the A. 
This immediately creates the impression that the letters are disposed on superimposed 
planes. Moreover, it is also apparent that the AM at left is positioned somewhat lower in 
the picture space than its rightward counterpart. In particular, the horizontal bar of the 
leftward A is significantly lower than that of the corresponding letter at the right of the 
work. Given that the legs of the leftward AM extend to the bottom edge of the painting 
and that the right leg of the M, occupying the far right extremity of the work, traverses 
the height of the canvas support in its entirety, the delineation of the figure AM I AM 
evidently defines either a gentle diagonal across the surface of the work or, alternatively, 
a succession of superimposed planes proceeding from lower left background to upper 
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right foreground. The tonal variance between the barely visible AM at left and the 
relatively illuminated I AM at centre-right reinforces the sense of a transition in depth 
from background shadow to foreground illumination. 
 
 However, this impression of letter-forms disposed, in depth, on a series of 
superimposed planes, also miscarries. For example, in relation to the right-hand AM, the 
boundary where the letters overlap is not well-defined but subject to various edge effects 
that undermine the sense of their planar separation. Indeed, at one point, the lower-right 
extremity of the A breaks into the adjacent M. Tonally, moreover, the figure AM I AM 
does not unfold in a linear progression from near-darkness to a radiant crescendo. On the 
contrary, the brightest letter is the centrally located I. The following A and M are 
rendered in progressively darker hues. Hence, if tonal brightness correlates with spatial 
proximity then, in contraindication of other spatial cues, the figure AM I AM would 
appear to balloon outward towards the spectator – as if seen through a fish-eye lens 
located over the central I. That the girth of the white lozenge defining Victory over Death 
2’s middle I exceeds the constituent geometries of the other major capitals reinforces the 
impression that it occupies a locus of maximal magnification. These spatial conundrums 
are further exacerbated in the figure of the rightmost M. Reversing the treatment of its 
left-hand counterpart, the left leg of the right-hand M is markedly thicker than its right 
leg. This tends to contradict the impression that the letter is proceeding towards the 
spectator – rather, its rightward segment seems to twist back into depth. However, this 
twisting back is, itself, countermanded by the fact that the right leg of the M defines the 
rightmost boundary of the canvas support. Hence, any impression of a turning into depth 
is abruptly forestalled in a blunt reiteration of the painted surface. In a fashion redolent of 
the tendency of cubist paintings to mix perspectives and spatial cues, Victory over Death 
2’s right-hand capital constitutes a visual paradox: at once, ‘coming’ and ‘going’, it 
warps into an implied interior space and reasserts the two-dimensionality of the picture 
plane. 
 
 Insofar as this formal discordance invites interpretation in terms of a focus that 
continuously shifts between apprehensions of dark and light, background and foreground, 
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depth and surface, one is reminded of Lacan’s account of the manifestation of the subject 
of the unconscious as a ‘discontinuity in which something is manifested as a vacillation.’ 
Nevertheless, given Lacan’s understanding that the insistent ‘signifier without a 
signified’ is constituted as a ‘one as difference’ or an identity-in-difference, it should be 
emphasised that the impression of spatial ambiguity in the painted matter of Victory over 
Death 2 is, strictly speaking, less a matter of swift alternations or vacillations between 
discrete, isolable elements and perspectives than the experience of their paradoxical 
simultaneity. Hence, one only imagines that Victory over Death 2’s AM I AM inculcates 
a confusion of, or wavering between, dark background and illuminated foreground, 
shadowy depth and radiant surface – as if dark and light, background and foreground, 
depth and surface might enjoy independent existence. Always already, however, these 
determinations are fading before the return of that which is repressed – an infinite field of 
pure differences in which there insists an infinity of letterings or tracings, identities-in-
difference or trace structures: light/dark, foreground/background, surface/depth, 
proximity/distance, presence/absence, substance/void, being/non-being, I AM/I AM 
NOT... 
 
 As a final note, I would point out that it cannot be sufficiently emphasised that, 
considered as an expression of the structurally necessary, real-as-impossibility implicated 
in the function of representation/symbolisation, the infinite field of pure differences in 
question fundamentally exceeds and eludes this function, even as it is synonymous with 
it. Hence, the proffered list of identities-in-difference must be regarded as merely 
illustrative or schematic. One might seek, ‘more precisely’, to represent/symbolise this 
infinite field of pure differences by (1) interposing retronyms between all these terms and 
(2) placing the terms in brackets or quotation marks so as to emphasise their contingency 
and ideality. On this basis, the phrase above might be represented/symbolised like so: 
‘light’ / ‘dark’ / ‘foreground’ /  ‘background’ / ‘surface’ / ‘depth’ / ‘proximity’ / 
‘distance’ / ‘presence’ / ‘absence’ /  ‘substance’ / ‘void’ / ‘being’ / ‘non-being’ / ‘I AM’ / 
‘I AM NOT’ / ‘...’ Indeed, given that the terms in quotes are, necessarily and inevitably, 
posited signifieds (i.e., contingent and ideal, always already fading) one may be tempted 
to dispense with them altogether, leaving only a field of retronyms and ellipses: ... / ... / ... 
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/ ... This illustrates how the content or meaning of one’s constructions tends to fade in the 
face of an insistence of that which is more purely formal – which is precisely to reiterate 
that the fading of the signified is commensurate with the insistence of the ‘signifier 
without the signified’. Also evident is that the repeated effort to represent/symbolise that 
which exceeds and eludes the function of representation/symbolisation is swiftly marked 
by diminishing returns, faltering in the face of its own impossibility. 
 
 Let us summarise the preceding discussion. The present chapter has sought to answer 
the question how does the meaning of painting come into being? by way of an elaboration 
of the ‘agent-like’, metaphoric dimension of the precipitation of points de capiton in 
painting – which I have termed the figuring of painting. Appealing to Lacanian theory, I 
have characterised figuring as a meaning-forming and forming-meaning that is 
synonymous with a psychical function of meaning repression/overdetermination or pure 
difference. In consequence, I have observed that, in consciousness, all signifieds/points 
de capiton emerge only insofar as they are fading (i.e., becoming ambiguous) before the 
‘return of the repressed’ or the ‘insistence’ of the ‘signifier without a signified’. Here, 
however, one encounters an evident difficulty. If it is the case that, in figuring meaning, 
points de capiton are precipitated only insofar as they are fading then how is one to 
understand what, in Seminar III, Lacan refers to as the ‘big Other of intersubjectivity... 
the stable system of the world’ – i.e., the experience of what appears to be an enduring, 
language-mediated, social and cultural reality? Transposing this problem into the field of 
painting, one confronts the following question: how is the meaning of painting sustained? 
As indicated in section 3.1, chapter four presents the following hypothesis: namely, that 
the meaning of painting is sustained by virtue of the ‘automatist’, metonymic dimension 
of the perpetuation of points de capiton in painting – which may be called the desire of 
painting. In other words, there is a twofold proposition such that (1) the meaning of 
painting (or, indeed, any expression of subjectivity/meaning-making) is perpetuated as 
automatist, metonymic, re-playing of existing meaning, and (2) this automatism, 
metonymy and repetition expresses the structure of subjective desire.  
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 Here, it should be apparent that if difference is the concept crucial to understanding the 
agent-like, metaphoric, precipitation of points de capiton in painting then repetition is the 
analogously critical concept for understanding their automatist, metonymic, perpetuation. 
Thus, if the point de capiton is metaphorically precipitated in painting by virtue of the 
function of metaphor-as-pure differencing (i.e., figuring) then the point de capiton is 
metonymically perpetuated in painting by virtue of the function of metonymy-as-
repetition (i.e., desire). In order to more fully elaborate these ideas, the following matters 
demand consideration. In section 4.1, it will be necessary, firstly, to specify in what 
senses metonymy is repetition. In section 4.2, I will apply this understanding to the 
painted matter of Painting from “Malady” and the Malady series in order to illustrate 
how they admit consideration as signs of metonymy-as-repetition that evince, so to speak, 
two ‘moments’ of repetition. Finally, in section 4.3, I will  explore the Lacanian 
proposition that ‘desire is a metonymy’ in order to justify the appellation desire for that 
which sustains meaning (of painting or, indeed, any expression of language-mediated 
subjectivity) as automatism, metonymy, repetition. 
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Chapter 4 The desire of painting 
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4.1 Metonymy: meaning the same again 
 
 4.1.1 Metonymy as repetition 
 
 How is metonymy repetition? Let us approach this question by way of recalling the 
brief encounter with Jakobson’s linguistics presented in chapter two. On this basis, 
metonymy may be defined as the manner by which ‘Any sign is made up of constituent 
signs and/or only occurs in combination with other signs’ so that 
 
...any linguistic unit at one and the same time serves as a context for simpler units 
and/or finds its own context in a more complex linguistic unit. Hence any actual 
grouping of linguistic units binds them into a superior unit: combination and 
contexture are two faces of the same operation.367 
 
Metonymy, therefore, defines the way in which signs can be understood as collective 
combinations of component signs and as building blocks for aggregate signs. For 
example, ‘words’ are signs assembled from component signs (i.e., syllables, letters, 
phonemes) that can be combined with other words to produce semiotic agglomerations 
(i.e., clauses, sentences, paragraphs, entire texts, etc.). To reiterate another key point 
made in chapter two, metonymic combination and contexture of signs implies that ‘the’ 
meaning of ‘a’ sign determined in consciousness defines the crystallisation and/or 
reconfiguration of a field of meaning or, equivalently, the assumption of a particular 
perspective on a ‘world’. This is simply to reaffirm that any (necessarily, conscious) 
determination of meaning emerges in the form of a relation of tension with a potentially 
infinite field of meaning/forms (i.e., the big Other, symbolic order, signifying chain), the 
greater part of which is, practically speaking, repressed and, therefore, unconscious. 
 
 In order to demonstrate how metonymy is repetition, it is necessary to reiterate that, 
from a Lacanian perspective, metonymy defines the combinational ordering of the 
signifying chain in terms of the tension obtaining between a synchronic constellation of 
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signifiers-as-potentials that are unconscious and a diachronic sequence of signifiers-as-
meaning/forms unfolding in consciousness. To put the matter equivalently, the tension 
between the conscious and the unconscious ‘dimensions’ of the signifying chain bears 
witness to the manner by which a synchronic metonymy that is unconscious 
metaphorically becomes as a diachronic metonymy in consciousness. In relation to 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making, this becoming is synonymous with what has 
been termed the ‘structuring of structure’. In chapter two, this idea was invoked in the 
context of a discussion addressing Lacan’s conception of das Ding as ‘the beyond-of-the-
signified’ or ‘the Thing’ in its ‘dumb reality’ – i.e., as an expression of the real. In 
chapter three, the aspect of structuring was prioritised in the elaboration of the figuring of 
painting – where, as previously discussed, figuring was defined, variously, in terms of the 
metaphoric function of pure difference proper to the operation of the unary trait, 
lettering/tracing/differencing, a real writing or writing in the real, the insistence of the 
signifier without the signified, and the return of the repressed. In its elaboration of the 
desire of painting, the present chapter prioritises the aspect of structure. That is to say, 
the form of conscious diachrony where, in accordance with the metonymic function, there 
unfolds an iterative series of signs within which sutured or subsumed metaphoric 
discontinuities testify to the insistent becoming or return of a repressed ‘structure’ or 
‘field’ of signifiers-as-potentials that are unconscious. 
 
 In this regard, I would suggest that metonymy is conceivable as repetition in a 
threefold sense. In the first place, by virtue of what has been termed, variously, the 
‘function of repression/overdetermination of meaning’, ‘structuring of structure’, the 
‘reciprocity of metaphoric and metonymic functions’, the insistent ‘return of the 
repressed’, and so forth, consciousness simply is diachronic metonymy. That is to say, 
consciousness or conscious discourse simply is the repetitive, serial positing of signs – 
this activity being synonymous with the repetitive, serial, determining of the field of 
meaning or assuming perspectives on the world. Equivalently, conscious diachrony, 
defined as the serial determination of signs, may be understood in terms of a movement 
among semiotic identities or signifying alternatives. Here, the understanding of 
consciousness as diachronic metonymy may merit further explanation. In accordance 
 223 
with the Lacanian proposition that expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making are 
governed by the laws of metaphor and metonymy, I have suggested that subjective 
experience bears witness to a structuring of structure – a metaphoric function of pure 
difference or lettering/tracing/differencing, by virtue of which a synchronic metonymy of 
signifiers-as-potentials that is unconscious metaphorically becomes as a diachronic 
metonymy (i.e., a sequence of signs) in consciousness. To this extent, one may conceive 
of subjective experience in terms of a continual series of (hidden) metaphoric 
precipitations that occur in concert with a similarly continual series of reconfigurations of 
the metonymic structure (i.e., the becoming of unconscious metonymy as conscious 
metonymy). Moment by moment, then, the metonymic structure is as continually being 
reconfigured and, therefore, is as continually becoming different from itself. This 
counterpoise of metaphor and metonymy is precisely equivalent to what has been called 
the insistent return of the repressed, the insistence of an identity-in-difference or, to 
anticipate matters addressed in section 4.3, desire as significant insistence.  
 
 The idea that there is a becoming of unconscious metonymy as conscious metonymy 
resonates with Lacan’s assertion, in Seminar I, that the ‘identity in difference... already 
saturated in the thing’ implies ‘absolute mobility in the existence of things such that the 
flow of the world never comes to pass twice by in the same situation’ and that, 
furthermore, the unconscious  
 
...is located outside time... because it is in itself time, the pure time of the thing, and 
as such it can reproduce the thing within a certain modulation, whose material 
support can be anything. The compulsion to repeat involves nothing but this.368 
 
Here, I would suggest that Lacan’s definition of the unconscious as the ‘pure time of the 
thing’ (i.e., ‘real temporality’) resonates with conceptions of temporality in the 
philosophy of Edmund Husserl (e.g., the conception of ‘time-consciousness’ in On the 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time 1893-1917 (1991 (1966)) and 
Heidegger (e.g., the notion of ekstasis in Being and Time (1927)) – a more nuanced 
elaboration of which is beyond the scope of the present study. What is crucial is the 
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distinction obtaining between the unconscious, considered as ‘pure time’ or ‘real 
temporality’, and the ‘abstract’ notion of time as it is conceived in consciousness. The 
unconscious as pure time would appear to be synonymous with that which reflects the 
function of pure difference or the lettering/tracing/differencing proper to the operation of 
the unary trait. Hence, the unconscious, as temporally structured, precisely, is that which 
is repressed/returning in consciousness and, thus, fundamentally escapes the grasp of 
consciousness. Consciousness does not take cognizance of temporality in its essence, so 
to speak (i.e., as the continual becoming of difference), but rather admits consideration as 
a series of ‘snapshots’ or ‘samples’ of this becoming – where this seriality (i.e., the 
difference between ‘snapshots’) is that which is repressed/returning. Each snapshot 
(equivalent to a determination of meaning that, retroactively, bears witness to a complete 
reconfiguration of the field of meaning) constitutes a model of reality or perspective on a 
world that, in accordance with the idealisations and rationalisations of consciousness, 
presents (however momentarily) as necessary, inevitable, normal and natural. 
 
 The second sense of metonymy-as-repetition obtains insofar as, by virtue of 
metonymic combination and contexture, any determined field of meaning or perspective 
on the world is a sign that admits decomposition into combinations of simpler signs and 
integration into more complex semiotic ensembles. Among these combinations and 
within these contexts, there obtain relations of similarity and difference between signs. In 
other words, within any particular semiotic ensemble, it is always possible to determine 
the repetition of a same – albeit, a same sustained only by virtue of the repression of 
difference and thus, in light of the return of the repressed difference, a same that is, 
always already, fading. For example, by way of anticipating the discussion in the 
following section, one might say that the sign ‘Painting from “Malady”’ means by virtue 
of a semiotic identity such as ‘Painting from “Malady”’ = ‘sanguineous annulus’. Insofar 
as the sign ‘sanguineous annulus’ can be understood as a combination of identical arc 
segments, it defines a field in which there is a reiteration of the same. On this basis, one 
may say that the sign ‘Painting from “Malady”’ means by virtue of the semiotic identity 
‘Painting from “Malady”’ = ‘repetition of the same ring arc’. At the same time, however, 
the determination that there is a repetition of the same ring arc is sustained on the basis of 
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a repression of difference (e.g., ring arcs of different lengths, ring arcs of different spatial 
orientation, ring arcs of different painterly execution, and so on). The return of these 
repressed differences ensures that the semiotic identities ‘Painting from “Malady”’ = 
‘sanguineous annulus’ or ‘Painting from “Malady”’ = ‘repetition of the same ring arc’ 
are sustained only insofar as they are fading/subject to ambiguity.  
 
 As a further example that anticipates the discussion in the third part of the thesis, one 
might say, similarly, that the sign ‘Hotere discourse’ means by virtue of a semiotic 
identity such as ‘Hotere discourse’ = ‘the figure of Hotere’s reticence’. Insofar as the sign 
‘the figure of Hotere’s reticence’ can be understood as a combination of texts in which 
there is reference made to ‘Hotere’s reticence’, it defines a field in which there is a 
reiteration of the same. On this basis, one may say that the sign ‘Hotere discourse’ means 
by virtue of the semiotic identity ‘Hotere discourse’ = ‘repetition of references to the 
same figure of Hotere’s reticence’. At the same time, however, the determination that 
there is a repetition of the same figure of Hotere’s reticence is sustained on the basis of a 
repression of difference (e.g., the many different ways in which the figure of Hotere’s 
reticence is articulated in different texts). The return of these repressed differences 
ensures that the semiotic identities ‘Hotere discourse’ = ‘the figure of Hotere’s reticence’ 
or ‘Hotere discourse’ = ‘repetition of references to the same figure of Hotere’s reticence’ 
are sustained only insofar as they are fading/subject to ambiguity. 
 
 The third sense of metonymy-as-repetition is more subtle and reflects the manner by 
which, from the perspective of consciousness, always already it is the case that particular 
determinations of meaning are as reiterated. To see how this is so, it may be useful to 
recall what was previously suggested in relation to the precipitation and perpetuation of 
points de capiton. Namely, that the (structurally synchronic/metaphoric) ‘moment’ of the 
‘precipitation’ of meaning is a (structurally diachronic/metonymic) function of both the 
anticipation and retroactive determination of meaning. Relevant, in this regard, is 
Lacan’s observation (in Seminar III) that ‘in the order of signifiers... [in] the continuity of 
the signifier... A signifying unit presupposes the completion of a certain circle that 
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situates its different elements.’369 Also noteworthy is Lacan’s aforementioned suggestion 
(in Seminar V) that posited signifieds involve ‘an anticipation of the signifying 
succession, every signifying chain opening out before it the horizon of its own 
completion, and at the same time... a retroaction, once there has come naturally the 
signifying term which... overtakes the sentence’.370 In consequence, it seems as if the 
metonymic, diachronic dimension of discourse is impelled towards that which it has 
already been. With the precipitation of meaning, and thus, retroactively, the complete 
reconfiguration of the field of meaning, that which was, formerly, anticipated is 
normalised and naturalised, taking on the appearance of necessity and inevitability. In 
other words, as Lacan suggests in the ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” ’, expressions 
of subjectivity/meaning-making define a ‘subjective trajectory... grounded in the actuality 
which has the future anterior as its present.’371 From this perspective, meaning admits 
consideration as that which precipitates as perpetuated or crystallises as that which will 
be what it was. Always already, meaning, which is to say, the emergent signified or point 
de capiton, is only insofar as it is again. 
 
 Here, it may be objected that subjective experience of a world that admits 
unpredictable novelty and change would seem to contradict the proposition that meaning 
precipitates as perpetuated or is only insofar as it is again. By way of responding to this 
objection, it is necessary to reiterate that determinations of meaning are a function of 
consciousness (even if, as previously suggested, consciousness, the unconscious, and 
their relation of tension demand, in effect, to be conceived as abstractions from what is 
‘primary’ – namely, language-mediated, subjective experience per se). Insofar as the 
making sense or meaning-that-is-made of subjective experience is a function of 
consciousness, it is subject to all the idealisations and rationalisations of consciousness. 
The proposition that meaning precipitates as perpetuated or is only insofar as it is again 
is intended to emphasise how, by virtue of these idealisations and rationalisations, the 
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determinations of consciousness (which include the fabrication of a world that witnesses 
change, novelty, etc.) are imbued with a seeming necessity, inevitability, normalcy and 
naturalness. This holds true for any conscious determination whatsoever – even 
determinations of uncertainty or incapacity. Always already, qua determination, the 
determinations of consciousness are endowed with a quotient of positivity. It is the case 
that, by virtue of the ‘hidden’ and ‘self-effacing’ nature of what has been called the 
‘metaphoric function’ (i.e., unconscious meaning-in-the-making), the precise moment of 
the precipitation of meaning can only ever be hypothesised after the fact – which is to 
reaffirm that, from a Lacanian perspective, the one that is conscious is never precisely 
coincident with or fully present to itself. Nevertheless, the positive dimension of 
conscious determinations of meaning (however imaginary or ideal) implies that a 
statement of the form ‘there is uncertainty’ is always amenable to being modified thus: 
‘on reflection, it is certain that there was uncertainty’. The nature of consciousness is 
such that, whilst there may be determinations that the world is uncertain, that 
determinations are made is not in doubt. Indeed, given the Lacanian understanding of 
subjective experience as a ‘trajectory... grounded in the actuality which has the future 
anterior as its present’, the conscious determination that ‘on reflection, it is certain there 
was uncertainty’ admits the more precise formulation: ‘always already it will have been 
the case that, on reflection, it is certain that there was uncertainty’. 
 
 In consciousness, then, always already it is the case that meaning registers as repeated. 
Recalling points made previously, this is to reaffirm that the event of the metaphoric 
crystallisation of points de capiton is ‘hidden’ – entirely subsumed within the appearance 
of a perpetual, metonymic re-playing of existing meaning. In consequence, any emergent 
signified or point de capiton admits consideration as an expression of an ‘agent-like’ and 
metaphoric operation of pure difference and as an expression of an ‘automatist’ and 
metonymic operation of repetition. In the face of the insistent ‘return of the repressed’, 
necessarily and inevitably, the signified precipitates as fading and as reiterated – which 
is precisely to say that the signified is ‘sustained’ only in its meaning ambiguity. Still 
further, this is also to reemphasise that, in the final analysis, the point de capiton, 
metaphorically precipitated as fading and metonymically perpetuated as endlessly 
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reiterated, is not ‘a’ signified or ‘determinate’ meaning/form but, on the contrary, an 
insistent ‘signifier without a signified’ – a form of meaning apart from any particular 
meaning. Hence, one may conclude that, in the diachronic unfolding of discourse, 
ultimately, ‘that’ which is perpetuated or which repeats is nothing other than the 
discontinuous form of repression/return, insistence/fading: conscious discourse is a 
continuum of sutured discontinuities within which all meaning-that-is-made fades before 
endlessly insistent forms of meaning-in-the-making. 
 
 4.1.2 Identity and difference 
 
 In accordance with the function of repression/overdetermination of meaning, the 
manner by which meaning is as fading and as reiterated also admits consideration in 
terms of a paradoxical simultaneity of identity and difference. This follows from the 
definition of repetition as the reiteration of a same that is not identical with itself. At the 
very least, to repeat is to return at a later (i.e., different) time. Always already, then, this 
irreducible, temporal difference implies that, in returning, the same is becoming different 
from itself. This is precisely to affirm that, in accordance with the psychical function of 
repression/overdetermination, the same that returns in repetition is sustained – indeed, 
overdetermined – by virtue of the repression/return of difference. In Seminar IX, this 
conception of repetition is evident from Lacan’s discussion of the contradictions inherent 
in the so-called Law of Identity: A = A. Lacan points out that whilst ‘ “A is A” appears to 
mean something: it makes a “signified” (cela fait “signifé”)’, at the same time, ‘ “A is A” 
signifies nothing’ where ‘It is precisely this nothing (rien) that is going to be in question, 
because this nothing has a positive value because it says what that signifies.’372 In other 
words, even though, by virtue of the redundant repetition of ‘A’, the identity ‘A = A’ is, 
ostensibly, empty or meaningless, nevertheless, it accrues a positive quotient of meaning 
insofar as (1) ‘meaning nothing’ is still, minimally, meaning ‘nothing’ and (2) ‘meaning 
nothing’ implies that, in some sense, ‘nothing’ means (i.e., ‘nothing’ ‘exerts’ a signifying 
effect). 
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 Ibid, Seminar IX, Seminar 4, 6 December 1961, 28. 
 
 229 
 
 Lacan illustrates this latter point by repeatedly flourishing and hiding a ping-pong ball, 
thereby pantomiming what he refers to as the ‘inaugural gesture’ in the game of Fort-Da 
played by Freud’s grandson.373 Lacan’s point is that identifications (i.e., significations, 
the making of meanings per se) are sustained by virtue of the difference between 
appearance and disappearance, presence and absence, something and nothing. The 
assertion that something appears, something is present, something is, depends on the 
possibility of something being disappeared, something being absent, something being 
not. In other words, the difference between being and being not is structurally necessary 
for successive manifestations of a same such that one may sustain an identity of the form 
A = A: namely, ‘the ping-pong ball is the ping-pong ball’...this little o is a little o.’374 Still 
further, Lacan proposes that 
 
...there is between these two moments, which I indisputably identify in a legitimate 
fashion, the disappearance of the ball; without that there is no means for me to 
show it, there is nothing formed on the plane of the image. Therefore, the ball is 
always there and I can fall into a cataleptic state looking at it.375 
 
Here, I would suggest that the assertion that ‘the ball is always there’ and that one can 
‘fall into a cataleptic state looking at it’ implies that, always already, identifications bear 
witness to a condition of entranced catalepsy. That is to say, identification is an 
automatism (i.e., an effect of the function of representation/symbolisation or what, in 
                                                 
373
 For references to the game of Fort-Da (gone-there) played by Freud’s grandson, see Freud, 
‘The Interpretation of Dreams (second part)’ (1900), in SE, v5, 461, n1 (added 1919), and ibid, 
‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920) in SE, v18, 14-17. 
 
374
 Lacan, Seminar IX, Seminar 4, 6 December 1961, 28-29. In this context, Lacan’s reference to 
‘little o’ is an allusion to the ‘object of desire’. However, the ‘o’ originally derives from ‘other’ 
(or, in French, ‘autre’ – hence the equivalent rendering of the object of desire as ‘little a’ or, 
indeed, in Seminar XI and later, ‘objet petit a’ – the so-called ‘object cause of desire’). The 
reference to the other reflects the fact that little o (or little a) was originally employed to 
designate ‘small other’ – i.e., the ego and its mirror image. Little o as object of desire will merit 
further attention in section 4.3. 
 
375
 Ibid, 29. 
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section 4.3, will be referred to as significant insistence) – even if, on the level of 
consciousness and ego, identification would seem to exemplify agency.  
 
 Lacan then enquires into the nature of the ‘is’ ‘which unites the apparitions of the ball 
and this intervening disappearance’ and suggests that it is sustained ‘On the imaginary 
plane...[in] this spontaneous assumption by the subject of the identity of two appearances 
which are nevertheless quite different.’ That is to say, as previously suggested, identity is 
sustained by virtue of the repression of difference. In order to explain how it is possible 
for signification to arise through the difference between appearance and disappearance, 
presence and absence, something and nothing, Lacan contends that it is necessary to 
transcend the order of imaginary idealisations of meaning and 
 
...question... the relationship of... identification... with what is a different dimension 
to everything that is the order appearance and disappearance; namely the status of 
the signifier.376 
 
To this extent, Lacan’s allusions to the ‘nothing’ that, paradoxically, ‘exerts’ signifying 
effects, and the ‘inaugural’ role of the signifier in enabling the possibility of making 
identifications, prefigure his elaboration of the ‘essence’ of the signifier in terms of the 
unary trait. As previously discussed in chapter three, the status of the signifier, in its 
‘essence’, so to speak, is to be as a ‘one as difference’ or ‘identity-in-difference’. That 
which ‘materialises’ the signifier as an identity-in-difference is the metaphoric function 
of pure difference – the lettering/tracing/differencing that, as structurally necessary, real-
as-impossibility, is synonymous with, yet inassimilable to, the function of 
representation/symbolisation. 
 
 Let us summarise the preceding discussion in order to clarify the relationships 
between the three senses of metonymy-as-repetition thus far articulated. In the first place, 
by virtue of the function of repression/overdetermination, expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making testify to an unconscious, synchronic metonymy of 
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 Ibid. 
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meaning potentials metaphorically becoming as a diachronic metonymy of actualised 
meanings in consciousness. That is to say, conscious discourse simply is the repetitive, 
serial positing of signs – a movement among semiotic identities or signifying alternatives. 
Secondly, by virtue of metonymic combination and contexture, ‘the’ meaning of ‘a’ sign 
determined in consciousness is synonymous with the determination of a field of meaning 
or, equivalently, the assumption of a particular perspective on a ‘world’. That is to say, 
any sign posited admits consideration as a semiotic ensemble of less complex signs 
within which, by virtue of the repression of difference, it is always possible to discern the 
reiteration of a same (albeit, a same that, by virtue of the return of the repressed is 
sustained only insofar as it is fading). Thirdly, the manner by which the (structurally 
synchronic/metaphoric) ‘moment’ of the ‘precipitation’ of meaning is a (structurally 
diachronic/metonymic) function of both the anticipation and retroactive determination of 
meaning, implies that meaning precipitates as perpetuated: meaning is as reiterated. From 
the perspective of consciousness, then, metonymy-as-repetition implies that, always 
already, (1) signs are serially determined, (2) any sign determined is decomposable into 
an ensemble of signs, within which there may be discerned the repetition of a same, and 
(3) any sign is only insofar as it is again. 
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4.2 Moments of repetition in Painting from “Malady” and the 
Malady series 
 
 4.2.1 The metonymy of painting  
  
 Having presented a theoretical understanding of the metonymic dimension of the 
perpetuation of points de capiton, it is now timely to apply this model to the painted 
matter of Painting from “Malady” and the Malady series. Here, it is important to bear in 
mind the following points. Firstly, in accordance with the function of 
representation/symbolisation, Painting from “Malady” and the Malady series admit 
consideration as expressions or signs of subjectivity/meaning-making. In order to 
emphasise this detail, the terms in question will be placed in quotes: ‘Painting from 
“Malady”’ and ‘the Malady series’. Secondly, by virtue of metonymic combination and 
contexture of signs, ‘the’ meaning of ‘Painting from “Malady”’ and ‘the Malady series’, 
determined in consciousness, defines a relation of tension with a potentially infinite field 
of other signs (i.e., the big Other, symbolic order, signifying chain) – the greater part of 
which is repressed and, therefore, unconscious. Thirdly, however, insofar as the repressed 
is returning, it is also the case that ‘the’ meaning of ‘Painting from “Malady”’ and ‘the 
Malady series’ is as reiterated and is as fading – which is to say, is sustained only in its 
ambiguity in the form of a repetitive movement among signifying alternatives. It is from 
this standpoint that one may say that the meaning of ‘Painting from “Malady”’ and ‘the 
Malady series’ is sustained by virtue of metonymy-as-repetition or that, equivalently, 
‘Painting from “Malady”’ and ‘the Malady series’ admit consideration as signs of 
metonymy-as-repetition. Indeed, in the following discussion it will be convenient to 
distinguish two ‘moments’ of repetition. The first moment of repetition obtains insofar as 
the meanings in question invite interpretation as reiterations of the same sustained by 
virtue of the repression of difference. The second moment of repetition obtains insofar as, 
always already, the meanings of the signs in question are fading before the return of the 
repressed difference or, equivalently, the insistence of an identity-in-difference. Hence, 
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these meanings are sustained only in their ambiguity as reiterations of the same that is 
not identical with itself – i.e., in the form of a movement among signifying alternatives.377 
 
 Let us clarify how ‘Painting from “Malady”’ and ‘the Malady series’ are signs that 
are defined by or mean by virtue of metonymic relations of combination and contexture. 
By virtue of metonymic combination, one may say that the sign ‘Painting from 
“Malady”’ is defined through being composed of subsidiary signs such as ‘sanguineous 
annulus’, ‘fifteen-fold reiteration of the stencilled word MELODY’, or ‘freely-brushed, 
orange-red discus’. Similarly, by virtue of metonymic contexture, one may say that the 
sign ‘Painting from “Malady”’ is defined by its membership in more complex semiotic 
ensembles represented/symbolised by signs such as ‘the Malady series’, ‘Hotere’s 
oeuvre’, ‘twentieth-century, modernist painting in Aotearoa/New Zealand’, and so on. 
Analogously, ‘the Malady series’ is a sign that means by virtue of its combination of 
more elementary signs such as ‘Painting from “Malady”’, ‘Malady series acrylic 
paintings on canvas’, ‘Malady series drawings in pen and ink wash on paper’, or even (as 
was suggested in chapter one) ‘the Malady book as a collection of poem-paintings by the 
poet-painter Manhire-Hotere’. At the same time, however, ‘the Malady series’ also is a 
sign defined by its inclusion in wider semiotic contexts such as ‘Hotere’s Black 
Paintings’, ‘Hotere’s oeuvre’ (or, perhaps, ‘the oeuvre of Manhire-Hotere’), ‘twentieth 
century painting in Aotearoa/New Zealand’ (or, perhaps, ‘twentieth century concrete 
verse in Aotearoa/New Zealand’) – clearly, the list of contexts may be extended 
indefinitely. 
 
 On this basis, one may say that the definition or meaning of the signs ‘Painting from 
“Malady”’ and ‘the Malady series’ emerges or precipitates by virtue of relations of 
identity such as ‘Painting from “Malady”’ = ‘sanguineous annulus’ or ‘the Malady 
series’ = ‘paintings exhibiting the application of art media to certain supports’. At the 
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 I should point out that, in specifying two ‘moments’ of repetition, there is no suggestion of a 
discernibly ‘real’ or ‘actual’ temporal separation between ‘events’. Rather, the moments in 
question define intervals taking place in what Lacan would refer to as a purely ‘logical time’. 
That is to say, to all practical intents and purposes, the two moments of repetition are temporally 
coincident. 
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same time, however, one also must take cognizance of the fact that the meaning of the 
signs ‘Painting from “Malady”’ and ‘the Malady series’ is sustained only in its ambiguity 
by virtue of a repression of difference (or, to be more precise, repressed/returning 
identities-in-difference) such that the meaning is expressed in the form of a repetitive 
movement among semiotic identities or signifying alternatives. Hence, anticipating the 
discussion to follow, one might say that the meaning of ‘Painting from “Malady”’ 
emerges in the form of a movement among the semiotic identities ‘Painting from 
“Malady”’ = ‘sanguineous annulus’, ‘Painting from “Malady”’ = ‘fifteen-fold 
reiteration of the stencilled word MELODY’, ‘Painting from “Malady”’ = ‘freely-
brushed, orange-red discus’, and so forth. Similarly, one might say that the meaning of 
‘the Malady series’ emerges in the form of a movement among the signifying alternatives 
‘the Malady series’ = ‘paintings exhibiting the application of art media to certain 
supports’, ‘the Malady series’ = ‘paintings exhibiting a palette of blacks and charcoal 
greys’, ‘the Malady series’ = ‘paintings juxtaposing stencilled text and simple, geometric 
forms’, and so on. 
 
 As noted in chapter three, the repressed/returning identities-in-difference (by which 
the meanings of signs like ‘Painting from “Malady”’ and ‘the Malady series’ are 
sustained only in their ambiguity) fundamentally elude the function of 
representation/symbolisation. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, and in accordance 
with the infinite constellation of signs enlivened by virtue of metonymic combination and 
contexture, the repressed/returning identity-in-difference that renders ambiguous the 
meaning of the sign ‘Painting from “Malady”’ might be represented/symbolised as 
‘.../sanguineous annulus/fifteen-fold reiteration of the stencilled word MELODY/freely-
brushed, orange-red discus/the Malady series/Hotere’s oeuvre/twentieth-century, 
modernist painting in Aotearoa/New Zealand/...’ Likewise, at risk of belabouring the 
point, the repressed/returning identity-in-difference that renders ambiguous the meaning 
of the sign ‘the Malady series’ may be represented/symbolised as ‘.../Painting from 
“Malady”/paintings exhibiting the application to art media to certain supports/paintings 
exhibiting a palette of blacks and charcoal greys/paintings juxtaposing stencilled text and 
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simple, geometric forms/Hotere’s oeuvre/ twentieth-century, modernist painting in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand/...’  
 
 Here, two matters demand further consideration. Firstly, it should be apparent that, 
excepting the particular signs determined in consciousness (i.e., ‘Painting from 
“Malady”’ and ‘the Malady series’), the ‘two’, aforementioned fields of 
repressed/returning identities-in-difference are synonymous. This is simply to reaffirm 
that determining ‘the’ meaning of ‘Painting from “Malady”’ and ‘the Malady series’ 
involves actualising or realising the big Other, symbolic order, or signifying chain (i.e., 
that which, encompasses meaning/forms actualised/realised in consciousness and an 
infinite realm of potentials that is unconscious) on two different ‘levels’ or, better 
perhaps, from two different ‘perspectives’. Secondly, insofar as the signs ‘Painting from 
“Malady”’ and ‘the Malady series’ mean by virtue of metonymic combination and 
contexture, the two, aforementioned moments of repetition apply equally to the 
subsidiary signs, of which they are combinations, and the more complex semiotic 
agglomerations, into which they are contextured. For the sake of convenience, the 
following discussion will illustrate moments of repetition in relation to subsidiary signs 
of which ‘the Malady series’ and ‘Painting from “Malady”’ are combined – the analysis 
of ‘the Malady series’ functioning, in effect, as a context for the analysis of ‘Painting 
from “Malady”’. 
 
4.2.2 Moments of repetition in the Malady series 
 
 From the level or perspective of ‘the Malady series’, then, let us consider the two 
moments of repetition with regard to the three aforementioned, semiotic identities by 
virtue of which ‘the Malady series’ means. Since each of these identities is, itself, a sign, 
we may omit the ‘=’ and write them like so: (1) ‘the Malady series’ application of art 
media to certain supports’, (2) ‘the Malady series’ palette of blacks and charcoal greys’, 
and (3) ‘the Malady series’ juxtaposing of stencilled text and simple, geometric forms’. 
On the basis of the preceding discussion, the first moment of repetition obtains insofar as 
‘the Malady series’ means by virtue of the reiteration of a same sustained on the basis of 
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a repression of difference. Here, it may be apparent that this difference is temporal and 
spatial. In the former case, one may say that, from one infinitesimal moment to the next, 
‘the Malady series’ means by virtue of repeated encounters with the same or typical 
‘application of art media to certain supports’, the same or characteristic ‘palette of blacks 
and charcoal greys’, and the same or common ‘juxtaposing of stencilled text and simple 
geometric forms’. In other words, the repression of temporal difference underpins one’s 
conviction that the same features of the world are repeatedly encountered – i.e., sustain 
their identity over time. In the latter case, metonymic combination and contexture of 
signs implies that ‘the Malady series’ application of art media to certain supports’, ‘the 
Malady series’ palette of blacks and charcoal greys’, and ‘the Malady series’ juxtaposing 
of stencilled text and simple, geometric forms’ are not inviolable gestalts but rather 
amenable to infinite, spatial subdivision. That is to say, ‘the Malady series’ may be 
separated into subgroups of paintings, individual works, or any spatial subdivision 
thereof. Indeed, it is only by virtue of the repression of these spatial differences that one 
may speak of the signs under consideration in the singular – e.g., as the ‘Malady series’ 
application of art media to certain supports’, the ‘Malady series’ palette of blacks and 
charcoal greys’, and the ‘Malady series’ juxtaposing of stencilled text and simple 
geometric forms’. 
 
 As previously suggested, the second moment of repetition obtains insofar as the 
meaning of ‘the Malady series’ is sustained only in its ambiguity, in the form of an 
endless movement among signifying alternatives. In the first place, this ambiguity 
testifies to the return of the repressed temporal difference such that the meanings of the 
signs in question are fading before the reiteration of the same that is, moment by moment, 
becoming different from itself. Hence, one may say that the meaning of ‘the Malady 
series’ is ambiguous to the extent that it evinces a temporal movement among the 
signifying alternatives ‘the Malady series’ application of art media to certain supports’ at 
time t1’, ‘the Malady series’ application of art media to certain supports’ at time t2’, and 
so forth. Secondly, this ambiguity may be understood in terms of the return of repressed 
spatial differences such that the meanings of each of the aforementioned three signs are 
fading before the insistence of their (potentially infinite) metonymic ‘subdivisions’. In 
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each case, these signs present as combinations of different elements, separately iterated 
(i.e., different applications of art media to certain supports, different palettes of blacks 
and charcoal greys, different juxtapositions of stencilled text and simple geometric forms) 
and as reiterations of a same (i.e., the same application of art media to certain supports, 
the same palette of blacks and charcoal greys, the same juxtaposition of stencilled text 
and simple geometric forms). 
 
 Therefore, in keeping with the terminology thus far employed, one may say that ‘the 
Malady series’ functions as a sign of metonymy-as-repetition insofar it means by virtue 
of the ambiguous, semiotic identities (1) ‘the Malady series’ typical application of art 
media to certain supports’, (2) ‘the Malady series’ characteristic palette of blacks and 
charcoal greys’, and (3) ‘the Malady series’ common juxtaposing of stencilled text and 
simple, geometric forms’. These semiotic identities are ambiguous to the extent that, 
temporally and spatially, they encompass a range of signifying alternatives. As 
previously observed, the alternatives disposed temporally define differences obtaining 
purely by virtue of the endless succession of infinitesimal moments and thus invite no 
further analysis. However, insofar as they define a much more diverse field of 
differences, the signifying alternatives disposed spatially do merit further examination. 
This investigation will serve the dual purpose of establishing the broad parameters of ‘the 
Malady series’ and emphasising the irremediable ambiguities and complexities to which 
this sign is subject. In so doing, the way will be prepared for the discussion in chapter 
five, where I will suggest that, in the final analysis, the sign ‘the Malady series’ refers to 
an ‘impossible object’, the identity and meaning of which rests on nothing more than the 
radically contingent articulation of the name ‘Malady’. 
 
 Let us begin with the first semiotic identity noted above: ‘the Malady series’ typical 
application of art media to certain supports’. On inspection, it is apparent that this sign 
encompasses a twofold equivocation. In the first place, ‘the Malady series’ typical 
application of selected art media to standard supports’ evinces a movement among the 
signifying alternatives ‘Malady series works featuring acrylic paint on stretched canvas’, 
‘Malady series works featuring watercolour on paper’, and ‘Malady series works 
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featuring pencil and/or ballpoint pen on paper’.378 Secondly, ‘the Malady series’ typical 
application of art media to certain supports’ testifies to a movement among the signifying 
alternatives ‘Malady series works on differently-sized surfaces’. In this regard, even 
restricting one’s attention to acrylic paintings on canvas, it is evident that the dimensions 
of Malady series works, whilst somewhat standardised, admit considerable variation.379 
                                                 
378
 The first category of Malady series works – acrylic paintings on canvas – embraces those 
members of the Malady that are of primary concern (i.e., privileged) in this project. The second 
category of Malady series works – watercolour paintings on paper – is exemplified by the likes of 
Malady Malady Malady (1970, ref. 53). The third category of Malady series works – pencil 
and/or ballpoint pen drawings on paper – encompasses Hotere’s working drawings for the 
Malady paintings, currently in the collection of the Hocken Library. For a reference to the 
Hocken Library’s collection of working drawings for the Malady paintings (and reproductions of 
seventeen such works), see Hocken Collections, Uare Taoka o Hākena, University of Otago, 
http://otago.ourheritage.ac.nz/collections/show/34, (19.06.13). 
 
 In so characterising the media employed in Malady series works, it may be apparent that, for 
the sake of simplicity, I am neglecting the suggestion (made in chapter one) that Malady series 
works comprise poem/paintings by the poet/painter Manhire/Hotere. If this possibility is allowed 
then the semiotic identity ‘the Malady series’ typical application of art media to certain supports’ 
also encompasses ‘Malady series works featuring mechanically reproduced text and pen and ink 
drawings on paper bound into book form’.  
 
379
 The majority of the Malady series paintings identified in this project are executed on canvases 
approximately 70 inches (~1780mm) high and either 28 inches (~711mm) or 36 inches 
(~914mm) wide. Even among these works, however, small variations ensure that no two Malady 
paintings are, in fact, exactly the same size. Other members of the Malady series diverge from the 
standard above either partially or wholly. For example, the dimensions of Painting from 
“Malady” are usually given as 1116x912mm – ‘non-standard’ in height, but of a standard width. 
Also close to a standard width, but non-standard in height is the Dowse Art Museum’s Black 
Painting from “Malady” (1970, ref. 54) at 2115x740mm. In verifying the dimensions of the 
Dowse Art Museum’s Black Painting from “Malady”, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of 
Georgia Morgan (Registrar, Dowse Art Museum). For details of the dimensions of this work, see 
email correspondence between the author and Georgia Morgan, 29 November 2013. Of two 
Malady series paintings in the collection of Te Manawa, Black Painting III from “Malady” 
(1970, ref. 55), at 1800x1240mm, is of standard height, but non-standard width, whilst Black 
Painting IIIa from “Malady” (1970, ref. 56), at 1681x1376mm, deviates from the Malady series 
‘norm’ in both height and width. In verifying the dimensions of the Malady series paintings in Te 
Manawa’s collection, I also would like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance given by Jeff Fox 
(Te Manawa, Senior Curator), Susanna Shadbolt (Te Manawa, Assistant Curator), and Rebekah 
Clements (Te Manawa, Registrar). For details of the dimensions of Black Painting III from 
“Malady” and Black Painting IIIa from “Malady”, see email correspondence between the author 
and the aforementioned Te Manawa staff, 28 November 2013. Comprising a sub-series within the 
Malady paintings proper, the seven Malady Panels (1971, ref. 57) conform to the standard height 
of ~1780mm but define a third standard width of ~1065mm. As a final observation (that makes 
no claim to have exhausted the variances in question), in Dunedin Public Art Gallery, Ralph 
Hotere, A survey 1963-73, exh. cat. (Dunedin: Dunedin Public Art Gallery, 1974), np, there is 
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Turning to the second semiotic identity mentioned earlier – namely, the ‘Malady series’ 
characteristic palette of blacks and charcoal greys’ – it is evident that this sign evinces 
ambiguity by way of encompassing the signifying alternatives ‘variations in tone of 
pigment’, ‘variations in density of pigment’, ‘variations in uniformity of pigment’ – or, 
indeed, ‘palette of blacks and charcoal greys combined with other hues’.380 Finally, let us 
consider the third semiotic identity in question: ‘the Malady series common juxtaposing 
of stencilled text and simple geometric forms’. This sign encompasses at least three 
domains of difference. One domain is defined by the different stencils employed and the 
manner of their combination between and within the picture spaces of individual works. 
To this extent, ‘the Malady series common juxtaposing of stencilled text and simple 
geometric forms’ encompasses the signifying alternatives ‘MELODY or MALADY’, 
‘MELODY and MALADY’, or ‘MELODY, MALADY, and MY LADY’.381 A second 
                                                                                                                                                 
mention of a ‘BLACK PAINTING ’72 from Malady a poem by Bill Manhire’, described as 
‘Selected for and first exhibited Benson and Hedges Art Award, 1972’, and the dimensions of 
which are given as 1985x1985mm. 
 
380
 Variations in the tone, density, and uniformity of the black and charcoal grey palette of 
Malady series works are particularly evident in Painting XV from “Malady” and Black Painting 
XVII from “Malady” (1970, ref. 58). That other tonalities are employed in members of the 
Malady series is, perhaps, most obvious in paintings like Painting from “Malady”, with its 
prominent orange-red discus, and Black Painting IIIa from “Malady”, with its eye-catching, 
chromatic sequence of annular rings. Subdued pink and purple hues inflect the stencilled text, 
vertical lines and vertical bands in the Dowse Art Museum’s Black Painting from “Malady”, 
whilst Black Painting XII from “Malady” exhibits a frame of MALADY stencils rendered in a 
dusky blue. In Black Painting XI from “Malady” (1970, ref. 59) and Black Painting XIV from 
“Malady” (1970, ref. 60), the violet and/or magenta tint of the prominent annular forms is 
reiterated, in a more understated fashion, in the dark backgrounds and stencilled script. In Black 
Painting XIIB from “Malady” (1970, ref. 61, fig. 10), the bisected arch-form is rendered in thinly 
applied tones of burgundy and chocolate. 
 
381
 Malady series works that exhibit repetitions of either MELODY or MALADY include 
Painting from “Malady” (with its fifteen MELODYs) and works like Black Painting XII from 
“Malady” (where there are sixty three MALADYs, forty one contained within the central 
cruciform and twenty two defining a rectangular boundary). Malady series works that juxtapose 
repetitions of MELODY and MALADY include Black Painting XV from “Malady” (where the 
diagonal iterations of MELODY and MALADY interpenetrate in the form of an ‘X’) and Te 
Papa’s Black Painting XIII from “Malady” (1970, ref. 62) (where, disposed leftwards in the 
picture space, there are separate columns of MALADY and MELODY, respectively). Members 
of the Malady series in which the reiterations of MELODY and/or MALADY are accompanied 
by a single iteration of MY LADY include Black Painting from “Malady”, in the collection of 
the Dowse Art Museum (where MY LADY terminates a descending sequence of MALADYs), 
and Black Painting XVII from “Malady” (where MY LADY supports a pedestal of MELODYs). 
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domain of difference obtains insofar as ‘the Malady series’ common juxtaposing of 
stencilled text and simple geometric forms’ encompasses the signifying alternatives (1) 
‘stencils arranged in rows and columns’, (2) ‘semi-random distributions in which stencils 
overlap’, (3) ‘dense arrays in which stencils may be oriented in different ways’, (4) 
‘stencils arranged diagonally’, (5) ‘stencils arranged radially’, and (6) ‘stencils placed 
along the line of an arc’.382 Lastly (although this does not, of course, exhaust the 
possibilities in question), ‘the Malady series’ common juxtaposing of stencilled text and 
simple geometric forms’ defines a third domain of difference insofar as it encompasses 
the signifying alternatives ‘picture space traversed by vertical lines’, ‘picture space 
divided into vertical bands’, ‘picture space exhibiting circular discs and rings’, ‘picture 
space exhibiting rectangles, arches, cruciforms, or X-shapes’.383 
                                                                                                                                                 
A third example is Black Painting XIV from “Malady”. Here, MY LADY occupies the centre of a 
picture space entirely filled with stencilled script, upon which is superimposed a violet annulus. 
 
382
 Malady series works in which stencils are arranged in rows and/or columns are exemplified by 
the aforementioned Black Painting from “Malady”, in the Dowse Art Museum, and Black 
Painting XII from “Malady”. The placement of stencils in semi-random, overlapping 
distributions is a feature of Painting from “Malady” and Black Painting XI from “Malady”. In 
both cases, there is reiteration of MELODY within bounding annular forms. Moreover, Black 
Painting XI from “Malady” and Black Painting XIV from “Malady” are examples of Malady 
series works in which the disposition of stencils defines a dense array. In the former work, that 
part of the picture space outside the annular feature is filled with an orderly array of MALADYs 
– except for the bottom of the painting, where three lines of MALADY are interleaved with two 
lines of MELODY. In the latter work, the single iteration of MY LADY is accompanied, above 
and below, by two vertical groups of nine MELODYS. The remainder of the picture space is 
filled with MALADYs, oriented vertically and horizontally, and thereby defining a broad, 
rectangular frame within which the other textual elements are enclosed. As previously noted, 
Black Painting XV from “Malady” bears witness to the stencilling of MELODY and MALADY 
along diagonals. The radial arrangement of MELODYs within an annular frame is a defining 
characteristic of Te Manawa’s Black Painting IIIa from “Malady”. Finally, in Black Painting 
XIIB from “Malady”, a linear sequence of fourteen MALADYs frames the bisected form of an 
arch. 
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 Black Painting from “Malady”, in the Dowse Art Museum, and Black Painting XIII from 
“Malady” exemplify those Malady series works in which the picture space is divided into vertical 
lines or rectangular bands in a fashion reminiscent of Barnett Newman’s so-called ‘zip’ motif. In 
addition to Painting from “Malady”, with its glowing annulus and orange-red discus, circular 
forms are prominent in Black Painting IIIa from “Malady” (in this case, in the form of a series of 
seven concentric rings in the colours of the spectrum), Black Painting XI from “Malady” (three 
concentric violet rings), and Black Painting XIV from “Malady” (where a centrally disposed, 
violet annulus is superimposed on the packed field of stencilled script). The seven Malady Panels 
are noteworthy insofar as they integrate rectilinear and annular forms. Thus, in the upper two 
thirds of each panel there is presented, in one of the seven colours of the rainbow, a single 
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 4.2.2 Moments of repetition in Painting from “Malady” 
 
 Having unpacked some of the meaning complexity of ‘the Malady series’, now let us 
consider the two moments of repetition with regard to ‘Painting from “Malady”’. Here, 
the suggestion is that ‘Painting from “Malady”’ means by virtue of the three 
aforementioned, semiotic identities (1) ‘Painting from “Malady”’s sanguineous annulus’, 
(2) ‘Painting from “Malady”’s fifteen-fold reiteration of the stencilled word MELODY’, 
and (3) ‘Painting from “Malady”’s orange-red discus’. In light of what has been said 
previously, the first moment of repetition obtains insofar as ‘Painting from “Malady”’ 
means by virtue of the reiteration of a same sustained on the basis of a repression of 
difference. The repression of temporal difference allows one to say that, from one 
infinitesimal moment to the next, ‘Painting from “Malady”’ means by virtue of repeated 
encounters with the same sanguineous annulus, through repeated readings of the same 
fifteen-fold reiteration of the word MELODY, and by repeatedly apprehending the same 
orange-red discus. Similarly, the repression of spatial differences enlivened by 
metonymic combination and contexture of signs allows one to speak of the identities in 
question in the singular – i.e., as the ‘sanguineous annulus of Painting from “Malady”’, 
the ‘fifteen-fold reiteration of the word MELODY of Painting from “Malady”’’, and the 
‘orange-red discus of Painting from “Malady”’’.  
 
 Nevertheless, even though the identity ‘Painting from “Malady”’s sanguineous 
annulus’ would seem to define a sign that is indivisibly singular (i.e., one interprets this 
sign as a reference to an unbroken, glowing ring), it is possible to conceive of it as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
annulus. The lower third of the picture space in each panel contains three rectilinear forms – the 
centremost and narrowest serving as a ground for vertical columns of stencilled script (ten 
iterations of MELODY on three panels, ten iterations of MALADY on the remaining four 
panels). It also may be observed that combining circles and rectangles produces the form of the 
rounded arch, prevalent in Romanesque architecture. At least two members of the Malady series 
exhibit these features: Black Painting XIIB from “Malady” and Black Painting XVII from 
“Malady”. At least another brace of Malady series works exhibit cruciforms – namely, Black 
Painting XII from “Malady” and Te Manawa’s Black Painting III from “Malady”, in which the 
cruciform is of the Tau-cross variety. Finally, as previously acknowledged, at least one member 
of the Malady series brandishes a distinctive X-shape: Black Painting XV from “Malady”. 
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metonymy of identical and infinitesimal ring arcs oriented and joined in such a way as to 
present the appearance of a seamless, circular whole. From this perspective, and in 
accordance with the terminology previously employed, one can say that ‘Painting from 
“Malady”’ functions as a sign of metonymy-as-repetition insofar it means by virtue of 
the ambiguous, semiotic identity ‘Painting from “Malady”’s infinite repetition of the 
same ring arc.384 The identities ‘Painting from “Malady”’s fifteen-fold reiteration of the 
stencilled word MELODY’ and ‘Painting from “Malady”’s orange-red discus’ provide, 
perhaps, a clearer illustration of this point insofar as both signs present, more obviously, 
as metonymic combinations. In the former case, Hotere’s employment of a stencil (or 
stencils) reinforces the trope of repetition insofar as the resulting text is imbued with a 
degree of homogeneity and regularity. In consequence, ‘Painting from “Malady”’s 
fifteen-fold reiteration of the stencilled word MELODY’ does not merely present as 
fifteen different MELODYs, separately iterated. On the contrary, one tends to read it as 
the fifteen-fold rehearsal of the same word ‘MELODY’. In a similar fashion, ‘Painting 
from “Malady”’s orange-red discus’ comprises a painterly patchwork within which the 
modulation of pigment testifies to innumerable brushstrokes. Compared with the 
stencilled MELODYs, the orange-red discus exhibits little order, structure, or constraint. 
Nevertheless, one may attribute to it a certain homogeneity in tone (orange-red) and style 
of execution (i.e., ‘free’, ‘expressive’, ‘not obviously figurative’, etc.). In consequence, 
‘Painting from “Malady”’s orange-red discus’ does not simply present as x different 
touches of the brush. On the contrary, one tends to read this sign as a coherent unity of 
these touches that, collectively, constitute a freely brushed, orange-red discus. That is to 
say, ‘Painting from “Malady”’s orange-red discus’ defines a sign in which, stylistically 
and tonally, there is a reiteration of the same brushstroke. 
 
 How Painting from “Malady”’s compositional features relate to the second moment 
of repetition is, as previously noted, a function of how the meanings of these signs are 
sustained only in their ambiguity, bearing witness to an endless movement among 
signifying alternatives. In the first place, this ambiguity testifies to the return of the 
                                                 
384
 Recall that, in chapter one, this appeal to the metonymic subdivision of meaning/forms in 
paintings was made in order to justify the idea that Malady series paintings (indeed, expressions 
of subjectivity per se) admit an infinity of ‘subject positions’. 
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repressed temporal difference such that the meanings of the signs under consideration are 
fading before the reiteration of the same that is moment by moment, becoming different 
from itself.385 Secondly, this ambiguity may be understood in terms of the return of 
repressed spatial differences such that the meanings of each of the three identities under 
consideration are fading before the insistence of their (potentially infinite) metonymic 
‘subdivisions’. In each case, the signs in question present as combinations of different 
elements, separately iterated (i.e., different ring arcs, different MELODYs, different 
brushstrokes) and as reiterations of a same (i.e., the same ring arc, the same MELODY, 
the same brushstroke). The impression that there are, in fact, different ring arcs, different 
MELODYs or different brushstrokes is a function of differences in spatial positioning 
within Painting from “Malady”’s  picture plane and, in concert with this spatial 
disposition, inflections in tone, hue, and density of pigmentation. 
 
 For example, whilst Painting from “Malady”’s bounding annulus initially presents as 
perfectly regular, on close inspection, the ring-shaped feature evinces a multitude of 
small variations in width, tone, paint thickness, edge sharpness, and circularity. Rather 
more obviously, as if imprinted by an imperfectly calibrated mechanism, the stencilled 
MELODYs define teetering rows and columns, and frequently overlap on horizontals that 
are not quite parallel. Tonally speaking, the MELODYs define a continuum from the 
strident to the almost invisible. Moreover, whilst the majority of the MELODYs are 
rendered in a light orange hue, others employ darker pigmentation – burgundy, chocolate, 
or cherry red. Indeed, this difference in colouration is particularly apparent in a few cases 
where Hotere has ‘reprinted’ a stencilled letter. This retouching is evident, for example, 
in the M of the second-to-bottom MELODY in the column of four occupying the upper 
right quadrant of the orange-red discus. The freely brushed areas of the painting exhibit 
these kinds of differences with even greater emphasis. Here, individual brushstrokes are 
deposited in overlapping layers, blended, and superimposed to form contrasting regions 
                                                 
385
 That is to say, in keeping with the terminology employed in section 4.2.1, the meaning of 
Painting from “Malady”’s compositional features is ambiguous to the extent that it evinces a 
temporal movement among the signifying alternatives ‘Painting from “Malady”’s compositional 
features at time t1’, ‘Painting from “Malady”’s compositional features at time t2’, and so forth. 
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of dense, brilliant, scarlet-toned brushwork (e.g., the loosely rendered ‘structure’ 
surrounding the solitary, dark red MELODY positioned in the upper left quadrant of 
Painting from “Malady”’s orange-red discus) and areas of more diaphanous, dimly lit, 
plum-coloured pigmentation (e.g., the lower left portion of the orange-red discus, within 
which two stencilled MELODYs are disposed, the lower being translated rightwards in 
relation to the upper). 
 
 In seeking to specify, more precisely, how it is that the meaning of Painting from 
“Malady”’s compositional features is ambiguous to the extent that it evinces a spatial 
movement among signifying alternatives, it is apparent that one encounters a field of 
infinite complexity. By way of conveying a sense of this complexity, one might attempt 
to define these signifying alternatives with the aid of an algorithm whose terms admit 
infinite range and variety. This formula might be written: ‘Painting from “Malady”’s 
compositional features of typen (e.g., n = 1 → ‘sanguineous annulus’, n = 2 → ‘stencilled 
word MELODY’, n = 3 → ‘freely-brushed, orange-red discus’, etc.), at spatial 
coordinates (xn, yn), of tonen, paint thicknessn, edge sharpnessn, degree of over-paintingn, 
degree of orthogonalityn, degree of circularityn...’ Here, it is not only the case that the list 
of qualifying criteria may be extended without limit but even the ranges of particular 
criteria (as specified by the use of the subscript ‘n’) are infinitely variable. For example, 
in seeking to delimit the boundaries of an arbitrarily defined patch of Painting from 
“Malady”’s picture space, it is clear that (xn, yn) do not simply define point values but 
rather surface areas. In consequence, the term (xn, yn) is merely a shorthand that demands 
to be more rigorously stated in accordance with the notation of a differential calculus. 
 
 A more elegant expression of the formula above would seem to be the province of the 
logician or mathematician. As this task is outside my competence, in the remainder of 
this subsection, I merely address some of the possibilities enlivened by the term 
‘compositional features of typen’. In this regard, as previously suggested in chapter one, 
the ambiguous, semiotic identity ‘Painting from “Malady”’s sanguineous annulus’ also 
invites interpretation as a symbolic representation of, variously, the letter ‘O’, the empty 
set ‘( )’, or the numeral ‘0’, and a pictorial representation of, variously, material 
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substance (e.g., a ruby orb, a person’s head, a mouth full of song), and immaterial 
emptiness (e.g., a foreground aperture or opening onto a background space of 
indeterminate extent). Therefore, insofar as it is sustained only in its ambiguity, the 
meaning of ‘Painting from “Malady”’s sanguineous annulus’ testifies to the return of the 
repressed identity-in-difference that, for the sake of argument, may be represented as 
‘...symbolic/O/( )/0/pictorial/material substance/ruby orb/person’s head/mouth full of 
song/immaterial emptiness/opening into a void/...’ Equivalently, one may say that the 
meaning of ‘Painting from “Malady”’s sanguineous annulus’ admits consideration as a 
sign of metonymy-as-repetition insofar as it bears witness to a movement among the 
signifying alternatives ‘symbol’, ‘O’, ‘( )’, ‘0’, ‘picture’, ‘material substance’, ‘ruby orb’, 
‘person’s head’, ‘mouth full of song’, ‘immaterial emptiness’, ‘opening into a void’, and 
so on. 
 
 By virtue of the execution and arrangement of its compositional elements, Painting 
from “Malady” excites associations similar to those previously observed in relation to 
Practical Religion or Victory over Death 2. Letters and words seem to be suspended on a 
series of superimposed, transparent planes or, indeed, cast adrift in a misty, turbulent, 
atmosphere, through which they scintillate like stars glimpsed between cloudy masses. 
To this extent, Painting from “Malady”’s stencilled text and expressive brushwork 
function as signs of metonymy-as-repetition insofar as they define a movement among 
the signifying alternatives ‘light’, ‘dark’, ‘foreground’, ‘background’, ‘surface’, ‘depth’, 
‘presence’, ‘absence’, ‘substance’, ‘void’, ‘constraint’, ‘freedom’, and so on. However, 
even these meaning ambiguities are only the tip of iceberg. For example, if one succumbs 
to the temptation to read the word MELODY as an evocation of music (i.e., 
synaesthetically) then its repetition is akin to a recurring musical riff or phrase; colour 
contrasts suggest notes of different pitch; variations in the texture and density of applied 
pigment evoke a medley of timbres; visual brightness is analogous to volume; the play of 
relatively well-defined stencils and more freely brushed pigment functions as a metaphor 
for the aural experience of listening to a song transported on shifting currents of air, now 
swelling close, now fading into distance.  
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 Finally, further meaning resonances are engendered in view of the fact that, in 
Hotere’s oeuvre, the annulus functions, among other things, as a symbol of love or desire 
(e.g., it is the exemplary sign of insistent repetition, of the endless cycles of fertility and 
procreation, and of the erotic potentials associated with all openings of the human body). 
This is particularly evident in the large, four-panel painting (named after yet another 
example of Manhire’s verse) February, May and the Birds of Ice. The Moon Drowns in 
its Voices of Water (1970, ref. 63), where the juxtaposition of bright red circles and blue-
violet, geometric blocks creates a stylised presentation of the word LOVE.386 With regard 
                                                 
386
 In Auckland City Art Gallery, Ten Big Paintings, exh. cat. (Auckland: Auckland City Art 
Gallery, 1971), np, http://www.aucklandartgallery.com/media/6507939/1971_03.pdf, (20.02.15), 
this painting is detailed as follows: 
 
Ralph Hotere born Mitimiti 1931 
FEBRUARY MAY AND THE BIRDS OF ICE  
THE MOON DROWNS IN ITS VOICES OF WATER 
(Poem: Bill Manhire) 
pigment dyes in alkyd resin on canvas 10 x 20  
 
As noted in T.J. McNamara, ‘ “Ten Big Paintings”, Masterly Works at City Art Gallery’, New 
Zealand Herald, 11 February 1971, section 1, 9, Hotere’s contribution to this exhibition consisted 
of ‘four panels’ in which ‘Vivid red circles hover in deep space over a pattern of shifting 
reflections. Unity is given by letters within the circles which spell “Love.” ’ There is also mention 
of this work in Dunedin Public Art Gallery, Ralph Hotere: A survey 1963-73 (Dunedin: Dunedin 
Public Art Gallery, 1974). There, it is described as ‘first exhibited Auckland City Art Gallery, 
1971’ and as a ‘set of 4 panels each 305.0 x 152.5’. Since 1974, this painting has been in the 
collection of Dunedin Public Art Gallery (5-1974). See 
http://collection.dunedin.art.museum/search.do?id=30755&db=object&page=1&view=detail, 
(29.11.13). In confirming the identity of this painting, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of 
Genevieve Webb (Registrar, Dunedin Public Art Gallery).  
 
 That annular forms, in Hotere’s paintings, function (among other things) as symbols of love 
and desire is supported by various other evidence. In the first place, whilst it does not specifically 
mention any paintings containing circle forms, one might consider the association of ‘Love’ and 
‘Zero’ in Mark Young, ‘Love plus Zero/no Limit’, Ascent, v1, n3, April 1969. Secondly, in 
Francis McWhannell, ‘Ralph Hotere, Working Painting for Big Panel’ in Webb’s, Important 
Works of Art (c. 2009), np, http://www.webbs.co.nz/node/77555, (27.11.13), it is observed that 
the format of Working Painting for Big Panel (1970, ref. 64) (a pigment and dye on canvas study 
for one of the panels Hotere submitted for the exhibition Ten Big Paintings) echoes that of the 
cover design Hotere provided for Tuwhare, Come Rain Hail (Dunedin: The Bibliography Room, 
University of Otago, 1970). That is to say, an orange-red annulus is disposed on a purple ground. 
As McWhannell observes, further, Tuwhare’s book features his well-known ode to Hotere, which 
includes the following stanza: 
 
But when you score a superb orange 
circle on a purple thought-base 
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to the annular forms employed in Malady series paintings, this reading also harmonises 
with Manhire’s characterisation of Malady as ‘a very sloppy old love poem, really.’387 
Relevant, in this regard, is the degree to which the metonymy of ‘MALADY’, 
‘MELODY’, and ‘MY LADY’ suggests the love sickness veiled beneath the chaste and 
courtly balladry of the troubadour. From this perspective, Painting from “Malady”’s  
stencilled text and expressionistic, sanguineous brushwork is a visual ode to the flames of 
passion or a fire in the blood. Insofar as the painting invites interpretation as a 
representation of a love fever, sickness, or malady, it implies that the travails of desire are 
both glorious and perilous, life-affirming and life-destroying. In this way, the 
compositional elements in Hotere’s painting function as signs of repetition in that they 
bear witness to a movement among signifying alternatives such as ‘loud’, ‘silent’, 
‘proximity’, ‘distance’, ‘heat’, ‘cold’, ‘consummation’, ‘disappointment’, ‘creation’, 
‘destruction’, ‘life’, ‘death’. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
I shake my head and say: hell, what 
is this thing, called love 
 
Like, I’m euchered man. I’m eclipsed (17) 
 
Finally, as illustrated in Hotere, Kriselle Baker, and Vincent O’Sullivan, Ralph Hotere 
(Auckland: Ron Sang Publications, 2008), 61, there exists a dye and enamel work on canvas 
entitled O For Love (1970, ref. 65). In size and format, this painting is very similar to the 
aforementioned Working Painting for Big Panel. On a navy blue ground, there is disposed a fine, 
magenta annulus intersecting a deeper blue triangle, oriented with its apex pointing down. 
 
387
 Manhire quoted in O’Brien, ‘Some Paintings I Am Frequently Asked About’, 23. 
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4.3 No beginning and no end: the metonymy of desire 
 
 4.3.1 The Other’s desire and significant insistence 
 
 Thus far, I have suggested that the point de capiton metonymically perpetuated admits 
consideration as a sign or symptom of metonymy-as-repetition. In other words, 
metonymy is understood to be synonymous with repetition insofar as, in expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making, (1) meaning is as reiterated, and (2) meaning is sustained 
only in its ambiguity – which is to say, in the form of a repression/returning of an 
identity-in-difference or, equivalently, a repetitive movement among signifying 
alternatives. In light of these deliberations, the present discussion seeks to justify the 
appellation desire for that which perpetuates meaning (of painting or, indeed, any 
expression of language-mediated subjectivity) as automatism, metonymy, repetition (i.e., 
as a repetitive movement among signifying alternatives). Particularly relevant, in this 
regard, are Lacan’s various characterisations of subjective desire as metonymy. Thus, in 
‘The Instance of the Letter’, it is asserted that ‘desire... is caught in the rails of 
metonymy, eternally extending toward the desire for something else’ and ‘the symptom is 
a metaphor... desire is a metonymy’.388 Similarly, in ‘The Direction of the Treatment and 
the Principles of Its Power’, Lacan suggests that ‘desire is the metonymy of the want-to-
be’ and, in Seminar VI, that ‘Desire is the metonymy of being in the subject’.389 In 
seeking to elaborate the Lacanian understanding of desire as metonymy, it will be 
convenient to express desire in terms of a repetitive movement or impetus to (1) recover 
that which is constituted as primordially lost and/or (2) resolve that which is constituted 
as an irreducible remainder – where, in both cases, that which is as primordially lost and 
is as irreducible remainder invites interpretation as a mythical, founding object, moment, 
or condition of being. However, in so doing, it will be necessary to relinquish the 
metaphysical-dynamical conception of desire as a fundamental, driving force and seek a 
                                                 
388
 Lacan, ‘The Instance of the Letter’, 431, 439. 
 
389
 Ibid, ‘Direction of the Treatment’, 520, and ibid, Seminar VI, Seminar 1, 12 November 1958, 
15.  
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logico-structural understanding of desire in terms of the topology of surfaces. Relevant, in 
this regard, is Žižek’s characterisation of the Lacanian ‘notion of the drive’ as  
 
...“desubstantialised”... not a primordial positive force but a purely geometrical, 
topological phenomenon, the name for the curvature of the space of desire’...390  
 
 By way of establishing a convenient framework within which to negotiate Lacan’s 
variegated reflections on subjective desire, it may be useful to briefly reiterate three key 
points made thus far regarding the nature of subjectivity/meaning-making. Firstly, by 
definition, expressions of subjectivity are language-mediated. This means that, secondly, 
expressions of subjectivity are law-governed and, thirdly, expressions of subjectivity 
define a counterpoise of possibility and impossibility. The first point affirms that, in 
accordance with the function of representation/symbolisation, subjective experience is 
experience in and of a field of meaning: it is thinking in and as signs. It is from this 
language-mediated standpoint that all hypothetical determinations of ‘reality’ proceed. 
The second point affirms that language-mediated expressions of subjectivity involve a 
reciprocity of metaphor and metonymy (i.e., a structuring of structure or, indeed, a 
figuring of desire) such that, by virtue of a ‘hidden’ and ‘metaphoric’ function of pure 
difference, unconscious metonymy (i.e., a synchronic structure of signifiers-as-potentials) 
becomes as conscious metonymy (i.e., a diachronic sequence of signs, signifieds, points 
de capiton), in which metaphoric discontinuities are repetitively sutured or subsumed. 
The third point affirms that unconscious metonymy becoming as conscious metonymy 
defines the order of the possible insofar as this encompasses that which can be articulated 
in the system of language (whether unconsciously subsisting in potentia or imagined in 
consciousness). That which exceeds and eludes the function of 
representation/symbolisation defines the real conceived as the order of the impossible. 
                                                 
390
 Žižek, ‘Prolegomena to a future answer to Dr Butler’, Agenda, Australian Contemporary Art, 
i43, July 1995, 8-9. Invoking the notion of curved space in order to think what might be termed 
the ‘real’ of the drives and/or of desire is reiterated in other writing by Žižek. See, for example, 
ibid, How to read Lacan (New York and London, W.W. Norton & Co., 2007 (2006)), 77, and 
ibid,  The Parallax View (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press, 2006), 61.  
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The metaphoric function of pure difference exemplifies the real insofar as ‘it’ effaces 
itself in its very operation, presencing as absence, appearing as disappeared. 
 
 Whilst the Lacanian understanding of subjective desire as language-mediated 
automatism/metonymy/repetition is complex and multivalent, for the purposes of the 
present discussion it may be usefully articulated in relation to the following two ideas: (1) 
‘man’s desire is the Other’s desire’ and (2) desire is equivalent to ‘repetitive insistence, 
significant insistence’.391 The first statement reflects the Lacanian reworking of the 
Hegelian dialectic of desire (i.e., desire expressed in terms of a relationship between other 
and same) through the transforming lens of structural linguistics.392 In this regard, as 
noted in the thesis Introduction, two interpretations of Lacan’s aphorism are especially 
noteworthy. Firstly, one desires to be what the other desires – which is to say, one desires 
recognition or love from the other. Secondly, one desires as an other – as if one were 
another person or adopting another person’s point of view.393 The first formulation 
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 Lacan, Seminar II, 206. 
 
392
 The dialectical understanding of desire in terms of a tension between self and other underpins 
the discussion of ‘Lordship and Bondage’ in Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 111-19. In the first 
place, Hegel maintains that, in itself, self-consciousness defines a relation of tension with 
otherness (i.e., to recall the terminology employed in chapter three, self-consciousness obtains as 
an identity-in-difference): 
 
Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for 
another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.... 
 
Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. This 
has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an other being; 
secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an 
essential being, but in the other sees its own self. (111) 
 
In Hegel’s view, this ‘action of one self-consciousness’ also applies in the intersubjective field: 
 
...this movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness... has itself 
the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other as well... 
the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees 
the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and 
therefore also does what it does in so far as the other does the same. (111-12)  
 
393
 As various commentators point out, Lacan’s aphorism closely resonates with Alexandre 
Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel. See, for example, Homer, 22-24, Evans, 37-38, and Edward S. 
Casey and J. Melvin Woody, ‘Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan: The Dialectic of Desire’ in Joseph H. 
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challenges the privileged notion of the subject as an individual self-sufficiency. The 
second formulation ushers in the conception of subjectivity defined in terms of the 
tension obtaining between the individual and a transindividual Otherness. As noted in 
chapter two, that Lacan understands the transindividual dimension of subjectivity to be 
language-mediated is evident from his use of the term ‘Other’ – that is to say, the ‘big 
Other’ of the symbolic order or, equivalently, the ‘transindividual’, law-governed 
structure of language-mediated, social and cultural reality. In the Seminar of the mid 
1950s to early 1960s, this understanding is also evident in Lacan’s repeated insistence 
that the ‘Other with a capital O... [is] the locus of the word’.394 
 
 The equivalence Lacan establishes between desire and ‘significant insistence’ reflects 
the application of structural linguistics to what, in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ 
(1920), Freud posits in order to explain the so-called ‘compulsion to repeat’ or 
Wiederholungszwang – namely, that which exceeds the psychical homeostasis maintained 
by virtue of the mediation of the primary process by the secondary process (or, 
equivalently, the mediation of the pleasure principle by the reality principle).395 Freud 
conceives of this as an instinctual ‘urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state 
                                                                                                                                                 
Smith and William Kerrigan (eds), Psychiatry and the Humanities, v6, Interpreting Lacan (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 76-88. Indeed, Evans observes (132, 144-45) 
that Lacan attended Kojève’s lectures on Hegel, presented at the École des Hautes Études, 
between 1933 and 1939. These lectures were subsequently published in Alexandre Kojève, 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, assembled by Raymond Queneau, ed. Allan Bloom, trans 
James H. Nichols, Jr. (New York and London: Basic Books, Inc., 1969, originally published as 
Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel (2nd ed.; Paris: Gallimard, 1947)). 
 
394
 See, for example Lacan, Seminar V, Seminar 27, 25 June 1958, 353, ibid, Seminar VI, Seminar 
12, 11 February 1959, 148, ibid, Seminar VIII, Seminar 12, 1 March 1961, 145, and ibid, Seminar 
IX, Seminar 14, 21 March 1962, 143. 
 
395
 The expression ‘compulsion to repeat’ first appears in Freud, ‘Remembering, Repeating and 
Working-Through’ (1914) in SE, v12, 150. Here, the compulsion to repeat is elaborated in terms 
of a distinction between remembering and repeating such that what is repressed is not reproduced 
in memory but rather finds expression in the repetition of certain modes of behaviour. Thus, 
Freud asserts: 
 
...we may say that the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and 
repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, 
without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it. 
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of things’ or ‘the conservative nature of living substance’, in accordance with which         
‘ “the aim of all life is death”. ’396 In short, Freud proposes that the ‘beyond’ of the 
pleasure principle is a ‘death instinct’.397 In Seminar II, Lacan’s linguistically-inspired 
transformation of Freud is evident from the assertion that  
 
The beyond of the pleasure principle is expressed in the word 
Wiederholungszwang. This is incorrectly translated in French by automatisme de 
répétition and I think I am giving you a better rendition with the notion of 
insistence [insistance], repetitive insistence, significant insistence. This function is 
at the very root of language in so far as a world is a universe subjected to 
language.398 
 
Similarly, in the ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” ’, Lacan asserts: 
 
My research has led me to the realisation that repetition automatism 
(Wiederholungszwang) has its basis in what I have called the insistence of the 
signifying chain.399 
 
 From a Lacanian perspective, Freud’s speculations anticipate the modelling of 
subjective experience as language-mediated (i.e., law-governed) and, thereby, as a matter 
of structural necessity, defined in terms of a counterpoise of possibility and impossibility. 
The order of the possible is implicit in Freud’s suggestion that the death instinct, as an 
expression of an overriding conservation law or restitutive tendency, is the condition of 
possibility for subjective experience per se. The order of the impossible is implicit in 
Freud’s characterisation of the death instinct as ‘beyond’ the psychical homeostasis of 
pleasure principle and reality principle. That is to say, the death instinct is posited as that 
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which, in ‘enlivening’ the very possibility of a psychical homeostasis is, nevertheless, 
excluded from or radically outside the terms of reference of that psychical homeostasis. 
Thus, in Seminar II, Lacan summarises Freud’s argument as a recognition that  
 
...something doesn’t satisfy the pleasure principle... what comes out of one of the 
systems – that of the unconscious... 
 
... has something disturbing about it. It is dissymmetrical. It doesn’t quite fit. 
Something in it eludes the system of equations and the evidence borrowed from the 
forms of thought of the register of energetics as they were introduced in the middle 
of the nineteenth century...400 
  
To recall the discussion in the thesis Prologue, the idea that modelling subjectivity as 
law-governed demands taking account of that which is, in a sense, excluded from the 
field of the law even as it constitutes that field is intrinsic to Lacan’s subsequent logico-
structural conception of the ‘beyond’ of the pleasure principle in terms of the structurally 
necessary counterpoise of possibility and impossibility that is proper to any symbolic 
system. This logico-structural understanding underpins Lacan’s aforementioned proposal 
that ‘The beyond of the pleasure principle is... repetitive insistence, significant insistence’ 
and his affirmation that, with regard to resolving  
 
...the questions of the relations between the Freudian notion of the death instinct 
and what I have called significant insistence... 
 
...the point we’re getting to is none other than desire and whatever can be said 
about it on the basis of our experience...401 
 
 In ‘The Instance of the Letter’, the notion of ‘significant insistence’ is further 
elaborated in terms of metaphor and metonymy such that, as noted previously, Lacan 
asserts ‘the symptom is a metaphor... desire is a metonymy’. This succinct formula 
reflects the fact that desire-as-significant insistence encompasses metaphor and 
metonymy insofar as these are reciprocal functions in language-mediated expressions of 
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subjectivity/meaning-making. A reciprocity of this kind is implicit when one speaks of 
‘the insistent return of the repressed’ or ‘the insistence of a signifier without a signified’. 
Each signified precipitates as metonymically displaced in concert with the metaphorical 
return of a repressed signifier. However, given that the function of pure difference 
associated with the metaphoric dimension of significant insistence is ‘hidden’ (i.e., of the 
order of the real-as-impossibility), always already it is the case that metaphoric 
discontinuities are encountered as sutured into metonymic continua (i.e., the order of the 
possible; that which is possible to express in language), wherein meaning is as a 
repetitive movement among signifying alternatives. 
 
 4.3.2 The primordially lost origin of desire 
 
 Lacan’s understanding that ‘man’s desire is the Other’s desire’ and that desire is 
‘significant insistence’ affirms that the Lacanian conception of desire is commensurate 
with a model of subjectivity that is (1) language-mediated and, therefore, (2) governed in 
accordance with the laws of metaphor and metonymy, and (3) counterpoised in terms of 
possibility and impossibility. Equivalently, one may say that language-mediated 
expressions of subjectivity evince the structure of subjective desire. This said, it now 
remains to explain how desire thus conceived testifies to an impetus to (1) recover that 
which is constituted as primordially lost and (2) resolve that which is constituted as an 
irreducible remainder – namely, a mythical, founding object, moment, or condition of 
being. Let us, firstly, elaborate the dimension of loss and, on this basis, proceed to 
address the dimension of irreducibility. In this regard, the idea that significant insistence 
bears witness to an imperative to recover that which is irremediably lost follows from the 
identity Lacan posits between ‘repetitive insistence, significant insistence’ and the 
Freudian understanding that repetition compulsion testifies to the operation of a death 
instinct – a supervening principle of conservation or restitutive tendency that is condition 
of possibility of and ‘beyond’ the psychical homeostasis maintained by the pleasure 
principle. Insofar as it is of the order of the real-as-impossible, this ‘beyond’ of the 
pleasure principle – which is to say, the ‘ground’ of subjective desire and, indeed, 
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subjectivity per se – fundamentally exceeds and eludes the function of 
representation/symbolisation.  
 
 Given that the ‘beyond’ of the pleasure principle is of the order of the real-as-
impossible, it should be apparent that there is no possibility of really or actually 
recovering the ‘origin’ that is the objective of subjective desire. Rather, there is only a 
perpetual movement among signifying alternatives such that, as Lacan points out, desire 
is ‘caught in the rails of metonymy, eternally extending toward the desire for something 
else.’ This is to affirm that the founding object, moment, or condition or being 
‘manifests’ as lost, missing, excluded, impossible. Equivalently, one might say that 
subjectivity is constitutively lacking. Particularly relevant, in this respect, is Lacan’s 
assertion, in Seminar II, that 
 
Desire is a relation of being to lack. This lack is the lack of being properly 
speaking. It isn’t the lack of this or that, but lack of being whereby the being 
exists.402 
 
I would suggest that this statement is precisely equivalent to Lacan’s aforementioned 
contentions, in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’, that ‘desire is the metonymy of the 
want-to-be’ and, in Seminar VI, that ‘Desire is the metonymy of being in the subject.’ 
Here, the implication is that the subjectivity paradoxically ‘existing’ by virtue of a ‘lack 
of being’ is not so much insufficient as incomplete, in process, becoming, in potentia. 
The ‘metonymy of being in the subject’ is nothing other than this condition of becoming 
whereby, moment by moment, subjectivity involves the reiteration of a same that is not 
identical with itself – a subjectivity that, paradoxically, is as perpetually becoming 
different from itself. Moreover, given Lacan’s understanding that ‘man’s desire is the 
Other’s desire’ (i.e., subjective desire is language-mediated – structured in accordance 
with the big Other as ‘locus of the word’), the ‘lack of being’ in question is not only that 
of the individual subject but also of the transindividual and Other field of language-
mediated subjectivity. In short, language-mediated, subjective desire admits 
                                                 
402
 Ibid, 223. 
 
 256 
consideration as an expression of a lack of being in the Other whereby the Other exists: it 
is not only the individual but also the big Other that is constitutively lacking. 
 
 In Lacan’s work produced between Seminar III and ‘Subversion of the Subject’, the 
idea that subjectivity is as constitutively lacking is implicit, firstly, in the suggestion that 
the ‘advent’ of subjectivity is structurally synonymous with the rejection or expulsion 
‘into the real’ of a ‘primordial signifier’403, and secondly, in the proposition that the 
‘origin’ of subjective desire is to be explained in terms of a ‘primordially lost... 
metonymical... object of desire’.404 As elements proper to a language-mediated 
subjectivity, the excluded primordial signifier or metonymical object of desire also define 
that which is missing from, or impossible correlate to, the symbolic order, the big Other, 
the signifying chain – in accordance with which the symbolic order is as constitutively 
lacking. In Lacanian theory, the status of the symbolic order as constitutively lacking is, 
itself, symbolised as S(Ⱥ) – the so-called ‘signifier of a lack in the Other’405 – and, more 
controversially, conceived interms of the ‘phallus’ or ‘phallic function’. 
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 It may be noted that, in conceptualising the constitutively lost primordial signifier or 
primordial object of desire synonymous with the mythical advent of language-mediated 
subjectivity, Lacan invokes various Freudian terms. Specifically, Lacan appropriates and 
reformulates the distinctions Freud makes between ‘repression proper’ or Verdrängung (i.e., the 
psychical function of repression/overdetermination of meaning) and, respectively, 
Urverdrängung (so-called ‘primal repression’), Verwerfung (rejection, exclusion), and 
Bejahung/Ausstossung (affirmation, taking things into oneself/expulsion, rejecting things from 
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Freud makes between Verdrängung and that which admits consideration as (1) grounding or 
enlivening the possibility of these operations and/or (2) radically other than, outside, or beyond 
the terms of reference of these operations (i.e., to some degree, the distinctions Freud makes 
prefigure what is proper to the death instinct). An in-depth consideration of this material is 
beyond the scope of the present study. However, by way of providing further context for the 
Lacanian conception of a primordially lost signifier, I present an overview in section 8.8.  
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 Here, it should be reiterated that, in keeping with the definitions proposed in previous 
chapters, the so-called ‘primordial signifier’ ought not to be conceived literally as a 
positive, singular entity or being-present but rather as an infinity of pure differences or 
differential traces such that ‘the’ signifier is a ‘universe’ of signifiers. Strictly speaking, 
then, ‘the primordial signifier’ designates a primordial trace structure synonymous with 
the precipitation of subjectivity. Still further, it is also evident that, from a Lacanian 
perspective, the primordial signifier or object of desire is mythical. This is to reaffirm 
that there is no possibility of assuming a transcendental perspective from which to 
objectively interrogate the limits of language-mediated subjectivity. Hence, the advent or 
origin of this subjectivity must be regarded as a hypothesis, conveniently presupposed as 
a matter of logical and structural necessity. Thus, in Seminar III, Lacan admonishes his 
audience not to become overly ‘fascinated’ with the question of what is ‘Prior to all 
symbolization’, since it is a ‘priority... not temporal but logical’.406 Lacan also asserts that 
the ‘primordial signifier... quite precisely means nothing’ and insists that   
 
I in no way believe that there is anywhere at all a moment a stage, at which the 
subject first acquires the primitive signifier, that subsequently the play of meanings 
is introduced, and that after that, signifier and signified having linked arms, we then 
enter the domain of discourse.407 
  
Likewise, in Seminar V, Lacan refers to the ‘primordial level’ as the ‘mythical level of 
the first establishment of demand’ (i.e., the advent of language-mediated subjectivity)408, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Something which can be only a signifier is lacking to it.’ As Lacan goes on to point out, this 
implies that ‘there is no Other of the Other’ – that is to say, no transcendental guarantee of 
meaning, or, as noted in Evans, 110, no ‘metalanguage’ or ‘transcendental signified’. 
Subsequently, in Lacan, ‘The Subversion of the Subject’, 693, Lacan affirms that ‘S(Ⱥ)’ is to be 
‘read as: signifier of a lack in the Other, a lack inherent in the Other’s very function as the 
treasure trove of signifiers’ and reiterates that ‘The lack at stake is one I have already formulated: 
that there is no Other of the Other.’ 
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and characterises the ‘metonymical object’, variously, as ‘this famous object that never 
is, that object which is always situated elsewhere, that is always something else’409 and as 
‘a primordial object which remains without any doubt to dominate the subsequent life of 
the subject’ that, by virtue of being ‘caught up in the function... of the signifier... is a 
signification which always slides, slips away and conceals itself’.410 
 
 4.3.3 The circulation of desire  
 
 Insofar as the Lacanian model of subjective desire admits consideration as an impetus 
to recover a primordially lost founding object, moment, or condition of being (in 
accordance with which subjectivity is as constitutively lacking), desire testifies to the 
order of the real-as-impossibility that is synonymous with, yet inassimilable to, language-
mediated expressions of subjectivity. However, insofar as subjective desire admits 
consideration as a repetitive movement among signifying alternatives (or determined 
objects) such that ‘desire... is caught in the rails of metonymy, eternally extending toward 
the desire for something else’, desire bears witness to the order of the possible in 
language-mediated expressions of subjectivity – i.e., the aforementioned tension between 
the conscious and unconscious dimensions of the signifying chain, ensuring that any 
posited signified/determined object is sustained only in its ambiguity. In Seminar IX, 
Lacan invokes the topological properties of the torus and the cross-cap of the projective 
plane in order to articulate, within a single frame of reference, the manner by which the 
structure of subjective desire reflects the structurally necessary counterpoise of possibility 
and impossibility proper to language-mediated expressions of subjectivity. By way of 
elaborating these figures, let us begin with a consideration of the torus and then proceed 
to address the cross-cap. 
                                                                                                                                                 
purposes of the present discussion, demand may be considered synonymous with that aspect of 
subjective desire expressed (or, indeed, expressible) in language. For further discussion of this 
point, see Evans, 34-35. 
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 Prefiguring Lacan’s consideration of the torus is his characterisation of subjective 
desire in terms of a cyclical impetus to recover an irremediably lost origin. Thus, Lacan 
suggests that ‘what we are dealing with in the automatism of repetition is... a cycle’, 
where, moreover,  
 
...what the automatism of repetition means... is... the fact... that if a determined 
cycle... was only that very one... designated by a certain signifier... [then] the 
behaviour repeats itself in order to make re-emerge this signifier that it is as such.411 
 
In other words, the ‘end’ or ‘aim’ of desire, considered as a cyclical 
automatism/metonymy/repetition, is to sustain the identity and meaning of an originary 
same through the repression of difference. However, as previously noted, given the 
reciprocity of metonymic and metaphoric functions in expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making, the same meaning that is as reiterated also is sustained only 
in its ambiguity in the form of an endless movement among signifying alternatives. Lacan 
refers to this as the ‘paradox of the automatism of repetition’ – namely, that it ‘introduces 
into the cycle of its repetitions – always the same in their essence and therefore 
concerning something which is always the same thing – difference, distinctiveness, 
unicity’.412 This paradoxical simultaneity of identity and difference also is apparent in 
Lacan’s subsequent characterisation of the unary trait (i.e., the essence of the signifier; 
the ‘hidden’, metaphoric function of pure difference that ‘grounds’ significant insistence) 
as ‘the uniquity as such of the circuit (tour) in repetition.’413 As previously suggested, the 
trace-like character of the unary trait (i.e., as ‘that’ which is encountered as effaced, 
presencing as absence, appearing as disappeared) ensures that there is no possibility of 
attaining what Lacan refers to as the ‘goal’ or ‘plan’ of subjective desire – namely, ‘of 
making the original unary re-emerge from one of its circuits.’414 Indeed, in 
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acknowledgement of this fact, Lacan suggests that ‘The subject as such is minus one... 
starting from... the unary trait qua excluded’.415   
 
  Having characterised subjective desire as a cyclical impetus to recover an ‘origin’ that 
is, fundamentally, effaced and excluded, Lacan invokes the figure of the torus in order to 
demonstrate that ‘there is a topological structure... necessarily that of the subject, which 
means that there are certain of its loops which cannot be reduced.’416 Elaborating this 
model, Lacan identifies two broad categories of irreducible loops: ‘empty circles’ 
defining toroidal paths (i.e., circulations around the toroidal void) and ‘full circles’ 
defining poloidal paths (i.e., rings spiralling around the tube of the torus – like the 
windings on an electric coil).417 Lacan proposes that the empty circles bear some relation 
to ‘the function of desire’ and, indeed, express ‘the unconscious minus one in its 
constitutive function.’418 In the context of Lacan’s discussion, the ‘emptiness’ of the 
toroidal circles can be understood, firstly, as a testament to the status of the ‘original 
unary’ (i.e., the primordial ground of subjectivity) as effaced, as excluded (i.e., a pure 
difference, exemplifying what has been called the structurally necessary real-as-
impossible synonymous with, yet inassimilable to, the function of 
representation/symbolisation), and thus the impossibility of achieving the aim of desire – 
namely, the recovery of the founding object, moment, or condition of being of 
subjectivity. Secondly, then, the empty centres of the circles also offer to symbolise the 
nature of the said founding object, moment, or condition of being as constitutively lost, 
and thus the nature of subjective desire as an expression of subjectivity that is as 
constitutively lacking. 
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 By contrast, the full circles are characterised as ‘circles of demand’419, which ‘series of 
circuits... carry out... the unary repetition of what returns and what characterises the 
primary subject in his signifying, automatism of repetition relationship.’420 In order to 
understand Lacan’s meaning, it is necessary to bear in mind that, as circles of demand, 
the poloidal circles define the order of the possible – that part of subjective desire which 
can be expressed in language in accordance with the function of 
representation/symbolisation (which is to say, in accordance with the aforementioned 
tension between the conscious and the unconscious dimensions of the signifying chain). 
As noted in section 4.1, the metonymic function implies that meanings posited or objects 
determined are (1) as reiterated, and (2), by virtue of the insistent return of the repressed, 
sustained only in their ambiguity. The first point affirms that repetition per se is intrinsic 
to positing meaning/determining objects. The second point affirms that this repetition 
takes the form of a movement among signifying alternatives or determined objects. Thus, 
the ‘unary repetition of what returns’ implies that the succession of poloidal circuits 
around the solid body of the torus (equivalent to meanings posited, objects determined, in 
consciousness) are, themselves, disposed along a wider toroidal circulation around the 
central void (namely, the ‘original unary’ that expresses ‘the unconscious minus one in its 
constitutive function’).421 
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Secondly, with tacit reference to the toroidal circulation, Lacan suggests: 
 
On the other hand what is implied in this succession of circuits, namely a circularity that is 
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[a] symbolisation for... what is implied in... unconscious desire, in so far as the subject 
follows its highways and byways without knowing it. Throughout all these demands, this 
unconscious desire is in a way by itself the metonymy of all these demands... 
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 4.3.4 The irreducible residue of desire 
 
 With regard to the mythical, founding object, moment, or condition of being of 
language-mediated subjectivity, Lacan’s topological reflections demonstrate that 
subjective desire is not only conceivable in terms of an impetus to recover that which is 
primordially lost but also to resolve that which is fundamentally irreducible. At first 
glance, this proposition seems beset with contradiction. Even considered separately, 
‘that’ which (1) is as lost and (2) is as irreducible defy logic. After all, how can 
something be as not-being, presence as absence, appear as disappeared? Similarly, how 
can some thing (i.e., a being that is, ostensibly, discrete, delineated, resolved, determined) 
be as irresolvable, indeterminable? With respect to expressions of subjective desire, 
Lacanian theory not only demands that these impossibilities be accepted on their own 
terms but also that they define a certain equivalence. Thus, logically and structurally, 
‘that’ which is as lost is synonymous with ‘that’ which is as irreducible. However, as 
signalled by placing ‘that’ in quotation marks, the amelioration of this antinomy follows 
from the understanding that, strictly speaking, there is no literal or actual founding object, 
moment, or condition of being, in relation to which desire arises and towards which 
desire is irresistibly impelled. ‘That’ which is as primordially lost and ‘that’ which is as 
irreducible residue is neither a metaphysical entity nor an expression of such. Strictly 
speaking, then, there is no literal or actual object of desire: in consciousness, there is only 
the positing of a succession of signifying alternatives sustained in their ambiguity; only 
the advancing of a series of imaginary surrogates coveted in their sophistry or 
speciousness.  
 
 The idea that subjective desire involves an impetus to resolve a founding object, 
moment, or condition of being that is fundamentally irreducible is already implicit in 
Lacan’s references to the so-called caput mortuum of the signifying chain (this follows 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Also relevant is Seminar 13, 14 March 1962, 134, where Lacan equates the ‘elided circle... the 
empty circle’ with ‘the metonymical object beneath all these demands’ and ‘the object of desire’. 
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from the definition of caput mortuum as a term designating the residual products of 
alchemical processes). Indeed, the irreducibility of the caput mortuum is simply another 
way of saying that it is the structurally necessary, real-as-impossibility synonymous with, 
yet inassimilable to, the function of representation/symbolisation. Topologically 
speaking, this real-as-impossibility also is expressed in the ‘irreducibility’ of the toroidal 
and poloidal circulations of the torus. Whilst Lacan’s precise meaning on this point is 
somewhat ambiguous, I would suggest that the irreducibility of the toroidal path follows 
from its disposition around an empty centre. Given that, in the limit, there is nothing to 
which the toroidal circuit may be reduced, any reduction can be sustained indefinitely. 
The irreducibility of the poloidal circulation can be understood in terms of the resistance 
to deformation of the ‘body’ of the torus. From this perspective, the reduction of a 
poloidal path to a point would be equivalent to the absolute positing of a signified or the 
absolute determination of an object. That this reduction is impossible is affirmed in ‘The 
Instance of the Letter’, where Lacan defines the ‘metonymic structure’ of language-
mediated subjectivity in terms of ‘the irreducible nature of the resistance of 
signification’.422 In consequence, the poloidal circulations are fated to eternally wind 
around the body of the torus – like a coil employing a wire of infinitesimal thickness (i.e., 
the succession of poloidal circulations never complete their toroidal orbit – a completion 
of this kind being equivalent to realising the objective or, indeed, object of desire by 
‘making the original unary re-emerge’).  
 
 In Lacanian theory, the idea that subjective desire involves an impetus to resolve an 
irreducible founding object, moment, or condition of being is, perhaps, more familiarly 
expressed in relation to what is termed objet petit a – the so-called ‘object... cause of 
desire’. Whilst this expression first appears in Seminar XI, its essential features are 
already present in Seminar IX, where (in Gallagher’s translation) it is rendered as ‘little 
o’. Here, Lacan articulates little o in topological terms as the irreducible remainder 
resulting from ‘cutting’ the four-dimensional surface known as the ‘cross-cap of the 
projective plane’ along the redoubled path of the so-called ‘interior eight’. By way of 
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concluding this section’s engagement with Lacan’s theory of desire, I elaborate each of 
these elements in turn, beginning with the ‘cut’. In so doing, it will be convenient, on 
occasion (whether in footnotes or in the main body of my text), to supplement and 
summarise Lacan’s ruminations with the aid of Juan-David Nasio’s lucid commentary in 
‘Objet a and the Cross-cap’ (1987).423 
 
 In the first place, then, Lacan invokes the figure of the interior eight in order to 
symbolise the antinomy proper to the essence of the signifier as an identity-in-difference 
– namely, that, in the ‘relationship of the signifier to itself... a signifier cannot signify 
itself... the signifier in so far as it can be used to signify itself has to be posed as different 
to itself.’424 Relevant, in this regard, is Lacan’s insistence that the figure of the interior 
eight is not to be interpreted merely as a circle within a circle, where the ‘inside circle 
touches on the limit constituted by the outside circle.’ On the contrary, and in keeping 
with the problematic of the signifier that offers to signify itself, Lacan proposes to 
construct the interior eight as an unbroken and redoubled trace so that ‘the line... of the 
outside circle continues into the line of the inside circle and finds itself here.’425 Thus 
conceived, the figure of the interior eight illustrates the paradoxical status of the signifier 
as that which is, simultaneously, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘identical to’ and ‘different from’ 
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‘itself’ – a logical aporia in harmony with the conception of the unary trait or ‘essence’ of 
the signifier as being of the order of the real-as-impossible.426 
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as a set that does not include itself should, by definition, be a member of the set of sets that do not 
include themselves. It may be noted that, in the context of Seminar IX, Lacan provides a more 
detailed account of Russell’s Paradox in Seminar 9, 24 January 1962, 89-90. For a primary 
reference to the antinomy in question, see Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical 
Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd, and New York: The Macmillan Co., 1919), 136. 
 
 The paradoxical status of the essence of the signifier as an identity-in-difference is 
emphasised, further, when Lacan applies the redoubled line of the interior eight to the torus. As 
noted above, the figure of the torus provides a useful illustration of the manner by which the field 
of language-mediated subjectivity defines a counterpoise between possibility and impossibility – 
poloidal circulations being synonymous with the order of the possible (i.e., the tension between 
the conscious and the unconscious dimensions of the signifying chain) and toroidal circulations 
being synonymous with the order of the impossible (i.e., the real). Here, what is relevant is that 
the closed surface of the torus eludes categorisation in terms of inside/outside. Thus, as Lacan 
observes, whether one ‘cuts’ the torus poloidally or toroidally, ‘The torus will remain entirely 
intact in the form of a pipe or of a sleeve if you wish.’ Topologically speaking, the ‘two types of 
circle... are the same... [they] do not define an inside and an outside’ (Seminar 17, 11 April, 1962, 
178). Moreover, as Lacan points out with the aid of a few diagrams, the interior eight can be used 
to model, along a single path, the poloidal ‘windings’ around the torus (i.e., ‘full’ circles of 
demand), the succession of which defines a toroidal circulation (i.e., an ‘empty’ circle of desire). 
Hence, as Lacan puts it, ‘the two loops represent the reiteration, the reduplication of demand and 
so involve this field of difference to itself, of self-difference’ (183). 
 
 In the context of Lacan’s topological ruminations, further clarification of the significance of 
the interior eight may be found in Nasio. As Nasio points out, the ‘two loops of the... interior 
eight represent... the different moments of the repetition of the signifier.’ Indeed, in harmony with 
the Lacanian proposition that, always already, subjectivity is language-mediated, Nasio insists 
that the interior eight is that which enables the very possibility of thinking repetition: ‘We take 
the folded eight; we think repetition with it’ (104). Still further, Nasio demonstrates how the 
interior eight can be used to illustrate the manner by which meaning (1) involves a retroactive 
determination, the very possibility of which is, itself, (2) a function of the unary trait. Here, 
Nasio’s commentary resonates with what was previously observed in chapter two with regard to 
Lacan’s suggestion (in Seminar V) that ‘the signifier and the signified are ‘always out of phase to 
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 Secondly, Lacan models the function of the unary trait implicated in what has been 
termed the structuring of structure or the figuring of desire by applying the redoubled cut 
or tracing of the interior eight to the surface of a four-dimensional figure: the cross-cap of 
the projective plane. Naturally, from the perspective of three-dimensional beings, the 
four-dimensionality of the cross-cap is conceivable only theoretically. However, it is 
possible to visualise the cross-cap in three-dimensional projection. From this perspective, 
the cross-cap may be apprehended as follows: take a deflated, rubber inner tube, pressed 
flat along its length. Cut the inner tube across its width – this will produce a long, 
flattened, rubber pipe or sleeve. Twist this sleeve once and reconnect its ends to generate 
a Möbius surface (which, it may be noted, is ‘handed’ in accordance with the direction of 
the originating twist). Now, re-inflate the inner tube until the interior void almost 
disappears. The result will resemble a torus, the central vacancy of which has been 
reduced to a point, and from which place there issues a pinching fold. Nasio refers to this 
feature as the ‘suture line’ or ‘self-intersecting line’, and observes that, in dimensions 
higher than three, the surface of the cross-cap does not intersect itself: ‘the line exists in 
the concrete cross-cap and does not with the abstract cross-cap.’427 Nasio also points out 
that, in Seminar IX, Lacan’s topological modelling of the structure of subjective desire by 
way of the properties of the cross-cap is complicated by the fact that this figure (or, to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
a certain degree’ – this ‘phase difference’ bestowing on any posited meaning or signified 
‘something which is essentially metonymical’. Thus, Nasio proposes that ‘The first loop 
schematizes simply the movement that we know as the deferred affect.’ That is to say, it is only 
on completing this loop that there is enlivened, retroactively, the possibility of registering a 
repetition – of being able to ‘count a before and an after, or rather a first, a second and an nth 
time’. That this retroactive determination of meaning is, itself, enabled by the function of the 
unary trait is evident from Nasio’s assertion that ‘The large loop encompassing the small one 
represents the operation of counting itself, the element that makes calculus possible, that is the 
trace of writing’ (105). However, in keeping with the status of the unary trait as the function of 
pure difference that is of the order of the real-as-impossible, Nasio also acknowledges that ‘This 
element – the trace of writing – that is indispensable to the constitution of a series of numbers, is 
not... itself reducible to a number. It is outside the series, or, if you will, outside of the repetitive 
succession’ (105-06). 
  
427
 Nasio, 99. Support for Nasio’s interpretation of the cross-cap may be found in Lacan, Seminar 
IX,  Seminar 20, 16 May 1962, where it is stated that the cross-cap ‘brings into play at the least 
the fourth dimension’ (220) and ‘the important thing in this figure is that this line of penetration 
should be held by you to be null and void’ (223). 
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precise, that which is produced from it by virtue of the cut of the interior eight) is invoked 
in both its three- and four-dimensional aspects.428 
 
 With regard to the cutting of the figure of the cross-cap along the line of the interior 
eight, Lacan makes the following, key propositions: (1) ‘a signifier, in its most radical 
essence’ is conceivable ‘simply as a cut... in a surface’429, (2) ‘the subject has the 
structure of a surface at least topologically defined’ so that ‘It is a matter of grasping... 
how the cut engenders the surface’430 (i.e., how the unary trait is implicated in the advent 
of language-mediated subjectivity), and (3) there are certain ‘figures’ whose ‘privileged 
properties’ will provide a way to understand the ‘relationship of the subject to the object 
of desire’.431 In seeking to understand Lacan’s meaning, one must appreciate that the 
‘cut’ in question is not a cut in any kind of actual, literal, material space or substance. 
Rather, the term ‘cut’ is employed to characterise the function of pure difference or 
lettering/tracing/differencing proper to the unary trait. Moreover, one also must take 
cognizance of the fact the ‘products’ of the cut (i.e., the ‘figures’ that possess ‘privileged 
properties’) are neither metaphysical entities nor expressions of such. Finally, in keeping 
with the thematic previously introduced in order to think Lacan’s conception of 
subjective desire, I would suggest that the relationship between the figures produced by 
virtue of the cutting of the cross-cap is synonymous with the counterpoise of the order of 
the possible and the order of the impossible that, as a matter of logical and structural 
necessity, is proper to language-mediated expressions of subjectivity – which is to say, 
the structure of subjective desire. 
 
                                                 
428
 As noted in Nasio, 100, 
 
We see that the cross-cap relevant to psychoanalysis is not the concrete one that we have 
constructed in three dimensions, nor the abstract one that exists in algebraic formulas, but 
the conjunction of the two. 
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 Lacan, Seminar IX, Seminar 20, 16 May 1962, 224. 
 
430
 Ibid, Seminar 22, 30 May 1962, 240. 
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 How is this so? As Nasio observes, the figures produced by cutting the cross-cap along 
the path of the interior eight comprise 
 
...two surfaces: one equivalent to the Möbius strip that Lacan identifies as the new 
subject and the other equivalent to a disk identified with objet a. In short to cut the 
cross-cap... [along] the line of the interior eight constitutes the gesture that spatially 
materialises or represents the fact that the repetition produces a subject and leaves a 
residue.432  
 
Nasio also refers to the disk as a ‘conch’ that follows a ‘spiraling movement’ (at least, in 
three-dimensional projection).433 In harmony with Nasio’s interpretation, in Seminar IX, 
Lacan asserts that the ‘double cut’ of the interior eight ‘always divides the surface called 
the cross-cap in two’, one of which is, indeed, identified as ‘a Möbius surface.’434 Rather 
less clearly, Lacan describes the other surface (i.e., the surface equivalent to o) as the 
‘central piece, isolated by the double cut’ and proposes that it is a 
 
...figure... [that] is exemplary... [in allowing us] to find the relationship of $ cut of 
o, the formalisation of the phantasy in its relationship with something which is 
inscribed in what is the remainder of the surface called the projective plane or 
cross-cap when the central piece is in a way enucleated.435 
 
 In order to unravel Lacan’s meaning, it is necessary to define the terms ‘$’, ‘o’, 
‘phantasy’, and to qualify the expression ‘$ cut of o’ as the ‘formalisation of the 
phantasy’. In the first place, then, and as Lacan states in Seminar V, $ symbolises the 
‘barred... subject...namely, qua marked by the effect of the signifier... split by the 
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 Nasio, 107-08. 
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 Lacan, Seminar IX, Seminar 23, 6 June 1962, 269. 
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 Ibid, Seminar 24, 13 June 1962, 280-81. In Seminar IX, Lacan’s derivation of little o is dense 
and, at times, convoluted. For a more concise summary of what results from cutting the cross-cap, 
see ibid, Seminar X, 95-99. 
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Spaltung... [splitting, division] which results from the action of the signifier’.436 That is to 
say, $ is neither a metaphysical entity nor an expression of such but rather that which 
reflects the tension between the conscious and the unconscious dimensions of the 
signifying chain, and thus corresponds to the order of the possible in expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making. Equivalently, one may say that $ defines subjectivity in 
terms of an alienating tension or split between the individual ‘one that is conscious’ and 
the transindividual Otherness of language-mediated, social and cultural reality, the 
greater part of which is, practically speaking, repressed and, therefore, unconscious. Still 
further, $ may be said to reflect the fact that the metaphoric dimension of the 
precipitation of meaning is ‘hidden’ – always already subsumed within the appearance of 
a perpetual, metonymic, re-playing of meaning (i.e., a repetitive movement among 
signifying alternatives, determined objects, imaginary surrogates). In Lacan’s cutting of 
the cross-cap along the line of the interior eight, $ designates the surface equivalent to a 
Möbius strip – which Nasio also refers to as the ‘new subject’ or ‘the subject of the 
unconscious’.437 
 
 Secondly, in defining o, it is necessary to distinguish between what Lacan refers to as 
‘little o’ and ‘little o’. Notwithstanding some ambiguities in the transcript of Seminar IX, 
it would appear that the former term designates the ‘object’ that corresponds to the order 
of the real-as-impossible in language-mediated expressions of subjectivity. The latter 
term designates the posited signified or determined object that, in consciousness, serves 
as an imaginary surrogate for o.438 Thus, subsequent to the lecture in which the Freudian 
game of hide and seek was pantomimed with the aid of a ping-pong ball (i.e., the ‘little o’ 
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 Ibid, Seminar V, Seminar 25, 11 June 1958, 324. See also Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 41, 
where $ is characterised as that which bears witness to the ‘death sentence of the subject of the 
unconscious... the subject as barred by language, as alienated within the Other’. 
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 Nasio, 103, 104, 108. More precisely, $ designates the ‘new’ divided/barred subjectivity 
precipitated by virtue of the operation of the subject of the unconscious. 
 
438
 In terms of the distinction between drive and desire noted in the thesis Introduction, one might 
say that, in consciousness, ‘o’ signifies the imaginary drive object or part object. By contrast ‘o’, 
as the ineffable object cause of desire, defines the ‘geometry’ of the ‘space’ within which are 
posited driven subjects, drive objects, and their relative trajectories. 
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identified in consciousness), Lacan refers to ‘the little o, the object which... corresponds 
to demand... the object of desire’439 and (alluding to the ‘fading’ that is proper to all 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making, by virtue of which determinations of 
meaning are sustained only in their ambiguity) to 
 
...the metonymical object of desire, the one in which every object represents this 
elective little o, in which the subject loses himself, when this object comes to 
metaphorical birth, when we come to substitute it for the subject who, in the 
demand has a syncope, has fainted...440 
 
Indeed, that the object of desire is of the order of the real-as-impossible is further evident 
where, in response to the rhetorical question, ‘What is the o?’, Lacan proposes: 
 
Let us put in its place the little ping-pong ball, namely nothing, anything at all, any 
support whatsoever of the alternating operation of the subject in the Fort-Da.441 
 
In other words, ‘What is involved is not simply the presence or the absence of small o, 
but the conjunction of the two, the cut.’442 That is to say, o is neither a metaphysical 
entity nor an expression of such but rather that which is invoked in order to think the real-
as-impossible, metaphoric function of pure difference proper to the operation of the unary 
trait. 
  
 As noted in the thesis Introduction, on the level of consciousness and ego, fantasy 
inheres in repetitively positing a series of imaginary surrogates for the primordially 
lost/fundamentally irreducible object of desire, thereby sustaining a false sense of identity 
and sufficiency. The expression ‘$ cut of o’, as the ‘formalisation of the phantasy’, may 
be understood with reference to the algorithm Lacan writes ‘$ ◊ o’, and his assertion that 
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The quadrilateral polygon originates the torus and the cross-cap... this shape ◊, 
stamp, desire, uniting the $ to the o in the $ ◊ o... this little quadrilateral should be 
read: the subject qua marked by the signifier is properly in the phantasy, the cut of 
o.443 
 
On the basis of the preceding discussion it should be clear that there is no question of 
taking literally the idea that ‘◊, stamp, desire... originates the torus and the cross-cap’ 
(that is to say, conceiving of subjective desire as a ‘substantial’, metaphysical-dynamical 
force giving rise to or effecting actual, material entities). On the contrary, I would suggest 
that Lacan is, rather, referring to the efficacy of these topological figures for modelling 
the structure of subjective desire. Similarly, ‘◊, stamp, desire uniting the $ to the o in the 
$ ◊ o’ affirms that, in language-mediated expressions of subjectivity, $ and o are 
theoretical figures on which basis one models the structure of subjective desire (i.e., 
either algorithmically in the expression $ ◊ o, or topologically in terms of the cutting of 
the cross-cap along the line of the interior eight). The remainder of Lacan’s pithy 
comment may be restated: ‘in the phantasy, $ is the cut of o’. That is to say, the repetitive 
positing of imaginary surrogates for o (i.e., the phantasy) evinces the structure of 
subjective desire in the form of a counterpoise between the order of the possible (i.e., $ as 
the subjectivity defined in terms of the tension obtaining between the conscious and the 
unconscious dimensions of the signifying chain) and the order of the real-as-impossible 
(i.e., the ‘cut of o’, which, itself, admits the equivalent formulation: ‘that’ which, in 
accordance with the function of the unary trait, is the conjunction of the presence and the 
absence, or the insistence of the identity-in-difference, of the object of desire). 
 
 By way of anticipating matters for discussion in chapter six, it may be appropriate to 
specify in greater detail the meaning of the so-called ‘formalisation of the phantasy’: $ ◊ 
o (or $ ◊ a). In this regard, Seminar XI and Seminar XIV are of particular relevance.444 In 
Seminar XI, Lacan explores the ‘relation between the subject and the Other’ in terms of 
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 A highly readable introduction to the ideas presented in these two Seminar may be found in 
Fink, The Lacanian Subject (see, especially, 42-63). 
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‘two operations’ – namely, ‘alienation’ and ‘separation’.445 In the former case, 
subjectivity is conceived in terms of a necessary relation between ‘Being (the subject)’ 
and ‘Meaning (the Other)’ such that to be as a subject is to be as a subject of meaning – 
which is to say, a subject of language. In this sense, language-mediated subjectivity is 
alienated insofar as one’s sense of self is, necessarily, defined in accordance with or, 
indeed, given to one, by an Other. In the latter case, subjectivity is conceived in terms of 
desire as that which ‘emerges from the superimposition of two lacks’ defining ‘the desire 
of the subject and the desire of the Other’.446 The crucial point to grasp is that, on this 
account, subjectivity is conceived in terms of that which precipitates as two, empty, 
intersecting sets: the individual subject (or ‘one that is conscious’) and the big Other (i.e., 
language-mediated, social and cultural reality, the greater part of which is, practically 
speaking, repressed and, therefore, unconscious). As Lacan’s diagrammatic 
representation illustrates, the intersection of the two empty sets may be designated ‘non-
meaning’, thereby alluding to that which exceeds and eludes (or which is of the order of 
the real-as-impossible in) expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making – namely, objet 
petit a.447 In the language of Seminar IX, these two, empty, intersecting sets are precisely 
synonymous with $ ◊ o. That is, the engendering (one also might say figuring) of ‘$’ as 
the ‘cut of o’ or, equivalently, the manner by which language-mediated expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making emerge in the form of a structurally necessary counterpoise 
between the order of the possible ($) and the order of the impossible (the cut of o). 
 
 In Seminar XIV, this interpretation of $ ◊ a is reiterated by way of an inversion of the 
Cartesian cogito. Thus, Lacan invokes the formula ‘Either I am not thinking or I am not 
(Ou je ne pense pas ou je ne suis pas)’ in order to elaborate the ‘point of crystallisation 
for the subject of the unconscious’ or, equivalently, ‘the revelation of something which is 
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the truth of the structure... the o-object’ – i.e., objet petit a.448 Again, Lacan models 
subjectivity in terms of the intersection of two negatives or empty sets: ‘I am not 
thinking’ and ‘I am not’. Here, as Fink points out, the ‘thinking’ in question admits 
consideration as an expression of the unconscious.449 From this perspective, the set ‘I am 
not thinking’ corresponds to conscious determinations of meaning sustained by virtue of 
the repression of meaning potentials that are unconscious. By the same token, the set ‘I 
am not’ corresponds to the return of repressed meaning potentials, in relation to which 
conscious determinations of meaning (including one’s sense of oneself as a conscious 
ego) are fading. On this basis, the space of intersection between the two, empty sets may 
be said to represent what is proper to the function of repression/return, insistence/fading – 
namely, figuring considered in terms of the metaphoric function of pure difference or the 
lettering/tracing/differencing that defines the operation of the unary trait. In this way, 
Lacan reaffirms his understanding of subjectivity as that which precipitates in the form of 
a structurally necessary counterpoise between the order of the possible ($) and the order 
of the impossible (the cut of o). 
 
 Having established that the relationship between the products of the cutting of the 
cross-cap along the line of the interior eight (i.e., $ and o) is synonymous with the 
counterpoise of possibility and impossibility that, as a matter of structural necessity, is 
proper to language-mediated expressions of subjectivity and the structure of subjective 
desire, it now remains to establish the status of o as topologically irresolvable or 
irreducible. In this regard, the surface equivalent to o possesses two critical properties. In 
the first place, as Nasio observes, considered in three-dimensional projection, the conch- 
or disk-shaped surface equivalent to o and the surface equivalent to a Möbius strip (i.e., 
$) retain ‘the portion of the self-intersecting line that originally pinched them when they 
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belonged to...[the cross-cap]’.450 However, with regard to the aforementioned ‘point hole’ 
of the cross-cap, ‘the conch retains the point within it, whilst the... Möbius strip... does 
not.’451 This anomalous point hole testifies to the irreducibility of the surface equivalent 
to o: it can be made infinitesimally small, but never absolutely eliminated. In Seminar IX, 
Lacan refers to this singularity as the ‘irreducible draught-hole’ which ‘if we ring it with 
a cut... is properly where there belongs, in the effects of the signifying function, o, the 
object as such.’ As Lacan relates, further, ‘This means that the object is missed, because 
in no case could there be anything here but the contour of the object’.452 Here, one 
encounters a resonance with Žižek’s suggestion that ‘the object-cause of desire resides in 
the curved space of desire’. In other words, o is grasped neither as a metaphysical entity 
nor as an expression of such – rather ‘it’ defines the topological structure within which, 
so to speak, the trajectory (or, better perhaps, orbit) of subjective desire bears witness to 
the repetitive positing of an endless series of signifying alternatives or imaginary 
surrogates for o. Still further, Lacan characterises the cross-cap as ‘the place of the hole’ 
– a ‘surface... particularly suitable to make function before us this most ungraspable 
element which is called desire as such, in other words lack’453 and suggests that  
 
We know the functions and the nature of this privileged point: it is the phallus... in 
so far as it is through it as operator that an object o can be put at the same place 
where in another structure (the torus) we only grasp its contour. This is the 
exemplary value of the structure of the cross-cap...454 
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That is to say, the point hole of the cross-cap, irreducibly preserved in the surface 
equivalent to o, represents the primordially lost metonymical object of desire or the 
signifier S(Ⱥ), in accordance with which language-mediated subjectivity is as 
constitutively lacking – i.e., desiring. To this extent, one finds an exemplary illustration 
of the manner by which objet petit a testifies to the object of desire as a structural 
simultaneity of lack and irreducibility. 
 
 Secondly, the irreducibility of the surface equivalent to o follows from the fact that, 
unlike the Möbius surface equivalent to $, it is, as Lacan puts it, ‘something which is... 
not... specularisable’, where ‘being specularisable... [involves] irreducibility to the 
specular image’.455 In other words, a specular object is that for which it is possible to 
define a mirror image – a laterally inverted other to which the specular object cannot be 
reduced or, to employ more precise language, transformed. Hence, that which is not 
specularisable or non-specular can be transposed onto its mirror image via a continuous, 
geometric transformation. That is to say, always already, it is its mirror image or, rather, 
it has no mirror image. With regard to the surface equivalent to o, Nasio expresses the 
matter as follows: ‘The disk can deform itself without tearing or scarring and adopt the 
exact same spatial disposition as the image in the mirror. At that point it no longer has an 
image.’456 The suggestion that the conch-shaped disk signifying little o has no mirror 
image implies that o has no representation/symbolisation other than itself and, in that 
sense, is irreducible. 
 
 Let us summarise the main points of the preceding two thesis chapters. I have sought 
to clarify the nature of painting, considered as an expression of an ambiguous and 
contradictory subjectivity/meaning-making, by posing two basic questions: (1) how does 
the meaning of painting come into being? and (2) how is the meaning of painting 
sustained? In the course of my deliberations, I have appealed to Lacanian psychoanalysis 
in order to present an understanding of painting as an expression of subjectivity/meaning-
making that is (1) language-mediated, (2) law-governed in accordance with the reciprocal 
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functions of metaphor and metonymy, and (3) defined in terms of a counterpoise of 
possibility and impossibility (where unconscious metonymy metaphorically becoming as 
conscious metonymy defines the order of the possible and the metaphoric function of 
pure difference defines the real-as-impossible). By way of addressing the first question, 
in chapter three, I employed the term figuring in order to elaborate the ‘agent-like’, 
metaphoric, precipitation of points de capiton in painting – where figuring was defined, 
variously, as the metaphoric function of pure difference proper to the operation of the 
unary trait, lettering/tracing/differencing, a real writing or writing in the real, the 
insistence of the signifier without the signified, and the return of the repressed. In 
consequence, I suggested that, always already, any meanings determined or figured via 
the function of repression/overdetermination are sustained only insofar as they are fading 
before the return of the repressed – namely, an infinite field of pure differences in which 
there insists an infinity of letterings or tracings, identities-in-difference or trace 
structures. By way of addressing the second question, in the present chapter, I have 
employed the term desire in order to elaborate the ‘automatist’, metonymic, perpetuation 
of points de capiton in painting. Here, desire has been defined in terms of a metonymic 
function of repetition such that meaning is as reiterated and is as fading – which is to say, 
sustained only in its ambiguity in the form of an endless movement among signifying 
alternatives or imaginary surrogates for the ineffable objet petit a.  
 
 In chapter two, I proposed the term structuring of structure to define the reciprocity of 
metaphor and metonymy in accordance with which expressions of subjectivity/meaning-
making admit consideration in terms of (1) a synchronic metonymy that is unconscious 
metaphorically becoming as a diachronic metonymy in consciousness and (2) the 
metaphoric precipitation and metonymic perpetuation of points de capiton. In the present 
chapter, I have suggested that the structuring of structure admits the equivalent 
formulation figuring of desire. This term provides a convenient framework for the 
discussion in the third part of the thesis where, in light of the preceding investigations of 
the nature of subjectivity and the nature of painting, I seek to enliven new potentials for 
considerations of the discourse surrounding McCahon and Hotere. In consequence, my 
focus shifts from painting and painted matter to related writing and testimony. In chapter 
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five, this discussion falls into three main areas – the discursive implications of figuring 
and desire first being elaborated separately, and then in combination. Thus, in section 5.1, 
I present an elaboration of the figuring of the written matter in that part of McCahon 
discourse addressing Victory over Death 2 and I one. In section 5.2, I engage with 
Hotere’s Malady series in order to demonstrate how Hotere discourse and the discourse 
of art history admit consideration as discourses of desire or desiring discourses. Finally, 
in section 5.3, I initiate an investigation of the figuring of desire (i.e., the metaphoric 
precipitation and metonymic perpetuation of points de capiton in discourses of desire) in 
the context of McCahon discourse and Hotere discourse. In so doing, I define the 
parameters of the discussion in the final thesis chapter. Namely, that the ‘desiring 
discourses’ surrounding McCahon and Hotere may be fruitfully conceived in terms of the 
apparent prominence and persistence of two points de capiton, the inherent complexities 
of which I propose to discuss under the headings ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s 
reticence’. 
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Part 3 Discourse 
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Chapter 5 Figuring desire 
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5.1 Figuring discourse: AM, I, one 
 
 5.1.1 Zepke, Brown, and Victory over Death 2 
 
 In order to elaborate the figuring of the written matter in that part of McCahon 
discourse relevant to Victory over Death 2 and I one, my analysis takes place on two 
levels. The first level of analysis addresses writing that directly refers to the painted 
matter of Victory over Death 2 and I one. The second level of analysis addresses writing 
that critiques the writing responding to the painted matter of these works. Specifically, I 
evaluate Zepke’s criticism of what he regards as logocentric and ontotheological thinking 
in Brown’s reading of Victory over Death 2 and Curnow’s reading of I one. At risk of 
stating the obvious, I should acknowledge that, in presenting these analyses, inevitably 
and necessarily, my discussion, itself, constitutes yet another level of figuring. That is to 
say, my determinations of meaning are sustained only insofar as they are fading before 
that which is repressed/returning. In consequence, and in common with all the 
determinations presented in the course of this study, my critical reading can make no 
claim to be definitive or final but rather is offered only as that which envisages its own 
analysis (i.e., re-reading and re-writing) by others in turn. 
 
 In relation to the written matter surrounding Victory over Death 2, exemplifying the 
aforementioned ‘first level’ of figuring are two contemporary reviews of the Barry Lett 
Galleries exhibition Colin McCahon Recent Paintings. Victory over Death or Practical 
Religion (1970), in which Victory over Death 2 was first shown.457 The first of these is 
                                                 
457
 In McCahon and Barry Lett Galleries, Colin McCahon Recent Paintings. Victory over Death 
or Practical Religion, exh. cat. (Auckland, 1970), np, (courtesy of Hocken Collections, Uare 
Taoka o Hākena, University of Otago, MS-1459/623, MS-1459/1093, accessed 27-29.08.13) nine 
works are listed and dated (the dates given ranging from October 1969 to February 1970). The 
first six works are large-scale, acrylic paintings on canvas sheets, each measuring 81” high 
(~2060mm) and between 99” (~2515mm) and 348” (~8840mm) in length. The last three works 
are small, acrylic paintings on hardboard, each measuring 24x24” (~610x610mm). The works 
listed are: 1. Practical Religion (then titled ‘Victory over Death’), 2. Are there not twelve hours of 
daylight (000011, February 1970, ref. 66), 3. A question of faith (000015, February 1970, ref. 67), 
4. Victory over Death 2 (then titled ‘The Way, Truth & Life Victory over Death (2)’, 5. This day 
a man is (001515, February 1970, ref. 68), 6. A grain of wheat (001022, February 1970, ref. 69), 
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T.J. McNamara’s New Zealand Herald article ‘Astounding “I AM” Revelation: Word 
Power in Visual Form’ (1970). In keeping with the title of his article, McNamara’s 
account of Victory over Death 2 suggests that ‘Out of a chaos of darkness where at first it 
is scarcely discernible comes a great I AM... The pronoun is a huge pillar of light at once 
assertive and a dazzling revelation.’458 The second example is Hamish Keith’s Auckland 
Star review, ‘Paintings with impact of a clenched fist’ (1970). Here, Keith maintains that 
McCahon’s exhibition ‘wastes no time with polite painterly gestures. It gets on with its 
job of confronting us with one man’s intensely realised vision of what might be meant by 
life and death, salvation and resurrection.’ Keith goes on to suggest that, in Victory over 
                                                                                                                                                 
7. James 3, Practical Religion (001625, 13 October 1969, ref. 70), 8. Victory over Death 
(000661, 10 October 1969, ref. 71), 9. Our friend Lazarus has fallen asleep, but we shall go and 
wake him (001626, 13-14 October 1969, ref. 72).  
 
 In the name of accuracy, I observe that this information contradicts Steven Miller, Martin 
Browne and Marja Bloem, ‘Solo Exhibitions and Selected Group Exhibitions’ in Bloem and 
Browne, Colin McCahon: a question of faith, exh. cat. (Amsterdam: Stedelijk Museum and 
Nelson: Craig Potton, 2002), 257. Here, the numbering of the large works on canvas is slightly 
different and there is no mention of the smaller works on hardboard. However, that the three 
smaller works were actually exhibited is strongly implied in contemporary reviews of the 
exhibition. Thus, in Hamish Keith, ‘Paintings with impact of a clenched fist,’ Auckland Star, 4 
March 1970, 9, it is noted that James 3 is ‘One of the three smallest works in the show’. 
Moreover, in McNamara, ‘Astounding “I AM” Revelation: Word Power in Visual Form,’ New 
Zealand Herald, 3 March 1970, section 1, 3, it is suggested that ‘what works on the epic scale of 
the “Victory Over Death” picture does not work as the little jottings on a two-foot square.’ This 
would seem to be a reference to the Victory over Death dated October 1969. 
 
458
 McNamara, ‘Astounding “I AM” Revelation’. It may be noted that McNamara reiterates this 
reading of Victory over Death 2’s  major calligraphy in his review of Colin McCahon: a survey 
exhibition (1972). Thus, in ibid, ‘City Gallery One-Man Show By McCahon’, New Zealand 
Herald, 8 March 1972, section 1, 3, McNamara observes that ‘In “Victory Over Death” the black 
is burned through by a great fall of light that makes the monumental assertion I AM’. Victory 
over Death 2’s I AM motif is also prioritised in McNamara’s summary of McCahon’s life and 
work: ibid, ‘McCahon fulfilled an artistic vision’, New Zealand Herald, 3 November, 1988, 
section 2, 1. Here, McNamara observes that Victory over Death 2  
 
...has a vast I AM as part of it... McCahon uses the letters to signify the fall of light and 
enlightenment in the land...  
 
These huge columns... are at once letters and light and pillars of strength...  
 
In Victory over Death they suggest the voice of God and the eternal victory of the spirit 
over death as exemplified in the story of Lazarus. 
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Death 2, ‘the massive image of “I Am,” is as much the pillars of a temple or a shaft of 
light, or a lightning flash, as it is a word.’459 
 
 In both reviews, priority and privilege is accorded to the figure I AM and/or to the 
status of the central I-form as a ‘pillar of light’. At the same time, however, it is 
significant that, in so delimiting Victory over Death 2’s major calligraphy, both 
McNamara and Keith are apparently impelled to tacitly acknowledge the insistence of 
otherness and ambiguity. Hence, in what invites interpretation as a simultaneous 
acknowledgement and disregarding of Victory over Death 2’s darkly rendered, leftward 
AM, McNamara alludes to that from whence the I AM emerges – namely, the ‘chaos of 
darkness where at first it is scarcely discernible’. Analogously, Keith’s determination of 
the ‘massive image of “I Am” ’ occurs in concert with the stating of other possibilities 
(‘pillars of a temple’, ‘a shaft of light’, ‘a lightning flash’). To some degree, the stating of 
these other possibilities merely reiterates the primacy of Victory over Death 2’s I AM – 
now the recipient of a four-fold reification. Indeed, Keith suggests that, by virtue of this 
slippage from symbolic to pictorial, the figure I AM is a condensation/summation of the 
meaning of the work:  
 
It carries, by this image, an illumination of the smaller areas of text, ‘While you 
have the light, trust to the light, that you may become men of light,’ as well as the 
assertion of the individual spirit or, in a strictly Christian sense, the risen Christ. 
 
Nevertheless, Keith also concedes: ‘It would be a mistake, of course, to settle for a 
strictly Christian interpretation of these paintings. They may well exist on that level, but 
they also exist on many others.’460 
 
 From the perspective of psychoanalysis (and in light of the discussion presented in 
chapter three), expressions of certainty that, on closer inspection, evince ambiguity are 
precisely illustrative of the psychical functions of negation and repression. By virtue of 
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 Keith, ‘Paintings with impact of a clenched fist’. 
 
460
 Ibid. 
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equivocations, qualifying asides, afterthoughts, etc., that which is, ostensibly, determined 
(i.e., a sign or figure, in relation to which there emerges a signified or point de capiton) is 
subject to negation/fading/ambiguity, and thus testifies to the return of that which is 
repressed. In the accounts of Victory over Death 2 by McNamara and Keith, this 
negation/fading/ambiguity attaches to the meaning of the figure I AM. As stated 
previously, ‘that’ which is repressed/returning is not any kind of determinable figure or 
entity but rather an identity-in-difference, trace structure, or ‘signifier without a 
signified’. Whilst this identity-in-difference fundamentally resists representation and/or 
symbolisation, for the sake of convenience, its form may be suggested by constructions 
like AM (dark)/I AM (light), dark/light, non-being/being, void/substance, 
absence/presence, and so forth.461 
 
 By way of proceeding to an illustration of the so-called ‘second level’ of figuring in 
the writing surrounding Victory over Death 2 et al, it may be observed that the privilege 
McNamara and Keith accord Victory over Death 2’s I AM is closely reiterated in 
Brown’s Colin McCahon: Artist. Here, Brown asserts: 
 
A massive I AM traverses the full 213-centimetre height of the painting as pillars of 
light rising up to support the heavens; then, in response to Jesus’ cry of ‘Father, 
glory your name’, there descends, like a thunderous crack of lightning, the 
                                                 
461
 Given that, in the privileging of its major calligraphy as I AM, it is Victory over Death 2’s 
barely visible, leftward AM and/or dark background that is neglected or marginalised, it may be 
tempting to regard the leftward AM and/or dark background as that which is repressed. Strictly 
speaking, however, to succumb to this temptation is to misunderstand what is entailed in 
repression/overdetermination, and the tension between consciousness and the unconscious 
thereby implied. To be clear on this point, consciousness is a domain of making determinations 
(albeit contingent and ideal) that are sustained, in their meaning ambiguity (i.e., sustained only 
insofar as, always already, they are fading) by virtue of repressions/returns in which subsist/insist 
unconscious meanings in potentia. Consciousness simply is making determinations. In 
consequence, always already, any reference to ‘that’ which is neglected or marginalised is 
precisely a determination of consciousness. Hence, one cannot speak of the ‘repression’ of the 
leftward AM, without, in effect, making a determination that is, itself, sustained on the basis of a 
repression, and that, always already, is fading in the face of the return of the repressed. By 
definition, and however retrospectively or belatedly it is determined, as an object of conscious 
reflection, the figure AM cannot be of the unconscious order of the repressed/returning. 
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answering call, ‘I have glorified it, and I will glorify it again.’ For God has said, ‘I 
AM that who I am, I AM what I will be: I AM.’462 
 
In the first place, Brown echoes McNamara and Keith in referring to the verticals of 
Victory over Death 2’s I AM as ‘pillars of light’ – conduits for the transforming light of 
divine revelation. Secondly, Brown’s invocation of the aforementioned quote from 
Exodus 3: 14, with its quadruplicate repetition of ‘I AM’, mirrors, with even greater 
flagrancy, the multiple emphases in Keith’s review. Finally, and again in common with 
McNamara and Keith, Brown’s prioritising of Victory over Death 2’s I AM occurs in 
concert with an accompanying qualification – namely, the reproduction of McCahon’s 
aforementioned testimony, in Colin McCahon: a survey exhibition, to the effect that 
Victory over Death 2 is ‘ “a simple I AM at first. But not so simple really as doubts do 
come in here too. I believe but don’t believe.” ’463 
 
 Brown’s Colin McCahon: Artist is subjected to a thorough-going criticism in Zepke’s 
MA thesis, Colin McCahon and the Writing of Difference. As suggested in the thesis 
Introduction, Zepke’s work merits serious consideration insofar as it is one of the few 
examples of McCahon scholarship that, by virtue of a sophisticated application of post-
structuralist theory, seeks to expose the metaphysical prejudices of traditionalising art 
history (of which, aspects of Brown’s writing are exemplary). Indeed, in the present 
context, Zepke’s assessment of Brown’s privileging of Victory over Death 2’s I AM is of 
especial relevance insofar as it combines appeals to Derridean post-structuralism with 
glancing references to Freudian and Lacanian theory – in particular, the psychoanalytic 
tropes of repression and negation. Zepke’s argument highlights the basic inconsistency in 
Brown’s account. Namely, that, by virtue of privileging the figure I AM, Victory over 
Death 2 is presented as a triumphant expression of self-present self-sufficiency – 
                                                 
462
 Brown, Colin McCahon: Artist (Wellington: Reed, 1984), 148. I should point out that, for the 
most part, this study refers to the 1993 edition of Brown’s book. However, in the context of a 
discussion addressing the criticism of Brown in Zepke’s MA thesis of 1992, it is appropriate to 
cite the edition of Brown’s text to which Zepke refers – i.e., the original edition of 1984. 
 
463
 McCahon and O’Reilly, Colin McCahon: a survey exhibition, 37, quoted in Brown, Colin 
McCahon: Artist (1984), 148. 
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ostensibly that of the Judeo-Christian divine but also, as noted in chapter one, tacitly of 
McCahon as artist-creator. However, this reading directly contradicts Brown’s opening 
acknowledgement of McCahon’s admission that the painting expresses ‘doubts’ – as if 
Brown has either failed to appreciate the significance of this statement or simply ignored 
it. Thus, Zepke suggests: 
 
Despite the ‘thunderous crack of lightning’ Brown has not seen the question of the 
initial ‘AM’... [the] emphasis on I AM drowns out the first AM, making it 
seemingly unreadable. 
 
In Zepke’s view, this is  
 
...unsurprising, given Brown’s (auto)biographical project, a project which as part of 
Western onto-theology has maintained that ‘The I am, being experienced as an I am 
present, itself presupposes the relation with presence in general, with being as 
presence.’464 
                                                 
464
 Zepke, Colin McCahon and the Writing of Difference, 17. In support of his claim, Zepke 
quotes Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans 
David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, 54. I should point out that, 
here, Zepke does not cite Derrida directly but rather via M.C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern 
A/Theology (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 42. In so doing, Zepke 
omits the word ‘only’ from Derrida’s phrase which, fully stated, reads: ‘The I am, being 
experienced only as an I am present, itself presupposes the relation with presence in general, with 
being as presence.’ Ironically, Zepke’s elision has the effect of introducing a degree of ambiguity 
into what is, ostensibly, an appeal to Derridean ‘authority’. That is to say, Zepke’s ‘typo’ 
weakens the force of Derrida’s assertion – namely, that the logocentric prejudice that, self-
evidently, the truth of being is present as presence rests on the presupposition that ‘I am’ only 
(i.e., determinately, exclusively) is synonymous with ‘I am present’.  
 
 Similar errors inflect Zepke’s borrowings from the first English translation of Derrida, Of 
Grammatology, trans Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976 (1974)). For 
example, in a key passage, where Derrida suggests that, in logocentrism and phonocentrism, there 
is assumed ‘absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice 
and the ideality of meaning’ (12), Zepke’s account reads ‘of voice and the identity of meaning’ 
(8). Where Derrida writes that ‘phonocentrism merges with the historical determination of being 
in general as presence’ (Derrida, ibid), Zepke’s text omits the emphasis and jumbles the word 
order: ‘the meaning of being as general presence’ (Zepke, ibid). Where Derrida remarks that, 
among the ‘subdeterminations’ of phonocentrism is the ‘presence of the thing to sight’ (Derrida, 
ibid), Zepke’s script reproduces this as ‘presence of the things to sight’ (Zepke, 9). 
 
 It may be argued that Zepke’s errors are inconsequential – although, it is striking that, as noted 
above, Zepke stumbles thrice in citing from the same page of what is, after all, a primary 
theoretical resource. Indeed, from a psychoanalytic perspective, these stutters and stumbles are 
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 What Zepke means by ‘Brown’s (auto)biographical project’ is an ‘art historical 
methodology’ where, in keeping with the metaphysical prejudices of a traditionalising art 
history, the individual artist-creator provides the privileged point of reference in securing 
the meaning of the work.465 Zepke goes on to suggest that, in accordance with the 
exigencies of these metaphysical prejudices, Brown ‘must repress any intimation of 
doubt’ in his assessments of McCahon’s work and McCahon the artist-creator – this 
repression constituting a ‘critical blindness’.466 Having raised the issue of repression, 
Zepke invokes Freud and Lacan in order to propose that Victory over Death 2’s leftward 
AM testifies to that which is ‘unconscious’ in Brown’s ‘(auto)biographical criticism’ and 
in the major calligraphy of McCahon’s painting. In the former case, doubt is cast on ‘the 
self-present simplicity of McCahon’s transcendence.’ That is to say, the degree to which, 
in determining the meaning of McCahon’s work, Brown considers a particular self-
sufficiency or art subject called ‘McCahon’ to be the exemplary point of reference. In the 
latter event, ‘the dark and almost invisible “AM” could be an unconscious and repressed 
                                                                                                                                                 
not neutral but, on the contrary, invite interpretation as symptoms of precisely the kind of neglect 
or forgetfulness Zepke attributes to Brown. The reader is reminded, thereby, that Zepke’s 
determinations are, themselves, sustained only in relation to that which is repressed/returning – 
on which basis, always already, these determinations are fading or becoming ambiguous. Hence, 
Zepke’s account is not (indeed, cannot be) definitive: Zepke’s writing, like any expression of 
subjectivity/meaning-making (the present study included), is, irremediably, at odds with itself. 
 
465
 Zepke, Colin McCahon and the Writing of Difference, 4. In his elaboration of this ‘art 
historical methodology’, Zepke proposes that Brown tacitly appeals to ‘the conflation of the 
artist’s position with God’s’ wherein ‘Both maintain a transcendental relation to their signs’ (6). 
On this basis, Zepke contends that ‘Although McCahon could not be called “the ground of all that 
is”, for Brown he is certainly the ground of all his paintings.’ In consequence, Zepke identifies 
Brown’s ‘(auto)biographical’ mode of writing with the ‘long Western metaphysical tradition of 
onto-theology, a tradition which takes a transcendental (Being, God, McCahon, etc) as the 
univocal ground for its sign (being, the bible, paintings etc)’ (7). As Zepke relates, further, ‘In 
onto-theology the signifier represents the signified’ (8). That is to say, there is an assumption that 
signifiers admit absolute determination – at least, in potentia. 
 
466
 Ibid, 17. I would argue that Zepke’s assessment of Brown as repressing ‘any intimation of 
doubt’ is excessively totalising. To give Brown due credit, it should be noted that his reading of 
McCahon’s Elias series paintings and the word paintings of 1969 and 1970 does, in fact, address 
issues of doubt and faith, and ambiguity of meaning – even if this sensitivity to the complexity of 
McCahon’s work coexists with other assertions that may invite criticism. See Brown, Colin 
McCahon: Artist (1984), 113-20, 148-52. This point will merit further discussion in chapter six. 
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question to which the “emphatic” white “I AM” would be... answer and negation’.467 
That is to say, Victory over Death 2’s I AM negates the incipient question of being, AM I 
AM, and in so doing is, as Freud asserts, ‘a way of taking cognizance of what is 
repressed’. In consequence, Zepke concludes that Victory over Death 2’s I AM 
 
...is in no way certain, answering as it does an unconscious uncertainty, an 
uncertain unconscious which does not know its own name, and whose emphatic 
repression determines that Brown’s ‘I AM’ must be as emphatic as it is.468 
 
 Whilst I would take issue with some of Zepke’s characterisations (specifically, the 
suggestion that Victory over Death 2’s leftward AM is ‘unconscious’ and ‘repressed’, and 
the idea that there can be ‘unconscious uncertainty’), his (psycho)analysis of Brown has 
merit.469 Nevertheless, it is crucial to appreciate that, necessarily and inevitably, Zepke’s 
account is, itself, another determination (or set of determinations) sustained, in its 
meaning ambiguity, on the basis of repressions returning. To the extent it neglects or 
forgets to acknowledge its own ‘fading’, Zepke’s reading of Brown is, I would suggest, 
also vulnerable to criticism – however much this criticism enlivens yet further levels or 
circuits of determinations, repressions, returns, ambiguities and fading. By way of 
substantiating this assertion, I observe that only in a footnote (i.e., the exemplary form of 
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 Zepke, Colin McCahon and the Writing of Difference, 19. 
 
468
 Ibid. 
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 Zepke’s characterisation of Victory over Death 2’s leftward AM as ‘an unconscious and 
repressed question’ ought to be taken figuratively as opposed to literally. As previously noted, 
always already, the meaning of the figure AM is encountered, in consciousness, as determined 
(albeit, subject to ambiguity and, thus, always already, fading). ‘That’ which is unconscious and 
repressed is precisely that which resists determination and, indeed, never can be made an object 
of consciousness – although, ‘it’ exerts effects (i.e., gives rise to symptoms) by virtue of the 
insistent return of the repressed. Similarly, Zepke’s allusion to an ‘unconscious uncertainty’ or an 
unconscious that ‘does not know its own name’ is, prima facie, incoherent. As noted previously, 
Lacan considers the unconscious to be, precisely, a realm of knowledge (savoir) – but it is 
knowledge that, as Fink points out, ‘has no subject, nor does it need one’. That is to say, on the 
level of the unconscious, there is no ‘it’ to be named. I would suggest that Zepke’s ambiguous 
phrasing makes more sense (at least, from a Lacanian perspective) if ‘unconscious uncertainty’ or 
the unconscious that ‘does not know its own name’ is considered in terms of an imaginary 
projection from the perspective of consciousness and ego. Confronted with the inevitable and 
irremediable fading of all posited determinations, it is the ego that becomes uncertain of what it 
‘knows’ – including its own identity and existence. 
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a qualifying aside or afterthought rendering ambiguous that which was stated previously) 
does Zepke acknowledge that ‘This symptomatic misreading of Brown’s is not a unique 
one’ – alluding, in this context, to articles by Ron O’Grady and John McDonald.470 
Moreover, in so doing, Zepke neglects to mention the review articles by McNamara and 
Keith that were contemporaneous with the first public showing of Victory over Death 2. 
Zepke’s omission of Keith’s article is especially striking given that Brown refers to it 
repeatedly (albeit, without supplying adequate references).471 One might speculate that 
this lacuna – equivalent to a decentring of ‘primary sources’ – evinces Zepke’s resistance 
to the manner by which a traditionalising art history seeks to determine and privilege 
original or originating gestures. Nevertheless, scholarly rigour would appear to demand 
some consideration of the close correspondences between McNamara, Keith, and Brown 
– even if, in a post-structuralist fashion, the aim is, ultimately, to unsettle the complaisant 
assumption that the trio concerned are ‘saying the same thing’. Insofar as no 
acknowledgement of this kind is forthcoming, Zepke’s ‘single-minded’ criticism of 
Brown invites accusations of ‘critical blindness’ in turn. The very possibility of making 
this criticism of Zepke demonstrates to what degree Zepke’s determinations are, 
themselves, always already fading before the return of a repressed – the form of which, 
for the sake of argument, might be defined as ‘McNamara/Keith/Brown on Victory over 
Death 2 and related works’. 
 
 5.1.2 Zepke, Curnow, and I one 
 
 The manner by which Zepke’s critical interventions are, themselves, figures fading by 
virtue of repressions returning also is evident in his evaluation of Curnow’s interpretation 
of I one, as presented in the untitled essay in the catalogue accompanying the exhibition I 
will need words. As noted in chapter one (see n129), I one prefigures the ambiguity of 
Victory over Death 2’s central motif. Moreover, both paintings juxtapose singularity and 
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 Zepke, Colin McCahon and the Writing of Difference, 63, n14. 
 
471
 See, for example, Brown, Colin McCahon: Artist (1984), 149, 151. Brown’s failure to footnote 
his references to Keith’s Auckland Star review article is remedied in the revised edition of Colin 
McCahon: Artist published in 1993. 
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duality such that the singular ‘I’ presides over, mediates between or, indeed, marks the 
identity-in-difference of a same – namely, a doubly-stated ‘AM’ and ‘AM’, or ‘one’ and 
‘one’. It is worth noting that, in contrast with the readings of McNamara, Keith, and 
Brown, Curnow’s essay acknowledges the ambiguity of Victory over Death 2’s major 
calligraphy much more explicitly: 
 
In VICTORY OVER DEATH 2 the ambiguity is the result of an ‘am’ preceding as 
well as following the ‘I’, so that the painting’s major text reads: ‘Am I [?] / I Am’. 
As if a question has been asked, then answered by the questioner him/herself. Or, as 
if there is some real uncertainty; it could be either. Since the first ‘am’ is somewhat 
obscured and the second in light and of a piece with the New testament text with 
which it is combined, it is the first reading which is to be preferred. But only 
preferred, the doubt is not altogether erased.472 
 
 Curnow’s sensitivity to the nuances of McCahon’s work also is evident in his reading 
of I one. As Curnow points out, I one is ‘contemporaneous with the ELIAS series in time 
and style.’ As is well established in McCahon scholarship, the Elias series paintings of 
1959 allude to that moment during the Crucifixion when Christ’s despairing cry ‘Eloi, 
Eloi, lama sabachthani?’ (‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’, Mathew, 27: 
46-49) is misconstrued by the onlookers as a call for the ninth century prophet ‘Elias’.473 
Hence, an exploration of doubt and faith is framed within an ambiguity of meaning. In 
view of the thematic preoccupations of the temporally and formally proximate Elias 
paintings, Curnow is encouraged to apply a similarly Judeo-Christian interpretation to I 
one’s play of double meanings. Thus, Curnow suggests that the light-toned, geometric 
shape occupying the lower portion of the work resembles both a close-up of the letter ‘I’ 
and a section of a cross, the right-hand horizontal of which is emblazoned with the word 
‘one’. On this basis, Curnow proposes that 
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 Curnow, untitled essay in McCahon, I will need words. 
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 For in-depth discussion of the Elias paintings see Brown, Colin McCahon: Artist (1993), 110-
120, Zepke, Colin McCahon and the Writing of Difference, 51-56, and Simpson, Colin McCahon: 
The Titirangi Years, 1953-59 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2007), 62-66. 
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...the question of individual identity is linked with the crucified Christ; self is a 
cross. The self is the impersonal ‘one’, and it is associated with individuation: 
‘one’, not ‘two’. The letter in the sky is the ‘I’ of God; Jesus and God are one and 
the same, that is to say they have different names, signifiers, but the same 
signified.474 
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 Curnow, untitled essay in McCahon, I will need words. It may be noted that Curnow’s 
employment of the jargon of structural linguistics is somewhat at odds with the definitions 
proposed in this study – something exemplary of the ambiguities to which, in arts scholarship, the 
terms ‘sign’, ‘signifier’, and ‘signified’ are, typically, subject. Indeed, Curnow’s wording is 
sufficiently troubling that, in Butler and Simmons, ‘ “The Sound of Painting” ’, corrections are 
proposed. 
 
 In commenting on the implications of these emendations, I should begin by affirming that I 
entirely agree with Butler and Simmons regarding the problematic aspects of Curnow’s 
terminology. Nevertheless, and in harmony with the impetus of the present discussion, I also 
would point out that these textual modifications carry certain, unavoidable consequences. 
Specifically, they constitute figurings or determinations of the meaning of Curnow’s text that are 
sustained only insofar as, always already, they are fading before that which is repressed/returning. 
To borrow a turn of phrase Butler and Simmons employ in their essay, one might say that, always 
already, any figuring of meaning is mistranslation of a ‘voice before any origin, authorship or 
even meaning is attributed to it. It is a voice that appears before it is translated, or that is able only 
to be mistranslated’ (339-40). Here, Butler and Simmons are responding, inventively, to 
McCahon’s aforementioned admonition (see chapter one) made in relation to The Lark’s Song: 
 
The words must be read for their sound, they are signs for the lark’s song. 
 
...Please don’t give yourself the pain of worrying out a translation of the words but try for 
the sound of the painting. (cited in Butler and Simmons, 340) 
 
As Butler and Simmons suggest, the ‘voice’ defining ‘the sound of... painting’ wholly emanates 
neither from the painted words nor the implied speakers of such. Rather, 
 
The voice appears as a kind of accent or phrasing in McCahon’s painting, crossing its 
writing but not simply to be identified with it. It is something like the breath or rhythm 
with which its texts and images are inscribed, the ‘grain’ of McCahon’s particular painterly 
hand. It is this voice that McCahon attempts to make us see in his work, and that would 
testify to the force of his convictions. (341)  
 
Here, one might draw a useful parallel with Smythe’s discussion of Blanchot’s literary theory 
(see chapter three, n314) – specifically, the ‘narrative... neutral voice’ or ‘mobile fragmentation’ 
proper to the functioning of language-mediated, desiring subjectivity per se. That is to say, from a 
Lacanian perspective, the lettering/tracing/differencing, function of pure difference, or figuring 
proper to the operation of the unary trait – the insistence of which testifies to the inexhaustible 
and relentless ‘becoming’ that is subjective desire. Considered in this light, the ‘voice’, to which 
Butler and Simmons allude is neither simply nor immediately that which ‘belongs’ to the 
conscious one or individual art subject called ‘McCahon’. Rather, it is the voice ‘McCahon’ 
speaks only insofar as he is as being given to speech by the Other of language – thereby testifying 
to the ‘force of his convictions’ as that which obtains only insofar as he is as being given to desire 
by the Other of desire. This, then, is the nature of the ‘voice’ by virtue of which ‘painting sounds’ 
 291 
 
 Given the subject matter of the Elias paintings, it is tempting to read I one’s 
ambiguities and doublings as dramatising existential doubts and fantasising their 
resolution. From this perspective, the correspondence of ‘I/cross’ and ‘one’, in the lower 
portion of the painting, invites interpretation as an illustration of the existential divide 
between the mortal and the divine – the ‘self... [that] is a cross’ is the fallen, doubting, 
mortal self whose Salvation demands the Crucifixion. This sacrifice makes possible the 
heavenly unity of ‘I’ and ‘one’ in the upper part of the work – a pictorial fantasy of 
existential and spiritual aspirations for self-completion and self-realisation in the re-
unification of mortal and divine; the overcoming and elision of the impasse between 
matter and spirit. In support of this reading, it may be noted that I one’s juxtaposition of 
‘I/cross’ and ‘one’ appears as a superimposition of different elements or existences – a 
difference quite literally underlined in the shadow arc that, implicitly, detaches the ‘o’ of 
‘one’ from the white ground ‘beneath’ it. By contrast, in the upper half of the painting, 
whilst ‘I’ and ‘one’ are separately delineated, they are, so to speak, disposed on the same 
dark ground and thus exist ‘on the same level’. In consequence, the bottom half of I one 
                                                                                                                                                 
(i.e., by which painting means) and, indeed, by virtue of which there might be a ‘sounding of 
painting’ (i.e., analysis of the meaning of painting). 
 
 In light of these preliminary observations, let us examine the letter of the modifications Butler 
and Simmons make to Curnow’s text. Thus, where Curnow writes ‘The letter in the sky is the “I” 
of God; Jesus and God are one and the same, that is to say, they have different names, signifiers, 
but the same signified’, Butler and Simmons have ‘Jesus and God are the same, they have 
different names as signifiers but the same signified’, in relation to which they suggest: ‘we would 
perhaps reverse this and say that what we have here is the same signifier – “I” – and different 
signifieds – “Jesus” and “God” ’ (336). On the basis of the definitions proposed in chapter two, 
the characterisation of the meaning/form ‘I’ as a ‘signifier’ is admissible as a convenient 
shorthand and, indeed, reflects discursive practice in general. However, I would suggest that the 
‘reversal’ to which Curnow’s text is subjected is, potentially, problematic. Curnow’s faulty 
terminology notwithstanding, I would suggest that, among the possible interpretations of his text, 
is that the figure or sign ‘I’ in I one means ‘Jesus and God are one and the same’. On the face of 
it, Butler and Simmons are correct to assert that ‘Jesus’ and ‘God’, considered separately, are, 
indeed, different signs with ‘different signifieds’. On this basis, I one’s ‘I’ is the ‘I’ of God and 
the ‘I’ of Jesus – that is to say, ‘I’ is a sign with two meanings. At the same time, however, there 
is an elision of the essential point that, in Curnow’s text (and, in potentia, in a manner that is not 
entirely a matter of conscious intention), the ‘I’ form does not simply refer to two singular entities 
called ‘Jesus’ and ‘God’. Rather, I would suggest that I one’s ‘I’ also is the sign which means 
‘Jesus and God’. The ambiguity of this sign may be said to bear witness to the return of the 
repressed identity-in-difference or signifier without a signified that, for the sake of argument, 
might be represented/symbolised as ‘Jesus/God’ or, indeed, ‘.../I/one/Jesus/God/...’. 
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admits consideration as a conjunction of distinct existences – a unity divided. In the upper 
half of the painting, however, ‘I’ and ‘one’ offer to function as different aspects of a unity 
that does not admit divisibility on the basis of this differentiation – that is to say, as 
aspects of a duality or, indeed, an identity-in-difference. 
 
 Moreover, given Curnow’s reference to I one’s uppermost ‘I’ as a ‘letter in the sky’, 
the ‘I/cross’ fragment, in the lower part of the work, invites interpretation as a brightly 
rendered, abstracted landscape. If this reading is tenable then the dark rectangle at lower 
right resembles a hollow or opening. Although the visual resonance is, admittedly, 
somewhat tenuous, one is reminded of McCahon’s paintings of Christ’s entombment – 
particularly, those works depicting a sarcophagus in a cave. Examples include Easter 
Morning (000662, February-April 1950, ref. 73), where the still-sealed sarcophagus 
glows in anticipation of Christ’s Resurrection, and The Marys at the Tomb (000669, 
January-March 1950, ref. 74), where the now-empty sarcophagus testifies to the miracle 
that has occurred. Whilst Curnow does not mention these works explicitly, he does 
remark: 
 
With the resurrection ‘one’ ascends, from the cross (or is it from the tomb?) to the 
‘I’.475 
 
 Zepke disputes Curnow’s analysis, contending that the interpretation Curnow offers, 
‘despite pointing out most of the work’s differences and multiplicities, still homogenises 
them in a unifying reading’.476 In Zepke’s view, this ‘homogenisation’ inheres in the 
manner by which Curnow’s reading remains ‘fairly close to Christian theology, 
conflating Jesus and God in the singular signifiers “one” and “I” with man’s ascendancy 
to God achieved through his identification with Christ.’477 However, as Zepke relates, 
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further, the degree to which McCahon’s painting ‘resists’ this reading follows from 
Curnow’s interpretation of I one’s lower left, right-angled form as ‘I’ and ‘cross’: 
 
As both ‘I’ and cross, it links “the question of individual identity with the unified 
Christ”... But as Curnow himself points out, its identity as a cross is debatable, and 
if it were a cross it would be the Tau cross, not the cross Christ was crucified on. 
Curnow must ignore such differences to maintain the force (i.e., coherence) of his 
narrative.478 
 
In a similar fashion, Zepke observes the evident tension between Curnow’s assertion that 
I one’s upper ‘I’ implies that ‘Jesus and God are one and the same, that is to say they 
have different names, signifiers, but the same signified’, and his admission that the 
painting is a visual pun in which ‘the image of the cross is connected with the sign I... in 
a marriage of coincidence and convenience.’479 For Zepke, Curnow’s ‘traditional, 
theological reading’ ‘effectively ignores the multiplying effects of the pun’ in a 
‘repression’ that underpins Curnow’s association of the self with the singular 
individual.480 
 
 In harmony with the impetus of the present study, Zepke makes glancing references to 
both Saussurean linguistics and Lacanian psychoanalysis in order to substantiate the view 
that any ‘unifying reading’ of a work like I one is destined to miscarry. Thus, Zepke 
invokes Saussurean diacriticality in support of the view that ‘signifiers do not operate 
through a positive and necessary reference to a signified, but by differentiation.’481 Zepke 
also appeals to the Lacanian distinction between the ‘subject of the enunciation’ and the 
‘subject of the statement’ (i.e., as noted in section 3.1, between the so-called ‘subject of 
the unconscious’ and the conscious ego) in order to illustrate that language-mediated 
expressions of subjectivity involve a doubling ‘differentiation and exteriorisation’ in 
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which there obtains an ‘alienating’ ‘disjunction between a pre-existing language, and the 
individual who uses it.’ Thus, contrary to Curnow, Zepke concludes that  ‘individuation 
involves “two” not “one”. ’482 
 
 Again, whilst Zepke’s criticism of Curnow has merit, I would argue that it is also 
characterised by a certain irony insofar as it perpetrates the very privileging of 
‘singleness’ it would seek to undermine. Thus, whilst Zepke’s appeals to structural 
linguistics and psychoanalysis support his contention that ‘individuation involves “two” 
not “one” ’, there is repression of the fact that the ‘traditional theology’, to which Curnow 
appeals in his interpretation of I one, also conceives of individuation in terms of dualities 
(e.g., the paradox of divine incarnation in the body of Christ) or even trinities (e.g., 
Father, Son, Holy Ghost). Insofar as Zepke’s analysis is vulnerable to criticism on these 
counts, always already, its determinations are fading before the return of repressed 
identities-in-difference of the form ‘I one/self is a cross’ or ‘I one/divinity is duality (or 
trinity)’. Notwithstanding Zepke’s unswerving tenacity in seizing upon a particular 
interpretation of Curnow, I would suggest that, whether by intent or insufficiency, 
Curnow’s succinct, allusive analysis is as resistant to univocal interpretations as the 
painting to which it is addressed. Is it mere incoherence when Curnow states, in the same 
breath, as it were, that ‘self is a cross’ (i.e., a conjunction of two natures: the one that is 
two or the identity that is difference – a reading that finds further support in the meaning 
of the word ‘cross’, which signifies, precisely, the ‘one that is two’ or the ‘two in the 
one’) and ‘the impersonal “one” ’? Could it be the case that the jarring force of this 
juxtaposition is more in the nature of a poetical device (one, moreover, that, precisely, 
evinces a ‘speaking of two minds’ – a tension between consciousness and the 
unconscious) wherein Curnow’s text emulates, rather than eliminates, the ambiguities in 
McCahon’s painting? 
 
                                                 
482
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5.2 Desiring discourse: circumnavigating the Malady series 
 
 5.2.1 Desiring discourses: the Malady series and the discourse of art 
history  
 
 In keeping with the thematic of figuring desire, the following discussion presents an 
interpretation of the Malady series and the discourse of art history as discourses of desire 
or desiring discourses. This characterisation reflects the following, instrumental points. 
Firstly, the Malady series and the discourse of art history constitute discourses insofar as 
they are collections of language-mediated expressions of subjectivity corresponding, for 
example, to individual Malady series works or individual pieces of scholarship (however 
ambiguous or evanescent may be the criteria on which basis these works are defined). 
Secondly, language-mediated expressions of subjectivity evince the structure of 
subjective desire. Hence, in order to understand how the Malady series and the discourse 
of art history are discourses of desire, it is necessary to elaborate how they express the 
structure of subjective desire. As previously discussed, the structure of subjective desire 
manifests as (1) the automatist, metonymic dimension of the perpetuation of points de 
capiton such that these posited signifieds are as reiterated and are as fading (i.e., 
sustained only in their ambiguity, in the form of an endless series of signifying 
alternatives), and (2) an impetus to recover that which is as primordially lost and to 
resolve that which is as fundamentally irreducible – namely, a mythical, founding object, 
moment, or condition of being.  
 
 Combining these formulae, one may say that the structure of subjective desire is 
synonymous with the automatism/metonymy/repetition by which there is posited an 
endless series of signifying alternatives, determined objects, or imaginary surrogates for 
the primordially lost/fundamentally irreducible object cause of desire (which, in chapter 
four, was termed ‘little o’, and which I will now generally refer to as objet petit a). That 
there is no possibility of recovering/resolving the ineffable object cause of desire is 
implicit in the Lacanian understanding that ‘desire... is caught in the rails of metonymy, 
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eternally extending towards the desire for something else’. However, given that objet 
petit a is not an actual object but rather that which expresses the structure of subjective 
desire in terms of a counterpoise of possibility and impossibility (i.e., $ ◊ a, in Lacan’s 
‘algebra’), this formula admits an alternative interpretation. Namely, that subjective 
desire does not incline towards the recovery, resolution, or re-presencing of an object but 
rather, as Fink suggests, towards the condition of desiring itself: ‘desirousness.’483 As 
Fink relates, further, 
 
Desire, strictly speaking, has no object. In its essence, desire is a constant search for 
something else, and there is no specifiable object that is capable of satisfying it... 
Desire... does not seek satisfaction, but rather its own continuation...484 
 
Hence, whilst there is, strictly speaking, no ‘satisfying’ desire (in the sense of promoting 
a cessation of desire through the recovery/resolution of a mythical, founding object, 
moment, or condition of being), with some loss of rigour, one may say that, 
paradoxically, desire is satisfied in the very missing of its aim or, indeed, that desire finds 
satisfaction in its very perpetuation. Support for this interpretation may be found in 
Seminar VIII. Here, alluding to the object cause of desire as a ‘being... which... already 
distances itself and is already eternally lost’, Lacan goes on to suggest that  
 
...this being is all the same the very one that you are trying to rejoin along the paths 
of your desire. Only that being is yours, and... it is, in some way or other, because 
of not wanting it, that you have also more or less missed it.485 
 
Still further, Lacan also remarks that  
 
...the first ambivalence proper to every demand is that in every demand there is also 
implied that the subject does not want it to be satisfied, aims in itself at the 
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safeguarding of desire, testifies to the blind presence of the unnamed, blind 
desire.486 
 
It may be observed that this conception of desire harmonises with Lacan’s conception of 
the subjectivity defined by the ‘end’ of analysis – namely, that which, by virtue of 
structural and ethical necessity, is a mode of being in and as traversing fantasy such that 
desire is sublimated into drive. The difference is that, in traversing fantasy, desire 
sublimated into drive is named and thus no longer blind (at least, from the idealising and 
rationalising perspective of consciousness). That said, the attainment of this desire so 
named (i.e., the attainment of a nominated drive object or imaginary surrogate for objet 
petit a) is indefinitely deferred. In the topological vernacular of Seminar IX, the manner 
by which desire tends towards its own perpetuation also is implicit in the eternally 
incomplete toroidal path traced by the endless series of poloidal circulations around the 
body of the torus or the cutting of the four-dimensional cross-cap along the redoubled 
path of the interior eight. 
 
 Let us apply this interpretation to the Malady series. The suggestion is that, considered 
as a discourse of desire, the Malady series bears witness to the manner by which desire 
perpetuates itself in the continual missing of its aim. Here, it is important to appreciate 
that, notwithstanding references to the ‘agent-like’, metaphoric function involved in the 
‘structuring of structure’ or the ‘figuring of desire’, strictly speaking, the ‘missing of the 
aim’ of desire is not a matter of (an unconscious) subjective intentionality but rather an 
expression of subjectivity understood in terms of a structurally necessary counterpoise of 
possibility and impossibility. From this logico-structural perspective, the desire that 
perpetually misses its aim is synonymous with the impossibility of actually or really 
recovering/resolving objet petit a – which is to say, the impossibility of 
actualising/realising objet petit a as an object in consciousness. For the sake of 
convenience, this impossibility may be understood as that which attaches to the 
determination, in an absolutely definitive and unambiguous fashion, of nothing other than 
the meaning of the sign ‘the Malady series’ – although, to be precise, in the context of the 
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Malady series considered as a desiring discourse, this sign is, in potentia, only one of an 
infinity of signifying alternatives, determined objects, or imaginary surrogates that may 
be posited in the place of the ineffable objet petit a. 
 
 An equivalent understanding of the way in which the Malady series, considered as a 
discourse of desire, bears witness to the manner by which desire perpetuates itself in the 
continual missing of its aim follows from Lacan’s assertion, in ‘The Direction of the 
Treatment’, that ‘desire is the metonymy of the want-to-be’. In the first place, and in 
accordance with the status of consciousness as a domain of idealisation and 
rationalisation of meaning, one might say that the very articulation of the name or 
identity ‘the Malady series’ asserts, as a fait accompli, the fulfilment of the desire for such 
to be (which is to say, to be a forming-meaning and a meaning-forming entirely and self-
sufficiently). Secondly, however, desire, conceived as the metonymy of the ‘want-to-be’, 
testifies to the ultimate insufficiency of these articulations – i.e., the manner by which, 
always already, determinations of meaning are as reiterated and are as fading. In relation 
to the discussion presented in chapter four, this is simply to reiterate that the ‘metonymy 
of the want-to-be’ is synonymous with the understanding of desire as the ‘lack of being 
whereby the being exists’ – thereby defining a subjectivity that is not so much 
insufficient as incomplete, in process, becoming, in potentia.487 As stated above, the 
manner by which the signified ‘the Malady series’ is sustained only in its ambiguity (in 
the form of a repetitive series of signifying alternatives or imaginary surrogates for objet 
petit a) testifies to the impossibility of attaining the object(ive) of desire. Paradoxically, 
however, it is in the very reiteration of this ‘failure’ that the desire in question is 
‘fulfilled’ – even if, ultimately, this fulfilment amounts to nothing more than what, in 
Žižek’s parlance, may be termed the ‘radical contingency’ of determining the sign ‘the 
Malady series’ as a metonymic ensemble of less complex signs, within which, by virtue 
of the repression of difference, one may discern the repetition of a same – e.g., the name 
‘Malady’.  
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 5.2.2 Circumnavigating the Malady series 
 
 In light of the preceding discussion, let us now consider the Malady series as it relates 
to the desiring discourse of art history. Here, the suggestion is that, in common with the 
Malady series, conceived as a discourse of desire, the discourse of art history is, 
similarly, defined by the symptomatic positing of a series of imaginary surrogates for 
objet petit a (indeed, if this is not stating the obvious, this condition is intrinsic to any 
discourse, any expression of subjectivity/meaning-making – the present study included). 
To the extent that it labours under metaphysical prejudices, art history exhibits a variety 
of these symptomatic gestures – two of which I propose to illustrate with reference to the 
Malady series. In light of the previous discussion, both gestures admit consideration as 
symptoms of the desire to realise or actualise objet petit a as an object in consciousness 
through the absolute determination of the meaning of the sign ‘the Malady series’. In the 
first case, the desire in question is evident in the effort to determine elements that may be 
termed common, exemplary, essential, original, etc. In the second case, the desire is 
expressed in the effort to achieve a full summation or accounting – an activity 
exemplified by that most prestigious class of art historical documents: the catalogue 
raisonné. In this regard, it may be apparent that each of these imperatives presupposes the 
other. Always already, to seek common elements in a body of work is to presuppose the 
existence of a corpus. Always already, to seek a final accounting of a body of work is to 
presuppose the existence of elements common to all works, on which basis the corpus 
can be fully counted. Logically speaking, then, ‘the common element’ and ‘the corpus’ 
are inextricably co-dependent. If one cannot sustain the idea of a common element (or a 
collection of common elements) then, by inference, there is also precluded the possibility 
of fully determining the corpus.488 
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 That the Malady series is, indeed, fundamentally resistant to an ultimate accounting or, 
figuratively speaking, a circumnavigation, is already implicit in the discussion presented 
in section 4.2. There, I considered the signs (1) ‘the Malady series’ typical application of 
art media to certain supports’, (2) ‘the Malady series’ characteristic palette of blacks and 
charcoal greys’, and (3) ‘the Malady series’ common juxtaposing of stencilled text and 
simple geometric forms’. I observed that all of these posited, common, signifying 
elements are subject to irremediable ambiguity – on which basis it may be concluded that 
there is no isolable or definable feature exemplary of all Malady series works other than 
the ‘radically contingent’ repetition of the name ‘Malady’. In light of the argument 
presented above, this implies that an absolutely definitive and final catalogue raisonné of 
the Malady series is impossible.489 By way of illustrating this proposition, let us consider 
the ambiguities that arise even when one seeks to delimit only the Malady acrylic 
paintings on canvas completed in 1970 (that is to say, even when one subjects the field of 
study to an entirely contingent restriction, conveniently instituted in order to make the 
process of accounting more tractable).490  
                                                                                                                                                 
Catalogue lists Comet (F1, F2, F3) (000244, 1974, ref. 75), (the respective components of which 
also bear the numerical inscriptions verso ‘3’, ‘2’, and ‘1’), Comet (F4, F5, F6, F7) (001526, 
1974, ref. 76) (the respective components of which, as Curnow observes, bear the facing 
inscriptions ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, and ‘4’), Comet (F8, F9, F10) (000672, 1974, ref. 77), Comet (F11) 
(001562, 1974, ref. 78), and Comet (F12) (000309, 1974, ref. 79). 
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 See section 8.9 for a presentation of data on Malady series acrylic paintings on canvas 
produced in 1970. As I point out in the thesis Introduction, the focus of this project is criticism of 
the discourse as opposed to primary research per se. Hence, for the most part, the information 
presented in section 8.9 (gleaned from books, exhibition catalogues, websites affiliated with art 
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precisely what is of interest. To the extent that the information presented in various contexts is 
reliable (not a given), it is possible to confirm the appearance of fourteen of nineteen Malady 
series paintings. As I acknowledge in section 8.9, question marks remain concerning the 
appearance of IV, VII, IX, X, XVI, and XVIII. 
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 In this regard, on the basis of contemporaneous newspaper reviews, journal articles, 
and exhibition catalogues, it would seem that nineteen Malady series paintings were 
exhibited in 1970, in two separate exhibitions. The first show, Black Paintings 1970 – 
Malady Series, was held at Dawsons Ltd Exhibition Gallery, Dunedin, in July 1970 and, 
apparently, included fifteen paintings, numbered I – XV, as well as an unspecified number 
of preparatory drawings. A search of archival material on Hotere, located in the Hocken 
Collections, Uare Taoka o Hākena, University of Otago and the E.H. McCormick 
Research Library, Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki, failed to unearth any surviving 
exhibition catalogue. However, independent corroboration of the Dawsons Gallery show 
may be found in Tom Esplin’s brief Otago Daily Times review article, ‘Black Art Of 
Ralph Hotere Is Stark Social Comment’ (1970), and Gordon Collier’s more in-depth 
summary in the ‘Reviews’ section of the December 1970 edition of Landfall. Thus, 
Esplin remarks that ‘ “Black Painting I” to “Black Painting XV” are all 70in high in 
acrylic and completed in this year’ and that ‘Hotere’s 15 black paintings have turned a 
little gallery under Dawsons into a little chapel’.491 Similarly, Collier refers to  
 
Hotere’s most recent exhibition of paintings and drawings – ‘Black Paintings I-XV 
from “Malady” a poem by Bill Manhire’ 
 
Moreover, Collier provides a detailed description of the works exhibited, noting that 
‘There are fifteen paintings... constituting a group but not a series’492 – a precise and 
cautious assessment that testifies to his sensitivity to the differences obtaining between 
individual Malady paintings. Collier goes on to observe that the paintings 
 
...all have a black (darker-than-charcoal-grey) ground; they are identically framed 
in black; they are all the same height (about seven feet); there is a slight variation in 
width... Ten of the paintings show vertical listings of either ‘melody’ or ‘malady’ 
alone. A couple incorporate ‘my lady’. A small number use a cross- and/or circle-
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motif as a central structural feature. Five combine ‘melody’ and ‘malady’ on the 
one surface, vertically, diagonally, or as a border or internal frame’493  
 
 The second exhibition of Malady series paintings, Ralph Hotere, Malady, was held at 
the Barry Lett Galleries, Auckland, in October 1970. According to the accompanying 
pamphlet, this consisted of fourteen paintings: II, III, IV, VI, VII, X (each measuring 
70x28 inches) and XI, XIIB, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII (each measuring 70x36 
inches).494 If this information is accurate, there were, apparently, four paintings not 
previously shown: XIIB, XVI, XVII, and XVIII. A degree of independent corroboration is 
provided by McNamara’s New Zealand Herald review article ‘Ralph Hotere Exhibition 
Is Triumph’ (1970). Whilst McNamara does not provide a comprehensive summary of 
the Barry Lett show, he does mention several works by name (although, as I indicate 
below, some of McNamara’s identifications are contrary to other documentation in 
Hotere discourse). Thus, McNamara remarks on the ‘delicate shading of words into black 
from colours like the deep blue on the edge of “Painting VI” ’ and opines, further, that  
 
The most striking is “Painting II” where My Lady is enshrined at the top of a pillar 
made up of Melody. On the pillar beneath My Lady a circle is delicately balanced 
and this is shaded with dimly perceived letterings of Malady with some slight 
variants. 
 
This and the arched form in “Painting XII,” the circle that hovers over a horizon in 
“Painting XI” and the powerfully rising reds and violet in “Painting VII,” provoke 
the deepest thought.495 
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match any readily available reproduction of a Malady series painting. Similarly, McNamara’s 
reference to the ‘arched form’ in ‘ “Painting XII” ’ seems to be a reference to Black Painting XIIB 
from “Malady” (especially given that XIIB, and not XII, is specified in the Barry Lett Galleries 
exhibition catalogue). I have not been able to independently verify the appearance of the work 
McNamara identifies as ‘ “Painting VII” ’. 
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 Further documentation of the disposition of Malady series paintings completed in 
1970 is presented in the catalogue accompanying the Dunedin Public Art Gallery 
sponsored touring exhibition, Ralph Hotere, A survey 1963-73 (1974). Under the heading 
‘BLACK PAINTINGS 1970 – MALADY SERIES’ one finds I, V, IX, X, XI, XII, and XIV 
listed as ‘First exhibited Dawsons Exhibition Gallery, Dunedin, 1970’. Number XVII and 
an un-numbered work bearing the generic title ‘BLACK PAINTING from Malady a 
poem by Bill Manhire’ are listed as ‘First exhibited Barry Lett Galleries, 1970’ (i.e., if 
the Barry Lett Galleries catalogue is accurate then this latter painting would appear to be 
XIIB, XVI, or XVIII). In agreement with the height and width data presented in Barry Lett 
Galleries documentation, the Dunedin Public Art Gallery catalogue specifies two, broad 
categories of widths (71.0 to 71.6cm and 91.2 to 91.4cm) with heights all falling within 
the range 177.2 to 178.1cm. This would appear to confirm that (most of the) Malady 
series works numbered I to X were ~28in (~711mm) in width, subsequent paintings being 
~36in (~914mm) in width. 
 
 Nevertheless, even assuming that the surviving documentation is substantially correct, 
it is clear that the nineteen Malady series paintings exhibited in 1970 do not account for 
all the Malady series paintings produced. Relevant, in this regard, are those paintings that 
might be regarded as Malady series ‘outliers’ insofar as they exhibit non-standard 
dimensions and/or lack serial identifiers in the form of letters and/or numbers. Painting 
from “Malady” constitutes one example given that, as noted previously, it is of a 
standard width (912mm) but truncated in height (1116mm). Moreover, in the three extant 
books on Hotere’s painting, the legends accompanying reproductions of Painting from 
“Malady” give no indication that the title of the work is qualified by additional 
identifying numbers or letters.496 Similar ambiguities concern the status of other Malady 
series paintings such as the Dowse Art Museum’s Black Painting from “Malady”, and Te 
                                                 
496
 In making this point, I am referring to the labelling accompanying reproductions of Painting 
from “Malady” in, respectively, Hotere, Baker, and O’Sullivan, Ralph Hotere, 60, David 
Eggleton, ‘From Absence to Presence’ in Ralph Hotere: Black Light, 60, and O’Brien, Hotere, 
Out The Black Window, 34. 
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Manawa’s Black Painting III from “Malady” and Black Painting IIIa from “Malady”. 
As previously noted, all three paintings depart from the ‘standard dimensions’ of Malady 
series works as reported in the Barry Lett Galleries catalogue. In addition, it appears that 
the painting in the Dowse lacks any indication of numbering.497  
 
 These ambiguities are exacerbated by the inconsistencies attending Hotere’s ‘system’ 
of embellishing the titles of Malady series paintings with letters and numbers. In the first 
place, as noted above, these designations are not applied to all Malady series works. In 
consequence, they do not constitute an all-encompassing framework, within which may 
be securely defined either the total number of Malady series paintings produced or their 
precise order of creation. Secondly, a closer examination of those pictures that are so 
labelled suggests that Hotere’s alphanumeric qualifiers obey an intractable logic – that is 
to say, their application tends towards ‘radical contingency’. By way of illustrating this 
latter point, consider for example, the designations of, respectively, Black Painting III 
from “Malady” and Black Painting IIIa from “Malady”, and Black Painting XII from 
“Malady” and Black Painting XIIB from “Malady”. One might expect that paintings IIIa 
and XIIB are so denominated in order to signal their close affinity with or, indeed, status 
as second versions or re-workings of, respectively, paintings III and XII. On this basis, 
the employment of the ‘a’ and ‘B’ suffixes would seem to testify to the insufficiency of a 
system of naming based on Roman numerals alone and thus of the necessity, perhaps, to 
more finely discriminate subgroups within the Malady series as a whole.498  
 
                                                 
497
 Email correspondence between the author and Georgia Morgan (Registrar, Dowse Art 
Museum), 29 November 2013, confirms that, whilst the ‘title, signature and date are present on 
the verso’, ‘There is no numbering on the painting’. 
 
498
 Indeed, in view of the fact that Black Painting XIIIa from “Malady” employs a lowercase 
suffix, the appearance of the uppercase suffix ‘B’ in Black Painting XIIB from “Malady” 
introduces a further level of denominative complexity and, hence, further uncertainties with 
regard to the limits of the Malady series. It must be allowed that, beyond a certain point, the 
proliferation of ‘possible’ Malady series works cannot be reasonably sustained. Nevertheless, if 
Hotere’s system of designing Malady series works obeyed a consistent, episodic logic then, as 
‘precursors’ to Black Painting XIIB from “Malady”, one might be justified in positing the 
existence of a Black Painting XIIa from “Malady”, a Black Painting XIIA from “Malady”, and a 
Black Painting XIIb from “Malady”. 
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 However, this conjecture falters when one considers the appearance of the paintings in 
question. Sufficient differences obtain between paintings III (MALADYs arranged in a 
Tau-cross and in a surrounding, internal frame) and IIIa (MELODYs arrayed radially 
within seven concentric circles, with horizontal bands of MALADY above and below), 
and paintings XII (MALADYs arranged in a cruciform and in an accompanying, internal 
frame) and XIIB (MALADYs arrayed along the periphery of an arch) as to preclude any 
simple assumption that IIIa is a re-working or re-thinking of III, or that XIIB is a re-
working or re-thinking of XII. This is not to suggest that there is no possibility of 
fabricating rationales, on which basis the titles of these paintings bear witness to 
relationships of form and meaning between – if not, episodic progressions from – one 
work to another. For example, it may be observed that the geometric forms employed in 
the two pairs of works under consideration (III’s Tau-cross, IIIa’s annulus; XII’s 
cruciform, XIIB’s arch-form) echo symbols often encountered in 
Christianity/Catholicism.499 From this perspective, it may be tempting to speculate that 
the two pairs of paintings evince ‘progressions’ from Tau-cross to annulus and from 
cruciform to arch reflecting, perhaps, the ‘advancement’ of Christ’s story from 
Crucifixion to Resurrection. In keeping with this reading, one might interpret the 
remorselessly still and implacably orthogonal geometries of the darkly-toned Tau-cross 
and cruciform to signify the mortal body of Christ fated to be sacrificed. By contrast, the 
glowing annulus and arch-forms invite interpretation as symbolising the window of the 
Church of Christ, through which is admitted the divine revelation of Christ’s 
transubstantiation and apotheosis. It also may be suggested that the ‘sequential’ figuring 
of Tau-cross/annulus, cruciform/arch signifies the hoped-for passage of humanity from a 
state of being Fallen to a state of being Saved. From this perspective, the Tau-
cross/cruciform functions as an existential barrier or a sign of prohibition: the expression 
of divine Law, whilst the annulus/arch-form functions as a portal or a sign of permission: 
the expression of divine Grace. 
                                                 
499
 As Eggleton observes, in ‘Tone Poems’ Art New Zealand, n84, Spring 1997, 83, ‘At the heart 
of Hotere are the cross and the circle: both, the most primitive, the most primal, and the purest of 
human marks.’ In other words, it may be suggested that these symbols transcend any particular 
historical or cultural context – a happenstance that would appear to preclude their precise 
interpretation and thus render fundamentally ambiguous any posited relation or progression 
between paintings III and IIIa, XII and XIIB.  
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 Notwithstanding the attractions of applying these interpretations to justify the 
designations of the paintings in question, the fact remains that their underlying logic is 
neither simply nor immediately extensible to the Malady series as a whole. Indeed, the 
necessity to invoke piecemeal rationalisations in order to make sense of Hotere’s system 
of naming certain Malady series paintings, precisely, illustrates the ambiguity attending 
the sign ‘the Malady series’. To this extent, one confronts the likelihood that Hotere’s 
system of bestowing titles on Malady series paintings obeys no supervening, unitary logic 
and thus, in consequence, the attempt to absolutely delimit the signified ‘the Malady 
series’ is destined to fade before the ‘radical contingency’ of repeatedly naming works 
‘Malady’. Insofar as the Malady series neither evinces a common ground nor submits to a 
final accounting, and to the extent that the discourse of art history concerns itself with the 
analysis and determination of this ‘impossible object’ called ‘the Malady series’, one 
finds an exemplary illustration of the status of the Malady series and the discourse of art 
history as desiring discourses – i.e., as symptoms of the desire that perpetuates itself 
through endlessly missing its aim. 
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5.3 Figuring desire: McCahon’s doubt, Hotere’s reticence 
 
 5.3.1 Preliminary considerations of the points de capiton ‘McCahon’s 
doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’  
 
 As noted at the outset of this chapter, thus far, the thesis has appealed to Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in order to present a model of subjectivity understood in terms of the 
‘structuring of structure’, the ‘reciprocity of metaphor and metonymy’ or, indeed, the 
‘figuring of desire’. From this perspective, expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making 
(e.g., painters, paintings and the writing and testimony surrounding painters and 
paintings) may be said to bear witness to the metaphoric precipitation and metonymic 
perpetuation of points de capiton in discourses of desire. In this final section of the 
present chapter, I establish the basis for discussion in chapter six, where I propose to 
investigate the ‘desiring discourses’ surrounding McCahon and Hotere in relation to the 
apparent prominence and persistence of two points de capiton, the inherent complexities 
and contradictions of which I will subsume under the headings ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and 
‘Hotere’s reticence’. Here, however, I would point out that, in keeping with the critical 
perspective this study has thus far embraced, these analyses resist the metaphysical 
prejudices of the ‘traditionalising’ mode of art history. In order to clarify what this 
implies for the discussion in chapter six, the following, preliminary matters demand 
consideration. 
 
 Firstly, as a matter of expediency, the material presented in chapter six elaborates the 
figure of McCahon’s doubt in McCahon discourse and the figure of Hotere’s reticence in 
Hotere discourse by way of a range of texts arranged, for the most part, chronologically, 
by author name. However, this is not to suggest that the series of proffered examples 
constitute (1) all-encompassing surveys within which (2) developments of the points de 
capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ are securely framed by first and 
final words. With regard to the former point, I would concede that, whilst my survey 
engages with a diverse range of texts (newspaper reviews to essays in scholarly journals), 
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by virtue of limitations of time and space, I address only a partial selection of examples 
sufficient to illustrate the relevant features of the points de capiton in question. However, 
in light of the theory of subjectivity/meaning-making thus far elaborated, it should be 
clear that any full accounting of these figures of discourse (i.e., what would be, in effect, 
the absolute determination of a signified that does not fade; the absolute realisation of 
objet petit a as an object in consciousness) is, fundamentally, precluded.  
 
 With regard to the latter point, the idea that the various examples given of the points 
de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ define a ‘developmental’ 
sequence of causes and effects within which earlier authors influence later authors or, 
alternatively, later authors appropriate earlier authors (‘authorship’, in this regard, 
tending to be understood in terms of the entirety and sufficiency of ‘ones that are 
conscious’) is, precisely, of the order of the imaginary. In keeping with the anti-
traditionalising tenor of the present study, the challenge is, rather, to entertain a more 
nuanced conception of ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ in terms of  the 
‘radical contingency’ by which the signs ‘McCahon discourse’ and ‘Hotere discourse’, 
respectively, are determined as metonymic ensembles of less complex signs, within 
which, by virtue of the repression of difference, one may discern the repetition of the 
same (i.e., the names ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’). This is precisely to 
say that these points de capiton are as reiterated and are as fading – i.e., sustained or 
perpetuated only in their ambiguity in the form of an endless series of signifying 
alternatives or imaginary surrogates for the ineffable object petit a. To the extent that the 
perpetuation of the points de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ 
ultimately rests on nothing other than the radically contingent repetition of the names 
‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ (or, simply, ‘McCahon’ and ‘Hotere’), 
respectively, one finds an exemplary illustration of the manner by which desire finds 
fulfilment through endlessly missing its aim. 
 
 Secondly, and in light of the aforementioned radical contingency attending the 
determination of the signs ‘McCahon discourse’ and ‘Hotere discourse’, the reference to 
the apparent prominence and persistence of the points de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and 
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‘Hotere’s reticence’ is intended to obviate any suggestion that McCahon discourse 
‘really’ is defined by the point de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ or that Hotere discourse 
‘really’ is defined by the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’ – where, in this context, 
‘really’ implies ‘actually’, ‘essentially’, ‘originally’, ‘centrally’. Again, it is crucial to 
appreciate that points de capiton are posited in consciousness and thus, necessarily and 
inevitably, are products of idealisation, rationalisation, normalisation, and naturalisation. 
In consequence, and like any posited signified, figure of discourse, or perspective on the 
field of meaning, the point de capiton claims certain privileges (albeit, momentarily – it is 
also important to bear in mind that, always already, the point de capiton is posited only 
insofar as it is fading) – one of which is the intimation that it is an eternal verity. In other 
words, the ‘prominence’ and ‘persistence’ of the figures ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and 
‘Hotere’s reticence’ is, in Lacanian terms, no less imaginary than their seeming 
‘development’ from origin to apotheosis. This is an inevitable consequence of the model 
of subjectivity/meaning-making thus far elaborated – namely, that the discourse 
surrounding McCahon and Hotere is the expression of an unconscious, synchronic 
metonymy of signifiers-as-potentials metaphorically becoming in consciousness as a 
diachronic metonymy of signifiers-as-meaning/forms. This implies that, in principle and 
in possibility, the points de caption ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ are only 
two of an infinity of such that may be posited in consciousness. It is precisely a reflection 
of the rationalising, naturalising function of consciousness that, once posited, points de 
capiton seem to possess priority and ubiquity – although, ‘in actuality’, they possess no 
inherent privilege or pre-eminence.500  
                                                 
500
 For example, one might analyse McCahon discourse in view of the point de capiton 
‘McCahon’s provincialism’. Exemplifying the contradictions to which this figure bears witness is 
the tension between McCahon’s ‘peripheral’ ‘Nationalist’ outlook and McCahon’s 
‘internationalism’, which looks towards artworld ‘centres’ in Europe and the United States. The 
elucidation of this seeming paradox is, in fact, prominent in writing by Pound – e.g., Pound, 
‘McCahon, Mondrian, Masking Tape’, and the major monograph, ibid, The Invention of New 
Zealand: Art & National Identity, 1930-1970 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2009). 
Analogously, one might engage with McCahon discourse from the perspective of the point de 
capiton ‘McCahon’s modernism’. Among the complexities associated with this figure is the 
contradictory tension defined by McCahon’s adherence to modernist formal abstraction and his 
‘anti-modernist’ investment in painting that emphasises narrative elements (e.g., the written 
paintings) and figuration (e.g., paintings responding to the New Zealand landscape). Examples of 
writing that engages with this apparent antinomy include Curnow, ‘Thinking about Colin 
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 This is not to imply, necessarily, that analysis of the discourse surrounding McCahon 
and Hotere (not to mention criticism and scholarship per se) is a vain endeavour. On the 
contrary, I would reaffirm the point made in the thesis Introduction regarding the 
conception of the subjectivity defined by the ‘end’ of analysis – namely, that which, by 
virtue of structural and ethical necessity, is a mode of being in and as traversing fantasy 
(or, analogously, being in and as deconstruction). Here, the ‘end’ of analysis – which is 
to say the ‘final’ determination of truth and meaning – is not to be conceived in terms of 
an ultimate destination but rather in terms of a process of becoming: a way and a journey. 
From this perspective, I would suggest that the degree to which undertakings of this sort 
are subject to relativism and contingency is not irremediably fatal to the making of truth 
and meaning but, rather, defines the spaces, intervals, and horizons within which this 
activity can be efficacious. Adopting this standpoint challenges one to recognise that, 
practically speaking, in consciousness, and in accordance with the function of 
representation/symbolisation, all one ever has are interpretations (i.e., realisations or 
actualisations of potentials for truth and meaning) of a ‘reality’ that, ‘in itself’, never can 
be ‘known’ or ‘experienced’ as anything other than a set of serially posited hypotheses, 
and certain discontinuities and disturbances associated with the making of these 
hypotheses. Hence, that these interpretations are relative and/or contingent (i.e., 
intrinsically ambiguous, if not, at times, self-contradictory) does not constitute a complete 
annihilation of truth and meaning but, rather, attests to the impossibility of there being 
any absolute standard, original essence, or final resolution of truth and meaning. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
McCahon and Barnett Newman’, Art New Zealand, n8, November 1977 – January 1978, 48-52, 
and Green, ‘McCahon and the Modern’ in Colin McCahon, Gates and Journeys, 27-40. 
 
 In a similar fashion, one might analyse Hotere discourse in view of the point de capiton 
‘Hotere’s black’. Among the contradictions to which this figure testifies is the tension Hotere’s 
work defines between ‘black’ and ‘light’. This seeming antinomy defines the frame of the 
catalogue Ralph Hotere: Black Light and also is a prominent theme in Baker, A World of Black 
and Light, Ralph Hotere 1968-1977 (PhD Thesis: University of Auckland, 2009). Still further, 
one might engage with Hotere discourse from the perspective of the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s 
Māoriness’. Exemplifying the apparent contradictions associated with this figure of discourse is 
the tension obtaining between ‘Hotere’s Māoriness’ and ‘Hotere’s modernism’. I have alluded to 
this writing in the thesis Introduction (see n48).  
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 What this implies for the arguments presented in this third part of the thesis is that 
interpretations of McCahon discourse and Hotere discourse in terms of, respectively, the 
‘prominent’ and ‘persistent’ figures ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ can be 
meaningful and effective – if not absolutely so. There is value, I would argue, in 
exploring the implications of these perspectives on McCahon discourse and Hotere 
discourse – even if the perspectives in question fundamentally resist being resolved into a 
clear, stable, final focus. Notwithstanding the status of these readings as ‘imaginings of 
the imaginary’ (all that any critical analysis ever can be), and notwithstanding the 
irremediable ambiguities that must attend any such endeavour, the position of this project 
is that the elucidation of ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ is of efficacy in 
generating some new perspectives and potentials for the practice of art history and art 
criticism in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that, in 
exploring the ‘prominence’ and ‘persistence’ of ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s 
reticence’, inescapably, this project is implicated in the reification of these figures as 
prominent and persistent. That is to say, necessarily and inevitably, the positing of 
particular meanings or perspectives on the field of meaning is synonymous with the 
repression of other possibilities and potentials (the subsistence/insistence of such 
ensuring that no interpretation ever can be final). This is the nature of any exercise in 
scholarship (or, indeed, meaning-making in general) – although, this study contends that, 
in McCahon discourse and Hotere discourse, there is, on occasion, a failure to sufficiently 
acknowledge this intrinsic limitation. That is to say, in Lacanian parlance, there is a 
tendency to indulge and invest in fantasy as opposed to traversing it. 
 
 5.3.2 Defining the points de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s 
reticence’ 
 
 Let us now proceed to the discussion that will define the final part of the thesis. Here, 
the suggestion is that McCahon discourse and Hotere discourse, respectively, may be 
fruitfully conceived in terms of the seeming prominence and persistence of two, 
inherently contradictory, figures. In the testimony and scholarship surrounding these 
artists and their work, these antinomies are evident in (1) McCahon’s dual 
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characterisation as a prophet or visionary and/or as a doubter and (2) Hotere’s dual 
characterisation as eloquent and/or as reticent. Indeed, in many cases, the contradiction is 
especially glaring insofar as McCahon is presented, simultaneously, as a visionary and a 
doubter (or even as a visionary insofar as he doubts – on which basis one might posit a 
seemingly paradoxical vision of doubt), and Hotere is presented, simultaneously, as 
eloquent and reticent (or even eloquent insofar as he is reticent – on which basis one may 
posit a paradoxically eloquent reticence). The contradictory nature of these attributions 
may be elaborated as follows: McCahon-as-visionary is a subject who ‘sees’ and 
‘knows’; McCahon-as-doubter is a subject who is, to some degree, ‘un-seeing’ and ‘un-
knowing’. Formerly, McCahon’s vision would appear to be superlatively prescient, acute 
and complete; latterly, McCahon’s vision is, by implication, near-sighted, obtuse and 
lacking. Analogously, Hotere-as-eloquent is a subject who fully speaks; Hotere-as-
reticent is a subject who does not fully speak. Formerly, Hotere’s eloquence signifies an 
apparent willingness to speak or a speaking that is articulate and richly nuanced; latterly, 
Hotere’s reticence would appear to signify a reluctance to speak or a speaking that is 
laconic.  
 
 In McCahon discourse and in Hotere discourse, respectively, the (seeming) 
prominence and persistence of characterisations of McCahon as a visionary and a 
doubter, and of Hotere as eloquent and reticent may be said to constitute symptomatic 
formations or points de capiton. For the sake of convenience and simplicity (and, indeed, 
in accordance with what Žižek refers to as the ‘radical contingency of naming’), I 
propose to subsume the contradictory characterisations of McCahon as a visionary and as 
a doubter under the rubric ‘McCahon’s doubt’, and of Hotere as eloquent and as reticent 
under the sobriquet ‘Hotere’s reticence’. From this perspective, the apparent repetition of 
assertions that, paradoxically, McCahon ‘sees’ and ‘fails to see’, or that Hotere ‘speaks’ 
and ‘fails to speak’, testifies to the ambiguous status of the points de caption ‘McCahon’s 
doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ as expressions of what has been termed the figuring of 
desire, thereby defining McCahon discourse and Hotere discourse as discourses of desire. 
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 The manner by which the inherently ambiguous points de caption ‘McCahon’s doubt’ 
and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ specify the figuring of desire in McCahon discourse and Hotere 
discourse, respectively, may be elaborated, further, through a consideration of what is 
implicit in the terms ‘doubt’ and ‘vision’, ‘reticence’ and ‘eloquence’. In the first place, 
then, it may be noted that, insofar as doubt is synonymous with hesitancy, indecision, or 
vacillation, it inflects or qualifies the content of subjective experience. To this extent, 
doubt is not that which might absolutely nullify seeing and knowing but rather that which 
signifies a wavering between alternatives insisting simultaneously within the field of that 
which is, always already, seen and known. Analogously, it is worth noting that reticence 
typically connotes taciturnity, reserve, silence – a reluctance, hesitance, or unwillingness 
to speak. However, on the basis of some dictionary definitions it is apparent that reticence 
also may imply ‘abstinence from the superfluous’ or the ‘avoidance of saying more than 
is absolutely necessary’. In other words, reticence also encompasses an unwillingness to 
speak too much and thus is not simply resistance to the origination of speech per se, but 
rather to its excessive or unnecessary continuation. To this extent, the function of 
reticence parallels the function of doubt: in the same way doubt operates within the field 
of that which is, always already, seen and known, reticence operates within the context of 
a speaking that is, always already, taking place. 
 
 The Lacanian modelling of subjectivity in terms of a structurally necessary 
counterpoise of possibility and impossibility offers to illuminate, further, the manner by 
which doubt involves a wavering between alternatives insisting simultaneously within the 
‘field of vision’ and reticence a mediative ‘not speaking’ within the ‘field of speech’. In 
relation to the order of the possible (i.e., that which can be articulated in language), doubt 
necessarily colours the seeing and knowing that, in consciousness, is only a partial, 
ambiguous, and misleading expression of what is, in potentia, more ‘fully’ and ‘truly’ 
seen and known (one might say envisioned) on the level of the unconscious. Similarly, 
reticence designates neither the condition of silence nor the failure of the initiation of 
speech but rather, by necessity, inflects the speaking that, in consciousness, is only a 
partial, ambiguous, and misleading expression of what is, in potentia, more ‘fully’ and 
‘truly’ (one might say eloquently) spoken on the level of the unconscious.  
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 In relation to the order of the impossible (i.e., ‘that’ which fundamentally resists being 
articulated in language), doubt and reticence bear witness to what, in Seminar XI, Lacan 
refers to as a ‘discontinuity in which something is manifested as a vacillation.’ As 
previously discussed, the ‘discontinuity’ in question is synonymous with the real-as-
impossible, ‘agent-like’, metaphoric function of pure difference or ‘subject of the 
unconscious’ synonymous with, yet inassimilable to, the function of 
representation/symbolisation. By virtue of the function of pure difference, the ambiguities 
and contradictions proper to points de capiton bear witness to insistently 
repressed/returning trace structures, ‘signifiers without signifieds’, or identities-in-
difference that exceed and elude expression in language. Nevertheless, for the sake of 
argument, one might represent/symbolise the repressed/returning identity-in-difference 
proper to the point de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ as ‘.../vision/doubt/...’. Similarly, one 
might represent/symbolise the repressed/returning identity-in-difference proper to the 
point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’ as ‘.../eloquence/reticence/...’. 
 
 Given the impossibility of realising these repressed/returning identities-in-difference 
as objects in consciousness, one may say that the contradictions proper to the points de 
capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’, respectively, testify to the 
impossibility of the ‘seeing’ that is visionary and the impossibility of the ‘speaking’ that 
is eloquent (or, equivalently, ‘eloquent speech’). On this basis, the attribution of visionary 
experience asserts a seeing the unseeable and the attribution of eloquent speech asserts a 
speaking the unspeakable. Still further, insofar as these identities-in-difference are 
insistently repressed/returning, the points de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s 
reticence’ are as reiterated and are as fading (i.e., sustained only in their ambiguity in the 
form of an endless series of signifying alternatives or imaginary surrogates for objet petit 
a). This is simply to reaffirm that the contradictions proper to the points de capiton 
‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ (i.e., the dual attribution of McCahon-as-
visionary and McCahon-as-doubter; of Hotere-as-eloquent and Hotere-as-reticent) reflect 
the status of ‘visionary experience’ and ‘eloquent speech’ as expressions of subjective 
desire. From this perspective, always already it is the case that assertions of visionary 
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experience invest in a seeing the necessity to see and assertions of eloquent speech invest 
in a speaking the necessity to speak. That is to say, on the level of consciousness and ego, 
appeals to visionary experience and eloquent speech testify to imperatives to realise the 
impossible and, by this very token, bear witness to the structure of subjective desire as 
that which finds fulfilment in endlessly missing its aim. 
 
 By way of concluding this preliminary discussion, it should be noted that an important 
corollary to the perpetuation of the figure of McCahon’s doubt in McCahon discourse 
and the perpetuation of the figure of Hotere’s reticence in Hotere discourse is the 
privileging of the individual art subjects called, respectively, ‘McCahon’ and ‘Hotere’. 
Whether characterised as visionary or doubting, eloquent or reticent, McCahon-the-artist-
individual and Hotere-the-artist-individual invariably function as the exemplary points of 
reference in writing and testimony seeking to establish the origin and the meaning of their 
work. Here, I would concede that perspectives of this kind often are useful and 
illuminating. At the same time, however, appeals to authorship and biography, pursued to 
the exclusion of alternative modes of analysis, demonstrate to what degree McCahon 
discourse and Hotere discourse labour under the metaphysical prejudices proper to what 
has been termed the traditionalising mode of art history or art criticism.  
 
 This said, it would appear that McCahon discourse and Hotere discourse express this 
privileging differently. Thus, in the discourse on McCahon and his work, there is a 
tendency to accord priority to McCahon’s testimony as expressed in various writings and 
recorded utterances, as well as McCahon’s paintings. In section 5.1, I alluded to this 
privileging in the context of a discussion addressing Zepke’s criticism of the 
‘(auto)biographical... art historical methodology’ perpetrated in Brown’s Colin 
McCahon: Artist. Indeed, in recent decades, various commentators have remarked on the 
special status accorded to McCahon’s testimony and the deleterious effect of this 
privileging in the field of McCahon scholarship. Whilst it seems appropriate to 
acknowledge some of this writing in the following footnote, in the context of 
Aotearoa/New Zealand, these critical interventions are, by now, sufficiently familiar as to 
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preclude the necessity for any extensive rehearsal here.501 Hence, by way of anticipating 
the discussion in chapter six, I merely observe that some writers appeal to McCahon’s 
authority and biography in order to make sense of an oeuvre that may appear to be, 
otherwise, incomprehensibly variegated, eclectic, or inconsistent.  
 
 By contrast, allusions to ‘Hotere’s reticence’ in Hotere discourse would seem to 
emphasise Hotere’s silence. Indeed, in the discourse on Hotere and his work, it is striking 
that commentators do not merely observe that Hotere is reticent but also tend to demand, 
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 Consider, for example, Pound, ‘McCahon, Skies, Stars, Writing’, 153-54, where it is observed 
that McCahon 
 
...was a skilled presenter in prose of his own public persona – so skilled, in fact, that 
criticism for many years all but abdicated before him, contenting itself with paraphrase and 
quotation from him. 
 
Also relevant, in this regard, is ibid, ‘McCahon, Mondrian, Masking Tape’, 11, 18 (n3), it is noted 
that in ‘Nationalist criticism McCahon is himself the origin and guarantor of all that is said about 
him, and his endorsement is required for every remark’. In a similar vein, it is asserted, in 
Lummis, Modelling the New Zealand artist, 258, 261, that ‘Writing on McCahon has often been 
informed by McCahon’s writings’, and that these writings ‘have consistently served to sanctify 
and ameliorate most art historical accounts of his work.’ Here, Pound and Lummis are alluding to 
the body of writing that appears to take too literally the oft-cited assertion, in McCahon and 
O’Reilly, Colin McCahon: a survey exhibition, 26, that 
 
My painting is almost entirely autobiographical – it tells you where I am at any given time, 
where I am living and the direction I am pointing in. 
 
For example, the above statement prefaces Curnow, ‘Necessary Protection’, 4, and Brown, ‘The 
Autobiographical Factor’ in Colin McCahon: gates and journeys, 13. However, as Lummis points 
out, the ambiguous dimension of McCahon’s comment is evident from its apparent indebtedness 
to the thirteenth stanza of Hooper’s poetry sequence ‘Notes in the Margin’, which begins: 
‘Poetry/isn’t in my words/it’s in the direction/I’m pointing’ (Lummis, 267, n31, citing Hooper, 
57). In relation to the model of subjectivity/meaning-making presented thus far, it is striking to 
what extent McCahon’s appeal to autobiography is, in effect, a speaking of an other. Finally, 
although this does not exhaust the field of relevant examples, one also might mention Simmons, 
‘McCahon’s Myth’, 41-42. Here, Simmons identifies Curnow and Brown as ‘early and 
enthusiastic devotees of... [the] autobiographical method’, and sees, in later writing produced by 
William McCahon, and Agnes Wood, evidence that ‘the founding autobiographical tautology still 
has currency’. Moreover, Simmons appeals to post-structuralist thought (specifically, Derrida’s 
investigation of the role of the artist’s signature in Signéponge (1984)) in order to suggest that 
‘paradoxically, it is a series of paintings which retrospectively create a painter, rather than a 
painter who creates paintings.’ 
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justify or apologise for this reticence.502 I would suggest that these demands, 
justifications, and apologies devolve into two basic categories where, again, in 
accordance with the contradictions proper to the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’, 
Hotere’s ‘silence’ is or bears witness to a kind of ‘speaking’ (a speaking, moreover, that, 
in keeping with what I have termed ‘eloquent speech’, offers to be, in potentia, self-
sufficiently full and entire). In the former case, and in keeping with the biographical 
mode of art history, there is an identification of or a vanishing of distinctions between the 
artist and the work. In consequence, it is suggested that Hotere fully speaks in or through 
the work. Insofar as the work is the exemplary repository or expression of this speaking, 
any further (verbal, written) discussion or explanation is unnecessary. In the latter event, 
there is an investment in the idea that Hotere’s work is formally autonomous. That is to 
say, demands, justifications, or apologies for the artist’s silence rest on the assumption 
that, entirely and sufficiently, the work speaks for itself or the work is its own 
explanation.503  
 
 Here, I would argue that an equivalence obtains between appeals to the formal 
autonomy of Hotere’s paintings and appeals to the visionary quality of McCahon’s 
paintings. In both cases, one confronts that which, ostensibly, resists analysis and 
explanation and, on this basis, either is unspeakable or unseeable. In the former case, this 
follows from the status of the formally autonomous artwork as that which offers to be, in 
and of itself, self-sufficiently entire; in the latter event, this follows from the status of the 
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 Relevant, in this regard, is the suggestion, in Wedde ‘Figure it Out’, 179, that ‘the disclaiming 
myths of silence and virtue’ surrounding Hotere and his work are the means by which ‘writers on 
Hotere’s work have apologised for their own temerity.’ 
 
503
 Here, in the claim that, entirely and sufficiently, Hotere’s work is its own explanation, one 
may observe a certain irony. It is apparent that, in themselves, these claims are contradictory 
insofar as they constitute and perpetrate the very ‘explanation’ that, ostensibly, they oppose (i.e., 
they employ the resources of written language to ‘explain’ Hotere’s work as being ‘inexplicable 
in words’). Moreover, these justifications (if not, in fact, apologies) for Hotere’s silence vis à vis 
the work often betray prejudices and preconceptions characteristic of metaphysical thinking 
insofar as ‘the work’, or what is ‘in’ and ‘of’ the work, is taken to be simply and immediately 
equivalent to a material, plastic, physical entity or expression of such. In this way, appeals to the 
self-sufficiency and/or autonomy of the artwork are, themselves, based on the presupposition that 
the artwork means nothing more than its material form or, equivalently, the material form of the 
artwork fully discloses its meaning. 
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visionary artwork as that which offers to be a full and true testament of a transcendent 
reality or a radical alterity. To some degree, the formally autonomous artwork is that in 
relation to which there remains nothing to be said; the visionary artwork is that in 
relation to which there remains nothing to be seen. Thus, the actual creation of a formally 
autonomous artwork would constitute an impossible speaking the unspeakable and, 
similarly, the actual creation of a visionary artwork would bear witness to an impossible 
seeing the unseeable. Always already, then, either the effort to create or the appeal made 
to the status of artworks that offer to be formally autonomous/visionary testifies to an 
imperative to objectively realise an impossibility: i.e., subjective desire considered as 
speaking the necessity to speak and/or seeing the necessity to see. From the perspective 
of consciousness, this imperative is destined to fail and thus, by necessity, speaking the 
unspeakable will be reticent; seeing the unseeable will be doubting. Equivalently, one 
might say that asserting the formal autonomy of Hotere’s painting is not only 
compensation for but, in fact, demanding of Hotere’s silence. Likewise, one may say that 
asserting the visionary quality of McCahon’s painting is not only compensation for but, 
in fact, demanding of McCahon’s doubt. This is simply to reaffirm that assertions of 
Hotere’s work as formally self-sufficient and of McCahon’s work as visionary are 
‘imaginings of the imaginary’. That is to say, these assertions are imaginary surrogates 
posited in an effort to objectively realise or resolve the ineffable objet petit a – in this 
case, synonymous with the impossible speaking the unspeakable proper to the point de 
capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’ and the impossible seeing the unseeable proper to the point 
de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’. 
 
 Having defined the points de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ in 
general terms, it is timely to look ahead to the more substantive discussion presented in 
chapter six. This final thesis chapter is organised into three main areas. In Sections 6.1 
and 6.2, I survey a series of texts in McCahon discourse and Hotere discourse, 
respectively. As a matter of convenience, these analyses are, for the most part, ordered 
chronologically by author name and, notwithstanding the provisos raised in chapter five, 
they serve to illustrate two basic claims made in relation to the points de capiton 
‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’. In the first place, I show how the figure of 
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McCahon’s doubt in McCahon discourse repeatedly bears witness to the characterisation 
of McCahon as a visionary and a doubter, and how the figure of Hotere’s reticence in 
Hotere discourse repeatedly bears witness to the specification of Hotere as eloquent and 
reticent. Secondly, I draw attention to the manner by which the perpetuation of the points 
de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ tends to privilege the individual 
art subjects called ‘McCahon’ and ‘Hotere’, respectively – where this privileging is 
evident in the emphasis placed on McCahon’s testimony and/or the visionary quality of 
his work, and in the emphasis accorded to Hotere’s silence and/or the formal autonomy 
of his work. In section 6.3, I focus on two particular variants of the points de capiton 
‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’ that reflect the manner by which (1) 
McCahon is not only presented, simultaneously, as a visionary and a doubter but rather as 
a visionary insofar as he doubts, and (2) Hotere is not only presented, simultaneously, as 
eloquent and reticent but rather as eloquent insofar as he is reticent. I show how these 
special cases arise in relation to presentations, in McCahon discourse and in Hotere 
discourse, respectively, of McCahon’s questioning faith and Hotere’s effecting discursive 
silence – where the figure of ‘McCahon’s questioning faith’ testifies to an investment in 
an inherently contradictory vision of doubt or faith in and as a praxis of questioning, and 
the figure of ‘Hotere’s effecting discursive silence bears witness to an investment in an 
intrinsically paradoxical eloquent reticence or faith in and as a praxis of silent speech. 
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Chapter 6 McCahon’s doubt and Hotere’s reticence  
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6.1 The figure of McCahon’s doubt in McCahon discourse 
 
 6.1.1 Brasch 
 
 One of the earliest and most exemplary characterisations of McCahon as a visionary 
and a doubter is found in Charles Brasch’s Landfall essay: ‘A Note on the Work of Colin 
McCahon’ (1950). That McCahon is a visionary artist is implied at the very outset of 
Brasch’s essay, where it is asserted that ‘There is no precedent in New Zealand for the 
work of Colin McCahon’ and that, furthermore,  
 
No other New Zealand painter has used either landscape or the human figure for the 
purpose of making general statements about the visible world, the place of man in 
the world, and the nature of human life.504 
 
On a superficial level, then, Brasch’s essay affirms that the visionary dimension of 
McCahon’s work inheres in its unprecedented and original making visible of that which 
(at least, in the context of New Zealand art), previously, has been invisible. Namely, by 
virtue of re-staging stories from the Bible in recognisably New Zealand landscape 
settings, McCahon makes visible the existential significance of the landscape or the 
human body. To this extent, McCahon’s vision testifies to his unique capacity to see that 
which, thus far, has been unseen. However, it is also evident that Brasch’s construction of 
McCahon as a visionary artist carries deeper implications, in relation to which is 
enlivened the contradictory simultaneity of vision and doubt proper to the point de 
capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’.  
 
                                                 
504
 Charles Brasch ‘A Note on the Work of Colin McCahon,’ Landfall 16, v4, n4, December 
1950, 337. Brasch is referring to McCahon’s so-called ‘Religious Paintings’ produced between 
about 1946 and 1950, in which Biblical scenes are re-enacted in landscapes sometimes 
recognisable as that of post-war Aotearoa/New Zealand. Examples include I Paul to you at 
Ngatimoti (000666, 1946, ref. 80), Crucifixion according to St. Mark (001062, October 1947, ref. 
81), and The Promised Land (000668, February – August 1948, ref. 82). For an account of this 
period in McCahon’s oeuvre see, for example, Luit Bieringa, ‘Colin McCahon: “Religious” 
Works 1946-52’ in McCahon, McCahon: ‘religious’ works, 1946 – 1952, 3-11, and Brown, Colin 
McCahon: Artist (1993), 35-46. 
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 This follows from Brasch’s observation that McCahon’s religious paintings of the 
1940s are not ‘in the usual sense “religious paintings”; they are not icons, objects for 
worship’ – that is to say, they neither literally represent religious dogma nor are they 
directed towards the fulfilment of any conventional, liturgical purpose. On the contrary, 
they are, in Brasch’s opinion, ‘symbolical, and the symbols chosen are the only ones 
which the painter has found adequate to express his vision of life.’505 In this way, the 
‘symbolical’ dimension of McCahon’s religious paintings confirms their visionary status 
insofar as they are visual surrogates for that which is not only unseen but unseeable. By 
the same token, however, McCahon’s religious paintings may be considered expressions 
of doubt (i.e., failing fully to see) insofar as their symbols are offered in compensation for 
that which fundamentally exceeds and eludes realisation as an object of vision and/or 
thought. Namely, the ‘real nature’ of the relationship between humanity and divinity, 
earth and heaven, matter and spirit represented/symbolised in paintings that situate the 
divine incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, and apotheosis of Christ in the New Zealand 
landscape. This inescapable counterpoise of vision and doubt flavours Brasch’s 
subsequent assessment of the relative successes and failures of McCahon’s art. Thus, on 
the one hand, referring to the ‘powerful and unquestioned impulse’ that drives 
McCahon’s painting (phrasing that invites interpretation in terms of a visionary ‘seeing 
the necessity to see’ or, in psychoanalytic terms, subjective desire), Brasch asserts: 
 
...at times, in... [McCahon’s] best work, when impulse is so strong... it creates for 
itself perforce a set of valid symbols. For some of his symbols are valid: they strike 
home at once, bare, powerful, uncompromising. 
 
On the other hand, however, Brasch also contends that 
 
...it would be a mistake to claim that... [McCahon] usually or even often succeeds 
in bringing his symbols to life... Colin McCahon is all the time feeling his way 
towards forms and symbols that will answer his needs; inevitably, since there are 
no guides before him, he often fumbles and loses his way in blind alleys.506 
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 Brasch, 337. 
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 Ibid, 339. 
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 6.1.2 Keith, McNamara 
 
 For the purposes of the following discussion, Brasch’s qualified endorsement of 
McCahon as a visionary whose vision, nevertheless, often falters or eludes realisation 
provides a useful model by which to illustrate the perpetuation of the figure of 
McCahon’s doubt in McCahon discourse. In the latter 1960s and in the 1970s, this 
perspective is evident, for example, in writing on McCahon by Keith and McNamara. 
Thus, in Keith’s Auckland Star piece, ‘Paintings with impact of a clenched fist’ (as noted 
in chapter five, a review of the Barry Lett Galleries show Colin McCahon Recent 
Paintings. Victory over Death or Practical Religion), it is suggested that the exhibition in 
question confronts its audience with ‘one man’s intensely realised vision of what might 
be meant by life and death, salvation and resurrection.’ At the same time, however, it is 
significant that Keith ameliorates this judgement with the suggestion that the visionary 
power of McCahon’s work compensates for technical failings. Hence, whilst Keith 
allows that ‘The power of McCahon’s vision carries his paintings past the point where 
technical considerations have any real relevance’, he also notes that ‘In fact, his 
technique often comes dangerously close to failure if it had to stand on its own.’507 The 
characterisation of McCahon as a fallible visionary also colours Keith’s Auckland Star 
article ‘Communicating a vision: Struggle on both sides’ (1973) (a review of the Barry 
Lett Galleries show ‘Jet Out From Muriwai’: McCahon Paintings and Drawings). Here, 
Keith opens with the assertion that  
 
Colin McCahon is the most uncompromising of painters. He rarely concerns 
himself with visual titillation, preferring to aim his works straight for the bedrock – 
the vision essential for any genuine work of art. 
 
At the same time, however, referring to the astringent text inscribed on some of the works 
on paper (specifically, the script defining the title of Rustic bird roost for vultures 
(000977, 1973, ref. 83) and the exhortation to ‘HOLD THE HORROR’ on Work towards 
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 Keith, ‘Paintings with impact of a clenched fist’. 
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the first stations of the Cross (000299, 1973, ref. 84)), Keith suggests that ‘These... 
inscriptions... seem to indicate moments of great doubt, as if the apparatus of belief was 
questionable if not the belief itself.’ In consequence, and in harmony with the title of his 
review article, Keith suggests that ‘Just as ... [McCahon] has to struggle with the insights 
that drive him to paint, we are obliged to struggle with the images he offers us.’508 
 
 Keith’s writing notwithstanding, the claim that McCahon’s vision is inconsistent is 
more insistently reiterated in McNamara’s art criticism. For example, in ‘Astounding “I 
AM” Revelation: Word Power in Visual Form’ (as noted in chapter five, McNamara’s 
New Zealand Herald review of the aforementioned exhibition Colin McCahon Recent 
Paintings), Victory over Death 2 is assessed as a ‘dazzling revelation’, whilst less 
epically-scaled words are criticised for their ‘disfiguring banality’, thus confirming, in 
McNamara’s view, that McCahon’s ‘successes and his failures are always closely 
allied.’509 Another notable instance is ‘From Magnificent to Meaningless’ (1975) – 
McNamara’s New Zealand Herald review of the Barry Lett Galleries show Colin 
McCahon – New Paintings 1975, wherein McCahon first exhibited the Urewera Mural 
and the series of word and number works on paper entitled Teaching Aids (Teaching Aids 
2 (June) (000004, June 1975, ref. 85), Teaching Aids 2 (July) (001514, July 1975, ref. 
86), and Teaching Aids 3 (001347, 1975, ref. 87)). Beginning with the observation that 
‘The inequalities and paradoxes of Colin McCahon’s art are displayed as never before’, 
McNamara goes on to praise the Urewera Mural as a ‘magnificent work’. However, the 
Teaching Aids series are denigrated as ‘totally unconvincing... It is hard to find any 
meaning or artistic merit in these paintings at all.’510 
 
 Whilst the Urewera Mural incorporates various non-representational or symbolic 
forms (e.g., Māori language script, the centrally located, golden-hued Tau cross, the 
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 Ibid, ‘Communicating a vision: Struggle on both sides’, Auckland Star, 18 August 1973, 
Weekender 7. 
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 McNamara, ‘Astounding “I AM” Revelation’. 
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 Ibid, ‘From Magnificent To Meaningless’, New Zealand Herald, 22 August 1975, section 1, 
11. 
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white-on-brick-red star of Te Kooti), it is clear from McNamara’s article that he 
considers it to be, first and foremost, a landscape painting.511 By contrast, the Teaching 
Aids works, with their compartmentalised rows and columns of words and numbers, 
would seem to demand interpretation in more abstract terms – potential meanings 
McNamara is, evidently, unwilling to entertain.512 To this extent, McNamara’s article 
clearly privileges landscape painting over abstract painting – where, moreover, it may be 
suggested that this privileging testifies to the making of an, ultimately untenable, 
distinction between ‘pictorial’ and ‘symbolic’. On the basis of this distinction, landscape 
painting is considered to be a mode of picture-making that delivers its meaning 
transparently, fully, and self-evidently. By contrast, abstract painting defines a mode of 
picture-making that renders meaning so opaque and enigmatic as to be, effectively, 
meaningless.  
 
 6.1.3 Curnow 
 
 Precisely such a perspective on McNamara’s writing is presented in Curnow’s 
Listener article ‘Devotions unlimited’ (1975), in which Curnow directly cites ‘From 
Magnificent To Meaningless’ (although, he does not identify McNamara by name). Here, 
in response to McNamara’s article, Curnow retorts: 
 
Now I’ve heard this story before. The one that goes: (1) McCahon is an erratic 
genius. (2) When he shows works I understand (landscapes mostly) he’s 
magnificent. (3) When he shows works I don’t understand (abstractions more or 
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 Thus, in ibid, reference is made to ‘The dark hills... conveyed by rich, strong forms’ that 
‘breathe out words – the history of the Tuhoe people emerging from the mists in the valleys’, and 
to the Tau cross as a ‘huge form that is both a massive tree and a fall of light.’ 
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 For example, the Teaching Aids paintings admit consideration as (1) expressions of ordering, 
succession, calculation, etc., (2) interrogative juxtapositions of different sign systems (e.g., the 
English language numbers ‘one’ to ‘ten’, the Arabic numerals ‘1’ to ‘14’, the Roman numerals ‘I’ 
to ‘XIV’), and (3) allusively symbolic (as opposed to literally or mimetically figurative or 
representational) reflections on the Fourteen Stations of the Cross. 
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less) he’s having another of his off-days. (4) When he shows both sorts in one show 
I know he’s an erratic genius.513  
 
Curnow’s four-part distillation of McNamara’s review article into the form of a tautology 
humorously exposes the degree to which McNamara’s criticism eschews a genuinely 
open-minded engagement with McCahon’s work in favour of the reaffirmation of 
McNamara’s own prejudices. Implicitly, then, Curnow’s rebuttal of McNamara 
constitutes an argument to the effect that assessments of the relative success and failure 
of McCahon’s work are less a reflection of McCahon’s vision and/or doubt than that of 
his critics. However, in saying this, it remains the case that Curnow’s discussion piece 
reiterates prejudices proper to the traditionalising mode of art criticism or art history. In 
effect, Curnow dismisses the ‘false’ vision of a particular critic only to affirm the ‘true’ 
vision of the individual art subject called ‘McCahon’ – an individual whose unique and 
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 Curnow, ‘Devotions unlimited’, New Zealand Listener, v80, n1871, 11 October 1975, 22. To 
what degree Curnow’s assessment of McNamara’s critical predilections may be justified follows 
from a cursory inspection of some of McNamara’s other reviews of McCahon’s work. Consider, 
for example, McNamara, ‘Paintings In Calligraphy Are Puzzling’, New Zealand Herald, 7 
October 1969, section 1, 2 (a review of the written paintings and drawings exhibited in the Barry 
Lett Galleries show Colin McCahon). Clearly, McNamara is unconvinced by these works, which 
he thinks ‘fail to communicate much’, notwithstanding a few exceptions where ‘a profound sense 
of atmosphere combines with the message to indicate the possibility of religious painting of great 
intensity.’ McNamara concludes: ‘The show exemplifies the typical McCahon process of 
producing 50 indifferent paintings on the way to a masterpiece.’ Also noteworthy is ibid, ‘Display 
Just Plain Exasperating’, New Zealand Herald, 15 March 1972, section 1, 10 (a review of the 
Barry Lett Galleries show Colin McCahon, Paintings From This Summer ’71 ’72, Muriwai & 
Kurow). Here, McNamara condemns some works as ‘so bad that one suspects a put-on’ and, 
whilst allowing that a few pieces are ‘absolutely masterly’, ultimately concludes that ‘this little 
exhibition speaks clearly about both the great merits and wilful eccentricities of McCahon’s art’. 
In this case, however, it may be noted that, in apparent contraindication of Curnow’s argument, 
McNamara’s most withering criticism is directed towards (broadly figurative) works like Moby 
Dick is sighted off Muriwai Beach (000211, February 1972, ref. 88), whilst his highest praise is 
reserved for the largely abstract, written painting Through the Wall of Death: A Banner (001405, 
1972, ref. 89). Finally, one might refer to ibid, ‘Latest McCahon Exhibition Creates Difficulties’, 
New Zealand Herald, 25 August 1976, section 1, 8 (a review of the Barry Lett Galleries show 
Colin McCahon, Paintings, Noughts and Crosses, Rocks in the Sky, On the Road). In relation to 
these paintings, which, for the most part, are composed of numbers, letters, and other abstract 
symbols, McNamara suggests: ‘Even to the sympathetic eye, much of the work is difficult to 
follow and the meaning esoteric and private.’ McNamara concludes: 
 
Altogether it is a paradoxical, perplexing show with passages of powerful simplicity and at 
other times pretentiously obscure. Certainly it could be painted by no one but Colin 
McCahon. 
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authentic life situation bestows coherence and unity on a body of work that, otherwise, 
would seem to be incomprehensibly eclectic. 
 
 This is evident from Curnow’s assertions that (1) ‘McCahon’s art is impure... a 
medley of symbolisms: religious, mathematical, linguistic, public and private, painterly 
and literary’, (2) McCahon’s ‘paintings are wilfully out of the mainstreams of 
contemporary art’, and (3) ‘McCahon’s forms are eccentric, his enterprise risky’. Here, it 
may be observed that Curnow’s assessment of McCahon’s eccentricity precisely reflects 
the counterpoise of vision and doubt proper to the figure of McCahon’s doubt in 
McCahon discourse. On the one hand, eccentricity exemplifies creative uniqueness and 
originality – thereby testifying to a visionary ‘seeing’ of that which has, previously, been 
‘unseen’ or, indeed, that which is ‘unseeable’. On the other hand, insofar as this vision is, 
perhaps, only partially glimpsed – either by the artist in question or by critics of the 
artist’s work – eccentricity admits consideration as a symptom of doubt. In the former 
case, uncertainty flavours the artist’s efforts to objectively realise visionary experience; in 
the latter event, uncertainty colours the critic’s evaluations of the efficacy of these 
realisations. However, for Curnow, McCahon’s status as ‘the most ambitious and exciting 
painter’ of his generation proves that, ultimately, this eccentricity is less a sign of doubt 
and insufficiency than of ‘the power of the artistic personality to make these symbolisms 
cohere in the body of the work, the corpus.’ It is, therefore, by way of an appeal to 
McCahon’s vision that what is, otherwise, a bewilderingly variegated oeuvre admits 
resolution into ‘one work, the life work’ of the particular art subject called ‘McCahon’.514 
                                                 
514
 Curnow, ‘Devotions unlimited’. The degree to which the eccentricity of McCahon’s art is 
moderated by the force of McCahon’s individual, artistic vision is a theme reiterated in ibid, 
‘Necessary Protection’. Here, for example, Curnow invokes the term ‘McCahon Dada’ in 
acknowledgement of the ‘eclecticism’ and ‘strangeness’ of McCahon’s work (12). At the same 
time, however, Curnow affirms that McCahon’s “Necessary Protection,” is ‘a body of work 
which has the force of a life and which speaks for itself’ and that, moreover, demonstrates how 
McCahon,  
 
Having invented painting in New Zealand... [can] now work in a tradition of his own 
making. The paintings in this exhibition are in the tradition of McCahon; were it not for 
him, they could not have been painted. (4) 
 
Indeed, Curnow goes so far as to assert that ‘If there’s any suggestion this is art talking rather 
than Colin McCahon it’s got to be scotched’ (5). 
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 6.1.4 Brown 
 
 In the 1980s, Curnow’s affirmation of McCahon’s vision is mirrored in Brown’s Colin 
McCahon: Artist (1984) – the first comprehensive monograph devoted to McCahon’s life 
and work. Here, Brown opens with the assertion that McCahon’s work evinces an 
‘attitude that is religious in its essential nature.’ Moreover, whilst acknowledging that 
McCahon’s ‘visionary attitude’ is complicated by the degree to which he ‘sees himself as 
both a believer and a doubter’, Brown goes on to suggest: 
 
...in consideration of the religious testimony of his work, and when cast against the 
panorama of internationalism in art, McCahon is a prophet in a wilderness bearing 
witness to the persistence of his unique vision.515 
 
To this extent, Brown’s assessment parallels Curnow’s: in the final analysis, McCahon’s 
vision is invoked to compensate for aspects of his work that (in the context of Western 
modernism, at least) may appear enigmatic or eccentric. Subsequently, the affirmation of 
McCahon as a visionary underpins Brown’s exploration of the tension between faith and 
doubt in McCahon’s Elias series paintings of 1959, and the written paintings of 1969 and 
1970. In the former case, Brown suggests:  
 
At the root of the Elias paintings it is the existential situation that prevails... The 
Elias paintings are a personal confession in which the artist’s concern is less with 
art than with the meaning of life... It is art used to give the conflict of faith and 
doubt coherence of thought, effort and expression in its most positive form.516 
 
With regard to Victory over Death 2 and related works, Brown observes that the ‘ 
“Victory over death” ’ one encounters, in The New English Bible, as a subtitle to John 10: 
40 is ‘a victory without which an encounter with the human failings of doubt and the 
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manifestation of faith can scarcely be imagined.’517 In both cases, then, Brown’s 
discussion implies that the very existence of the paintings in question testifies to a 
triumph or victory of the positive over the negative, vision over doubt. From this 
perspective, the visionary dimension of the Elias paintings and Victory over Death 2 
resides in McCahon’s uniquely acute and perceptive making visible that which, 
previously, has been invisible – namely, the nature of the ‘conflict of faith and doubt’.  
 
 Moreover, also relevant to the analysis of the figure of McCahon’s doubt in McCahon 
discourse is the suggestion, in Brown’s closing chapter, that the ‘essence of McCahon’s 
work’, resulting from his ‘lifetime vision’ and ‘essentially religious consciousness’, 
defines an ‘autobiographical... unity’, the ‘quality’ of which ‘comes near to being 
prophetic.’ As Brown explains, further, this is not prophecy in the sense of augury or 
divination so much as a ‘by nature, speculative’ exploration of ‘the spiritual struggle... 
between good and evil’. The speculative (i.e., questioning, doubting) dimension of 
McCahon’s prophetic (i.e., visionary) work reflects a ‘vision of the universe’ that is ‘in 
some respects fragmented and... [which] falls short of being totally conceived’ whilst, at 
the same time, investing in the idea of  ‘a coherent governing principle’ or ‘sense of 
morality – a morality of reverence’ for ‘ “the world as it ought to be and as it will by 
grace become”. ’518 In other words, Brown’s contention is that, however much 
McCahon’s oeuvre testifies to a conception of the world that is fragmentary and 
doubting, at the same time, it also bears witness to an impulse towards a more complete 
understanding – an impulse sustained, in the final analysis, by a vision of a universal, 
existential, and moral order to come. To this extent, Brown, precisely, conceives of 
McCahon’s vision in terms of an impossible seeing the unseeable. Moreover, insofar as 
Brown grounds McCahon’s visionary experience in a wish or desire for a better world, 
his discussion also illustrates the manner by which, always already, McCahon’s visionary 
‘seeing the unseeable’ also is ‘seeing the necessity to see’ (i.e., an expression of an 
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imperative to realise the impossible and, thereby, of subjective desire fulfilled in 
endlessly missing its aim). 
 
 6.1.5 Pound 
 
 In the early 1990s, the contradictions proper to the point de capiton ‘McCahon’s 
doubt’ are further reiterated in writing by Francis Pound. Exemplary, in this regard, is the 
Art Monthly Australia article ‘Colin McCahon and the language of practical religion’ 
(1990) (a commentary on the Institute of Contemporary Art, London exhibition Colin 
McCahon: The Language of Practical Religion (1990)). Here, I would suggest that, 
whilst generally eschewing the overt appeals to McCahon’s biography made by Curnow 
and Brown, nevertheless, Pound echoes their affirmations of the visionary (i.e., unique, 
authentic) status of McCahon and his work. Thus, Pound denies that the ‘strenuous and 
tragically dramatic... religiosity’ of McCahon’s paintings is merely a ‘pictorial attitude – 
a form, as it were, of post-modern quotationalism, or even a “critique” of Christianity.’519 
On the contrary, Pound insists that the genuinely religious dimension of McCahon’s work 
is a key component defining his ‘strangeness, the very eccentricity of his place in the 
larger modernist endeavour.’520 Still further, Pound invokes the ‘vast’ and ‘sublime’ I 
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AM calligraphs of Gate III and Victory over Death 2, suggesting that, in each case, ‘what 
emerges from... [McCahon’s] doubt and... devotion is a kind of billboard of consummate 
grandeur, advertising the Christian God’ and that, moreover, ‘If McCahon paints a 
shadowed and barely visible ‘I AM’, as the mark of a doubt, the affirmation and 
answering ‘I AM’, entirely outshines it.’521  
 
 However, in addition to affirming the uniqueness and originality of McCahon’s vision 
(i.e., the degree to which McCahon’s work testifies to a seeing of that which, previously, 
has been unseen), Pound also alludes to the manner by which McCahon’s vision involves 
a ‘seeing the necessity to see’ – i.e., subjective desire understood in terms of an 
imperative to realise the impossible. In ‘Colin McCahon and the language of practical 
religion’, this is evident from Pound’s suggestion that McCahon’s use of Christian texts 
in his paintings  
 
...simply answers to the announcement made by... Allen Curnow, that ‘the New 
Zealand poet is unlikely to escape wholly the character of prophet to his people”. 
The artist is the prophet who cries out in the wilderness – another standard topos of 
McCahon’s time and place.522  
 
Here, Pound is referring to the manner by which New Zealand’s European colonisers and 
their descendents invested in the prophetic voice in order to ameliorate their alienated 
experience of a land they found to be ‘painfully empty... silent... full only of solitude... 
lacking a history and a past.’523 This reveals to what degree New Zealand artists and 
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writers of European extraction, finding themselves ‘In a country which seemed without 
history, in which history was experienced only as a loss, as an elsewhere’ embraced the 
‘task... to trace over the emptiness, to fill it with the marks of the old legends and myths.’ 
From this perspective, McCahon’s vision admits consideration as responding to the 
imperative for ‘A past which was, as it were, at a remove, which had not occurred here, 
but elsewhere in Europe... to be reconstituted for local consumption... to be invented 
anew for this place.’524 
 
 The manner by which McCahon’s vision is construed in terms of a paradoxical ‘seeing 
the unseeable’ or ‘seeing the necessity to see’ also is evident in the essay Pound 
contributed to the catalogue accompanying the exhibition Colin McCahon: The Last 
Painting: ‘Endless Yet Never, Death, the Prophetic Voice and McCahon’s Last Painting’ 
(1993). Here, Pound discusses one of McCahon’s final works – I considered all the acts 
of oppression (000169, c.1982, ref. 91) – which, in Pound’s view, ‘may be seen as the 
culminatory utterance of McCahon’s lifelong use of the prophetic voice.’525 I considered 
all the acts of oppression is noteworthy insofar as it presents four blocks of painted script 
(drawn from Ecclesiastes), each of which is contained within pictorial sections defined by 
a faintly stated I-form. However, on the right hand side of the painting, there is 
rectangular field of dark ground, free of painted calligraphy. As Pound relates,  
 
We might think it a sign that the painting is ‘unfinished’, except that further writing 
follows after it, writing which leaves it as a singular, rectangular gap: the writing 
which says ‘endless yet never’.526 
 
On this basis, Pound is inclined, rather, to read the dark rectangle as a sign of ‘the 
unfinished because unfinishable, the unrepresented because unrepresentable’.527 To this 
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extent, Pound’s interpretation affirms that the dark rectangle is a sign of McCahon’s 
‘visionary seeing the unseeable’. Indeed, Pound observes that 
 
Darkness is... the very mark of the deepest depths of visuality – of the unseeable. It 
is the abyss where speech is rendered mute. It is the colour of a specifically 
modernist Sublime.528 
 
In support of this idea, Pound appeals to the discussion in Foucault’s The Order of 
Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1970). Here, Foucault reflects on the 
nature of human subjectivity as the ‘locus of an empirico-transcendental doublet’ or a 
‘paradoxical’ tension between the ‘cogito’ or ‘self-consciousness’ and the ‘unthought’ or 
‘unconscious’.529 Bending Foucault’s argument to his own purposes, Pound proposes that 
the visionary dimension of the black rectangle in I considered all the acts of oppression 
lies not so much in the possibility it affords of illuminating the unconscious as in its 
confronting ‘Death as the final limit of representation.’ In consequence, Pound 
concludes: 
 
Here, then, in this black rectangle, in a painting which speaks of Death, in his final 
painting before his own death, is McCahon’s last impossible attempt, after so many 
attempts – ‘endless but never’ – to represent the unrepresentable: Death.530 
 
Pound’s reference to McCahon’s ‘many attempts – “endless but never” ’, to represent the 
‘unrepresentable’ or realise the ‘impossible’ affirms that McCahon’s vision, in I 
considered all the acts of oppression, is not merely a ‘seeing the unseeable’ but also a 
‘seeing the necessity to see’ (i.e., an expression of subjective desire fulfilled in endlessly 
missing its aim). 
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 6.1.6 Simmons 
 
 Recent scholarship produced by Simmons and Butler, either working independently or 
in collaboration, also evinces sophisticated and nuanced engagements with the question 
of the visionary dimension of McCahon’s work. Although limitations of time and space 
preclude a properly thorough consideration of this body of writing, in these final two 
subsections, I address two essays, previously mentioned in the thesis Introduction: 
Simmons’ ‘ “I shall go and wake him”: The figura of Lazarus in Colin McCahon’s 
Painting’, and Butler’s Colin McCahon in Australia. From the perspective of the present 
study, this writing is of especial interest insofar as it enlivens an understanding of the 
visionary dimension of McCahon’s work that is not defined, exclusively, in terms of the 
unique and perspicacious capacity by which the individual art subject called ‘McCahon’ 
sees that which, previously, has been unseen. On the contrary, I would suggest that, in the 
two essays under consideration, one finds a conception of McCahon’s ‘vision’ in terms of 
that which, as a matter of structural necessity, is intrinsic to language-mediated 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making per se. By way of elaborating this point, I 
propose to read certain assertions made by Simmons and/or Butler in light of a Lacanian 
model of subjectivity – with particular reference to the complex temporality of the point 
de capiton and the structure of subjective desire. In the present subsection, I apply this 
perspective to Simmons’ elucidation of McCahon’s vision in terms of (1) Auerbach’s 
exegesis of ‘figura’, (2) the nature of ‘parables’ or ‘parabolic narratives’, and (3) 
Derrida’s conception of the ‘messianic’. In the following subsection, I adopt a Lacanian 
standpoint in relation to Butler’s closely related analysis of McCahon’s vision in terms of 
the ‘artistic posterity’ or ‘afterlife’ of McCahon’s work.  
 
 Beginning with Simmons’ essay, then, I would suggest, firstly, that figura are 
synonymous with points de capiton insofar as they function as figures of discourse. The 
question of the visionary arises insofar as, according to the account presented in 
Auerbach’s Scenes from the Drama of European Literature (1959), figura admit 
consideration not only as forms of perception or rhetoric but also of ‘prophecy or 
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prefiguration’.531 As Simmons explains, this sense of figura is particularly evident in 
‘biblical exegesis’ where ‘figura became the relation between two persons, events or 
circumstances, the first of which is a prefiguration of the second’ so that, for example, 
‘The raising of Lazarus... was read as a prefiguration of the Resurrection of Christ.’532 
Here, it may be noted that the prophetic dimension of figura harmonises with the 
complex temporality proper to points de capiton such that, as previously discussed, 
always already, meaning precipitates as perpetuated or crystallises as that which will be 
what it was – which is to say (at least, from the idealising and rationalising perspective of 
consciousness) that meaning is as envisioned or prophesied.  
 
 In part, Simmons invokes Auerbach’s conception of figura in order to draw parallels 
between the presentation of the Lazarus story in McCahon’s Practical Religion and the 
presentation of the gospels in biblical texts. Specifically, Simmons refers to the manner 
by which the use of marginal references in certain editions of the Bible generates the 
‘impression of the text as spread out in a timeless continuum before us’ so that we ‘think 
of connections between parts of the book entirely in terms of words and phrases.’533 From 
a Lacanian perspective, the scriptures, thus conceived, define an unconscious, synchronic 
metonymy (i.e., the ‘timeless continuum’) metaphorically becoming as a conscious, 
diachronic metonymy within which, by virtue of the repression of difference, one 
discerns insistent repetitions of the same – that is to say, certain ‘words and phrases’ (in 
short, figura), the meaning of which appears to be stable and (pre-)determined. As 
Simmons points out, McCahon’s painting ‘replicates this process of “spreading out” in 
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repeated and carefully highlighted letters and words’ that serve ‘to fragment but also to 
hold down the text’ so that ‘We are aware that every word counts.’534 From a Lacanian 
standpoint, this simultaneity of meaning ‘held down’ and ‘fragmented’ recalls the manner 
by which points de capiton, emerging by virtue of the insistent return of repressed 
identities-in-difference, bear witness to meaning that is as reiterated (‘every word 
counts’, so to speak) and is as fading (becoming ambiguous). 
 
 The paradoxical nature of meaning that is as reiterated and is as fading also is implicit 
in Simmons’ consideration of the ‘mode of narration’ of ‘McCahon’s retelling the story 
of Lazarus’ in terms of the ‘parable’ or ‘parabolic narrative’.535 Here, it may be noted 
that, in accordance with metonymic combination and contexture of signs, ‘the parable’ is 
a collection of signs that is, itself, a sign taking its place in more complex semiotic 
organisations. Hence, like any sign or ensemble of signs, the parable admits consideration 
as a figure of discourse – a species of figura – and, to this extent, bears witness to a 
reciprocity of metonymic and metaphoric functions. Simmons alludes to the former 
function in noting that ‘the biblical parables have to do with their own working: parables 
also tend to be parables about parable. Among other things they are about their own 
efficacy.’536 In other words, insofar as parables are ‘parts’ that refer to a ‘whole’ (i.e., the 
form of synecdoche, which is, precisely, a kind of metonymy), they exemplify the 
movement among signifying alternatives, within which, in any given iteration, it is 
always possible to determine the reiteration of a same by virtue of the repression of 
difference. The metaphoric dimension of the parable is implicit in Simmons’ observation 
that ‘The distinctive feature of a parable... is the use of a realistic story to express another 
reality or truth not otherwise expressible.’ By way of illustrating this property, Simmons 
refers to the sectioning of a conic surface in the shape of a parabola – a curve that, in the 
fashion of a cometary orbit, ‘traces its graceful loop from infinity and back out to infinity 
again.’ As Simmons explains, further, 
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When this image is taken as the parable as the working of parable in scripture, it 
suggests that parable is the indirect indication, at a distance, of something that 
cannot be described directly, like that imaginary invisible cone or the sun, or like 
that inaccessible place from which the comet comes and to which it returns. 
 
On which basis, Simmons proposes that 
 
A parabolic narrative is... in some way governed at its origin and at its end, by the 
infinitely distant and invisible, by something that transcends altogether direct 
presentation. Something we don’t or can’t see.537 
 
To this extent, Simmons’ commentary resonates with what has been said about the 
‘hidden’, metaphoric dimension of points de capiton – i.e., the real-as-impossible 
function of pure difference proper to the operation of the unary trait. Equivalently, one 
may say that, insofar as the ‘trajectory’ of a parabolic narrative is ‘governed’ by an 
‘imaginary’, ‘invisible’, or ‘inaccessible’ focus or centre of meaning, it unfolds in 
accordance with what Žižek refers to as ‘the curved space of desire’ in which ‘resides... 
the object-cause of desire’.538 
 
 Having elaborated ‘McCahon’s parabolic use of the figura of Lazarus’ in Practical 
Religion, Simmons draws an illustrative parallel with Derrida’s discussion of faith in 
terms of a ‘messianic structure’, as presented in ‘The Villanova Roundtable’ and the 
essay ‘Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of “Religion” at the Limits of Reason 
Alone’ (1996).539 Here, the critical point is that the messianic structure of acts of faith, 
precisely, echoes the paradoxical manner by which, in the figura and the parabolic 
narrative, always already, meaning is as reiterated (which is to say, envisioned, 
predetermined) and is as fading (which is to say, becoming ambiguous, subject to doubt, 
indeterminate – if not, indeterminable). Thus, in ‘The Villanova Roundtable’, Derrida 
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conceives of faith in terms of a ‘universal... messianic structure’ that is ‘not limited to 
what one calls messianisms, that is, Jewish, Christian, or Islamic messianism, to these 
determinate figures and forms of the Messiah’ whilst, in ‘Faith and Knowledge’, Derrida 
expresses the indeterminate nature of ‘the messianic, or messianicity without messianism’ 
in terms of  
 
...the opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the advent of justice, but 
without horizon of expectation and without prophetic prefiguration.540 
 
By way of anticipating matters for further discussion in the following subsection and in 
section 6.3, in ‘The Villanova Roundtable’, Derrida states explicitly that the faith under 
consideration is to be understood in a Kierkegaardian sense – namely, as that which 
‘cannot be simply mastered or domesticated or taught or logically understood, a faith that 
is paradoxical.’541 Applying this idea with the aid of a quotation from ‘Faith and 
Knowledge’, Simmons suggests that ‘McCahon’s parabolic use of the figura of Lazarus’ 
exemplifies the manner by which the ‘act of faith “exceeds through its structure, all 
intuition, all proof, all knowledge” ’ and that, in consequence, there is enlivened the 
possibility that McCahon embraces the ‘structural possibility of the religious without 
professing a determinate, orthodox faith’.542 That is to say, as Simmons relates, further, a 
faith residing in an ‘interspace of undecidability’ between ‘some particular, determinate 
religious content’ and the very ‘possibility... of such’.543 
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 That this paradoxical, undecidable faith is intrinsic to expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making is further evident from Derrida’s assertion, in ‘The 
Villanova Roundtable’, that faith, thus conceived, is ‘presupposed by the most radical 
deconstructive gesture.’544 In other words, the very possibility of performing a 
deconstruction (i.e., a disassembling and reassembling of the field of meaning that, to 
some degree, proceeds on the basis of doubting the truth that is taken for granted) rests on 
a belief in the efficacy of deconstruction. Insofar as this belief admits no objective 
justification, it must be considered a visionary act of faith. In this regard, an illuminating 
parallel may be drawn with what, in Seminar XV, Lacan considers to be a necessary 
condition for traversing fantasy or performing the ‘psychoanalytic act’ – namely: 
 
...this leap that I have called the pass (la passe)... one could say that everything in 
the organisation of psychoanalysis is done to conceal that this leap is a leap. 
 
and, furthermore, 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
...in fact... a way of being very much on time – not the present-rapidly-becoming-past of 
some artistic tradition, but rather the present-pointing-to-the-future of the structure of 
figura. (25-26) 
 
Furthermore, Simmons characterises this approach as 
 
The exceptional place that McCahon occupies in terms of the ‘religious’ today. It is an 
exceptional place less in terms of the question of the religious than in terms of the religious 
as a question. (26) 
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...what is effectively involved in the necessary pre-supposition of the 
psychoanalytic act... [is] what we call an act of faith.  
 
An act of faith... in the subject supposed to know and precisely by a subject who 
has just learned what is involved in the subject supposed to know, at least in an 
exemplary operation, which is that of psychoanalysis.545 
 
 Insofar as a radically contingent affirmation or leap of faith in the efficacy of this 
endeavour is a necessary precondition for performing a deconstruction (or, in 
psychoanalytic parlance, traversing fantasy), Derrida suggests that faith is ‘On the side of 
messianicity’. That is to say, faith expresses the manner by which ‘every speech act is 
fundamentally a promise’ where 
 
This universal structure of the promise, of the expectation for the future, for the 
coming, and the fact that this expectation of the coming has to do with justice – that 
is what I call the messianic structure.546  
 
Here, I would suggest that, in place of what Derrida terms a ‘speech act’, one may 
substitute ‘expression of subjectivity/meaning-making’ – in relation to which I have 
suggested that, from a Lacanian perspective, always already, meaning is as envisioned or 
prophesied (albeit, a vision sustained only insofar as it is fading, becoming ambiguous, 
becoming open to question). Furthermore, insofar as messianicity defines faith as faith in 
the coming of justice, implicitly, it expresses what Simmons (reshaping, for his own 
purposes, Derrida’s comment above) refers to as 
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...a fundamental ethical promise, for that faith answers to the indeterminate hope of 
an unforeseeable future, an always-yet-to-come, a hope that, because it is always 
yet to come, no knowledge could ever accommodate or master.547  
 
This is simply to reaffirm that, insofar as it entails an impossible, visionary seeing the 
unseeable, the messianic bears witness to the insistent return of repressed identities-in-
difference and, to this extent, is an expression of subjective desire: seeing the necessity to 
see. In relation to the contradictory duality of vision and doubt proper to the point de 
capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’, it may be suggested that the messianic structure of 
McCahon’s work is that by virtue of which the realisation of desire is envisioned and 
subject to doubt. By way of anticipating the discussion of McCahon’s questioning faith in 
section 6.3, this is precisely to say that, always already, McCahon’s ‘prophetic vision of 
the world as it ought to be and as it will by grace become’ is a matter of vision and doubt, 
a vision that is only insofar as it is doubting – in short, a vision of doubt. 
 
 6.1.7 Butler 
 
 In Butler’s Colin McCahon in Australia and related works, the conception of 
McCahon’s ‘artistic posterity’ or ‘afterlife’ harmonises closely with Simmons’ 
understanding of McCahon’s work in terms of figura, parable, and the messianic and, 
similarly, invites interpretation in terms of the structure of subjective desire. The 
resonances in question are, immediately, apparent from Butler’s reference to the 
‘universal, globe-spanning, messianic fate... [McCahon’s] work understands for itself’ – 
which Butler also terms ‘McCahon’s afterlife... the fate of his works once he is dead.’548 
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 Butler, Colin McCahon in Australia, 10, 13. Subsequently, Butler characterises the afterlife of 
McCahon’s work in the following terms: 
 
...McCahon’s work not only was made with its artistic posterity in mind, but in some way 
this afterlife is the very subject of the work... it is through its reflection on its afterlife that 
his work seeks to bring this afterlife about. In a prophetic or even self-prophetic mode, the 
future fate of the work is predicated and incorporated from the very beginning. And it is 
this particular quality that characterises all great art. it is precisely this quality that makes it 
great. (30-31) 
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As Butler also explains, this ‘messianic fate’ or ‘afterlife’ is inherently contradictory 
insofar as it is (1) the ‘fulfilment of a potential already in the work, a destiny already 
plotted and planned for by McCahon himself while alive and by his work after he is 
dead’, and (2) ‘not something that McCahon could have foreseen, predicted or ensured, 
either through any series of worldly actions or through any inherent quality in his art.’549 
Insofar as the afterlife of McCahon’s work is predicated on a visionary leap of faith that 
there will be an afterlife, it demonstrates that  
 
...there is always something unknown about McCahon’s work, even to McCahon 
himself... even if we can see McCahon expressly thematising or speaking about his 
artistic posterity or the afterlife of his work, there is also something about it that 
must escape him, and that is how we respond to it here and now.550 
 
Subsequently, Butler elaborates this ‘unknown’ quantity in terms of the manner by 
which, insofar as it has an afterlife, the ‘influence’ or authority of McCahon’s oeuvre 
defines an ‘impossible equivalence’ obtaining between two, ostensibly, mutually 
exclusive factors: (1) ‘worldly actions’ or social and cultural ends that McCahon’s work 
serves, and (2) an ‘innate quality in the work’ that it carries into the world. In the former 
case, the locus of the meaning of McCahon’s work lies outside it – it is a meaning 
transcending the work; in the latter event, the locus of the meaning of McCahon’s work 
lies within it – it is a meaning immanent to the work. As Butler points out, the 
‘impossible equivalence’ in question arises to the extent that, in the final analysis, neither 
mode of explanation fully accounts for the afterlife of McCahon’s work and, indeed, in 
extremis, transforms into or betrays a dependence on its opposite. Thus it is that, in 
exhausting appeals to that which lies outside the work (i.e., the afterlife of the work 
explained in terms of its social and cultural context), one is forced to confront the very 
thing this explanation represses: the meaning of the work in and of itself. Similarly, in 
exhausting appeals to that which lies inside the work (i.e., the afterlife of the work 
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explained in terms of some isolable, intrinsic quality that the work passes on to other 
works by other artists), one is forced into a confrontation with that which this explanation 
represses: the meaning of the work in its social and cultural context.551 
 
 Butler’s resolution of this logical conundrum is of particular relevance to the concerns 
of the present study insofar as he invokes a Lacanian model of subjectivity, alluding to 
the place of the ineffable objet petit a in the Lacanian formalisation of the fantasy, $ ◊ a. 
In this regard, Butler’s appeal to Lacanian theory is made by way of Žižek’s Enjoy Your 
Symptom!: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and out (1992) where, among other things, 
Žižek presents a Lacanian analysis of the conception of the ‘authority’ underlying divine 
revelation in Søren Kierkegaard’s essay ‘Of the Difference between a Genius and an 
Apostle’ (1849). Here, the instrumental point is that the logical aporia Butler identifies as 
proper to the authority underpinning the afterlife of McCahon’s work parallels the 
antinomy arising in the context of Kierkegaard’s discussion of the ground of the authority 
of divine revelation. That is to say, divine authority presents a paradox insofar as, strictly 
speaking, it resides in neither the content or meaning of an authoritative statement (e.g., a 
divine Commandment or, in relation to considerations of the afterlife of McCahon’s 
work, the extrinsic, social and cultural context) nor the nature, character, temperament, 
life, actions, etc. of an authoritative person (e.g., a divinely ordained prophet or apostle 
or, in relation to considerations of the afterlife of McCahon’s work, an intrinsic feature of 
the work).552  
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 Let us, briefly, outline the antinomy Kierkegaard’s discussion enlivens, and Žižek’s response. 
In the first place, in relation to the ground of the authority of an authoritative statement 
Kierkegaard asserts: 
 
 344 
 
 Žižek expresses the problem thus: ‘If... Christ’s authority is contained neither in his 
personal qualities nor in the content of his teaching, in what does it reside?’ 553 Applying 
                                                                                                                                                 
Is authority the profundity of the doctrine, its excellence, its brilliance? Not at all... 
Authority... is something that remains unchanged, something that one cannot acquire by 
having perfectly understood the doctrine. Authority is a specific quality that enters from 
somewhere else and qualitatively asserts itself precisely when the content of the statement 
or the act is made a matter of indifference esthetically. (179) 
 
As Žižek puts it: ‘we obey a statement of authority because it has authority, not because its 
content is wise, profound, etc.’ (94). Kierkegaard goes on to suggest that, given the ‘eternal 
essential qualitative difference’ obtaining ‘Between God and a human being’, authority resides in 
the status of being a divinely ordained ‘apostle’: 
 
The paradoxical-religious relation (which, quite rightly, cannot be thought but only 
believed) appears when God appoints a specific human being to have divine authority... 
(181) 
 
On this basis, Kierkegaard asserts that ‘As God-man, Christ possesses the specific quality of 
authority’ (182) and, in consequence, the authority of Christ’s statements (such as, for example, 
the promise of ‘eternal life’) ‘consists not in the statement but in the fact that it is Christ who has 
said it’ (184). To this extent (as Žižek points out, 94), Kierkegaard seems to privilege the person 
of Christ or the teacher over the content of Christ’s assertions or the teaching. 
 
 However, secondly, and in apparent contraindication of his previous argument, Kierkegaard 
allows that, in seeking to ‘demonstrate that he has authority... An apostle has no other evidence 
than his own statement’ (186) and, in this respect,  
 
Just as little as a person sent into the city with a letter has anything to do with the content 
of the letter but only with delivering it... so an apostle primarily has only to be faithful in 
his duty, which is to carry out his mission. (186-87) 
 
In Žižek’s view, this demonstrates how the divinely ordained apostle (whose person supposedly 
takes priority over the content of any message) is ‘reduced to his role of a carrier of some foreign 
message, he is totally abrogated as a person, all that matters is the content of the message’ (94). 
As Žižek relates, further, this antinomy defines the ‘paradox of authority’ – the manner by which 
a person in authority (i) compels obedience ‘irrespective of the content of his statements’ and yet 
(ii) is a person whose authority resides in nothing more than being the ‘neutral carrier... of some 
transcendent message’ (95). 
 
 As a final point, I should acknowledge that, in the context of McCahon discourse (and, in 
particular, in the context of a consideration of McCahon’s vision), Kierkegaard’s essay occupies a 
central place in Simmons, ‘ “I AM”: Colin McCahon Genius or Apostle’, Interstices, Journal of 
Architecture and Related Arts, v7, 2006. Whilst I address some of its themes in my discussion of 
Butler’s Colin McCahon in Australia, I will not engage with Simmons’ essay directly (although, I 
would concede that it is deserving of a comprehensive treatment in its own right). 
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the Lacanian logic of fantasy, Žižek locates the source of the compulsion to obey in ‘the 
empty space of intersection between... two sets... personal features and... teaching’ – that 
is to say, ‘in... [an] unfathomable X... which corresponds exactly to what Lacan called 
objet petit a.’554 On the basis of the elaboration of the ‘formalisation’ of the fantasy 
presented in chapter four, it should be apparent that what Žižek refers to as ‘personal 
features’ and ‘teaching’ is synonymous with $. Namely, the ‘ex-centric’ or ‘barred’ 
subjectivity that exceeds and eludes the metaphysical distinction between ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’, and which defines an ‘intersection’ or tension between conscious and 
unconscious dimensions of the signifying chain. In placing objet petit a in the space of 
intersection between two empty sets, Žižek affirms the Lacanian understanding that 
expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making also define a structurally necessary 
counterpoise between the order of the possible (i.e., the tension between conscious and 
unconscious dimensions of the signifying chain) and the order of the real-as-impossible 
(i.e., the metaphoric function of pure difference implicated in the insistent return of the 
repressed or, in the topological language of Seminar IX, the ‘cut of o’) such that 
subjective desire invites interpretation in terms of an impetus to recover that which is as 
primordially lost and to resolve that which is as fundamentally irreducible – namely, the 
ineffable objet petit a.  
 
 By way of Žižek’s Lacanian reading of Kierkegaard, then, Butler applies the logic of 
fantasy to the functions of the divine and/or the artist in order to present an understanding 
of the ground of the authority or greatness of McCahon and/or McCahon’s art. With 
reference to Žižek’s diagrammatic representation of the Lacanian matheme of fantasy,    
$ ◊ a, in the form of the intersecting, empty sets ‘personal description’ and ‘teaching’555, 
Butler invokes objet petit a to account for the ‘strange excess produced out of nothing’ 
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that is, in the final analysis, the ground of the authority (or compelling quality) in divine 
and/or artistic revelation.556 Still further, Butler’s succinct definition of objet petit a as  
 
...that strange excessive object of desire we find in the other (although it is not 
really there and is just a reflection of ourselves) that produces the appearance of a 
secret to be deciphered and that sets interpretation in motion...557 
 
affirms that, as noted in chapter four, there is no literal or actual object of desire. Rather, 
in consciousness, there is only ‘interpretation in motion’ via the positing of an endless 
series of signifying alternatives or imaginary surrogates for objet petit a. To put the 
matter in equivalent terms, this is also to reiterate that subjective experience, as desiring, 
defines what Lacan refers to, in Seminar II, as the ‘lack of being whereby the being 
exists.’ That is to say, subjectivity is being in becoming – the condition of continually 
being impelled on a trajectory through what Žižek refers to as the ‘curved space of 
desire’. It is from this perspective, I would suggest, that one might read Butler’s account 
of the retroactive realisation of McCahon’s artistic posterity (i.e., the recognition of the 
‘greatness’ of his art): 
 
...McCahon, like Christ, can do nothing to persuade us, but must await our decision 
to believe. This is a pure act without precedent and before which the spectator does 
not even properly exist: in front of his work, we are literally ‘born again’.558 
 
 Strictly speaking, the sense that, in a particular time and place, one ‘decides to believe’ 
(i.e., makes a leap of faith) is precisely of the order of imaginary idealisations and 
rationalisations of consciousness. From the perspective of the subjectivity that is as 
becoming or is as desiring, the ‘pure act’, to which Butler alludes, is neither simply nor 
immediately an expression of any ‘one that is conscious’. On the contrary, by virtue of 
the subjectivity defined in terms of $ ◊ a, always already it is the case that the conscious 
one is as continually being given to believe and is as continually being birthed. As 
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previously suggested, in consciousness, the exemplary expression or symptom of this 
way of being-as-desiring is the serial determination of signs (or assumption of 
perspectives on the world) equivalent to the positing of an endless series of signifying 
alternatives or imaginary surrogates for objet petit a. As noted in chapter five (with 
regard to ground of the meaning of the sign ‘the Malady series’), the manner by which 
any determinations are sustained only in their ambiguity testifies to the impossibility of 
attaining the object(ive) of desire. Paradoxically, however, it is in the very reiteration of 
this ‘failure’ that desire is ‘fulfilled’. Thus, in the final analysis, the decision to believe in 
the ‘greatness’, ‘authority’, or significance of the individual art subject called ‘McCahon’ 
or ‘McCahon’s art’ testifies to desire fulfilled as nothing more than what, in Žižek’s 
parlance, may be termed the ‘radical contingency of naming’. That is to say, the radical 
contingency (or leap of faith) on which basis serial determinations of the field of meaning 
are, in each iteration, conceivable as metonymic ensembles of less complex signs, within 
which, by virtue of the repression of difference, one discerns the repetition of a same – 
e.g., the names ‘McCahon’, ‘McCahon’s art’, ‘McCahon’s visionary art’, ‘McCahon’s 
great art’, and so on.559 
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6.2 The figure of Hotere’s reticence in Hotere discourse 
 
 6.2.1 McNamara 
 
 In the latter 1960s, McNamara’s New Zealand Herald review articles: ‘Intense Colour 
Enriches Absolute Abstracts’ (1967), ‘Beauty in Black his Theme, Show by Ralph 
Hotere’ (1968), and ‘Austerity Can Be Exquisite’ (1969)  (reviews, respectively, of the 
Barry Lett Galleries exhibitions Zero, an exhibition of paintings, Black Paintings/68, and 
Ralph Hotere) exemplify the contradictions proper to the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s 
reticence’. Thus, in the first review piece, McNamara remarks on the ‘single-minded 
severe purity’ of paintings, confirming that ‘Ralph Hotere is unique among New Zealand 
painters in this severity and austerity’, and asserts that, in Hotere’s work, ‘expressionism, 
any form of personal drama are totally excluded’.560 In the second article, whilst noting 
the ‘obvious debt to... Ad Reinhardt’ in Hotere’s earlier, Zero series paintings, 
McNamara praises the Black Paintings exhibition as a ‘remarkable display’ that ‘shows 
Hotere’s tremendous skill in manipulating a powerful visual idea of his own’ and 
suggests that Hotere’s ‘show... proves that he can purge art of any personal idiosyncrasy 
even further... Any display of the artist’s personality... is rigidly excluded.’561 Finally, in 
the third exhibition summary, McNamara observes that ‘in the best of these pictures 
Hotere’s discipline has enabled him to make images of great clarity and precision’ and 
that ‘Hotere the man, the New Zealander, is concealed behind all this. His own 
personality is hidden but his pictures can be all things to all men.’562  
 
 On a superficial level, then, McNamara’s articles affirm Hotere’s eloquence insofar as 
Hotere’s paintings testify to a unique capacity to speak of that which, hitherto, has been 
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unspoken. However, on a deeper level, McNamara’s comments also demonstrate to what 
degree assertions of Hotere’s eloquence testify to the contradictory simultaneity of 
eloquence and reticence proper to the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’. This is 
evident from McNamara’s suggestions that Hotere’s paintings express his artistic 
personality and bear witness to a complete self-abnegation. Here, the implication is that 
Hotere ‘speaks’ in the act of self-renunciation and, in consequence, Hotere’s work 
expresses a speaking that is, at the same time, a foreclosure of speech. To this extent, the 
eloquence of Hotere’s paintings resides not only in their speaking of that which has been 
unspoken but also in their ‘impossible’ ‘speaking the unspeakable’ or ‘eloquent speech’. 
 
 Furthermore, with varying degrees of emphasis, each of McNamara’s review pieces 
observes that, in and of themselves, Hotere’s paintings offer to be self-sufficiently entire, 
thereby rendering further elucidation in words superfluous or impossible. Although it is 
worth noting that McNamara’s analyses do not accept the idea of the autonomy of the 
artwork without question, the contradictory simultaneity of reticence and eloquence 
proper to the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’ obtains insofar as Hotere’s ostensible 
self-banishment from his paintings is considered to be synonymous with the creation of 
artworks that offer to be, entirely and sufficiently, their own explanation. That is to say, 
as noted in chapter five, in the very making of works that offer to be formally 
autonomous, it is necessary for Hotere to be silenced. Thus, in ‘Intense Colour’, 
McNamara proposes that Hotere’s Zero series works constitute ‘a quintessence of form’ 
and ‘a kind of minimal essence of painting’, situating Hotere’s sensibility ‘close to the 
Eastern mind where the contemplation of vacuity of pure space and form is found 
satisfying in itself.’563 In ‘Beauty in Black his Theme’, McNamara remarks that Hotere’s 
Black Paintings of 1968 are free of ‘any literary sentiment’ and, indeed, asks whether 
Hotere’s ‘minimal style of painting’ is ‘establishing what is absolutely basic to visual art 
or destroying valuable possibilities for communication’.564 Finally, in ‘Austerity Can Be 
                                                 
563
 Ibid, ‘Intense Colour Enriches Absolute Abstracts’. 
 
564
 Ibid, ‘Beauty in Black his Theme’. 
 
 350 
Exquisite’, McNamara assesses Hotere’s Black Paintings of 1969 as ‘minimal art at its 
most extreme’ – where, by virtue of  
 
A logical process... Story telling, composition, brushwork, individual 
unreproducible qualities, any intervention of the medium between the viewer and 
the austerity of the painter’s form has been rejected. 
 
In consequence, McNamara asserts that the most successful of these paintings possess ‘a 
quiet, calm beauty that defies analysis’ and ‘exist in their own right as objects of great 
beauty.’565 
 
 6.2.2 Collier 
 
 McNamara’s qualified assessments of the impersonal, formally self-sufficient, and 
fundamentally enigmatic nature of Hotere’s abstract paintings are reiterated, with greater 
force, in Collier’s Landfall review of the Dawson’s Gallery exhibition Black Paintings 
1970-Malady Series. In support of his claim that Hotere’s paintings transcend what may 
be expressed in words and, therefore, demand to be taken on purely formal, visual terms, 
Collier opens with a rebuttal of two ‘literary’ readings of Hotere’s work. These comprise, 
firstly, the assertions of an unidentified speaker at the opening of Hotere’s exhibition, 
who suggested that, like a ‘Malay kris’, Hotere’s paintings ‘must contain and manifest a 
soul’ in relation to which one ought to ‘ “be absorbed!” ’. The second reading Collier 
addresses is, evidently, Esplin’s Otago Daily Times review of Hotere’s show,’ Black Art 
Of Ralph Hotere Is Stark Social Comment’ (although, again, Collier does not identify 
Esplin by name). As a preliminary to their repudiation, Collier reproduces several of 
Esplin’s observations: 
 
 ...‘each painting stems from an internal mood’; Hotere was showing ‘his 
conviction of a world of sin, sickness, malaise and death and his vision of eventual 
harmony’; the exhibition might be ‘visual black power with a racialist symbolism’, 
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and was certainly ‘intended to be didactic’ and ‘shrouded in ancient religious 
symbolism’.566 
 
In Collier’s view, these two readings ‘constitute a list of what the paintings are not.’567 
That is to say, the Malady paintings neither ‘contain and manifest a soul’, nor do they 
proceed from ‘an internal mood’; the Malady paintings neither condemn the evils of the 
world nor do they proclaim Hotere’s personal vision for its salvation; the Malady 
paintings neither present a lesson nor do they constitute an expression of religious 
mysticism. 
 
 To this extent, Collier echoes McNamara’s suggestion that Hotere’s abstract paintings 
expunge any expression of the artist’s personality or narrative content. Rather than 
reading the Malady paintings as manifestations of the essential, inner self and feelings of 
the particular art subject called ‘Hotere’, Collier proposes, instead, that ‘It may be more 
fruitful to talk about the pictures as things which one can see, than as texts from which 
one can derive overt messages’.568 To this extent, one finds a reiteration of the argument 
that the formal self-sufficiency of Hotere’s paintings not only renders superfluous but, in 
fact, demands the absence of any explicit expressions of Hotere’s personality. The 
individual art subject called ‘Hotere’ must be silenced in order that, in and of itself, the 
work may speak. Hence, whilst allowing that the Malady paintings ‘are shapings of 
Hotere’s intuitions as an artist’ (i.e., they testify to a kind of speaking), Collier insists that 
‘The principal thing about almost all the pictures is that nothing is overt, nothing is 
proclaimed’ (i.e., the speaking they evince is muted, mediated, or reticent). Indeed, 
Collier goes so far as to suggest that any attempt to analyse the meaning of Hotere’s work 
is inappropriate: ‘The way a painting interacts with the spectator’s power of sight is a 
complex business and best left so.’569 
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 6.2.3 Young, Middleditch 
 
 On initial inspection, Mark Young’s effusive Ascent article, ‘Love plus Zero/no Limit’ 
(1969), presents a stark contrast to the assessments of McNamara and Collier that, in their 
acquiescence to the supremacy of pure form, Hotere’s paintings offer to vanish the self 
and any other worldly reference. With reference to the political consciousness discernible 
in Hotere’s Sangro, Polaris, and Algérie works of the early to mid 1960s (paintings that, 
respectively, allude to the Italian campaign of 1943 – which claimed the life of Hotere’s 
brother, Jack – the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the activities of the Organisation de 
l'Armée Secrète towards the end of the Algerian War of Independence (1954-62)), Young 
proposes that these paintings are, precisely, eloquent expressions of the artist’s 
personality and personal involvement in the human world: 
 
Hotere is too human, too compassionate, too caring for his fellow men; is 
concerned with the things we prefer to ignore – such as the international crises... He 
is trying to teach us love, offering us a chance for our own betterment & self-
discovery.570 
 
In light of these precedents, Young rejects the idea that Hotere’s slightly later and more 
abstract paintings (i.e., the Zero series and the Black Paintings of 1968) are ‘Impersonal’ 
or ‘Negative’. On the contrary, Young characterises these works as ‘positive act[s]... 
temper[ed] with love’, by which Hotere is likened to a ‘zen master... [who] has set the 
koan’ – the unravelling of which is, simultaneously, a challenge and a gift. Indeed, 
Young’s affirmation of Hotere’s paintings as embodiments of Hotere’s personality is 
underscored with the inclusion of a photograph of the artist’s face reflected in the highly 
finished surface of one of the Black Paintings.571  
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 Insofar as Hotere’s paintings are considered to be revelatory teachings inculcating a 
lesson of love and potential self-realisation, Young’s essay affirms Hotere’s eloquence in 
the sense of Hotere’s unique capacity to speak of that which, hitherto, has been unspoken. 
However, a closer consideration of the parallel Young draws between Hotere’s paintings 
and the koans set by a Zen master evinces the contradictions proper to the point de 
capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’. In effect, Young proposes that Hotere’s work presents 
enigmas or paradoxes specifically intended to exhaust analysis on the level of 
consciousness and ego, thereby facilitating the more profoundly true or real experience of 
what Zen scholars such as Shin’ichi Hisamatsu and Daisetz Suzuki refer to as, 
respectively, the ‘Formless Self’ and, ‘mushin no shin’ or ‘no-mind-ness’.572 To this 
extent, Young’s commentary implies, firstly, that, within the frame of conscious 
experience, Hotere’s paintings clearly articulate humanistic concerns and speak in riddles 
(i.e., there is, simultaneously, clear, unmediated speaking and unclear, mediated 
speaking; eloquence and reticence). Secondly, it is precisely the enigmatic dimension of 
Hotere’s work (i.e., that which, from the perspective of consciousness is a ‘not-speaking 
clearly’) that facilitates an experience of the true and real speaking of the Formless Self 
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Eastern Buddhist Society, 1938)), 110, where Suzuki states: 
 
The conscious mind is ushin no shin contrasting with mushin no shin, mind unconscious of 
itself. Mushin literally means “no-mind,” it is the mind negating itself, letting go itself from 
itself... 
 
See also, ibid, Essays in Zen Buddhism, Third Series (London: Rider and Company, 1973 (1953), 
originally published London: Luzac, 1934), where it is asserted that ‘the Buddhist teaching of 
Non-ego’ is ‘the practical method of expounding the philosophy of the Unconscious’ (361) and, 
furthermore, that 
 
To the Japanese mind, ‘Muga’ and ‘Mushin’ signify the same thing. When one attains the 
state of ‘Muga’, the state of ‘Mushin’, the Unconscious, is realized. ‘Muga’ is something 
identified with a state of ecstasy in which there is no sense of ‘I am doing it’. (362) 
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or no-mind-ness (i.e., from the perspective of psychoanalysis, a speaking that is 
unconscious). From this second perspective, Hotere’s paintings are, again, conceived as 
enacting a logically impossible simultaneity of not speaking (consciously) and speaking 
(unconsciously); reticence and eloquence. 
 
 The contradictory positing of Hotere-as-eloquent and Hotere-as-reticent also flavours 
John Middleditch’s Otago Daily Times article ‘Powerful Hotere Paintings Compel 
Viewers’ Attention’ (1972) (a response to the Dawson’s Gallery exhibition Hotere: 
Sangro Panels 1962 and 1964, Port Chalmers Paintings 1972).573 In the former case, 
Middleditch echoes Young’s interpretation of the Sangro paintings as, first and foremost, 
direct expressions of Hotere’s personality and personal politics. Thus, Middleditch 
locates the genesis and meaning of the Sangro series in Hotere’s visit, in 1962, to his 
brother’s resting place in the New Zealand Servicemen’s Cemetery, located in the Sangro 
River area. Indeed, in Middleditch’s view, this personal connection ‘probably brought out 
the best in... [Hotere’s] painting, for these are among his greatest works’ and, still further, 
‘among the most powerful and compelling works we are likely to see in New Zealand.’574 
Moreover, by way of highlighting Hotere’s anti-war sentiments, Middleditch paraphrases 
Young’s observation that the Sangro paintings are ‘ “an expression of utter futility and 
wasteful destruction of the lives of young men in war.” ’575 
 
 Compared with the expressionistic Sangro paintings (in which central, rectangular 
regions of brightly coloured, freely applied brushwork present striking contrasts with 
surrounding, black-painted frames – often emblazoned with letter and numbers, stencilled 
and applied freehand), Middleditch asserts of the Port Chalmers paintings that: 
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 Representative Sangro series paintings include Sangro Panel (1962-63, ref. 92) and Winter 
Landscape, Sangro River, Italy (1963, ref. 93), whilst the Port Chalmers paintings include the 
aforementioned Port Chalmers Painting No. 10, Port Chalmers Painting No. 14 (1972, ref. 94) 
and Port Chalmers Painting No. 16 (1972, ref. 95). 
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 John Middleditch, ‘Powerful Hotere Paintings Compel Viewers’ Attention’, Otago Daily 
Times, 12 December 1972, 14. 
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 Ibid. Middleditch cites Young, 16.  
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Instead of coming out to the viewer they are shy and retiring, and you must go after 
them. These cannot be skimmed over in one visit to the gallery, but must be 
studied. 
 
Still further, in comparison with the outspoken, immediacy of expression of the Sangro 
paintings, Middleditch suggests that the Port Chalmers paintings are muted almost to the 
point of being indiscernible: 
 
Until your eyes become used to the light you will not see the subtle changes from 
greys to blacks, from warm grey to cold grey. Sometimes the square or circular 
motif is marked only by a change in texture, and little or no change in colour or 
tone. 
 
Nevertheless, Middleditch’s commentary also implies that this surface silence masks a 
subterranean speaking: 
 
There seems to be something aggressive in this series, something that says “Keep 
out.” I suppose outsiders will never quite get under the surface, and the artist seems 
reluctant to help us.576 
 
To the extent that Middleditch presents the Port Chalmers paintings as actively resistant 
to analysis, it is as if, paradoxically, they clearly speak that they are unspeakable (or, 
perhaps, not to be spoken). Having posed this aesthetic challenge, however, Middleditch 
immediately leavens it with a compensatory gesture of normalisation. This is evident 
from his characterisation of Hotere as ‘a shy, retiring man who gets great pleasure from 
the simple things of life. If you see him, you will probably find him like any other Kiwi – 
in a pub.’577 Here, it is evident that, in doubling the reference to being ‘shy and retiring’, 
Middleditch offers to vanish distinctions between Hotere and his work. In this way, the 
seeming reticence of the Port Chalmers paintings can be reconciled with the apparent 
verbosity of the Sangro works insofar as both series are understood to be direct 
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expressions of Hotere’s personality. In effect, this is, again, to trans-mute the silence of 
the Port Chalmers paintings into speech – where, moreover, the potentially alienating 
incomprehensibility of this silent speech is ameliorated by Middleditch’s reassuring 
presentation of Hotere as a modest and regular, ‘Kiwi’ bloke. 
 
 6.2.4 Hall 
 
 The contradictions proper to the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’ are reiterated in 
one of the most significant contributions to Hotere discourse published in the 1970s: 
Garth Hall’s untitled, unpaginated essay in Waikato Art Gallery Bulletin 4, Ralph Hotere 
(1973).578 In common with the likes of Young and Middleditch (both of whom Hall 
references), Hall acknowledges Hotere’s engagement with contemporary politics – 
briefly outlining the significance of the Polaris, Algérie, and Human Rights paintings, as 
well as a Watergate-inspired series of xerox images of Richard Nixon. To this extent, 
Hall’s opening comments are in harmony with the idea that Hotere speaks directly and 
openly in his work. Subsequently, however, Hall’s discussion places special emphasis on 
Hotere’s silence – albeit, an emphasis that is, paradoxically, sustained by continual 
appeals to Hotere’s speaking. This contradictory counterpoise of speaking and not-
speaking is evident, for example, in Hall’s presentation of the Zero paintings as defining 
a ‘stage’ in a progression from Hotere’s speaking (e.g., in the politically engaged works 
of the early to mid 1960s) to Hotere’s silence (e.g., in the more minimal works of the 
latter 1960s and early 1970s). Indeed, it may be apparent that this posited progression 
from speech to silence is, at the same time, the positing of a progression from works 
engaged with and reflecting on the world to works that offer to be worlds unto 
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 Garth Hall, untitled essay in Waikato Art Gallery Bulletin 4, Ralph Hotere (Hamilton: Waikato 
Art Gallery, 1973), np. This publication is significant for being the first overview of Hotere’s 
work sponsored by a public arts institution in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Whilst not an exhibition 
catalogue proper, on the last page of this publication it is stated: 
 
The Waikato Art Gallery Bulletin No.4 was produced as a comment on the work of Ralph 
Hotere. Publication of the Bulletin coincides with the artist’s exhibition at the Waikato Art 
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themselves – i.e., works that are formally autonomous and which, therefore, not only 
offer to fill but, in fact, demand, Hotere’s silence.  
 
 Thus, alluding to Hotere’s artist statement in the catalogue accompanying Zero, an 
exhibition of paintings, Hall remarks that ‘At this stage... [Hotere] still commented on the 
purpose of his painting’ and, by way of substantiating the inference that the Zero 
paintings mark a ‘stage’ in a progression from speech to silence, reproduces Hotere’s 
comment that ‘ “I was still at a stage... where I was giving names to my paintings.” ’ Hall 
then asserts that  
 
Even the sequence of some of the titles... [in the Zero catalogue]: ‘Zero Beginning’ 
‘Zero is White’ Zero is Round’ ‘Zero Flowing’ ‘Zero is Silence’ ‘Zero Silent’ – 
implied Hotere’s attitude from then on. He spoke less about his work, relying more 
and more on the paintings to express.579 
 
Here, it should be noted that, in the first place, Hall does not reproduce the sequence of 
titles in the order they appear in the Zero catalogue. The first two works are ‘1. ZERO IS 
SILENCE’ and ‘2. ZERO BEGINNING’, whilst the final pair of paintings are ‘16. ZERO 
SILENT’ and ‘17. ZERO IS ZERO’. Hence, whilst the Zero catalogue twice associates 
‘zero’ and ‘silence’, there is, in the numerical sequencing of the works, no evident 
progression towards silence. Rather, there is an opening identification of ‘zero’ and 
‘silence’, and a closing identification of ‘zero’ with itself. That is to say, Hotere’s titles 
propose ‘zero’ as the sign of that which is ‘silent’ insofar as it is, entirely and sufficiently, 
‘itself’ and, therefore, that in relation to which nothing else remains to be spoken.580  
 
 Secondly, it is evident that, insofar as it contains a considerable number of direct 
quotes and paraphrases in which Hotere discusses his work, Hall’s essay, itself, directly 
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contradicts the idea that Hotere has become progressively reticent. For example, Hall 
reproduces or alludes to Hotere’s comments on (1) the benefits of working in Dunedin as 
opposed to Auckland: ‘ “In Dunedin,” he noted, “they accept that I’m a painter and leave 
me to go about my work. In Auckland it’s not like that.” ’; (2) Hotere’s dissatisfaction 
with the Te Whiti series of 1972: ‘But it is a series about which the artist is unhappy. At 
least, he says, if he did the “Te Whiti” series again he’d do something quite different.’; 
(3) the formal and expressive significance of the circle motif in the context of the (then, 
recently completed) Founders Memorial Theatre Mural (1973, ref. 96) in Hamilton: ‘He 
sees murals as “a means of art that wouldn’t get across with a painting.” “Who would buy 
one of those for their house?” he asked, referring to one of the mural panels for Hamilton. 
“That circle is a complete statement. I tried to do that eighteen months ago but 
couldn’t.”... “Each circle,” Hotere remarked, “loses some of that impact when it goes up 
as part of the mural.” ’; (4) the idea that the visual takes priority over the verbal: ‘ “It’s 
unfair to expect an artist to be articulate. It’s a visual thing, not verbal.” ’; (5) the idea 
that the making of the painting is, already, a sufficient statement: ‘ “When you show a 
painting you bare your soul, you don’t want to bloody well sell your soul as well.” ’; (6) 
the shortcomings of certain types of art criticism: ‘He is irritated by comment which is 
“comparative”, not capable of seeing anything in its own right. As with the “minimalist” 
label, Hotere feels “they want to put you in little pigeon holes.” ’; (7) the desirability of 
the Waikato Art Gallery Bulletin piece being purely pictorial: ‘Recalling one 
conversation with Hotere at Port Chalmers earlier this year, when the subject of a 
Bulletin about him came up, he simply said: “If you have to do something on me, fill it 
with photos of my work. They say all that really needs to be said.” ’581 
 
 In keeping with the resistance this project presents to the traditionalising mode of art 
history and art criticism, wherein there may be a tendency to identify originating gestures 
too swiftly and absolutely, one ought to exercise caution in regarding Hotere’s testimony 
as a series of grounding assertions, establishing the tenor and direction of subsequent 
discourse. Nevertheless, it is evident that some of Hotere’s statements exemplify features 
characteristic of the figure of Hotere’s reticence in Hotere discourse – namely, the 
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reification of the right of the artist to be silent, the insistence that, always already, the 
artwork is the repository of a full speaking, the suggestion that, insofar as it is 
preoccupied with expressing preconceived ideas, art commentary fails to ‘see’ the 
artwork as it really is. In each of these assertions, there is a valourisation of the visual 
experience of the artwork as primary, genuine, real and a denigration of verbal (spoken or 
written) interpretation of this visual experience as secondary, distorted, fabrication.582 
However, it may be observed that this privileging is tenable only on the condition that the 
artwork (or the artist-creator) is primary, first, origin, source. If one entertains the idea 
that artists and artworks are expressions of a subjectivity defined in terms of a tension 
between self and Other, individual and transindividual then, always already, the art 
subject and the art object are, themselves, expressions of reading and interpretation – 
albeit, reading and interpretation taking place in a language that may tend to emphasise 
the visual over the verbal.  
 
 Whilst this is not a matter that admits any final resolution, if, indeed, Hotere’s verbal 
testimony, as presented in Hall’s essay, resounds through Hotere discourse with the force 
of a command then a profound irony flavours the subsequent perpetuation of the point de 
capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’. In this event, the repeated positing of Hotere-as-reticent 
would be, in the ‘first’ instance, secured on the basis of Hotere’s speaking and, to this 
extent, would, thereby, expose the degree to which Hotere discourse fixates on the 
individual art subject called ‘Hotere’. Regardless of the priority this interpretation of 
‘Hotere’s reticence’ may be accorded, it is striking that, in reading Hall’s account, one 
gains the impression that, far from being taciturn or uncommunicative, Hotere speaks 
incessantly. Indeed, the sense that Hotere continuously speaks also colours Hall’s 
assessment of Hotere’s personality. Consider, for example, Hall’s observation that 
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 At first glance, this position would seem to be incommensurable with the incorporation of 
textual elements in Hotere’s paintings. However, I would suggest that these cases are subject to a 
number of ameliorating factors. Firstly, Hotere selects the textual elements in question. Secondly, 
textual elements placed in painting become visual elements, thereby demonstrating the 
artificiality of distinctions between writing and painting, graphic and plastic. Thirdly, the 
presence of the textual in Hotere’s paintings bears witness to a conversation between visual and 
verbal – a complementary speaking with each other. This contrasts with art commentary or art 
criticism, where the drive towards exegesis tends to result in a speaking to or a speaking for the 
artwork. In either case, there is a speaking in lieu of or in the place of the artwork. 
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Ralph Hotere is an extremely intense individual, almost to the point of appearing 
furtive. He expresses himself in short bursts of conversation surrounded by long 
silences... 
 
Here, it is worth noting that Hall almost immediately qualifies this observation, 
suggesting that, on reflection (or, rather, I would suggest, as rationalisation), the 
precarious – indeed, almost perilous – encounter with Hotere-the-artist-enigma is, 
somehow, transformed into a reassuring revelation of essences of meaning: 
 
Gradually, one realises the value of the silence; the brooding nature heightens, 
rather than strains, conversation... Rather than inarticulation abbreviated speech 
expresses the essentials. No leading in. No prior justification. Hotere gives the 
essence of his thoughts in a few words.583 
 
One might suggest that, for Hall, Hotere’s silence is akin to the continuous emanation of 
a repulsive field of force, the insistence and intensity of which increases the more closely 
one approaches an explanation (or speaking) of Hotere-the-person or Hotere’s work. The 
‘short bursts of conversation surrounded by long silences’ are like the intermittent 
breakdowns of a powerfully oppressive field potential. From this standpoint, Hall’s 
impression that Hotere’s ‘intense’, ‘furtive’, brooding’ silence ‘heightens, rather than 
strains, conversation’ would seem to exemplify the manner by which the figure of 
Hotere’s reticence in Hotere discourse bears witness to a paradoxical not speaking that is 
a speaking. That is to say, the manner by which, in consciousness, reticence functions as 
a principle of mediation, bearing witness, thereby, to the ‘unconscious speaking’ that is, 
always already, taking place. 
 
 6.2.5 Leech 
 
 The manner by which the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’ bears witness to the 
constancy or insistence of a paradoxical not speaking that is a speaking also is evident in 
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Peter Leech’s Art New Zealand piece: ‘Style and Change, Ralph Hotere’ – a response to 
Hotere’s Paintings 1983 show at the Bosshard Galleries, Dunedin, in which (as Leech 
observes) eight of the sixteen works exhibited employed stainless steel – for example: 
Black Window (1983, ref. 97) and Baby Iron (1983, ref. 98).584 The basic impetus of 
Leech’s discussion is evident from his suggestions that, in the Bosshard Galleries show, 
‘Hotere has introduced an occasion for a deepening consideration of what his style is and 
has been’ and that, furthermore, ‘the exhibition offers, I think, an authentic scaffolding 
for a Hotere style-delineation.’ That is to say, Leech’s primary concern is the elaboration 
of the truth or essence of Hotere’s style – where Paintings 1983 provides the framework 
within which the possibility of articulating this truth or essence is enlivened. Leech 
embarks on this objective by making an instrumental distinction between ‘signature’ and 
‘style’. The former is defined as ‘mere visual recognisability’ whilst the latter is defined 
as ‘a univocal language for the working out and through of successive artistic concerns’. 
Furthermore, Leech insists that ‘style... permits change; signature does not’ and, on this 
basis, he repudiates the suggestion that Hotere’s works ‘incorporating... a new and 
seductive element of highly-polished stainless steel sheets’ bear witness to the artist’s 
adoption of ‘a different, more inviting style’. On the contrary, Leech insists that the 
works exhibited in Paintings 1983 ‘constitute perseverations of the artist’s style, rather 
than innovations’.585 
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stainless steel were titled Black Window. It would appear that the Black Window illustrated in 
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polished, stainless steel surface introduces ‘figures which stand in grey shadow on the cold 
polished steel.’ 
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 From the perspective of psychoanalysis, Leech’s signature/style distinction illustrates, 
precisely, the paradoxical not speaking that is a speaking proper to the point de capiton 
‘Hotere’s reticence’. It may be noted that signature, as ‘mere visual recognisability’, 
defines that which is identified clearly and immediately. Style, by contrast, as that which 
invites ‘deepening consideration’, is proper to determinations that lack clarity (i.e., evince 
ambiguity) or that obtain as mediated. In other words, the seeming clarity and immediacy 
by which one affirms the identity of signature would seem to exemplify the idealisations 
and rationalisations of consciousness. The insufficiencies of these determinations testify 
to the status of the ‘speaking of signature’ as a partial, ambiguous, and mediated 
expression of what, on the level of the unconscious, would be the fuller, truer ‘speaking 
of style’. To put the matter in equivalent terms, one might suggest that, insofar as the 
speaking of signature tends to prohibit change in its reification of the same, it harmonises 
with the metonymic function: namely, that which is implicated in ‘resistance of 
signification’ and thus re-playing of existing meaning. By contrast, insofar as it bears 
witness to the emergence of difference and, thereby, ‘permits change’, the speaking of 
style resonates with the metaphoric function implicated in ‘emergence of 
signification’.586 From this standpoint, always already it is the case that the (conscious) 
speaking of signature is as reiterated (even if this amounts to nothing more than the 
radical contingency of repeating the name ‘Hotere’) and is as fading in the face of the 
insistence of the (unconscious) speaking of style. 
 
 The manner by which, in consciousness, reticent not speaking functions as a principle 
of mediation, bearing witness to the insistence of a speaking that is unconscious, also 
follows from Leech’s elaboration of the ‘two crucial aspects of Hotere’s style’ in terms of 
a mediating tension. In relation to the first detail, this is evident from Leech’s reference to 
the 
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desire that, paradoxically, finds fulfilment in endlessly missing its aim). 
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...peculiar tenseness of Hotere’s formalism: the sense, in so many paintings over the 
years, that formal elements are employed not so much for formal ends but rather to 
clamp and artificially to hold down turbulent undercurrents.587 
 
Leech contends that this ‘holding down of turbulent undercurrents’ – the reticent 
mediation of what might, otherwise, burgeon into an unbridled expressionism – is, itself, 
achieved in a twofold way. Firstly, Leech alludes to the manner by which ‘the stainless 
steel sheets act... rather like high-tensile skins’. Here, the implication is that there is a 
containment of and, indeed, a pulling into a taut, rigid, and impenetrable flatness of 
anything in the works that might speak out. Secondly, Leech maintains that, insofar as 
many of the works in question incorporate recycled, ‘rough-cut’, wooden, window 
frames, ‘The seductive glamour of the steel is immediately overpowered by this literally 
clamping convention.’ In so prioritising the ‘holding down’, ‘overpowering’, and 
‘clamping’ of any overt expressionism in Hotere’s work, Leech signals his investment in 
the notion of formal autonomy. Indeed, this is made explicit in Leech’s closing comments 
where, acknowledging ‘Hotere’s notorious distaste for discussing his own work’, Leech 
concludes: ‘The work of course speaks for itself; and in this exhibition it speaks very 
clearly in Hotere’s style.’588 In taking this position, Leech’s article echoes writing by 
McNamara and Collier insofar as the appeal to formal autonomy is sustained on the 
condition that Hotere’s ‘artist-self’ is silenced or contained in the work. In this way, 
Leech’s commentary reiterates two features proper to the figure of Hotere’s reticence in 
Hotere discourse – namely, that (1) Hotere ‘speaks’ in the act of self-renunciation and 
that, furthermore, (2) the appeal to formal autonomy is not merely compensation for but, 
in fact, demanding of the artist’s silence.589 
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 By way of amplifying this point, recall that, in chapter five, it was suggested that the 
realisation of a formally autonomous artwork is an impossibility insofar as a work of this kind 
would be that which is (or speaks, is spoken) entirely and self-sufficiently. Insofar as the formally 
autonomous artwork is that in relation to which, so to speak, nothing remains to be said, it is that 
which resists analysis and explanation. Hence, the actual creation of a formally autonomous 
artwork defines a contradiction. It is, in effect, a speaking of that which is unspeakable. In the 
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 The contradictions inherent in his appeal to formal autonomy are also evident in 
Leech’s assessment of the second crucial characteristic of Hotere’s style – namely, 
‘subtle stresses of lighting effect’. By way of elaborating the ‘stresses’ in question, Leech 
refers to the ‘shimmer’ in Hotere’s Window in Spain series of the late 1970s and the 
‘textured corruscations’ of the Aramoana paintings of the early 1980s. Whilst Leech does 
not qualify these allusions in greater detail, one may understand them with reference to 
paintings such as Window In Spain (1978, ref. 99) and the ten-piece, corrugated iron 
work Aramoana (1982, ref. 100). In the former picture, Hotere creates a broad, cruciform 
shape from a dense patterning of white-on-white, blobbed and speckled pigment. In the 
latter work, fine speckling, in white and rust-red paint, is augmented with stringy splashes 
and rivulets of white pigment. In either case, ‘stresses of lighting effect’ would seem to 
deny any significant recession into illusory depth, thereby reifying the autonomy and 
integrity of the painted surface. However, in comparison with these earlier works, Leech 
finds fault with some of the Bosshard Galleries stainless steel pieces for the ‘seductive... 
irrelevance’ of their ‘mirror effect’, which ‘produces an illusory depth’ and ‘evanescence’ 
Leech finds ‘troublingly at odds with Hotere’s customary muscularity and robustness.’ 
Moreover, by virtue of this mirroring, Leech maintains that the stainless steel works 
‘acquire too facile a glamour and tend, in that respect, to promote the belief that Hotere 
has moved to a different and more inviting style.’590 
 
 In other words, Leech criticises certain works for what might be termed their facile 
loquaciousness – for speaking out, as it were, too swiftly and too superficially, for 
                                                                                                                                                 
appeal to formal autonomy, then, one expresses a desire to realise an impossibility – one speaks 
the necessity to speak. Insofar as this appeal is destined to fail, the impossible speaking the 
unspeakable involved in the creation of the formally autonomous artwork will be reticent. That is 
to say, appealing to formal autonomy necessitates insisting on a paradoxical ‘not speaking’ (on 
the level of consciousness) that is a ‘speaking’ (on the level of the unconscious). Equivalently, 
one may say that asserting the formal autonomy of Hotere’s work demands Hotere’s silence. The 
presence of these contradictions demonstrates that the assertion of formal autonomy is an 
imagining of the imaginary – an imaginary surrogate posited in an effort to realise objet petit a – 
in this case, synonymous with the impossible ‘speaking the unspeakable’ proper to the point de 
capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’. 
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substituting glamour, evanescence, and illusion for sobriety, plainness, constancy, 
sturdiness, reality, and truth. Those works that invite Leech’s approval are considered to 
mitigate this overt and alluring speaking out (one might say, in Leech’s parlance, a 
signature speech) with what is, in effect, a more mediated, reticent speaking (or, perhaps, 
a speaking of style). Thus, Black Window attracts Leech’s approbation for the manner by 
which ‘the glossy glamour of the steel sheet has been traumatised... hammered down into 
the painting with crude leadhead nails... a strip torn from the side and made to curl over 
on itself.’ In consequence, ‘Toughness and tenseness is restored; the seductive mirroring 
is dismissed.’ In Leech’s opinion Baby Iron achieves a similar result through its 
employment of corrugated steel: ‘What this... achieves is a reflectivity and shimmer 
folded in on itself: the play of light across the surface is more subtly contained and 
independent’, thereby preserving ‘the sense of closed-upness and tautness which is so 
characteristic of Hotere’s art.’591 Here, Leech’s formalist stance emerges insofar as he 
praises those works that tend to draw attention to the physical reality of the materials 
employed in their fabrication or the degree to which the manipulation of formal elements 
results in a sense of ‘containment’, ‘independence’, and ‘closed-upness’. At the same 
time, however, Leech invests in the hand/mind of Hotere-as-artist/creator in suggesting 
that the ‘toughness’, ‘tension’, and ‘tautness’ of Black Window and Baby Iron results 
from ‘turbulent undercurrents’ being ‘artificially held down’ (my italics). In accordance 
with the paradoxes proper to the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’, Hotere’s work is 
praised to the extent that, paradoxically, it exhibits formal self-sufficiency and evidence 
of artistic creativity (albeit, an agency or speaking that must be reticent). 
 
 6.2.6 Wedde 
 
 In the 1980s and 1990s, one encounters explicit references to Hotere’s ‘reticence’ in at 
least two pieces by Wedde – one of Hotere’s longstanding supporters and artistic 
collaborators. The first of these is the Evening Post review article ‘Hotere stunning’ 
(1985) – a response to the Janne Land Gallery show ...and death wears the colours of a 
peacock, in which Hotere displayed some of his vividly colourful and expressionistic 
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works protesting French, nuclear weapons testing on Mururoa atoll. The second example 
is ‘Where is the art that does this?’ – Wedde’s introduction to O’Brien’s Hotere, Out The 
Black Window (1997). Here, it may be noted that the Evening Post piece prioritises the 
surpassing or superseding of Hotere’s formal restraint whilst, in the introduction to 
O’Brien’s book, there is a reinvestment in the notion of Hotere’s silence – albeit, as that 
which is efficacious in promoting the speaking of others. Whilst, ostensibly, these two 
perspectives seem irreconcilable, it is apparent that, in both cases, and in accordance with 
the paradoxical form and functioning of the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’, Wedde 
appeals to the idea that there is a ‘not speaking’ which is a ‘speaking’ on behalf of the 
particular art subject called ‘Hotere’. On the one hand, then, Wedde deserves credit for 
astutely subverting the rhetoric of silence surrounding Hotere and his work. On the other 
hand, however, and notwithstanding the acuity and sensitivity of his arguments, it 
remains the case that Wedde privileges Hotere-the-artist-individual as the exemplary 
point of reference enabling and grounding the meaning of Hotere’s work. 
 
 Thus, in ‘Hotere stunning’, Wedde opens with the observation that ‘Ralph Hotere’s 
show at Janne Land’s will shock those accustomed to his reticent lyricism.’ That is to 
say, in Wedde’s view, prior to the exhibition in question, Hotere’s work has been 
conceivable in terms of a paradoxical not speaking that is a speaking – a singing that, 
whilst not absolutely silent is, at least, subject to reticence as a principle of mediation. 
However, the Mururoa paintings deviate from this paradigm insofar as they present 
‘more colour than we’ve ever seen from Hotere, and more sense of an expressive link 
between the artist and the marks on the canvas: a greater sense of personal urgency.’ In 
other words, Wedde suggests that, to a degree unprecedented, the Mururoa paintings 
testify to Hotere’s speaking, immediately and fully, in or through his work. Indeed, whilst 
allowing that ‘The sense of frustration and rage in these works doesn’t, of course, need to 
have a personal line-in to Ralph Hotere himself’, nevertheless, to a significant degree, 
Wedde presents the Mururoa works as Hotere’s personal riposte to those critics (e.g., 
Leech – although Wedde demurs from making any positive identification) who ‘lately’, 
have been 
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uneasy about the elegant, decorative, beautiful features of his work... This beauty 
they find incongruous in art whose chief qualities are reticence, austerity, and a 
deeply embedded political commitment.  
 
Wedde continues: 
 
As though in response to this line of criticism, Hotere, in a furious burst of activity, 
has produced works that could be described as flagrantly, aggressively beautiful... 
 
It seems to me that Hotere is also, with some irritation, offering the critics a chance 
to take a colder bath than the luke-warm one they’ve offered him.592 
 
It may be noted that, regardless of whether it is restrained or expressive, ‘reticent’ or 
‘eloquent’, Wedde’s account proposes ‘lyricism’ as a defining feature of Hotere’s work. 
Here, one may observe a certain irony: to the extent that it articulates a qualitative 
constant for Hotere’s style, Wedde’s article mirrors that of Leech – even if, in contrast 
with Leech’s favouring of a ‘clamping down’ of ‘turbulent undercurrents’ (i.e., an 
impetus to silence and self-containment), Wedde advocates their unimpeded outflow (i.e., 
an impetus to open and effusive self-expression).  
 
 Whilst his Evening Post review article would appear to celebrate the outspoken and 
expressionistic aspects of Hotere’s work, a decade later, Wedde’s ‘Where is the art that 
does this?’ seems to conduct an about-turn in presenting a twofold reinvestment in the 
notion of Hotere’s ‘reticent lyricism’. This is evident, firstly, in the suggestion that 
‘Despite their frequent darkness, there’s often a sense of illumination behind Ralph 
Hotere’s paintings’ – even if, in some cases, ‘paradoxically, the light is dark (the “black 
windows”).’593 That is to say, behind or of that which would appear to stifle any 
expression of subjectivity/meaning-making (i.e., ‘darkness’), something is, nevertheless, 
apprehended or disclosed. Thus, the contradiction Wedde finds proper to Hotere’s 
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paintings (at least, those works employing black that, to be fair, do constitute a significant 
subset of Hotere’s oeuvre) resides in their status as illuminating darknesses or darknesses 
that illuminate – in the quality of this illumination as a ‘light... [that] is dark’. In aural 
terms, this might be characterised as a speaking that is silent.594 Secondly, and 
specifically alluding to Hotere’s work with New Zealand poets (of whom Wedde is one), 
Wedde presents a tacit apology for Hotere’s reticence on the basis that it is  
 
...a way of leaving space in which the words of others can be heard... a taciturnity 
which is a homage to the speech or writing of others... A silence not sullen or 
inarticulate, but respectful...595 
 
In consequence, Wedde concludes:  
 
The silence of Ralph Hotere’s art is like the silence of a host whose guests are 
poets. The excess of the art is like generous hospitality. The collaborations in the 
art are like a love of conversation.596 
  
Here, the implication is that Hotere’s silence reflects selflessness or even self-abnegation 
in the name of inviting collaboration and conversation. At the same time, however, 
Hotere’s self-effacement or self-silencing also is an eloquent ‘not speaking’ that is a 
‘speaking’ insofar as it is an essential, structuring component of a ‘conversation’ in which 
the speech of others is promoted with particular skill and efficacy. To the extent that 
Wedde celebrates Hotere’s self-vanishing as the virtuoso performance of a ‘generous... 
host’, his introductory piece, in Hotere, Out The Black Window, harmonises, precisely, 
with the primary impetus of ‘Hotere stunning’ – namely, the privileging of the individual 
art subject called ‘Hotere’. 
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 6.2.7 Pound 
 
 Whilst this by no means exhausts the field of possibilities, as a final illustration of the 
figure of Hotere’s reticence in Hotere discourse, one may consider Pound’s contribution 
to the suite of texts presented in the catalogue accompanying the exhibition Ralph 
Hotere: Black Light: ‘Tiger Country: Hotere, Reinhardt and the US Masters’. Proceeding 
on the basis of Hotere’s annotation of the catalogue accompanying the exhibition Ad 
Reinhardt (1991), Pound’s essay invokes Reinhardt’s writing in order to analyse Hotere’s 
Black Paintings of the late 1960s – with special attention being devoted to the so-called 
‘early black paintings’ of 1968.597 Here, it is noteworthy that, in common with Wedde, 
Pound rejects the simplistic notion that Hotere and/or his work are silent. It is the case 
that, given the ‘inextricably literary... New Zealand context’ of the late 1960s, in which 
‘poets were canonisers, critics, sharers and co-providers of content’, Pound considers 
Hotere’s Black Paintings to be striking for what they ‘exclude and negate’ – namely, 
words, poetry, narratives. Still further, Pound also acknowledges that in ‘refusing – or 
seeming to refuse – speech’ the Black Paintings reflect the manner by which 
 
If Hotere puts no words in the paintings, and no illustrations of words, nor does he 
put words around them. This exemplary and much mythologised refusal to frame 
the work in words (artist’s statements, interviews, etc.) is akin to the refusal of the 
works themselves to offer any easy speech.  
 
However, Pound also recognises that 
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Yet, clearly, both silences can be read as a positivity: to refuse speech is a speech: 
the statement of a refusal, a negation which silently resounds.598 
 
Pound’s observation may be fruitfully compared with that made by Susan Sontag, in ‘The 
Aesthetics of Silence’ (1967). Here, Sontag suggests that ‘ “Silence” never ceases to 
imply its opposite and to depend on its presence’ and, furthermore, that 
 
A genuine emptiness, a pure silence, are not feasible – either conceptually or in 
fact. If only because the artwork exists in a world furnished with many other things, 
the artist who creates silence or emptiness must produce something dialectical: a 
full void, an enriching emptiness, a resonating or eloquent silence. Silence remains, 
inescapably, a form of speech... and an element in a dialogue.599 
 
Combining these statements, one may suggest that the manner by which Hotere’s Black 
Paintings seemingly refuse to ‘offer any easy speech’ does not imply an absolute absence 
of speech but rather testifies to a speaking that is difficult or enigmatic. Similarly, always 
already, Hotere’s refusal to offer explanations of his work is, qua refusal, a ‘statement’, 
an ‘element in a dialogue.’ Repudiating words, then, is not repudiating speech; being 
wordless is not being silent. Indeed, the repudiation in question invites interpretation as a 
‘speaking out’ in the form of a demand or a challenge that (as stated in the pamphlet 
accompanying the exhibition of Zero series paintings) ‘the spectator... [provoke] the 
change and the meaning in these works.’ That is to say, a demand for the spectator 
relinquish the language to which they are accustomed or acculturated and embrace an 
other language, custom, culture. The complexity of this demand/challenge, and thus the 
manner by which the Black Paintings neither speak easily nor are easily spoken, reflects 
the complexity of this other. In the case of Hotere and his work, this other might be 
(albeit, inadequately) represented/symbolised thus ‘.../Te 
Aupōuri/Māori/Catholic/Western Modern painter/Post-war artist in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand/political activist/...’ 
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 In light of the preceding discussion, Pound deserves credit for recognising that, 
paradoxically, ‘Hotere’s reticence’ is a kind of ‘not-speaking’ that, nevertheless, bears 
witness to a ‘speaking’. Nevertheless, Pound’s subsequent analysis of the Black Paintings 
of 1968 evinces two features exemplary of the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’. 
Firstly, Pound explicitly privileges the actions of Hotere-the-artist-individual and, in this 
way, reifies Hotere’s speaking. Secondly, however, and in common with earlier 
commentators such as McNamara, Collier, and Leech, Pound invests in the idea that 
Hotere’s Black Paintings are formally autonomous. That is to say, in suggesting that 
Hotere’s works fully speak in and of themselves, Pound demands Hotere’s silence. Thus, 
in the former case, whilst denying that ‘Hotere’s black paintings were necessarily 
influenced by Reinhardt’s pungent brevities’, Pound finds it ‘encouraging’ that, in the 
1960s, Hotere specifically referred to Reinhardt’s writing on at least two occasions.600 
Proposing, therefore, ‘simply to use’ Reinhardt’s texts ‘as Hotere himself twice did, as a 
convenient way in’, Pound declares his intention to 
 
...use the protocols for making one body of black paintings (Reinhardt’s) as 
protocols for describing another (Hotere’s). Where they miss should be as 
instructive as where they hit: we shall learn to see what Hotere is by seeing what he 
is not.601 
 
Pound’s posited modus operandi is noteworthy for demonstrating a sensitivity to the 
possibilities of analyses that are non-essentialist, non-traditionalising, and differential. At 
the same time, however, Pound’s acknowledgement of Hotere’s referencing of Reinhardt 
in the 1960s, contained, moreover, within the frame of Hotere’s annotated Reinhardt 
catalogue of 1997, demonstrates to what extent reading Hotere through Reinhardt is 
enlivened and legitimised by Hotere’s precedents – i.e., implicitly privileges the 
individual art subject called ‘Hotere’. 
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 That Pound’s analysis of Hotere’s Black Paintings appeals to formal autonomy 
follows from the reading of these works in light of the intentional antinomy stated in 
Reinhardt’s ‘ART IN ART IS ART AS ART, Art-as-Art Dogma, part three’ (1966). 
Here, as Pound points out, Reinhardt asserts that ‘Poetry is art is poetry’ and ‘Poetry in 
art is not poetry’.602 In Pound’s opinion, the first formulation implies that ‘painted writing 
does not fully turn into paint, or, at least, it does not cease to signify as writing, even if in 
its materiality it has become paint.’ The second formulation refers to the degree to which 
(in what Pound fully acknowledges are ‘the words of an earlier formalism’) ‘all art 
aspires to... a state of autonomy from the world – and of a complete refusal to imitate it.’ 
If this state of affairs obtains, Pound contends that  
 
...‘poetry’, in the sense of a given medium charged with its maximum intensity, is 
painting, or painting as painting is meant to be – painting, say, as it is given to us in 
Hotere’s early black paintings. In which case, ‘poetry in art is not poetry’. It is 
art.603   
 
That Pound genuinely advocates for the notion of formal autonomy would appear to be 
confirmed by his characterisation of Hotere’s later re-admission of poetry into his work 
as ‘succumbing to the prevailing literary nature of most twentieth-century New Zealand 
art.’ Again, one may draw an illustrative parallel with Sontag’s ‘Aesthetics of Silence’, in 
which it is suggested that language is ‘the most impure, the most contaminated, the most 
exhausted of all the materials out of which art is made’604  
 
 In making these assertions, Pound and Sontag appear to invest in the formalist notion 
of painting (or art-making in general) purified of anything other than painting – 
specifically, words (or other conventionally linguistic or symbolic gestures) about, of, in 
or, otherwise, accompanying painting. In so doing, however, I would argue that both 
writers insist on making untenable distinctions between writing and painting, graphic and 
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plastic, symbolic and pictorial. As suggested in chapter three, insofar as painting defines 
a grammar of form and a space of meaning, always already it is the case that painting is 
language-mediated: always already it is the case that painting is painting in and of signs. 
Always already, in other words, painting is by virtue of being enmeshed in a world of 
meaning that exceeds and eludes distinctions between what is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ a 
particular painting or, indeed, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the categories of ‘painting’ and 
‘poetry’. This implies that ‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ painting and poetry are impossible ideals – 
on which basis, I would reject Pound’s claim that in  
 
...refusing entry to the poets, Hotere’s early black paintings are absolute poetry... 
poetic to a degree disallowed by the literal presence of poetic texts. They are the 
most poetic paintings he has ever made.605 
 
Indeed, I would suggest that, in its reification of impossibly ‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ painting 
and poetry, Pound’s essay exemplifies the desire to realise the ineffable objet petit a – in 
this case, synonymous with the creation of the formally autonomous artwork wherein (as 
proposed in chapter five) there is expressed the impossible speaking the unspeakable or 
eloquent speech proper to the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’. 
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6.3 Praxes of contradiction: McCahon’s vision of doubt and 
Hotere’s eloquent reticence 
 
 6.3.1 The vision of doubt: McCahon’s questioning faith 
 
 The idea that McCahon is a visionary precisely insofar as he doubts, in relation to 
which one may speak of a seemingly contradictory vision of doubt, is implicit in 
Curnow’s Art New Zealand essay ‘Thinking about Colin McCahon and Barnett Newman’ 
(1977-78). Here, Curnow revisits the question of McCahon’s artistic ‘eccentricity’, 
previously elaborated in his Listener article ‘Devotions Unlimited’ and the essay included 
in the catalogue for the exhibition McCahon’s “Necessary Protection”. In the Art New 
Zealand piece, Curnow proposes that the eccentricity of McCahon’s oeuvre reflects 
McCahon’s conception of truth – in effect, the manner by which McCahon engages not 
with the Truth, absolute, universal, total and univocal, but on the contrary, with truths 
that are, inherently, contingent, local, partial and multivalent. To this extent, McCahon’s 
creative activity is doubting insofar as it reflects a questioning of the existence of an 
epistemological absolute. With reference to Morse Peckham’s essay ‘Rebellion and 
Deviance’ (1973), Curnow refers to this as the post-Enlightenment ‘crisis of failed meta-
explanations’ (i.e., the undermining of both a Christian and an Enlightenment faith in the 
existence of absolute standards of truth and knowledge – secured, in the former case, by 
appealing to the notion of divine omnipotence and omnipresence, and in the latter case, 
by appealing to the power of human reason). In consequence, Curnow characterises 
McCahon’s modus operandi as a ‘Romantic search activity’ that engages not with the 
Truth but rather truths – in particular, those ‘eccentric, incongruous... knowledges’ 
associated with ‘Christian and Maori myth’.606 Curnow suggests that McCahon’s titling 
one series of work ‘Practical Religion’ demonstrates how his Romantic search activity 
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seeks ‘not true knowledge but knowledges of, for, use.’607 That is to say, knowledge takes 
the form of a praxis of questioning – neither a fixed point of reference nor an absolute 
sufficiency, but rather a way of negotiating particular contingencies. This said, Curnow 
allows that there remains a certain visionary dimension to McCahon’s art-making. For 
underlying McCahon’s multifaceted and eclectic engagement with knowledges is a belief 
in the efficacy of this practice. Hence, Curnow asserts of McCahon that 
 
As an improviser, he obeys these injunctions: his art must change, it must be direct, 
it must be sacred – a matter of life and death. And in his obedience to them lies an 
affirmation that somehow lies outside all his doubts.608 
 
Here, what is crucial is that the ‘affirmation’, to which Curnow refers, has no obvious 
basis in reason or logic. It is to this extent that McCahon’s ‘belief’ in the efficacy of 
sustaining a praxis of questioning is ‘visionary’ and, indeed, invites interpretation as an 
apparently paradoxical vision of doubt.  
 
 In the decade following Curnow’s article, the understanding of McCahon’s doubt in 
terms what I am calling a ‘vision of doubt’ is reiterated in at least three other 
commentaries on McCahon and his work. Compared with Curnow’s essay, these other 
pieces of writing may be distinguished by their tendency to consider the question of 
McCahon’s doubt in a more obviously theological or Christian context. In consequence, 
Curnow’s allusion to McCahon’s visionary ‘affirmation’ of a praxis of questioning 
becomes, in these other examples of McCahon scholarship, McCahon’s visionary 
engagement with the fundamental question or paradox of faith. Exemplary, in this regard, 
is Green’s ‘Review: I Will Need Words’ – in part, a response to Curnow’s untitled essay, 
included in the catalogue accompanying the exhibition I will need words. Particularly 
relevant, in the present context, is Green’s acknowledgement and amplification of 
Curnow’s suggestion that the ambiguities inherent in the ‘I AM’ motif (in works such as 
Victory over Death 2 and Gate III) resonate with the interrogative textual content of the 
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Elias paintings – a correspondence Curnow attributes to the status of the works in 
question as ‘dramatisations of the crises of belief’.609 Reiterating Curnow’s recognition of 
the implicit question of being posed in the major text of Victory over Death 2 (i.e., ‘AM I 
AM’), Green points out that, in Practical Religion, texts asserting ‘the conditions of Faith 
in the Gospel of Eternal Life and belief in the power of the Resurrection’ are subject to a 
similar qualification in the form of the challenge, posed in a capitalised, calligraphic 
aside, inserted at the lower right of the work: ‘DO YOU BELIEVE THIS?’610 In Green’s 
view: 
 
This leads to the opening of the question which is fundamental to these pictures, the 
question of Faith. In so far as McCahon does not simply proclaim a belief, the 
question remains open, doubt remains, and an implication of a doubt of the artist is 
to be taken.611 
 
 Green then addresses Curnow’s references to McCahon’s various admissions of doubt, 
by virtue of which McCahon’s assumption of a truly Christian identity is precluded. 
These include the testimony in Colin McCahon: a survey exhibition, where, with regard 
to the Elias paintings, McCahon confesses, parenthetically, (‘I could never call myself a 
Christian, therefore these same doubts constantly assail me too.’) and, in relation to the 
Practical Religion works, ‘doubts do come in here too. I believe, but don’t believe...’612 
On this basis, Green proposes that McCahon’s expressions of doubt ‘can be read, in the 
light of these pictures, as statements about the central difficulty of belief, or of Faith.’ 
Specifically, Green suggests that McCahon’s comments resonate with  
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The Reformation insistence on Salvation through Faith, as distinct from Salvation 
in and through the Sacraments, especially of the Eucharist’, which ‘makes of Faith 
something that must be attained, struggled for. It cannot be taken for granted as a 
given, as a starting point.  
 
Thus, from Green’s perspective, the Reformist dimension of McCahon’s spiritual 
sensibility inheres in its resistance to the idea that faith = unquestioning performance of 
ritual or acceptance of dogma – as is enshrined in what Green refers to as pre-
Reformation ‘Revealed Christian Doctrine’: the ‘key’ to the absolute and incontestable 
meaning of ‘Both the world and the Book’.613  
 
 To put the matter equivalently, in Green’s view, what McCahon doubts is the notion 
that spiritual enlightenment or salvation lies in unquestioning adherence to certain ritual 
forms (e.g., the Eucharist). Indeed, implicit in Green’s observation that ‘The distance 
between signifier and signified is abolished in the rite of the Eucharist, in which the sign 
becomes the Flesh of the Real Presence, the supreme metonymy’ is the idea that, within 
the very forms and materials of ritual activity, ‘Salvation in and through the Sacraments’ 
is, simultaneously, an embodying/encoding – a perfect coincidence of form and meaning, 
signifier and signified, by virtue of which the absolute is made present and presenced 
absolutely.614 It is precisely the possibility of realising this presencing that McCahon 
places in question – on which basis, Green characterises McCahon’s spiritual sensibility 
in terms of maintaining a distance between signifier and signified, of suspending/delaying 
meaning determinations: ‘For McCahon there is always a gap between the utterance of 
the message in its signs and its reception by the reader/beholder.’615 To this extent, 
Green’s assessment of McCahon’s doubt clearly harmonises with that presented by 
Curnow in ‘Thinking about Colin McCahon and Barnett Newman’ (although Green 
eschews considerations of Enlightenment rationality and restricts his analysis to the 
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‘failed meta-explanation’ of (pre-Reformation) Christianity). That is to say, the 
complementary obverse of McCahon’s doubt in the efficacy of ‘Salvation in and through 
the Sacraments’ is what amounts to faith in and as a praxis of questioning. The term 
‘faith’ applies insofar as McCahon’s belief in the value and efficacy of the praxis resists 
logical or rational justification. 
 
 Here, however, one may observe a certain irony. In the performance of the sacraments, 
the ‘supreme metonymy’, to which Green refers, admits consideration as a vanishing of 
the gulf dividing the realms of the mortal and the divine – a vanishing of the mortal self 
into the absolute, divine unity and sufficiency. From this perspective, the resistance to a 
pre-Reformation insistence on adherence to ritual (which tends to objectify subjects and 
suppress agency in favour of automatism) can be regarded as a reification of the status of 
the individual. It may be noted that such an exaltation of individuality is a point de 
capiton prominent in the discourse of Romanticism and, indeed, also is implicit in 
Curnow’s account of McCahon’s doubt in terms of a ‘Romantic search activity’ (i.e., 
McCahon-the-artist-individual actively seeks truths as opposed to being the passive 
recipient of the Truth).616 However, insofar as the reification of the individual becomes a 
preferred or desired mode of being or subjective expression (that is to say, a praxis), the 
very means by which the subversion of one praxis/metonymy/automatism (namely, 
unquestioning adherence to the Sacraments) is attained itself assumes the status of a 
praxis/metonymy/automatism on another level. Insofar as the question of faith resolves 
into a praxis (i.e., a continual, repetitive performance), its final resolution is indefinitely 
deferred and, by the same token, the belief in its very efficacy is revealed to be, itself, the 
product of a leap of faith. In acquiescing to or conforming with this necessity, one 
confronts one’s own insufficiency, incompleteness, or becoming in the very act of one’s 
reification. 
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Mitchell Benjamin Frank, German Romantic Painting Redefined, Nazarene tradition and the 
narratives of Romanticism (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2001), 37-47. 
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 Green’s understanding of McCahon’s doubt in terms of a faith in and as a praxis of 
questioning is reiterated in two subsequent commentaries on McCahon and his work – 
Alexa Johnston’s ‘Godtalk – McCahon and Theology’ (1988) and McKenzie’s ‘Celestial 
Lavatories’ (1989). It will be convenient to discuss these essays in parallel insofar as both 
writers (1) address an apparent reluctance, in McCahon discourse, to engage with or 
acknowledge the ‘Christian’ dimension of McCahon’s work, and (2) locate McCahon’s 
‘questioning faith’ within the context of Christian theology. To this end, one might begin 
with Johnston’s contention that 
 
...there is a skandalon, a stumbling block which still lies at the centre of McCahon’s 
work... [in] his insistent exploring of issues of doubt and faith, of hope and despair, 
in a consciously Christian framework.617 
 
In Lacanian terms, Johnston’s invocation of the skandalon resonates with the status of the 
point de capiton ‘McCahon’s doubt’ as a symptomatic formation – a repetitive stutter by 
which McCahon discourse evinces a desire to recover the primordially lost/fundamentally 
irresolvable objet petit a. Johnston identifies this skandalon with a certain reluctance 
(among arts consumers, institutions, etc.) to acknowledge the religiosity of McCahon’s 
art – although she provides only two examples in support of this claim. The first of these 
is an entirely anecdotal observation from an art curator based in the United States and 
thus, perhaps, of limited value.618 However, Johnston’s second example clearly resonates 
with the contradictions proper to the figure of McCahon’s doubt in McCahon discourse – 
namely, the title of the exhibition McCahon: ‘Religious’ Works 1946 – 1952 (1975). 
Echoing admissions made in the accompanying catalogue by the exhibition curator, Luit 
Bieringa, Johnston observes that placing the word ‘ “religious” ’ in inverted commas 
immediately signals a degree of equivocation.619 Indeed, in Johnston’s view, Bieringa’s 
                                                 
617
 Alexa M. Johnston, ‘God-talk – McCahon and Theology’ in Auckland City Art Gallery, Colin 
McCahon, Gates and Journeys, exh. cat. (Auckland: 1988), 55. 
 
618
 See Margy P. Sharpe (curator at the National Museum of American Art, Washington D.C.) in 
a letter to Johnston dated 22 February 1988 and cited in Johnston, ‘God-talk’, 56, 67 (n2). 
 
619
 Johnston, ‘God-talk’, 56. See also Bieringa, ‘Colin McCahon: “Religious” Works 1946-52’ in 
McCahon, McCahon: ‘religious’ works, 1946 – 1952, 3, where it is asserted:  
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comments evince a certain ‘anxiety’ and ‘nervousness’ that a ‘ “strictly Christian” 
interpretation’ might damage the credibility of McCahon’s work. As Johnston points out, 
Bieringa seems concerned that the religious or Christian dimension of McCahon’s 
creative activity may be seen as ‘purist, narrow, inflexible’ – an impediment that 
demands to be overcome if one is to avoid the ‘nagging suspicion that McCahon has 
somehow let us down by being a great twentieth century painter yet insisting on 
“bringing religion into it”.’620 
 
 McKenzie’s article opens with an acknowledgement of Johnston’s suggestion that 
there is a ‘prevailing reluctance to address the “religious content” of McCahon’s 
painting.’ More significantly, however, McKenzie identifies a glaringly obvious example 
that Johnston overlooks – namely, Curnow’s essay: ‘Thinking about Colin McCahon and 
Barnett Newman’. In McKenzie’s view, Curnow’s ‘high opinion of McCahon and low 
opinion of Christianity’ inheres in the insistence that Christianity is an ‘ “eccentric 
knowledge” ’ that McCahon ‘does not regard... as true, so much as useful.’621 Although 
McKenzie does not press this point, one might ask whether Johnston’s failure to engage 
with Curnow was precluded by Curnow’s status as a co-contributor to Colin McCahon, 
Gates and Journeys? If so, Johnston’s essay evinces a certain irony – perpetrating, on 
another level of McCahon discourse, the very skandalon it seeks to elaborate and 
undermine.  
 
 Notwithstanding Johnston’s oversight (the precise reasons for which, it should be 
admitted, are purely speculative), her willingness to acknowledge that McCahon’s 
engagement with Christianity admits a positive dimension facilitates the part of her 
                                                                                                                                                 
The title of the exhibition specifically qualifies the adjective ‘religious’ so as to avoid any 
narrow interpretations of the term, to avoid labelling the works as strictly Christian despite 
their obvious Christian symbolism, for, just as McCahon has continued to stretch the limits 
of painting, so has he extended the bounds of purist theology or narrow inflexible creeds. 
 
620
 Johnston, ‘God-talk’, 57. 
 
621
 McKenzie, ‘Celestial Lavatories’, Antic, n6, November 1989, 35. In the name of accuracy, I 
should point out that, in his footnotes (35, n3), McKenzie incorrectly attributes to Johnston 
Curnow’s characterisation of Christianity as an ‘eccentric knowledge’. 
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argument that is of greatest significance in the present context. Namely, the degree to 
which ‘McCahon seems... to be at home in the questioning tradition of theological 
thought’ and the manner by which ‘his paintings exist within the questioning tradition of 
Christian faith’ – i.e., the degree to which McCahon’s painting reflects currents in 
contemporary theology that are characterised not by dogmatic inflexibility, but rather by 
what Johnston refers to as ‘rigorous debate’ and a ‘broadening of terms of reference’ in 
relation to the ultimate questions of human existence.622 In substantiating this claim, 
Johnston appeals to arguments presented in Ronald Gregor Smith’s The Doctrine of God 
(1970) and Allan Galloway’s Faith in a Changing Culture (1967), in relation to which 
she conveys two, further points of critical importance. In the first place, Johnston 
suggests that faith cannot be explained or defined in relation to matters of knowledge and 
belief but rather demands to be considered as ‘something more than belief... a total 
attitude to life and a commitment to a way of life.’ By way of Smith’s account of Paul 
Tillich’s conception of the divine as ‘Being-itself’, Johnston presents a conception of 
faith as concerned less with the ontic dimension of particular beings (i.e., what is) than 
with the ontological mode of Being considered as a way or process of becoming.623 
Secondly, Johnston refers to Galloway’s elucidation of Tillich’s conception of faith as 
‘the state of being ultimately concerned’.624 As Galloway points out, ‘ultimate concern’ is 
a ‘transcendental concept in the strict Kantian sense’ insofar as it is (1) an a priori 
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 Johnston, ‘God-talk’, 59, 67. 
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 Ibid, 60-61. In support of this idea, Johnston appeals to discussion in Ronald Gregor Smith, 
The Doctrine of God, edited and prepared for publication by K. Gregor Smith and A.D. Galloway 
(London: Collins, 1970). Here, Smith (101) refers to the advocacy of an ontological conception of 
divinity made in Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press and James Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 1955), 82-83. 
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 Johnston, ‘God-talk’, 61. In support of this idea, Johnston’s primary reference is Galloway, 
Faith in a Changing Culture (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967) – in particular, 
Galloway’s response to the definition of faith given in Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957), 1, as ‘the state of being ultimately concerned’. Here, I should 
point out that, whilst Galloway (13) acknowledges Tillich as the source of this definition, he 
neither mentions Tillich’s book nor provides any other explicit reference. Indeed, Galloway’s 
book lacks a Bibliography. Johnston compounds this difficulty by reproducing Galloway’s 
paraphrase of Tillich in the main body of her text – without, however, providing page references 
either in Tillich or Galloway. 
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condition of possibility according to which, in lived experience, faith is structured and 
actualised, and yet (2) that which is, in its essence, unavailable to such experience.625 In 
other words, the efficacy of the conception of faith as ultimate concern resists objective, 
empirical, rational determination and, in consequence, must be taken, as it were, on faith. 
However, rather than seeking to resolve this antinomy, Galloway insists that ‘This 
paradoxical element is essential to authentic faith. Indeed it becomes the touchstone of its 
authenticity.’626 In consequence, Johnston concludes that ‘Galloway sees questioning, 
tension and paradox as essential elements which characterise rather than compromise an 
authentic faith.’627  
 
 Whilst making no reference to Johnston’s essay beyond the preliminary 
acknowledgement mentioned previously, it is noteworthy that McKenzie’s article 
recapitulates several of Johnston’s primary observations. Specifically, by way of appeals 
to Kierkegaard’s philosophy of religion, McKenzie reiterates Johnston’s understanding of 
McCahon’s vision of doubt in terms of a faith in and as praxes of (1) becoming, (2) 
questioning, (3) embracing paradox.628 Beginning with McCahon’s admission: ‘I could 
never call myself a Christian, therefore these... doubts constantly assail me too’, 
McKenzie proposes that ‘Rather than negating the Christian way, this statement can be 
taken as valorising doubt as vital to Christianity.’629 In support of this claim, McKenzie 
observes, firstly, that McCahon’s statement is ‘an exact echo’ of Kierkegaard’s 
sentiments, according to which Kierkegaard repudiates the practice of Christianity as 
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 Galloway, Faith in a Changing Culture, 27. 
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 Johnston, ‘God-talk’, 61. 
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 In this regard, I note that McKenzie’s essay does not directly engage with Kierkegaard’s 
writings, depending almost entirely on a secondary source: Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood, 
Hegel & Kierkegaard (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1980). In 
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 McKenzie, ‘Celestial Lavatories’, 36, 38. 
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slavish or complacent adherence to doctrine in favour of a vision of Christianity as an 
unattainable ideal to which one must continually aspire (i.e., in Kierkegaard’s view, being 
truly Christian is neither an accomplished fact nor the product of a primal baptism but 
rather a state towards which one must struggle in a never-ending process of becoming).630 
Secondly, McKenzie suggests that Kierkegaard conceives of being Christian as ‘the 
relentless task of hazarding guesses, elaborating possibilities, undermining solutions, 
confronting oneself as a question-mark’ in which one assumes the position of the 
‘Socratic educator’ who ‘must question but not presume to answer.’631  Thirdly, 
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 Ibid, 36. In relation to the idea that the Kierkegaardian ideal is a state of being towards which 
one must struggle in a never-ending process of becoming see, for example, Kierkegaard, 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript To Philosophical Fragments: A Mimical-Pathetical-
Dialectical Compilation, An Existential Contribution, v1, in Kierkegaard’s Writings, XII.1, 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript To Philosophical Fragments (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992, originally published as Johannes Climacus, ed. S. Kierkegaard, Afsluttende 
uvidenskabelig Efterskrift til de philosophiske Smuler. Mimisk-pathetisk-dialektisk Sammenskrift, 
Existentielt Indlæg (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel, 1846). Here, Kierkegaard presents a validation of 
subjective (as opposed to objective) religious thinking on the basis that: 
 
Whereas objective thinking invests everything in the result and assists all humankind to 
cheat by copying and reeling off the results and answers, subjective thinking invests 
everything in the process of becoming and omits the result... (73) 
 
In consequence, Kierkegaard favours subjective religious thinking for its efficacy in 
communicating the ‘conviction’ that ‘truth is inwardness; objectively there is no truth, but the 
appropriation [i.e., the way or taking possession of/responsibility for the truth-making] is the 
truth’ (77), and ‘the truth is not the truth but... the way is the truth, that is, the truth is only in the 
becoming, in the process of appropriation... [and] consequently there is no [objectively verifiable] 
result’ (78). Indeed, in his Conclusion, Kierkegaard insists: ‘No one begins with being Christian; 
each one becomes that in the fullness of time – if one becomes that’ (591). 
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 McKenzie, ‘Celestial Lavatories’, 36. With regard to the idea that Kierkegaard considers 
questioning to be an intrinsic aspect of being Christian see, for example, Kierkegaard, The 
Concept of Irony, With Continual Reference to Socrates in Kierkegaard’s Writings, II, The 
Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates together with Notes of Schelling’s Berlin 
Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, originally published as Om Begrebet Ironi 
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presumes ‘plenitude’ – i.e., presupposes and/or demands the possibility of being satiated, of there 
being, in Kierkegaard’s parlance, an objective ‘result’. By contrast, ironic questioning presumes 
‘emptiness’ and, on this basis, is a questioning intended, primarily, to perpetuate the activity of 
questioning. Kierkegaard asserts that ‘Socrates in particular practised the latter [i.e., ironic] 
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McKenzie observes that, for Kierkegaard, a defining tenet of Christianity – namely, 
divine incarnation in the figure of Christ – is an ‘Absolute Paradox’ or ‘logical 
impossibility’, the acceptance of which has no basis in reason but, on the contrary, 
demands a ‘ “leap of faith” ’.632 Indeed, in The Sickness unto Death. A Christian 
Psychological Exposition For Upbuilding And Awakening (1849), Kierkegaard insists 
that the fundamental test of faith is whether one ‘will believe that for God everything is 
possible... But this is the very formula for losing the understanding; to believe is indeed 
to lose the understanding in order to gain God.’633 This comment reveals to what extent 
Kierkegaard understands faith as that which necessitates (indeed, as that which simply is) 
the embracing of paradox in the face of reason. Moreover (as McKenzie observes), that 
Kierkegaard acknowledges the difficulty in attaining and sustaining this faith is evident 
from his reference to the ‘battle of faith, battling madly if you will, for possibility, 
because possibility is the only salvation.’634 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
method’ and thereby ‘expelled... [the] poetic vapors’ by which ‘the Sophists... had befogged 
themselves in their own eloquence’.  
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 McKenzie, ‘Celestial Lavatories’, 38-39. For a reference to Kierkegaard’s conception of 
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 6.3.2 Eloquent reticence: Hotere’s effecting discursive silence 
 
 The idea that Hotere is eloquent insofar as he is reticent, on which basis one may posit 
a seemingly contradictory eloquent reticence, is particularly evident in writing suggesting 
that, historically, there has been no substantial Hotere discourse – where, crucially, 
Hotere’s reticence (expressed either in the obduracy of Hotere-the-person or in the 
challenges Hotere’s work presents to interpretation) is specifically implicated as the 
cause of this discursive silence. As noted in the thesis Introduction, acknowledgement of 
this phenomenon may be found in Wedde’s Landfall review article, ‘Figure it Out’. Here, 
it is observed that  
 
Hotere’s unwillingness to discuss his work has become mythical and this reticence 
is often elided with the sparseness of writing, as though the artist’s silence explains 
and amplifies the absence of critical record.635 
 
Wedde goes on to suggest that the ‘silences’ associated with Hotere-the-artist-individual 
or with the discourse on Hotere (i.e., the idea that this discourse is absent) 
 
...have sometimes been applauded as unpretentious integrity and this has, in turn, 
been elided with an oversimplified modernist dictum that expects works of art to 
speak for themselves.636 
  
Notwithstanding its sophisticated approach and recognition of Hotere’s ‘much 
mythologised refusal to frame the work in words’, Pound’s aforementioned essay ‘Tiger 
Country’ would appear to exemplify the kind of writing to which Wedde alludes. 
Relevant, in this regard, is Pound’s suggestion that 
 
Not only do Hotere’s early black paintings negate speech inside themselves... They 
make respondent speech difficult... Hence the almost complete lack of critical 
writing around Hotere’s wordless black paintings.637 
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 Pound, ‘Tiger Country’, 16. 
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Moreover, as previously discussed, the degree to which Pound considers Hotere’s Black 
Paintings of 1968 to be formally autonomous (i.e., to ‘speak for themselves’) is evident 
from the characterisation of these works as an ‘absolute poetry... poetic to a degree 
disallowed by the literal presence of poetic texts’.  
 
 However, I would suggest that this aspect of the point de capiton ‘Hotere’s reticence’ 
may be elaborated even more usefully with reference to three texts from the latter 1990s 
that, variously, demand, offer to enact, or reflect on what might be termed Hotere’s 
‘institutional rehabilitation’. The exemplary signs of this ‘second coming’ were twofold. 
Firstly, there was the publication of O’Brien’s Hotere, Out The Black Window – the most 
elaborate monograph on Hotere and his work produced up to that point. Secondly, there 
was the presentation of the national touring show, Hotere – out the black window (1997-
98) (which O’Brien curated in association with the City Gallery, Wellington) – 
noteworthy as the most extensive, institutional gesture devoted to Hotere and his work 
since the national touring show Ralph Hotere, A survey 1963-73.638 The three texts in 
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 According to various sources, Hotere – out the black window toured all four main centres 
between June 1997 and September 1998. As noted in Elizabeth Kerr and Mary Trewby, ‘A 
Chronology of Ralph Hotere’ in Ralph Hotere: Black Light, 127, the exhibition debuted at 
Wellington City Art Gallery, 7 June – 14 September 1997. According to Charmian Smith, 
‘What’s on’, Otago Daily Times, 2 December 1997, 16, the exhibition was presented at Dunedin 
Public Art Gallery, 6 December 1997 – 8 February 1998. In the ‘Current Exhibitions’ section of 
Robert McDougall Art Gallery and Annex, Bulletin, n111, December 1997 – February 1998, np, 
http://christchurchartgallery.org.nz/media/uploads/2010_07/Bulletin_111.pdf, (28.05.14), the 
Christchurch schedule of Hotere – out the black window is given as 5 February – 19 April 1998. 
Finally, in Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki, Auckland Art Gallery Exhibition History 
(Auckland, December 2013), np, 
http://www.aucklandartgallery.com/media/1514410/aag_exhibition_history_dec2013.pdf, 
(28.05.14), it is stated that Hotere – out the black window was shown 4 July – 6 September 1998. 
 
 It may be observed that Hotere’s status as a key figure in the art canon of Aotearoa/New 
Zealand received further validation in the form of the national touring exhibition Ralph Hotere: 
Black Light (2000-2001) and the publication of the accompanying catalogue. As noted in Kerr 
and Trewby, 128, the exhibition in question debuted at Dunedin Public Art Gallery 4 March – 21 
May 2000. In Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki, Auckland Art Gallery Exhibition History, it is 
stated that Ralph Hotere: Black Light was shown at Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki 10 June 
– 23 August 2000. Finally, according to Josie McNaught, ‘Grandeur in black’, Dominion, 26 
October 2000, 18, in its culminating phase, Ralph Hotere: Black Light was presented at the 
Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, Wellington 28 October 2000 – 25 February 2001. 
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question comprise O’Brien’s Landfall interview with Manhire: ‘Some Paintings I Am 
Frequently Asked About’, Jonathan Mane-Wheoki’s Landfall review article, ‘Hotere – 
out the black window’ (1997), and Keith Stewart’s seminar piece, ‘I Do, Ralph Hotere 
And Constructive Silence’ (1998). In each of these documents, the suggestion that 
Hotere’s reticence is implicated in discursive silence is, itself, enmeshed in various 
ambiguities or contradictions. Thus, in the first place, one encounters the claim that 
discursive silence is a product of Hotere’s reticence and institutional dereliction of duty. 
Secondly, one finds the assertion that the New Zealand arts establishment has failed to 
fully meet its responsibilities towards Hotere and Hotere and/or his work has attracted 
ever-increasing institutional recognition, commanding widespread admiration and 
respect. 
 
 Consider, for example, O’Brien’s opening statement, in ‘Some Paintings I Am 
Frequently Asked About’, where it is observed that 
 
Ralph Hotere is a singular if elusive figure in recent New Zealand art... Hotere is an 
intensely private person whose reticence has almost certainly contributed to the 
paucity of in-depth critical writing about his work over the past two decades, during 
which time the institutional and public recognition of his work has increased 
markedly. The absence of a published monograph on Hotere’s work is the 
extraordinary oversight of New Zealand art history.639 
 
Here, one encounters the claim, proper to the special case of the point de capiton 
‘Hotere’s reticence’ in question, that not only is there a ‘paucity of in-depth critical 
writing’ on Hotere’s work but that this is a state of affairs to which Hotere’s ‘reticence 
has almost certainly contributed’. It may be evident that an underlying implication of this 
remark is that ‘in-depth critical writing’ on art demands validation by the person of the 
artist. To this extent, O’Brien’s article would seem to privilege the artist individual as the 
exemplary point of reference enabling and securing determinations of the meaning of the 
work. This said, O’Brien also offers the counter claim that, notwithstanding the 
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 O’Brien, ‘Some Paintings I Am Frequently Asked About’, 21. It may be noted that the very 
title of O’Brien’s essay obliquely reifies the idea of Hotere’s reticence insofar as it implies that 
Hotere’s persistent refusal to account for his work results in questions being frequently addressed 
to Manhire – one of the pre-eminent donors of words employed in Hotere’s paintings. 
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significant expansion of ‘institutional and public recognition of... [Hotere’s] work’ over 
the last twenty years, ‘The absence of a published monograph on Hotere’s work is the 
extraordinary oversight of New Zealand art history’. In this regard, in advocating 
Hotere’s institutional reification, O’Brien places the responsibility for the discursive 
silence surrounding Hotere onto the, implicitly, neglectful arts establishment of New 
Zealand – or, to be more precise, the not-quite-clearly-defined sector of this arts 
establishment that might undertake the ‘in-depth critical writing’ of a ‘New Zealand art 
history’. 
 
 However, when one examines documentation related to the production of the text that 
would offer to fill this lack (i.e., O’Brien’s Hotere, Out The Black Window, published just 
over a year after the Landfall article in question), it becomes evident to what extent the 
successful orchestration of Hotere’s institutional re-ascendance is attributed to a 
negotiation or overcoming of Hotere’s reticence. For example, on the basis of a faxed 
communication exchanged between O’Brien and Rodney Kirk-Smith in mid 1996, it is 
clear that, before proceeding, O’Brien clearly desired Hotere’s blessing. This is evident 
from the disenchantment O’Brien expresses over Hotere’s failure to reply to letters and 
phone messages, and O’Brien’s proposal to withdraw from the book project.640 Still 
further, Peter Kitchin’s Evening Post review article ‘Hotere: artist in verse and paint’ 
(1997) recounts how O’Brien ‘found a way through Hotere’s reservations.’ In Kitchin’s 
report, O’Brien credits Kirk-Smith (Hotere’s longstanding, Auckland dealer) with giving 
‘Hotere a nudge’. Subsequently, O’Brien and Hotere discussed the book project at Kirk-
Smith’s funeral. Kitchin concludes: 
 
The result was that O’Brien’s work accelerated. The exhibition, and O’Brien’s 
book with the same title, is as much a testament to his fortitude as to his 
scholarship.641 
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 See, for example, O’Brien, faxed letter to Rodney Kirk-Smith dated 16 July 1996, courtesy of 
University of Otago, Hocken Collections Te Uare Taoka o Hākena, ‘Papers relating to Gregory 
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 The ambiguities present in O’Brien’s interview with Manhire are reiterated in Mane-
Wheoki’s review of O’Brien’s book and the accompanying touring show. Mane-
Wheoki’s opening comments paint a picture of Hotere as an artist of national significance 
who has endured a degree of establishment indifference that is unfathomable – if not 
unconscionable. Thus, whilst there is cause ‘to celebrate’ the publication of O’Brien’s 
book and the accompanying touring exhibition, Mane-Wheoki stresses the belatedness of 
these gestures in remarking on ‘the first major exhibition to be devoted to Ralph Hotere’s 
art in more than twenty years, and the publication of a substantial monograph – at long 
last.’ Even more emphatically, Mane-Wheoki asserts: 
 
In retrospect, the yawning interval of time New Zealand’s art establishment has 
allowed to elapse, the institutional neglect of an artist of undisputed mana, whose 
career spans almost half a century, might be regarded as scandalous. 
 
Indeed, in a fashion that not only contradicts O’Brien’s view that ‘over the past two 
decades... institutional and public recognition of... [Hotere’s] work has increased 
markedly’ but also Mane-Wheoki’s own claim that Hotere is ‘an artist of undisputed 
mana’ (my italics), Mane-Wheoki goes so far as to imply that institutional mistreatment 
of Hotere and his work is perennial: 
 
...since the unfortunate abandonment of the national tour of his survey exhibition in 
1975, after two-thirds of the works were badly damaged in transit, Hotere has 
tended to be taken for granted, occasionally overlooked and even ignored...642  
 
 This said, and precisely in accordance with the ambiguities previously identified with 
the absence of discourse on Hotere and his work, Mane-Wheoki also speculates that, in 
concert with Hotere’s residence in Dunedin since 1969, ‘beyond the immediate horizons 
of Wellington’s culture brokers, and Auckland’s’... 
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Maybe the artist’s disinclination... “to discuss or explain his work, preferring to let 
the work exist on its own very broad terms”... has, hitherto, deterred art writers and 
curators from attempting anything more than scattered reviews and articles, and 
inclusion in the odd survey exhibition.643 
 
Moreover, echoing the view that O’Brien’s book and the accompanying exhibition 
necessitated a negotiation of Hotere’s reticence, Mane-Wheoki remarks that 
 
To have gained the artist’s trust and co-operation, in view of his oft-stated 
reticence, as O’Brien has so obviously done, in order to undertake this project, is in 
itself no small achievement.644 
 
 Before proceeding to address Stewart’s seminar piece, the striking difference in degree 
between O’Brien’s moderate suggestion that, historically, ‘in-depth critical writing’ on 
Hotere has been lacking and Mane-Wheoki’s much stronger claim of ‘institutional 
neglect’ merits further attention. Here, I would argue that, in the period 1975-97, if one 
considers the number of Hotere’s works acquired for public collections, the quantity and 
scale of exhibitions in which Hotere’s work was featured, and references to Hotere in 
publications such as Art New Zealand then Mane-Wheoki’s claim seems somewhat 
exaggerated.645 This said, Mane-Wheoki’s comments would appear to reflect his fervent 
conviction that Hotere is ‘clearly well overdue for institutional recognition on a grand 
scale’ – where, moreover, neither the touring exhibition nor O’Brien’s monograph ‘set 
out to be the long-awaited retrospective... [or] the definitive catalogue of... [Hotere’s] 
oeuvre.’
646
 Whilst it is unclear what Mane-Wheoki would consider to be ‘institutional 
recognition on a grand scale’, it is undeniable that Hotere’s work has yet to receive the 
level of institutional support devoted to internationally presented shows such as Colin 
McCahon: Gates and Journeys (1988-89) or Colin McCahon, A Question of Faith (2002-
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04).647 Indeed, at the time of writing, if one relies on the (admittedly, potentially 
deceptive) criterion of numbers of works exhibited then there has yet to be a Hotere 
exhibition more extensive than the national touring show Ralph Hotere, A survey 1963-
73 (1974-75), which included sixty three separate works and which was presented in nine 
of its intended ten, national venues. Finally, it may be noted that neither Hotere nor 
McCahon has been subject of a catalogue raisonné.648 
 
 Stewart’s ‘I Do, Ralph Hotere And Constructive Silence’ reiterates the ambiguities 
present in the aforementioned articles by O’Brien and Mane-Wheoki – albeit, with a 
notably higher rhetorical temperature. Stewart begins with the now-familiar justification 
of Hotere’s reticence on the basis that, (1) Hotere speaks fully in the work, and (2), in and 
of itself, the work fully speaks for itself: 
 
Ralph Hotere doesn’t say much, at least with his tongue. He prefers to leave 
comment to his work, art which is supremely eloquent, accentuating his silence and 
the plea that silence makes for the primacy of art over theory.649 
 
Stewart’s overt privileging of ‘art over theory’ is further evident in his insistence that 
Hotere’s work ‘highlights the impotence of any words we may have’ and ‘thrives without 
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literary midwifery’, thereby transcending ‘the inevitable discussions which yammer 
around all art.’650 The degree to which Stewart invests in the notion of the autonomy of 
the artwork reiterates an irony observed previously (see n503) – namely, that this 
prioritisation precisely employs the resources of spoken and written language in order to 
advance the notion that Hotere’s work is ‘inexplicable in words’. To this extent, 
Stewart’s seminar piece constitutes and perpetrates the very praxis that, ostensibly, it 
opposes. 
 
 In relation to the idea that Hotere’s reticence is implicated in discursive silence, 
Stewart suggests (in a tone much less conciliatory than either O’Brien or Mane-Wheoki) 
that 
 
Hotere’s silence in the preening, posturing cacophony of the contemporary 
artworld... is a dissonance which has unsettled the clamouring crowd to such an 
extent that they have been frightened away from his work.651 
 
and 
 
This academic and intellectual silence matches Hotere’s and is a consequence of it, 
for Hotere’s silence denies the easy theological foundation of the artist’s articulated 
philosophy, and so it denies the theorists a starting point.652 
 
In suggesting that ‘Hotere’s silence denies... theorists... the easy theological foundation of 
the artist’s articulated philosophy’, Stewart would seem to be directing his criticism 
towards arts discourse that genuflects in the direction of the authority of the artist-
individual. That is to say, discourse that prioritises the individual art subject insofar as it 
responds to or orients itself in accordance with the perceived expressions and wishes of 
the artist-individual. In Hotere’s case, this privileging would appear to manifest 
negatively: discursive silence mimicking the silence of the artist-individual. If this was, in 
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fact, Stewart’s intent then his commentary would be in harmony with the impetus of the 
present study. However, given Stewart’s pronounced hostility to ‘theory’ or ‘literary 
midwifery’, this interpretation is precluded. On the contrary, insofar as Stewart valourises 
the manner by which Hotere’s reticence effects discursive silence he is, precisely, 
engaged in privileging the individual art subject called ‘Hotere’. 
 
 To this extent, Stewart’s exposition is marked by the same ambiguities that appear in 
the writing of O’Brien and Mane-Wheoki – namely, that the discursive silence on Hotere 
and his work is, at once, an occasion for validating Hotere’s individual authority and 
criticising a national arts establishment considered to have been deficient in meeting its 
obligations. Indeed, Stewart contends that ‘our art theologians have grafted their rituals 
onto a cavalcade of lesser artists’ than Hotere and even goes so far as to claim that ‘the 
arrival of Hotere Out The Black Window shocked a significant sector or the art 
establishment into attempting to ignore it.’653 Still further, Stewart issues the 
condemnatory judgement that 
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In our imitative Western Atlantic fine arts culture of commentary, curatory, and 
canon, it is amazing that this is the first serious Hotere retrospective, and the 
supporting publication is the only substantial script on forty years of authoritative 
artmaking.654 
 
At the time Stewart’s essay was written, O’Brien’s book was, indeed, the ‘only 
substantial script’ on Hotere’s work. However, in view of the precedent set by Ralph 
Hotere, A survey 1963-73, the claim that Hotere – out the black window is the ‘first 
serious Hotere retrospective’ is incorrect. This error is compounded by the fact that, 
whilst Stewart supplies a Bibliography, his many assertions of fact and opinion are 
unsubstantiated by footnotes or other references. Given Stewart’s strong distaste of 
‘theory’ or ‘literary midwifery’, that he eschews the finer points of scholarly convention 
is, perhaps, unsurprising. Nevertheless, I would suggest that, in disdaining scholarly 
balance and moderation in favour of the presentation of a pronounced polemic, ironically, 
Stewart’s seminar piece risks being taken as an example of the very ‘posturing 
cacophony’ it denounces. 
 
 Let us summarise the preceding discussion in order to clarify what the writing of 
O’Brien, Mane-Wheoki, and Stewart implies for considerations of the point de capiton 
‘Hotere’s reticence’. Here, it would appear that, certain ambiguities and contradictions 
notwithstanding, all three writers invest in the idea that Hotere, in being reticent, has 
discouraged critical discourse and, thereby, effected discursive silence. Insofar as 
Hotere’s reticence is considered to be effective, it is not presented as pure passivity but 
rather admits consideration as an active element ‘resounding’ through the discourse with 
the force of a command. From this perspective, Hotere’s reticence testifies to a 
contradictory ‘speaking’ by virtue of ‘not speaking’ and, to this extent, the discursive 
silence in question invites interpretation as a product of Hotere’s eloquent reticence or, 
equivalently, Hotere’s adherence to a praxis of silent speech. Immediately, the question 
arises as to the ostensive purpose of this praxis. That is to say, how is the praxis to be 
explained or justified? At first glance, the answer would appear to be that the work be 
permitted to speak or, better perhaps, the orchestration of a state of affairs in which the 
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‘speaking of the work’ (i.e., its being and meaning) may be clearly apprehended. In 
Hotere discourse, the level of investment in this praxis is evident from the continual 
rhetoric insisting on the formal autonomy of Hotere’s work and the resistance to analysis 
this work presents. 
 
 By way of emphasising this point, let us briefly revisit some of the statements in 
question. Thus, in relation to Hotere’s Black Paintings of 1969, McNamara suggests that 
they possess ‘a quiet, calm beauty that defies analysis’ and ‘exist in their own right as 
objects of great beauty.’655 With regard to the Malady series of 1970, Collier asserts that 
‘The principal thing about almost all the pictures is that nothing is overt, nothing is 
proclaimed’ and ‘The way a painting interacts with the spectator’s power of sight is a 
complex business and best left so.’656 Writing on Hotere’s Port Chalmers Paintings of 
1972, Middleditch speculates that ‘There seems to be something aggressive in this series, 
something that says “Keep out.” I suppose outsiders will never quite get under the 
surface’.657 As noted in Hall’s essay for the Waikato Art Gallery Bulletin, Hotere, 
himself, asserts ‘ “If you have to do something on me, fill it with photos of my work. 
They say all that really needs to be said.” ’658 Discussing the works employing stainless 
exhibited in 1983, Leech concludes: ‘The work of course speaks for itself; and in this 
exhibition it speaks very clearly in Hotere’s style.’659 Reflecting on Hotere’s Black 
Paintings of 1968, Pound observes that ‘Not only do Hotere’s early black paintings 
negate speech inside themselves... They make respondent speech difficult’ and, 
furthermore, ‘while refusing entry to the poets, Hotere’s early black paintings are 
absolute poetry... poetic to a degree disallowed by the literal presence of poetic texts.’660 
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Finally, in Stewart’s polemic, one finds the insistence that Hotere’s work ‘is supremely 
eloquent, accentuating... [Hotere’s] silence and the plea that silence makes for the 
primacy of art over theory’ and, still further, that Hotere’s work ‘highlights the impotence 
of any words we may have’ and ‘thrives without literary midwifery’.661 
 
 The suggestion that Hotere’s eloquent reticence or praxis of silent speech aims to 
make apprehensible the ‘speaking’ or, rather, being and meaning of the work admits an 
equivalent formulation. Namely, that, in silencing (part of) the field of subjectivity or 
effecting a suspension of prejudices and preconceptions, the praxis in question enlivens 
the possibility of an experience of the work that is primary, immediate, genuine, original, 
essential, authentic, and so forth. To this extent, Hotere’s praxis of silent speech parallels 
McCahon’s praxis of questioning: in both cases, the praxes are intended to facilitate 
experiences that are real and true. Moreover, the dimension of faith enters the equation 
insofar as, in either case, there is no objective guarantee that the praxes in question will 
be efficacious. It is not possible to know in advance that a praxis of questioning will be of 
efficacy in attaining knowledge and truth (or, as Curnow would have it, knowledges and 
truths). Similarly, it is not possible to know in advance that a praxis of silent speech will 
be of efficacy in attaining a true and real experience of the artwork. In either event, by 
necessity, the praxes in question demand a radically contingent affirmation or leap of 
faith. Hence, in the same way that McCahon’s paradoxical vision of doubt admits 
consideration as an expression of faith in and as a praxis of questioning so, too, does 
Hotere’s contradictory eloquent reticence admit consideration as an expression of faith in 
and as a praxis of silent speech. 
 
 Here, it should be emphasised that the ostensive aim of these praxes of contradiction – 
namely, the revelation of the reality and truth of the being and meaning of art subjects 
and art objects – is, precisely, of the order of the imaginary idealisations and 
rationalisations of consciousness. Always already, the fact that there is a praxis – which 
is to say, repetition – is symptomatic of the structure of desiring subjectivity. That is to 
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say, as praxes of contradiction, the figures of McCahon’s questioning faith and Hotere’s 
effecting discursive silence are commensurate with the insistent return of the repressed, 
lettering/tracing/differencng, or figuring of desire that (as Lacan puts it in Seminar VIII) 
bears witness to ‘the blind presence of... unnamed, blind desire’, paradoxically fulfilled in 
endlessly missing its aim. Hence, investing in or performing praxes, precisely, defines 
consciousness as automatism/metonymy/repetition such that to be conscious is to be 
repeating; the conscious one makes meaning only insofar as this meaning is made again. 
To recall the point made earlier, in relation to Butler’s comment regarding the ‘pure act’ 
of the ‘decision to believe’, strictly speaking, the ‘investment in’ or ‘performance of’ 
praxes of questioning or silent speech reflects the manner by which the conscious one is 
as continually being given to invest in and perform the praxes in question and, therefore, 
is as continually being given to believe in their efficacy. Given that the praxes lack any 
objective justification, this also is to say that the conscious one is as continually being 
given to make radically contingent affirmations or leaps of faith and, therefore, is as 
continually being given to posit an endless series of signifying alternatives or imaginary 
surrogates for the ineffable objet petit a. Thus, the challenge confronting the ‘one that is 
conscious’ is to negotiate the tension obtaining between the idealisations and 
rationalisations of consciousness (which would tend to, precipitately and prematurely, 
determine or close the field of meaning) and the insistence of ineffable subjective desire 
that seeks only its own perpetuation (i.e., that which would tend to render the field of 
meaning fundamentally indeterminate or open). As noted in the thesis Introduction, this 
challenge is, precisely, to be in and as traversing the fundamental fantasies of the ‘one 
that is conscious’ and the ‘subject supposed to know’ such that the attainment of one’s 
fantasised self-realisation or one’s fantasy objects is indefinitely deferred. In the process, 
‘unnamed, blind desire’ is sublimated into named, directed drive (however radically 
contingent, idealised and rationalised this naming and directing may be), and ‘one’ finds 
satisfaction in being as a subject endlessly in becoming or as an analyst forever as 
arriving. 
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis has generated some new perspectives on and potentials for the practice of 
art history and art criticism in Aotearoa/New Zealand through an intervening in and 
interweaving of the discourse surrounding McCahon and Hotere, the philosophy of art, 
and Lacanian psychoanalysis. In so doing, this project has initiated the first, 
comprehensive, interdisciplinary conversation between Lacanian theory and that part of 
arts discourse in Aotearoa/New Zealand addressing McCahon and Hotere. By way of 
presenting some final words in this thesis (which are, it is to be hoped, the first words in a 
discourse to follow), let us, briefly, summarise the main gestures of this conversation. In 
the first part of this study, then, I explored the ambiguous and contradictory nature of the 
subjectivity expressed in the written paintings Victory over Death 2, Painting from 
“Malady”, and related works in order to demonstrate the efficacy of conceiving of this 
subjectivity in terms of the tension obtaining between the individual ‘one that is 
conscious’ and the transindividual Otherness of language-mediated, social and cultural 
reality, the greater part of which is, practically speaking, repressed from the perspective 
of the conscious one and, therefore, unconscious. In the process, I elaborated a model of 
subjectivity/meaning-making that (1) unsettles the metaphysical thinking invested in 
making absolute distinctions between self and Other, (2) resists making clear-cut 
differences between painting and writing, and (3) understands expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making (i.e., painting – and the writing and testimony surrounding 
painting) in terms of the agent-like, metaphoric precipitation and automatist, metonymic 
perpetuation of symptomatic formations, figures of discourse, or points de capiton. 
 
 The second part of the thesis applied this preliminary understanding to painting, 
considered as a sign or expression of subjectivity/meaning-making, in order to address 
two, key questions: how does the meaning of painting come into being? and how is the 
meaning of painting sustained? In this regard, the expression figuring of painting was 
employed to define the investigation of the agent-like, metaphoric function implicated in 
the precipitation of points de capiton in painting, whilst the term desire of painting served 
to designate the elaboration of the automatist, metonymic function enabling the 
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perpetuation of points de capiton in painting. The novel formulation figuring of desire 
was introduced in order to define the reciprocity of metaphoric and metonymic functions 
in language-mediated expressions of subjectivity. In the course of these deliberations, I 
drew upon a range of Lacanian texts (including some, as yet, little discussed Seminar – 
notably, Seminar IX, where Lacan presents a topological model of subjectivity), 
presenting interpretations of various, instrumental Lacanianisms – specifically, the 
‘materiality’ and ‘agency’ of the ‘letter’ considered as the ‘essence of the signifier’ or 
‘unary trait’, the ‘real-as-impossible’, synonymous with, yet inassimilable to, the function 
of representation/symbolisation, and the ‘formalisation of fantasy’: $ ◊ a. On the basis of 
this discussion, I have sought to clarify how the Lacanian model of subjectivity/meaning-
making may be efficaciously conceived in terms of a structurally necessary counterpoise 
of possibility and impossibility – unconscious metonymy becoming as conscious 
metonymy defining the order of the possible ($), and the metaphoric function of pure 
difference implicated in this becoming defining the order of the real-as-impossible (the 
‘cut’ or lettering/tracing/differencing of a). 
 
 In the third part of the thesis, this understanding has been applied to the discourse 
comprising paintings by McCahon and Hotere, and related writing and testimony, in 
order to interrogate this discourse from the perspective of two points de capiton – the 
various complexities and contradictions of which have been subsumed under the 
headings ‘McCahon’s doubt’ and ‘Hotere’s reticence’. The thesis has shown, firstly, how 
these two figures engender the possibility of interpreting McCahon discourse and Hotere 
discourse, respectively, in terms of repeated characterisations of McCahon as a visionary 
and a doubter (or, indeed, as a visionary insofar as he doubts, on which basis one 
confronts the contradictory figure of McCahon’s vision of doubt) and of Hotere as 
eloquent and reticent (or, indeed, as eloquent insofar as he is reticent, on which basis one 
confronts the paradoxical figure of Hotere’s eloquent reticence). Secondly, this study also 
has demonstrated that, to the extent McCahon discourse and Hotere discourse are 
conceivable as discourses of desire, defined in terms of fixations on symptomatic 
formations, they also are expressions of radically contingent affirmations of, or leaps of 
faith in, praxes of contradiction. I have suggested that, by virtue of these praxes, the 
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discourses in question sustain fantasies of the revelation of the reality and truth of the 
being and meaning of art subjects and art objects. The impossibility of objectively 
realising these fantasies (i.e., of realising objet petit a as an object in consciousness) 
testifies to the status of subjective desire as that which seeks only its own perpetuation or 
that finds fulfilment in endlessly missing its aim. 
 
 Here, I should reaffirm that, underlying these investigations, the thesis has been 
concerned about the very possibility of being as an agent in the world, of making 
meaning, of performing scholarship. To this extent, the discursive possibilities this 
project has enlivened, and the limits within which these possibilities have been defined, 
have embraced the Lacanian contention that, in a logico-structural and an ethical sense, 
the ‘psychoanalytic act’ or ‘end’ of analysis necessitates ‘traversing fantasy’. In the first 
place, this implies that the thesis has proceeded in light of the understanding that, always 
already, ‘I’, in becoming (as a subject, an analyst, a scholar), catalyse Other traversing of 
fantasy (i.e., enliven the possibility of assuming new perspectives in and of the discourse) 
only insofar as ‘I’ am being catalysed by the Other in traversing the fantasy I am given to 
speak/desire (i.e., the ‘I’ becoming by virtue of writing the thesis is, at the same time, 
being written by the discourse of the Other in which the thesis sits). Secondly, with 
particular regard to the arts discourse surrounding McCahon and Hotere, the thesis has 
traversed the fantasies of the traditionalising mode of art history as enshrined in the 
privileging of ‘ones that are conscious’ and the ‘subject supposed to know’. In the former 
case, this study has challenged the tendency, in seeking to determine the being and 
meaning of the artwork, to make the artist-individual the exemplary point of reference 
and, in so doing, to reify questionable notions of originality, authority, and genius. In the 
latter event, this project has challenged the (often unspoken) investment in the ideal of 
total knowledge, incontestable truth, and final meaning – as evinced in the tendency to 
advance explanations that are excessively totalising, reductive, or simplistic. 
 
 In practical terms, this means that the thesis has been less about presenting ‘primary’ 
research or deriving quantifiable results and more about enlivening and exploring 
possibilities – in particular, the possibility of assuming certain perspectives on a 
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discourse or a world of meaning, and questioning the exigencies and limits of these 
endeavours. To this extent, this study embraces the understanding that there are no final 
answers to those questions concerned with the reality and truth of the being and meaning 
of art subjects and art objects. Indeed, the very idea of there being objectively ‘real’ 
(which is to say, stable, enduring, substantial, material) entities of this kind is, in 
Lacanian terms, an imagining of the imaginary. However, this is not to say that the thesis 
presents an apology for relativism or idealism – both of which bear witness to an 
investment in fantasy insofar as they fixate on determinate positions: relativism tending 
to deny, absolutely, the possibility of making truth; idealism tending to deny, absolutely, 
the possibility of knowing (material) reality. On the contrary, ‘I’ who must be where ‘it’ 
was, who must become through the ‘term’ of analysis, is challenged to confront and 
relinquish the fixation on privileged fantasy objects (e.g., that which would offer to 
provide the final answer or reveal the ultimate truth of the being and meaning of art 
subjects and art objects) and to invest in the mode of being in and as traversing fantasy. 
In the process, ‘unnamed, blind desire’ (that seeks only its own perpetuation) is 
sublimated into named, directed drive – albeit, a ‘direction’ that, by virtue of investing in 
the very activity or movement of analysis, interpretation, meaning making, leaves its 
object(ive) indefinitely suspended or deferred. 
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Appendices 
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8.1 Barrie, Zepke, and the question of Lacanian phallogocentrism 
 
 8.1.1 Barrie  
 
 Barrie’s ‘Remissions’ and ‘Deferrals’ evince two themes that are particularly 
noteworthy. Firstly, in the broadest sense, Barrie’s writing may be situated within that 
part of the feminist project seeking to define and promote a specifically feminine mode of 
subjectivity in order to subvert entrenched and inequitable constructions of gender and 
difference in Western patriarchy. Thus, in ‘Remissions’, Barrie aligns herself with the 
‘new [F]rench feminisms’ (citing writing by Cixous and Irigaray, in particular) whose 
‘revolutionary dimension... lies in their insistence upon the specificity of feminine 
unconscious’, in their  
 
...call for the creation of a specifically women’s language and writing, informed by 
the feminine unconscious, to speak the female body through the cracks in the 
syntax, semantics and logic of male language... 
 
and in their ‘SUBVERSION of... the EXISTING phallocentric order’.662  
 
 Secondly, Barrie’s primary theoretical resource is Derridean deconstruction, which she 
wields against aspects of Lacanian theory she considers unhelpful to the feminist project. 
In ‘Remissions’ this is criticism is implicit in her suggestion that 
 
...what we perceive as the ‘real’ becomes merely a manifestation of the symbolic 
order as constituted to privilege men. Only by deconstructing this 
phallogocentrism, can we transform the ‘real’ in a fundamental way.663 
 
This quotation conveys well the density of the specialist jargon Barrie employs – and her 
tendency, apparently, to take for granted the familiarity of her readers with this 
terminology. Compounding this happenstance, Barrie also mistakenly conflates the 
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Lacanian order of the ‘real’ with the Lacanian order of the ‘symbolic’ (i.e., language-
mediated, social and cultural ‘reality’).664 ‘Phallogocentrism’ (a contraction of 
‘phallocentrism’ and ‘logocentrism’) is a neologism Derrida employs, in ‘The Purveyor 
of Truth’ (1975), in order to critique the apparent investment of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
in ‘The transcendental position of the phallus... in the chain of signifiers to which it 
belongs, while simultaneously making it possible’.665 That is to say, in Derridean terms, 
the Lacanian phallus is a ‘transcendental signified’ (i.e., a transcendental and absolute 
standard of truth and meaning) in a ‘logocentric’ system of thought (i.e., a system of 
thought that, in the final analysis, re-presents the truth as presence).666  
 
 In ‘Deferrals’, Barrie’s criticism of Lacanian theory is more explicit. By way of a 
direct (albeit, selective) engagement with Seminar XX, Barrie allows that ‘Lacan’s 
structuralist analysis... [of Freudian theory] was of enormous value to French feminists, 
because it located the nature of women’s repression in language itself’. Nevertheless, 
Barrie also contends that ‘Lacan... imposed a closure. He sealed women’s fate as an 
irreversible process.’667 This conclusion reflects Barrie’s understanding that, in Lacanian 
theory, ‘woman lacks a relation to the phallus’ and, in consequence, ‘she has no position 
to speak from. She is “outside the symbolic” which structures the unconscious.’ Still 
further, as ‘Excluded from language, woman is thus deprived of a subjectivity of her own 
and a desire of her own... She inhabits absence within this phallocentric discourse and is 
forced into silence.’668 By way of substantiating her commentary, Barrie cites (with some 
editorial emendations) the following passages from Lacan’s Seminar XX: ‘ “there is 
woman only as excluded by the nature of things, which is the nature of words” ’ and        
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‘ “women... don’t know what they’re saying which is the whole difference between them 
and me.” ’669 That Barrie considers deconstruction to offer the possibility of ameliorating 
this state of affairs is evident from her assertion that ‘Feminist deconstructions using 
Derridean methods are POST-structuralist precisely because they demonstrate that the 
binary oppositional structures which create women’s fate, can be displaced and (re) 
inscribed in a different way.’670 
 
 8.1.2 Zepke 
 
 I would point out that, in general, I agree with the rebuttal of Barrie presented in 
Zepke’s ‘Repetitions’ and, indeed, consider his essay to exhibit a sounder grasp of theory 
than either of Barrie’s articles. Nevertheless, Zepke’s piece exhibits some of the very 
issues he criticises in Barrie’s work. A case in point is Zepke’s contention that Barrie 
fails to acknowledge the significant differences distinguishing the thinking of Kristeva 
and Irigaray, and, thereby, indulges in a ‘project of HOMOgenising Kristeva and 
Irigaray... under the banner of  “new French feminism”. ’671 In support of this claim, 
Zepke observes that ‘Over both... [Barrie’s] articles Kristeva is specifically mentioned 
four times and never quoted... The quotations Barrie uses to illustrate the claims of “new 
French feminists” come exclusively from Cixous and Irigaray.’672 Whilst Zepke’s point 
is, substantially, correct, nevertheless, he fails to recognise the quotation of Kristeva in 
Barrie’s ‘Remissions’, where there is reference to ‘what Kristeva calls the “not that” and 
the “not yet” ’ – albeit, by way of an insufficiently detailed reference to a translation of 
Kristeva’s writing in Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (eds), New French 
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Feminisms: an Anthology (1981).673 Moreover, Zepke’s presentation of Kristeva’s ideas 
also lacks exegetical rigour. The discussion of Kristeva’s thought is, largely, 
unreferenced – the two references Zepke does include addressing Kristeva at one remove 
by way of Elizabeth Grosz’s Sexual Subversions: three French Feminists (1989). Even 
here, Zepke’s essay is marked by imprecision, erroneously misrepresenting Grosz’s text 
as ‘Sexual Submission’.674 
 
 These problems notwithstanding, in my view, Zepke’s ‘Repetitions’ rightly finds each 
of the aforementioned currents in Barrie’s work to be deeply problematic. In the former 
case, Zepke contests Barrie’s appeals to Derridean deconstruction in support of her effort 
to reify a ‘ “feminine difference”... inscribed “outside” of “patriarchally determined 
dichotomies” ’, thereby enlivening ‘ “the possibility of an as-yet unknown and 
unimaginable conception of woman”  ’ existing ‘outside the “old hierarchical terms” with 
a “new, dephallicized meaning” ’.675 In Zepke’s view, this demonstrates how Barrie’s 
project sustains a ‘logocentric conceptualisation of inside/outside’ and, indeed, in seeking 
to use Derrida’s writing as the ‘received wisdom... [of] a... voice of authority’ 
recapitulates ‘the very logocentrism she tries to deconstruct.’676 In the latter event, Zepke 
contends that a fundamental misreading of Lacanian theory underpins Barrie’s 
‘accusations that Lacan’s phallogocentric symbolic order excludes women from an 
authentic subjectivity, and so forces them into silence’ and her insistence that ‘women are 
silenced by the “lack” of a relation to the phallus’.677 Specifically, Zepke suggests that 
Barrie reiterates Derrida’s conflation of penis and phallus perpetrated in ‘The Purveyor of 
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Truth’.678 In so doing, Barrie locates the phallus within the logocentric dichotomy of 
presence/absence, surplus/lack instead of appreciating its status as that which enlivens the 
very possibility of there being a dichotomy. In other words, Barrie speaks of the phallus 
in terms of ‘that’ which one has or doesn’t have, as opposed to the phallic function that 
enlivens the very possibility of there being a difference between ‘having’ and ‘not 
having’. In so doing, Zepke maintains that Barrie misunderstands the role played by the 
phallus or phallic function in Lacanian theory as that which is implicated in the 
emergence of gendered subjectivity whilst being, in itself, so to speak, ‘non-gendered and 
non-privileging .’ In consequence, Zepke insists, contrary to Barrie, that it is not the case 
that ‘women are silenced by the “lack” of a relation to the phallus’ – on the contrary, ‘it is 
precisely their relation to the phallus which allows them to speak at all.’679 
 
 8.1.3 Lacanian phallogocentrism 
 
 In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the aforementioned ‘phallus’ or ‘phallic function’ is 
implicated in the emergence of gendered subjectivity and, to this extent, has aroused 
controversy. In particular, for some feminist scholars (among whom one would include 
Barrie), this term exposes Lacanian theory as inherently sexist and patriarchal. Whilst I 
do not entirely agree with these assessments, I would concede that, given its cultural 
associations, the word ‘phallus’ is problematic. Insofar as the present study has been 
concerned less with the genesis of (gendered) subjectivity per se than with the analysis of 
expressions of subjectivity in discourse, there have been only fleeting references to the 
phallus. Nevertheless, given that Lacanian theory often has been invoked and criticised 
within the frame of feminism, the term ‘phallus’ demands clarification. Thus, in Seminar 
V, the term ‘phallus’ is employed to designate the ‘primordially lost... metonymical... 
object of desire’ that is ‘caught up in a function which is that of the signifier’ and which 
is ‘pivotal... central... in the whole dialectic... purely and simply of all subjective 
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development.’680 Lacan’s reference to the phallus as the ‘primordially lost... 
metonymical... object of desire’ is addressed in chapter four. Here, it suffices to say that 
the phallus, so conceived, designates an excluded ‘primordial signifier’, by virtue of 
which subjectivity is as constitutively lacking (i.e., desiring, becoming). However, of 
more immediate relevance, in the present context, is the ‘pivotal... central’ role Lacan 
accords the phallus or phallic function in the ‘development’ of language-mediated 
subjectivity. These inferences are amplified in ‘The Signification of the Phallus’ (1958), 
where Lacan insists that ‘the phallus is not a fantasy... as an imaginary effect. Nor is it as 
such an object... Still less is it the organ – penis or clitoris – that it symbolizes.’ On the 
contrary, ‘the phallus is a signifier... the signifier that is destined to designate meaning 
effects as a whole, insofar as the signifier conditions them by its presence as signifier.’681 
However, of obvious interest to feminist scholars concerned with questions of gender 
identity, Lacan also asserts:  
 
The developments that appear in psychological genesis confirm the phallus’ 
signifying function...  
 
...one can indicate the structures that govern the relations between the sexes by 
referring simply to the phallus’ function...682 
 
 That Barrie’s reading of Lacan’s text (in common with those of other, Anglophone, 
feminist writers) may lack depth and balance is suggested by Suzanne Barnard’s 
‘Introduction’ to Reading Seminar XX, Lacan’s Major Work on Love, Knowledge, and 
Feminine Sexuality (2002). Here, Barnard alludes to the over-dependence of ‘English-
language scholarship’ on the brace of chapters from Seminar XX presented in Juliet 
Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (eds), Feminine Sexuality, Jacques Lacan and the école 
freudienne (1982), and points out that delays in the availability of a complete, ‘English-
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language translation of Seminar XX have precipitated ‘its almost exclusive popularization 
as a text on sexual difference’.683 Indeed, Barnard suggests that, in condemning ‘the more 
scandalous sounding’ of Lacan’s remarks on femininity (and, here, Barnard reproduces, 
precisely, those passages Barrie selects) ‘as evidence of Lacan’s phallocentrism’, feminist 
scholarship misses ‘a serious and profoundly original attempt to go beyond both the 
patriarchal dimensions of Freud’s corpus and the banalities concerning feminine sexuality 
characteristic of neo-Freudian revisionism.’684 Still further, Barnard suggests that 
Anglophone feminism, insofar as it tends to mirror the focus of writers like Kristeva and 
Irigaray on ‘the relationships between sexual difference and epistemology, as well as 
between sexual difference, social structure and politics’, has insufficiently understood the 
status of the Lacanian real ‘as the traumatic cause on account of which any attempt to 
reduce sexual difference to biology, phenomenology, or cultural construction is doomed 
to fail.’685 This kind of misunderstanding would seem to flavour Barrie’s identification of 
the ‘ “real” ’ with ‘what we perceive as... a manifestation of the symbolic order’. 
 
 In contrast to Barrie, Zepke aligns himself with the pro-Lacanians in the debate 
surrounding the meaning and implications of the phallus or phallic function. Between 
Lacan’s defenders and detractors, the critical point of difference concerns the status of the 
phallic function either as that which is of efficacy merely in describing the emergence of 
gendered subjectivity in patriarchy or as that which, always already, is complicit with 
patriarchal privilege and prejudice in the very construction and elaboration of the theory 
in question. Exemplifying the pro-Lacanian position is Ragland-Sullivan who finds  
 
...no a priori Lacanian support for phallocentrism – any more than for Lacanian-
supported feminism. Lacan discovered the phallic signifier, its effects and the 
resulting structure of substitutive Desire. These intrinsically neutral elements give 
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rise to ideologies of the masculine and feminine that cluster around the male-female 
difference and dramatize themselves in a parade.686 
 
The anti-Lacanian position is summarised by Grosz, for whom  
 
...the phallic signifier is not... neutral... The relation between the penis and phallus 
is not arbitrary, but socially and politically motivated... by the already existing 
structure of patriarchal power...687 
 
 Resolving this dilemma is beyond the scope of the thesis. However, I would suggest 
that attending to what, in the second part of the thesis Introduction, I refer to as the mode 
of being in and as traversing fantasy (or, in post-structuralist parlance, being in and as 
deconstruction) may provide a possible amelioration. Being in and as traversing fantasy 
implies that final determinations of meaning (which is to say, of subjectivity, subject 
positions) are endlessly deferred. The corollary of this indefinite suspension is that all 
determinations must remain in question, thereby being amenable to endless 
reformulation. Always already, then, any account of subjectivity in terms of the ‘phallic 
function’ must, as a structural and ethical necessity, place in question the terms of its 
derivation. I would suggest that, in potentia, Lacanian theory is open to this possibility. 
However, to what degree this possibility is realised remains a matter for debate. 
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8.2 Lacan, Heidegger, and Derrida: comparisons and key ideas 
 
 Whilst this is not a project on Heidegger or Derrida per se, I should acknowledge that 
these writers have provided useful points of comparison and contrast for my explorations 
of Lacanian theory. With regard to Lacan and Heidegger, the consonances can be quite 
explicit: in his Écrits and Seminar, Lacan regularly refers to Heidegger and appropriates 
Heideggerian terms. Whilst important differences obtain between Heideggerian and 
Lacanian thought, one might suggest that Lacan’s conception of an ex-centric subjectivity 
(i.e., a subjectivity that exceeds and eludes distinctions between that which is inside and 
outside the one) resonates with Heidegger’s conception of ‘ek-sistence’ (or ‘ex-sistence’) 
and ekstasis. Similarly, it may be suggested that the Lacanian unconscious, understood as 
a field of meaning in potentia, bears comparison with Heidegger’s conception of the 
subject (for which Heidegger employs the word Dasein) in terms of potentials and 
possibilities.688  
 
 In the literature, Derrida and Lacan often are portrayed as intellectual antagonists. 
Whilst both writers present re-workings of Freudian psychoanalysis in light of the 
implications of structural linguistics, it should be acknowledged that significant 
differences in detail and in intent obtain between them. For example, whilst this is a gross 
simplification that, likely, obscures more than it reveals, one might say that if Derrida 
engages with subjectivity as text then Lacan addresses a desiring subjectivity. This state 
of affairs notwithstanding, throughout the thesis, I have found it useful to compare 
Lacan’s various allusions to, variously, the ‘subject of the unconscious’, the ‘letter’ as the 
‘essence of the signifier’, and the metaphoric function of pure difference proper to the 
operation of the ‘unary trait’ with Derrida’s conception of the trace and différance – 
terms that merit further explanation below.689 
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 8.2.1 Other fantasies in the discursive field: ontotheology and 
logocentrism 
 
 By way of providing further clarification of what is implicit in the notion of 
‘traversing the fundamental fantasy’, I would suggest that illuminating parallels may be 
drawn with Heidegger’s critique of ‘ontotheology’ and Derrida’s critique of 
‘logocentrism’. That is to say, traversing the fantasies of the conscious one and the 
subject supposed to know is, to some degree, synonymous with traversing the fantasies 
(i.e., myths, prejudices, preconceptions, symptomatic formations, figures of discourse) 
inherent in discourses that may be termed ontotheological and logocentric. In making this 
comparison, I observe that, notwithstanding their differences in detail, Lacanian, 
Heideggerian, and Derridean theory all present challenges to what may be termed 
Western-style, metaphysical thinking. That is to say, a way of thinking reality in terms of 
substantial, material essences, first causes, or fundamental forces – or, more generally, 
perhaps, conceiving being and existence in terms of origins and essences, ends and 
absolutes. 
 
 What, then, is meant by ‘ontotheology’ and ‘logocentrism’? With regard to 
ontotheology, one of Heidegger’s clearest definitions may be found in the essay ‘Kant’s 
Thesis About Being’ (1961). Here, Heidegger asserts that in 
 
...Occidental European thought... the question about being, taken as a question 
about the being of beings, is double in form. It asks on the one hand: What are 
beings, in general, as beings? Considerations within the province of this question 
come... under the heading of ontology. The question “What are beings?” includes 
also the question, “Which being is the highest and in what way is it?” The question 
is about the divine and God. The province of this question is called theology. The 
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duality of the question about the being of beings can be brought together in the title 
“onto-theo-logy.” The twofold question, What are beings? asks on the one hand, 
What are (in general) beings? The question asks on the other hand, What (which 
one) is the (ultimate) being?690 
 
According to Heidegger’s definition, ontotheology presumes the potential closure or 
absolute determination of the field of meaning on the basis of a double appeal. Firstly, 
there is an investment in the idea that, in a given context, there is an irreducible element 
common to all beings therein – some defining feature they have in general. For example, 
if one defines the ‘context’ in question as an artist’s oeuvre’ then candidates for beings-
in-common might be the name, signature, handiwork, personality, etc. of the artist 
(where, it may be noted, defining some of these features – e.g., ‘artistic personality’ – 
presents a, seemingly, insurmountable challenge). Secondly, there is an investment in the 
idea that there is an ultimate being serving as absolute, transcendental origin and end of a 
collection of particular beings. In the case of an artist’s oeuvre, invariably, this being is 
identified with the individual artist-creator. As an ultimate being, the artist-creator is 
solely, uniquely, and authentically responsible for originating and determining the 
purpose or meaning of their oeuvre. From an ontotheological standpoint, then, a painting 
(or collection of paintings) whose meaning is, in principle, fully determinable offers to 
represent (indeed, re-presence) this hypothetical common element and/or ultimate being. 
To this extent, ontotheological discourse tends to reify individual author-creators as first 
and final causes – which is also to say that, from the perspective of ontotheology, author-
creators speak in original and originating voices as opposed to being spoken by what 
Lacan refers to as the ‘Other’ of language per se. Here, the implication is not merely that 
origination and meaning derive from beings-present. Rather, in ontotheology, the very 
possibility of origination and meaning proceeds by virtue of a metaphysical prejudice 
whereby being means presence. 
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 To this extent, Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology parallels Derrida’s critique of 
logocentrism. As various commentators suggest, in a general sense, one may define as 
logocentric any system of thought that (1) invests in the idea of origins and essences, 
ends and absolutes of truth, meaning, and being, and (2) in making assertions of truth, 
meaning, and being, seeks to recover, represent, re-presence these origins and essences, 
ends and absolutes.691 Thus, in Of Grammatology (1967), Derrida asserts that 
‘Logocentrism would thus support the determination of the being of the entity as 
presence’ and writes of ‘logocentric metaphysics, determining the sense of being as 
presence’.692 Similarly, in the essay ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ (1966), Derrida writes: 
 
The history of metaphysics... is the determination of Being as presence in all senses 
of this word. It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to 
principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable presence – eidos 
[form, essence], archē [origin], telos [end, purpose], energeia [energy, power in 
action], ousia [substance] (essence, existence, substance, subject) alētheia 
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Deconstruction questions the dream of logocentrism, which is to make truth present in 
spoken discourse... Relentlessly, deconstruction challenges the question, “What is...?”... as 
a move against essentialism, a logocentric fiction of presence. 
 
See also Niall Lucy, A Derrida Dictionary (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 71, 
where it is observed that 
 
...logocentrism... refers to the idea that, before everything else (history, knowledge, 
consciousness, etc.), there is presence. Before everything, there is the Logos, the 
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Logocentrism in Derrida refers to the philosophical tendency to find truth in the 
presentation of Being, Spirit, Consciousness, History across a philosophical system or any 
idea, mode of experience, emphasized in a philosophical system. 
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[unconcealment, disclosure], transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so 
forth.693 
  
Thus, logocentrism invests in a metaphysics of presence insofar as presence is considered 
to be the ultimate criterion of truth, meaning, and being. The ‘true’ meaning of ‘to be’ is 
‘to be present’. That which is present truly is, entirely and self-sufficiently. However, as 
Niall Lucy points out, this presumption is false: always already, presence is, itself, 
secondary to what may be termed a ‘structure of supplementarity’.694 That is to say, what 
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be contextual, derivative, outside. From Derrida’s perspective, always already it is the case that 
what is ‘inside’ or ‘essential’ to a determined object or meaning is neither an entirety nor a 
sufficiency but is, on the contrary, an original lack that demands supplementation by what is 
‘contextual’ or ‘outside’. To put the matter equivalently, in Derridean terms, there is no isolable 
origin, essence or interiority by virtue of which an object or meaning might be present entirely 
and sufficiently. Rather, always already it is the case that, interminably, the ‘outside’ is entering 
and supplementing the ‘inside’, thereby defining the ‘inside’ as ‘inside’. In its interminability, 
supplementation is never complete – the ‘inside’ lack is never completely ‘filled’ and, in 
consequence, the absolute presence/determination of the object or meaning is indefinitely 
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 For a reference to the logic of the supplement see, for example, Derrida, Of Grammatology, 
145, where it is asserted that  
 
...the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. it intervenes or insinuates itself in-
the-place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void... As substitute, it is not simply added to the 
positivity of a presence... its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness. 
Somewhere, something can be filled up of itself, can accomplish itself, only by allowing 
itself to be filled through sign and proxy. The sign is always the supplement of the thing 
itself.  
 
See also ibid, Speech and Phenomena, And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans 
David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, originally published as La 
Voix et le Phénomène, Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), 88, where it is stated that  
 
...what is supplementary is in reality differance, the operation of differing which at one and 
the same time both fissures and retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to primordial 
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is considered to be ‘intrinsic to’, ‘inside of’, ‘present to’ presence depends on a relation 
to that which is ‘extrinsic to’, ‘outside of’, ‘absent from’ presence. In other words, it is 
not the case that a full and positive presence secures the possibility of making absolute 
determinations of knowledge, truth and meaning. On the contrary (and in accordance 
with the insights of structural linguistics), it is only by virtue of negative relations of 
difference (in Derrida’s parlance, the operation of the ‘trace’ and ‘différance’) that there 
is enlivened the possibility of meaning-making per se – where, moreover, the endpoint of 
this process is an unrealisable ideal, indefinitely deferred. 
 
 8.2.2 Another Other: Derrida’s archive 
 
 With regard to considerations of subjectivity in its transindividual aspect, it may be 
suggested that certain resonances obtain between the Lacanian conception of the ‘big 
Other’, ‘symbolic order’, or ‘signifying chain’, and the psychoanalytically flavoured 
conception of the ‘archive’, as articulated in Derrida’s essay, ‘Archive Fever, A Freudian 
Impression’ (1995). For example, at the outset of his essay, Derrida discerns, in the 
etymology of the word ‘archive’, a ‘name’ that ‘coordinates two principles in one: the 
principle according to nature or history... where things commence... but also the principle 
according to the law... where men and gods command’, in relation to which there are 
expressed ‘two orders of order: sequential and jussive’.695 In the Lacanian parlance I 
employ in chapter two, these ‘two orders of order’ seem analogous to subjectivity 
                                                                                                                                                 
division and delay. Differance is to be conceived prior to the separation of between 
deferring as delay and differing as the active work of difference. 
 
where, moreover (and, I would argue, in harmony with the Lacanian conception of the subject of 
the unconscious, the metaphoric function of pure difference, or the psychical function of 
repression), Derrida asserts that this operation of différance, fundamental to expressions of 
subjectivity/meaning-making is 
 
...inconceivable if one begins on the basis of consciousness, that is, presence, or on the 
basis of its simple contrary, absence or nonconsciousness. 
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 Derrida, ‘Archive Fever, A Freudian Impression’ (1995), trans Eric Prenowitz, in Diacritics, 
v25, n2, Summer 1995, 9. 
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conceived in terms of a metonymically ordered structure that is subject to metaphoric 
structuring.   
 
 Moreover, with reference to the Freudian conception of the death drive (see section 
8.7), Derrida characterises the ‘jussive’ order of structuring as that which  
 
...is at work, but since it always operates in silence, it never leaves any archives of 
its own. It destroys in advance its own archive, as if that were in truth the very 
motivation of its most proper movement. It works to destroy the archive: on the 
condition of effacing but also with a view to effacing its own “proper” traces – 
which consequently cannot properly be called “proper.”696 
 
That is to say, in the context of Derrida’s thought, the ‘jussive’ dimension of the Freudian 
death drive is synonymous with the operation of the trace and différance. As previously 
noted, the thesis presents an understanding of this order of structuring in terms of a 
metaphoric function of pure difference proper to the operation of what Lacan terms, 
variously, the ‘letter’, the ‘essence of the signifier’, or the ‘unary trait’. Here, the 
instrumental point is that, thus conceived, the letter or unary trait is implicated in the 
generation and/or ordering of the field of meaning whilst, at the same time, 
fundamentally exceeding and eluding the terms of reference of that field. 
 
 Relevant, in this regard, is Derrida’s reference to the ‘decisive paradox’ by which, in 
contrast to ‘anamnēsis’ (i.e., remembrance of previous incarnations), ‘The archive is 
hypomnesic’ (i.e., in the manner of an auxiliary aid to memory, radically outside or other 
than memory, yet somehow necessary for the functioning of memory). This paradox 
implies that  
 
...if there is no archive without consignation [i.e., deliverance into the charge or 
custody of an other]... in an external place which assures the possibility of 
memorization, of repetition, of reproduction, or of reimpression, then we must also 
remember that repetition itself, the logic of repetition, indeed the repetition 
compulsion, remains according to Freud, indissociable from the death drive. And 
thus from destruction. Consequence: right on what permits and conditions 
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archivization, we will never find anything other than what exposes to destruction... 
The archive always works, and a priori, against itself.697 
 
In chapter four, I invoke Freud’s conception of the ‘compulsion to repeat’ or the ‘death 
instinct’ in the context of a discussion of Lacan’s elaboration of subjective desire as 
‘significant insistence’. Here, the critical point is that, paradoxically, the Freudian 
‘compulsion to repeat’ or ‘death instinct’ defines the field of subjectivity as a structurally 
necessary counterpoise of possibility and impossibility: it is, simultaneously, that which 
enlivens the possibility of meaningful, subjective experience and that which, ‘in itself’ is 
impossible to represent/symbolise in subjective experience. As Derrida puts it: 
 
The death drive is not a principle. It even threatens every principality... every 
archival desire. It is what we will call... le mal d’archive, archive fever.698 
 
 8.2.3 The transcendental signified 
 
 In Of Grammatology, Derrida defines the transcendental signified as the absolute 
standard and guarantor of truth and meaning ‘implied by all categories or all determined 
significations, by all lexicons and all syntax, and therefore by all linguistic signifiers, 
though not to be identified simply with any one of those signifiers’. The paradoxical 
status of the transcendental signified emerges in view of the fact that whilst it allows 
itself to be ‘precomprehended’ through each signifier (i.e., insofar as a signifier ‘points’ 
towards ‘a’ determinate meaning, there is presupposed an ‘end’ of meaning), it remains 
‘irreducible to all the epochal determinations that it nonetheless makes possible, thus 
opening the history of the logos, yet itself being only through the logos; that is, being 
nothing before the logos and outside of it.’699 The antinomy, to which Derrida refers, 
obtains insofar as these absolute concepts are considered to be entirely full and self-
sufficient (i.e., in ‘themselves’ irreducible and, therefore, undifferentiated) and yet, on 
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this very basis, precisely that which enables the possibility of there being any 
differentiation, derivation or representation – that is, any movement of meaning. 
Equivalently, one might say that transcendental signifieds are posited as being (1) only by 
virtue of, or in relation to, the system of meaning (i.e., appeals to transcendental 
signifieds are, by necessity, mediated by language) and yet (2) that which, by virtue of 
their utter priority and alterity from the system of meaning, grounds or secures the very 
possibility of there being any system of this kind. 
 
 Derrida’s position (the subtleties of which are, here, necessarily, much abridged and 
simplified) is that there are no transcendental signifieds. The very idea is an ‘illusion’ of a 
‘history of truth’ constructed on the basis of logocentric and metaphysical prejudices, 
where speech is misconstrued as the spontaneous expression of self-presence and, 
thereby, the truth of being.700 Instead, Derrida advocates the notion that ‘From the 
moment there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We think only in signs.’701 Hence, 
rather than positing a transcendental ground for truth and meaning (i.e., a position that is, 
at once, absolutely other than and condition of possibility for signification), Derrida 
repudiates the idea of the transcendental signified in favour of the notion of the 
‘limitlessness of play’ of signs.702 In other words, it is not only a matter of dispensing 
with conceptual absolutes – but, indeed, of redefining concepts per se as ideals that are, 
strictly speaking, unattainable or unrealisable. Derrida’s argument, which is intrinsic to 
post-structuralism, is that the signified is, in practice, never fully determined or made 
present. Hence, in Derrida’s words, the endless play of signs (i.e., movement of meaning 
associated with relations of difference among signifiers) implies ‘the impossibility that a 
sign, the unity of signifier and signified, be produced within the plenitude of a present 
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and an absolute presence’703 and that, in a sign, ‘the signified is originarily and 
essentially... always already in the position of the signifier’.704  
 
 8.2.4 Trace and différance 
 
 In Of Grammatology, Derrida conceives of the transcendental ground of meaning-
making not in terms of a transcendental signified but rather in terms of an originary 
‘arche-writing’ or ‘movement of differance’705 where, at the same time, the ‘arche-trace’ 
or ‘originary trace’ is a ‘concept... [that] destroys its name’.706 In other words, the arche-
trace, posited to describe that which transcends and, indeed, enables the very possibility 
of making meaning, effaces ‘itself’ in ‘its’ very mode of operation. The arche-trace 
‘exists’, therefore, neither as a determinate meaning nor as a metaphysical entity (e.g., the 
‘real’, ‘empirical mark’ of a ‘first writing’). Indeed, as Derrida points out, the arche-trace, 
if it is to elude the antinomies associated with the transcendental signified is, by 
necessity, always already ‘encountered’ as absent, as disappeared, as effaced. 
Consequently (and, as noted in chapter 3, in a fashion that harmonises with the Lacanian 
conception of the ‘unary trait’ as presented in Seminar IX), Derrida insists that 
 
The concept of arche-trace... is in fact contradictory and not acceptable within the 
logic of identity. The trace is not only the disappearance of origin... it means that 
the origin did not even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally 
by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin.707  
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 Notwithstanding the status of the ‘originary trace’ as that ‘which must make its 
necessity felt before letting itself be erased’708, it is characterised as the ‘pure movement 
which produces difference. The (pure) trace is differance’709 where, moreover, 
‘Differance is... the formation of form. But it is on the other hand the being-imprinted of 
the imprint.’710 In suggesting that the trace and différance involve a forming that is, at the 
same time, a being formed – or, alternatively, a simultaneity of or reciprocity between 
movements of inscription and effacement – Derrida emphasises their resistance to 
metaphysical characterisation in terms of originating forces or activities, or the loci of 
such. 
 
 Derrida goes on to characterise the movement of différance or ‘origin of signification’ 
in terms of a ‘spacing (pause, blank, punctuation, interval in general, etc.)’, which ‘is 
always the unperceived, the nonpresent, and the nonconscious.’711 In consequence, 
Derrida suggests: ‘Spacing as writing is the becoming-absent and the becoming-
unconscious of the subject.’712 To be clear on this point, Derrida does not mean that the 
spacing/writing associated with différance witnesses subjective disappearance and loss of 
consciousness – as if différance operates on a pre-existing entity that is present and 
conscious. On the contrary, the sense of Derrida’s comment is that différance ‘reveals’ 
the ‘way of being’ of ‘the subject’ as absence and unconscious. 
 
 Here, it is important to note that, by ‘spacing’, Derrida has in mind ‘the articulation of 
space and time, the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space’.713 This 
rather enigmatic formulation is clarified in ‘Differance’ (1968). Here, Derrida presents 
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différance as a neologism that exploits inherent ambiguities in the French verb différer. In 
this way, différance refers to the simultaneity or reciprocity of two modes of differing: 
difference as ‘distinction’ or ‘inequality’ and difference as ‘delay’ or the ‘interval of a 
spacing and a temporalizing’.714 Reiterating points made in Of Grammatology, Derrida 
affirms that the tracing involved in the movement of différance involves a reciprocity of 
effacement and re-inscription. Hence Différance is characterised as  
 
...what makes the movement of signification possible only if each element that is 
said to be ‘present’ … is related to something other than itself but retains the mark 
of a past element and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation 
to a future element.715 
 
Likewise, addressing the trace, Derrida insists it 
 
...not a presence, but is rather the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, 
displaces, and refers beyond itself. The trace has, properly speaking, no place, for 
effacement belongs to the very structure of the trace... from the start, effacement 
constitutes it as a trace … makes it disappear in its appearing, makes it issue forth 
from itself in its very position.716 
 
 Derrida’s characterisation of différance in terms of the production of an ‘interval’, a 
‘spacing’ or ‘temporalizing’ implies that the kind of writing inculcated by différance is 
not merely a simultaneous operation of inscription and effacement within an ostensibly 
pre-existing or transcendental space and time – rather, différance implies a writing that 
makes and re-makes space and time consequent to its ‘activity’. It is in this space-time 
produced and re-produced that difference becomes as a play of differences sustained 
indefinitely (hence the movement of meaning is inculcated in a manner that both erases 
its origin and indefinitely defers its ‘end’). The trace is, precisely, what is glimpsed in this 
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production of a space-time interval that is, in Derrida’s words, ‘Constituting itself, 
dynamically dividing itself... spacing; time’s becoming spatial or space’s becoming-
temporal (temporalizing).’717 I would suggest that these two terms could be characterised, 
equivalently, as the simultaneous and reciprocal movement of ‘becoming difference’ and 
‘difference becoming’ that is intrinsic to writing and the movement of meaning. 
 
 8.2.5 Ek-sistence and ekstasis 
 
 In Lacan’s work, the term ‘ex-sistence’ apparently derives from Heidegger’s concept 
of ‘ek-sistence’ – itself, a modification of the ancient Greek word ekstasis (literally ‘out-
standing’ – the state of being transported from or outside oneself, this self-transcendence 
also being associated with the culmination of existential possibilities). This is implicit in 
the essay ‘Letter on “Humanism” ’ (1946), where Heidegger asserts that 
 
...standing in the clearing of being I call the ek-sistence of human beings... Ek-
sistence so understood is not only the ground of the possibility of reason, ratio, but 
is also that in which the essence of the human being preserves the source that 
determines him.718 
 
In order to understand Heidegger’s meaning, it is necessary to appreciate that he 
conceives of the human being (in Heidegger’s terminology, Dasein – literally: ‘there-
being’) in terms of that which is or makes a ‘clearing’ in the field of being. Thus, in 
Being and Time, Heidegger suggests that 
 
To say that [Dasein]... is ‘illuminated’ means that it is cleared in itself as being-in-
the-world, not by another being, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing... By 
its very nature, Dasein brings its there along with it... Dasein is its disclosedness.719 
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In Heidegger’s thought, this idea is further elaborated by way of an appeal to the Greek 
notion of aletheia or unconcealment. Here, the critical idea is that Dasein, ek-sisting as a 
clearing in the field of being, is defined in terms of a necessary counterpoise of 
unconcealment and concealment. For example, in the essay , ‘On the Essence of Truth’ 
(1943), Heidegger states that 
 
To let be... to let beings be as the beings that they are... means to engage oneself 
with the open region and its openness [i.e., the ‘clearing’] into which every being 
comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself. Western 
thinking in its beginning conceived this open region as... the unconcealed...720 
 
and 
 
Precisely because letting-be always lets beings be in a particular comportment that 
relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole. Letting-be is 
intrinsically at the same time a concealing.721 
 
An in-depth consideration of these matters is beyond the scope of the present study. 
Nevertheless, it may be observed that the counterpoise of unconcealment and 
concealment proper to the ‘clearing’ of the Heideggerian Dasein resonates with the 
reciprocity of meaning repression and meaning overdetermination (or the return of the 
repressed meaning) proper to the Lacanian model of subjectivity.722 
 
 8.2.6 The real Thing 
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 On the basis of the discussion presented in chapter two, it may be evident that das 
Ding, considered as a ‘real’ ‘structuring of structure’ resonates with Derrida’s conception 
of the trace and différance. Relevant, here, are Derrida’s aforementioned assertions that 
‘The (pure) trace is differance’ and, moreover, ‘Differance is... the formation of form. 
But it is on the other hand the being-imprinted of the imprint.’ More specifically, 
however, Lacan’s use of the term das Ding recalls the consideration of the being or 
‘thingliness’ of a peasant’s jug or vase in Heidegger’s essay ‘The Thing’ (1951). Whilst a 
thoroughgoing elucidation of this matter lies beyond the concerns of this project, it may 
be noted that parallels obtain between the Lacanian conception of das Ding as a ‘real’ 
‘structuring of structure’ and Heidegger’s use of the word in order to address the question 
of Being – where, in this context, ‘Being’ precisely connotes ‘reality’ or ‘the real’: the 
logico-structurally mandated ‘ground’ or condition of possibility of there being a 
counterpoise between unconcealment and concealment. In the poetic language employed 
in ‘The Thing’, this is evident from Heidegger’s reference to the ‘thinging’ of ‘the thing’ 
as a ‘gathering’ of the ‘fourfold’ of heaven and earth, gods and mortals: 
 
The thing things. Thinging gathers. Appropriating the fourfold, it gathers the 
fourfold’s stay, its while, into something that stays for a while: into this thing, that 
thing.723 
 
 It must be conceded that elaborating this consonance is not a straightforward exercise: 
Lacanian and Heideggerian conceptions of the real are not synonymous. Moreover, in 
Seminar VII, whilst there is explicit acknowledgement of ‘the function of das Ding in 
Heidegger’s approach to the contemporary revelation of what he calls Being and that is 
linked to the end of metaphysics’, Lacan specifically denies that this is the impetus of his 
own discussion. Rather, Lacan appropriates Heidegger’s account of the peasant’s vase in 
order to illustrate the relationships between the signifier in its ‘signifying essence’, 
nothingness, and the real. Hence, Lacan asserts that the vase is ‘in its signifying essence a 
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signifier of nothing other than of signifying as such’, ‘an object made to represent the 
existence of the emptiness at the centre of the real that is called the Thing’ and, therefore, 
a confirmation that ‘the fashioning of the signifier and the introduction of a gap or hole in 
the real is identical’.724 
 
 8.2.7 Dasein: being possible 
 
 As suggested in chapter two, the understanding of the Lacanian unconscious as a field 
of pure potentials resonates with Heidegger’s definition of Dasein in terms of potentials 
and possibilities, and his conception of the temporality of Dasein in terms of ekstasis. For 
example, in Being and Time, Heidegger asserts that Dasein is ‘The being which is 
concerned in its being about its being’ and, therefore, ‘is related to its being as its 
ownmost possibility. Dasein is always its possibility.’725 Still further, Heidegger also 
suggests that 
 
Dasein is not something objectively present which then has as an addition the 
ability to do something, rather it is primarily being-possible... The essential 
possibility of Dasein... [is] always already... the potentiality of being itself, for its 
own sake.726 
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With regard to the notion of ekstasis, it is necessary to take cognizance of Heidegger’s 
definition of the ‘primordial ontological ground of the existentiality of Dasein’ as 
‘temporality [Zeitlichkeit]’727, where ‘Temporality “is” not a being [Seiendes] at all... but 
rather temporalizes... possible ways of itself’, thereby making ‘possible the multiplicity 
of the modes of being of Dasein’. Heidegger defines these modes of being in temporal 
terms as ‘Future, having-been, and present’ or ‘the ecstasies of temporality’. On this 
basis, Heidegger suggests that ‘Temporality is not, prior to this, a being that first emerges 
from itself; rather, its essence is temporalising in the unity of the ecstasies’ – i.e., in the 
field of subjective potential and possibility.728 
 
 For further clarification of these ideas, the reader is referred to the lucid discussion in 
Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (2005, 1996). Here, Mulhall suggests 
that ‘Heidegger’s idea is not that human beings necessarily exist in time but rather that 
they exist as temporality... human existence most fundamentally is temporality’ where  
 
...temporality is not an entity, not a sequence of self-contained moments that move 
from future to present to past, and not a property of feature of something, but is, 
rather, akin to a self-generating and self-transcending process. 
 
Mulhall goes on to explain that, since this process ‘underpins the Being of Dasein’, it also 
enlivens the possibility of this Being as ecstatic – i.e., ‘the distinctively human capacity 
to be at once ahead, behind and alongside oneself, to stand outside oneself, to exist’. In 
consequence, Mulhall suggests that ‘if Dasein’s unity as an existing being is literally 
“ecstatic” (a matter of Dasein’s Being-outside-itself, hence being internally related to 
what it is not, being non-self-identical)’, then this ecstatic quality extends to 
considerations of temporality. As Mulhall puts it, ‘past, present and future are not 
coordinates or dimensions but “ecstasies” – modes of temporality’s self-constituting self-
transcendence’. This, Mulhall concludes, is what Heidegger means by the enigmatic 
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characterisation of temporality in its essence as ‘temporalising in the unity of the 
ecstasies’.729 
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8.3 ‘Influence’ and ‘agency’ 
 
 It is evident that, in seeking to understand the forces implicated in the creation of 
artworks and the development of artistic oeuvres, art scholars frequently make recourse 
to the idea of artistic ‘influences’. Critics of this idea point out that precisely ‘in what’ 
influence consists, and ‘how’ it is transmitted through space and time, is profoundly 
enigmatic. From the perspective of this project, whilst these interventions have 
considerable merit, they are open to criticism insofar as they repudiate the idea of 
‘influence’ in favour of a reification of the creativity and agency of individual art subjects 
or ‘ones that are conscious’. I would concede that, in the first instance, the attribution of 
expressions of subjectivity to a ‘force’ or ‘intentionality’ that is unconscious (more 
precisely, a dialectical tension between consciousness and the unconscious) would seem 
no less ‘enigmatic’ than the positing of ‘influence’. However, it is the position of this 
study that, from a Lacanian perspective, the very idea that ‘one’ is ‘under the influence’ 
precisely misrecognises expressions of subjectivity as expressions of ‘ones that are 
conscious’. This misrecognition is predicated on the metaphysical preconception or 
rationalisation that, entirely and sufficiently, it is the nature of subjectivity to be grounded 
in the ‘conscious one’ – a self-contained, delimited, autonomous agent. Hence, anything 
that disrupts this false sense of self-unity and self-determination seems inherently ‘other’, 
‘enigmatic’, ‘mysterious’. 
 
 In general terms, the ‘enigma’ of ‘influence’ is emphasised in Foucault’s The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), where it is listed among those structuring ‘unities of 
discourse’ that must be discarded in order to develop less prejudicial forms of historical 
enquiry. In Foucault’s view, influence is troubling insofar as it 
 
...provides a support – of too magical a kind to be very amenable to analysis – for 
the facts of transmission and communication; which refers to an apparently causal 
process (but with neither rigorous delimitation nor theoretical definition), the 
phenomena of resemblance or repetition; which links, at a distance and through 
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time – as though the mediation of a medium of propagation – such defined unities 
as individuals, oeuvres, notions, or theories.730 
 
Of more immediate relevance to the practice of art history is the ‘Excursus against 
influence’ presented in Michael Baxandall, Patterns of Intention, On the Historical 
Explanation of Pictures (1985). In Baxandall’s view: 
 
‘Influence’ is a curse of art criticism primarily because of its wrong-headed 
grammatical prejudice about who is the agent and who the patient: it seems to 
reverse the active/passive relation which the historical actor experiences and the 
inferential beholder will wish to take into account. If one says that X influenced Y 
it does seem that one is saying that X did something to Y rather than that Y did 
something to X. But in the consideration of good pictures and painters the second is 
always the more lively reality.731 
 
 8.3.1 McCahon discourse: Leech and Pound 
 
 In McCahon discourse, the appeal to influence would seem to be exemplified by the 
claim made in Brown and Keith, An introduction to New Zealand painting (1969), that, 
during his visit to the United States in 1958, McCahon’s ‘exposure... to current American 
painting profoundly influenced his own.’732 However, in direct response to this assertion, 
Green, in ‘McCahon’s Visit to the United States, A reading of letters and lecture notes’ 
(1975), suggests that, whilst McCahon’s American experience was a ‘stimulus’ that ‘set 
him up’ for an ‘outflow’ of work subsequently, there was ‘No flash of insight, no 
exposure to the art of the centre, therefore no “profound” influence from American 
Art.’733 
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 This claim is also addressed in Leech’s essay: ‘ “A Sort of Generalized Thing”: 
McCahon, Influence and Explanation’ (2004) – one of the most exhaustive considerations 
of the issue of ‘influence’ in McCahon discourse and one that is, moreover, fully 
cognizant of the interventions of writers like Baxandall. As Leech points out, the title of 
his essay reflects McCahon’s assessment of his American visit as an experience from 
which  
 
It was almost impossible to sort out any influences. It was a jumble of various 
things, and certainly it was not always the obvious, the big names that carried the 
most lasting interest for me. Rather than specific people it was finally a sort of 
generalized thing that left its mark.734 
 
From the perspective of a study appealing to psychoanalytic theory in order to expose and 
ameliorate the myths and prejudices of traditionalising art history, Leech’s essay is of 
interest insofar as it attributes to the scholarly discipline of art history a ‘syndrome’ that 
is not merely an expression of institutional structures but also of desires. The symptoms 
of this malaise are evident in the recourse art history makes to ‘hard causal schedules’ (a 
phrase, that as Leech acknowledges, derives from Baxandall’s essay ‘The language of art 
criticism’ (1991) in order to justify indulging in various forms of ‘explanatory 
determinism’ and ‘influence fabrication’. Leech proposes that this ‘syndrome’ is a 
product of an uneasy conflation of two tendencies present in the arts discourse of the late 
nineteenth century. Firstly, the emergence of art history as a scholarly discipline 
‘anxious’ to legitimise its practices and secure its authority by accruing to itself certain 
features of scientific orthodoxy (e.g., the positing of ‘hard causal schedules’). Secondly, 
the mode of ‘art appreciation’ in which, rather less rigorously, the understanding of art 
proceeds on the basis of contingent associations (i.e., as Leech points out, the overly 
simplistic positing of positive resemblances). In the colourful language Leech employs, 
the contemporary issue of this ‘incompatible partner[ship]’ of art academia and art 
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appreciation is the ‘deformed child called “art history” in which an archaeology of 
association comes to function as “cause” ’.735 
 
  In consequence, whilst Leech acknowledges and agrees with Green’s repudiation of 
the claim made in Brown and Keith, he also observes: ‘what quickly becomes clear is that 
Green is not in any sense resisting the language and explanatory determinism of 
influence; rather he wants to argue that Keith had picked on the wrong influences.’736 
Leech then reproduces Green’s comment that ‘Any account of influences in the States 
must include Mondrian, Tessai, possibly Gris and Gauguin.’737 Whilst it is true that 
Green does not interrogate the conceptual prejudices inherent in the notion of ‘influence’, 
he does, tacitly, relegate influence as subsidiary to McCahon’s activity as an art-maker 
and art-explorer. Hence, Green’s comment: ‘What hits me is not influences but after 
McCahon’s return from the states the outflow’ and ‘His experience in the States was far 
more than picture-gazing. That is why “influences” is only a small part of the 
question.’738 Indeed, on reflection, it is striking that, however much Leech finds fault 
with Green, in the final analysis, both Leech and Green are, in effect, playing down the 
role of ‘influence’ in order to reify the creative power of the particular art subject called 
‘McCahon’. In other words, in the writing of Leech and Green, what underlies the 
dismissing or de-emphasising of ‘influence’ is the symptom par excellence of arts 
scholarship – namely, the privileging of the notion of artistic genius, originality, and 
authenticity.  
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 In the case of Leech, specifically, this prioritisation echoes that made in another 
important essay on the topic of McCahon and ‘influence’, namely, Pound’s ‘McCahon, 
Mondrian, Masking Tape’. Here, one finds the suggestion that McCahon’s ‘response to 
Mondrian... in the face of a major “overseas” master, may be a means of at once 
accepting that master, and of asserting one’s difference – or of asserting New Zealand’s 
difference.’739 In support of this view, Pound cites Ian Burn, ‘The Re-Appropriation of 
Influence’ (1988), in which the response of Australian, modernist artists (specifically, 
Sidney Nolan) to the modernist canon is characterised as an ‘evasive strategy, of 
participation and demurring at the same time’.740 Pound also appeals to Harold Bloom’s 
psychological model of artistic creation, whereby later artists creatively ‘misread’ their 
canonical predecessors in accordance with what Bloom terms the ‘anxiety of influence’. 
Among the works Pound cites, in this context is, Harold Bloom, The Western Canon: The 
Books and School of the Ages (1994), wherein Bloom asserts:  
 
The anxiety of influence is not an anxiety about the father, real or literary, but an 
anxiety achieved by and in the poem, novel, or play. Any strong literary work 
creatively misreads and therefore misinterprets a precursor text or texts... the 
strongly achieved work is the anxiety.741 
 
In consequence, Bloom maintains that  
 
Tradition is not only a handing-down or process of benign transmission; it is also a 
conflict between past genius and present aspiration, in which the prize is literary 
survival or canonical inclusion... Poems, stories, novels, plays come into being as a 
response to prior poems, stories, novels, and plays, and that response depends upon 
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acts of reading and interpretation by the later writers, acts that are identical with the 
new works.742 
 
In harmony with Bloom’s ideas, Pound suggests that McCahon’s interpretation of 
modernism (specifically, Mondrian) is ‘weirdly novel’ in accordance with McCahon’s 
status as ‘ “a-modern”, a painter outside the centres of modernity, and thus neither 
modern nor not.’743 In consequence, for Pound, McCahon’s work is 
 
...an art of the periphery, modernist but not quite, at once inside and outside the 
whole modernist endeavour. It is this eccentricity – his provinciality, in this 
substantive, non-pejorative, sense – which makes for his strength and his 
novelty.744 
 
According with the impetus of Pound’s argument, Leech, similarly, privileges that which 
he considers to be singular and novel in McCahon’s painting. This is evident from his 
assertion that ‘certainly what McCahon wanted pictorially to derive from the certitudes of 
Gris and Mondrian is indeed eccentric.’745 Leech then proceeds to detail how certain of 
McCahon’s Gate and Elias series paintings deliberately violate the paradigmatic, spatial 
flatness of modernism in favour of a ‘three-dimensional, sculptural property’ that follows 
from the ‘ distinctively... “a-modern eyes” ’ with which McCahon views the world.746 
 
 8.3.2 Hotere discourse: O’Brien and Baker  
 
 In Hotere discourse, there has been no rigorous questioning of the notion of influence 
per se. Rather (as Leech observes with regard to Green), debate fixates on what 
influences are of greatest import – a field that includes western style high modernism, the 
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Catholic tradition, and Hotere’s affiliation with Te Aupōuri (if not, Māoritanga in a more 
general sense). Moreover, whilst one seldom finds appeals to influence as simplistic or 
reductive as those condemned by the likes of Baxandall or Leech (at least, in the 
scholarship produced since the latter 1990s), the question of Hotere’s ‘influences’ tends 
to operate in a vague and ambiguous counterpoint with invocations of Hotere’s artistic 
agency. The point may be illustrated with reference to the writing of two prominent 
Hotere scholars, O’Brien and Baker. For example, in O’Brien’s Hotere, Out The Black 
Window, one finds mention of ‘...the American abstractionist Ad Reinhardt, whose work 
was to become Hotere’s major influence during the following decade.’747 In relation to 
Hotere’s literary influences, O’Brien suggests ‘Bill Manhire’s poetry has been an abiding 
influence over Hotere’s language-based work’ and ‘Another overriding influence... was 
Ralph Hotere’s father Tangirau, who instilled a sense of the incantatory capabilities of 
language in his son from an early age...’.748 At the same time, however, O’Brien 
characterises Hotere’s engagement with Māori culture as a matter of ‘Necessary 
distances’.749 Thus, whilst acknowledging that ‘Hotere has never belittled or downplayed 
his cultural origins (and he would posit the early influence of a devout Catholic 
upbringing in that category)’, O’Brien asserts, nevertheless, that Hotere finds ‘being 
labelled “Maori artist”... constrictive.’ Consequently, the relevant ‘range of influence’ 
must extend beyond Toi Māori and encompass, for example, ‘references... to pivotal 
Modernist artists including... Malevich... Reinhardt, McCahon...’.750 In a similar fashion, 
O’Brien’s essay, ‘Tenebrae – Transfigured Night’, one finds the opening statement: 
 
While the art of Ralph Hotere has been shaped by elements of both Māori and 
Western spirituality, his work moves beyond those traditions to occupy a territory 
at once broad and non-sectarian, yet at the same time subtly formed and nuanced by 
his background. When considering Hotere’s recurrent engagement with the spiritual 
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or inner life, the hybridised Māori-Catholic tradition of his upbringing is ground 
zero.751 
 
 The tendency, in O’Brien’s writing, to oscillate between appeals to Hotere’s 
‘influences’ and appeals to Hotere’s ‘agency’ is mirrored in Baker’s doctoral dissertation 
A World of Black and Light, Ralph Hotere 1968-1977 (2009). Here, for example, one 
encounters ostensibly reductive observations: ‘From the mid-1960s and through the early 
1970s Reinhardt was, arguably, the major influence for Hotere’752, and more moderate 
assessments: ‘Hotere does not necessarily always agree with or follow Reinhardt’s 
proscriptions on art’; ‘the way in which Hotere diverges from Reinhardt’s dictates is 
equally as revealing as where he confirms in his own work Reinhardt’s theories on what 
art should and should not be.’753 As these two citations indicate, it is apparent that, in 
common with O’Brien (not to mention Green, Pound and Leech), Baker relinquishes 
appeals to ‘influence’ only to reify and privilege the notion of the creative power and 
agency of the artist-individual.  
 
 With regard to Hotere’s debt to mātauranga Māori (Māori knowledge and 
understanding), Baker states, without ambiguity, that ‘an inherent understanding and 
expression of Maori tikanga (customs) forms an underlying element within much of 
Hotere’s work’754 and that, moreover, ‘Hotere’s cultural background is as much part of 
his art as the influence of an international modernist aesthetic’.755 In consequence, Baker 
devotes the final chapter of her thesis to a consideration of ‘A Whakapapa Of Black and 
Light’ – with a particularly in-depth consideration of the rich meaning resonances 
enlivened by the Māori text in Godwit/Kuaka (1977).756 Whilst Baker’s contextual 
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analysis of Godwit/Kuaka’s text is a valuable contribution to Hotere discourse, in the 
context of the present study, where there is resistance to the traditionalising mode of art 
history, one might express disquiet over Baker’s attempt to locate Hotere’s work within a 
‘lineage of black’757 and her claim to ‘have found... that Godwit/Kuaka represents a 
critical moment in Hotere’s career.’758 Moreover, the ambiguous, if not enigmatic, nature 
of ‘influence’ reasserts itself in Baker’s conclusion when, in relation to works like 
Godwit/Kuaka, she presents the following statement: 
 
It is my suggestion that the task Hotere set himself, whether consciously or 
subconsciously, was to allow the Maori aspects of his work and heritage to be 
expressed on an equal footing with twentieth-century abstraction so that the one did 
not detract from the other, but that they rather fed into and reinforced one 
another.759  
 
In the context of this study, Baker’s appeal to the idea of tasks one sets oneself 
subconsciously clearly privileges the notion that, in general, expressions of subjectivity 
are grounded in or equivalent to the expressions of individual subjects. The subconscious, 
it should be noted, is a term designating that part of one’s psyche that (1) ‘underlies’ or 
‘grounds’ consciousness (i.e., the seat of instincts or intuitions). However, in this regard, 
Baker contradicts her thesis Introduction, where she contends that Hotere has  
 
...whether consciously or unconsciously... remained close to the prescriptions of 
Contemporary Maori Art as described by Skinner in that ultimately his work seeks 
a form of ‘integration rather than rupture’.760 
 
Here, Baker appeals to the argument presented in Skinner’s book The Carver and the 
Artist: Māori Art in the Twentieth Century (2008), where it is suggested: 
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Contemporary Māori Art is formally a practice of integration rather than rupture, in 
which the pictorial space works to bridge divisions and the art work’s main task is 
the construction of a strong Māori identity.761  
 
Regardless of whether one finds Skinner’s argument convincing, Baker’s suggestion that 
Hotere may have unconsciously sought to maintain a certain integrity of the self seems a 
contradiction in terms. Is it not the case that, always already, unconscious imperatives 
testify to a ‘self’ whose nature is precisely to be split, fractured: in itself other than itself 
– which is to say, that which exceeds and eludes the metaphysical distinctions between 
self and other, or that which is inside and outside one? This conceptual confusion is 
compounded by Baker’s later appeal to the notion of the subconscious. Here, in effect, 
Baker elides the instrumental distinction between ‘unconscious’ (i.e., that part of 
psychical ‘reality’ that is transindividual and otherness) and ‘subconscious’ (i.e., that part 
of the psyche that is individual – a substrate of the one) – privileging the latter at the 
expense of the former.762 
                                                 
761
 Skinner, The Carver and the Artist: Māori Art in the Twentieth Century (Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 2008), 134, cited in Baker, A World of Black and Light, 4, 5. That extending 
Skinner’s thesis to Hotere’s work may be problematic is evident from the observation, in chapter 
one, that there is a reification of difference in those of Hotere’s paintings employing both Māori 
and English language script (e.g., Darkness Settles Down, Me Tangi Ko Te Mate I Te Marama). 
Indeed, I would suggest that this incompatibility reflects the manner by which Hotere’s work 
exceeds and eludes labels like ‘Contemporary Māori Art’, ‘New Zealand Modernism’, and so 
forth. 
 
762
 I would point out that, in perpetrating these conceptual confusions, Baker seems not to have 
taken cognizance of an earlier criticism of, precisely, this issue in Wedde, ‘Figure it Out’, 183. 
 
 439 
8.4 Unconscious structure versus unconscious process 
 
 Among the ambiguities defining Lacanian theory is the dual attribution of the term 
‘unconscious’ as an adjective (i.e., unconscious psychical processes) and a noun (i.e., the 
unconscious as a system or structure). It may be apparent that this ambiguity resonates 
with that discussed, in the thesis Prologue, in relation to the real. Namely, the ambiguity 
arising from the real, understood as a material substrate of representation/symbolisation 
and as an impossibility arising in the form of a necessary counterpoise with 
representation/symbolisation. In the former case, the real is conceived in metaphysical-
dynamical terms; in the latter case the real is conceived in logico-structural terms. This 
tension between the metaphysical and the structural also obtains in the dual application of 
‘unconscious’ to, respectively, processes occurring within the psyches of individual 
subjects and the ‘transindividual’ field or system that eludes and exceeds metaphysical 
determination. Here, I should point out that the resolution of these antinomies is not the 
primary aim of this study. My responsibility is, rather, to acknowledge the existence of 
these contradictions insofar as they define the limits of a project devoted to the 
elucidation of a non-metaphysical model of subjectivity, wherein non-metaphysical 
interpretations are accorded priority. 
 
8.4.1 The Freudian view  
 
 With this point of mind, it may be noted that, in his essay ‘The Unconscious’, Freud 
distinguishes between unconscious psychical acts and processes, and the unconscious as 
a psychical system (Ucs.) in a triadic topography that also comprises the conscious (Cs.) 
and the preconscious (Pcs.).763 Immediately, then, what is called ‘unconscious’ takes on a 
dual aspect. In the former case, ‘unconscious’ is deployed adjectively to characterise a 
psychical process that takes place apart from or away from the cognizance of 
consciousness. Here, it should be noted that, in Freud’s writing, consciousness is divested 
of its active principle and privilege, and characterised as that which passively perceives 
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‘mental processes... [that] are in themselves unconscious’.764 Indeed, one of the 
fundamental justifications for the psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious is the fact 
that, as Freud points out: 
 
...the data of consciousness have a very large number of gaps... which can be 
explained only by presupposing other acts, of which, nevertheless, consciousness 
affords no evidence. These not only include parapraxes and dreams in healthy 
people, and everything described as a psychical symptom or an obsession in the 
sick; our most personal daily experience acquaints us with ideas that come into our 
head we do not know from where, and with intellectual conclusions arrived at we 
do not know how.765 
 
In the latter case, ‘unconscious’ is deployed as a noun to characterise a structure or 
system such that 
 
The nucleus of the Ucs. consists of instinctual representatives which seek to 
discharge their cathexis; that is to say, it consists of wishful impulses. These 
instinctual impulses are co-ordinate with one another, exist side by side without 
being influenced by one another, and are exempt from mutual contradiction.766 
 
In consequence, a certain ambiguity arises from the inference that the term ‘unconscious’ 
applies both to (1) a ‘transindividual’ structure or field and (2) processes by virtue of 
which the structure is expressed in individual subjects. The force of this antinomy 
becomes evident when one considers Freud’s assertion that 
 
The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e., they are not ordered temporally, 
are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. 
Reference to time is bound up... with the work of the system Cs.767 
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 8.4.2 The Lacanian view  
 
 Lacan’s writing echoes this Freudian understanding of the unconscious in terms of 
structure and process (albeit, atemporal). For example, in the ‘Seminar on “The 
Purloined Letter” ’, the notion of the indestructibility of unconscious formations informs 
the discussion of repetition automatism. Here, Lacan asserts that 
 
...in repetition automatism... the subject follows the channels of the symbolic... It is 
not only the subject, but the subjects, caught up in their intersubjectivity, who line 
up... who, more docile than sheep, model their very being on the moment of the 
signifying chain that runs through them.  
 
If what Freud discovered... has a meaning, it is that the signifier’s displacement 
determines subjects’ acts, destiny, refusals, blindnesses, success, and fate, 
regardless of their innate gifts and instruction, and irregardless of their character or 
sex; and that everything pertaining to the psychological pregiven follows willy-
nilly the signifier’s train, like weapons and baggage.768  
 
This is, perhaps, one of Lacan’s clearest statements that subjects are, basically, 
automatons completely at the mercy of a supervening symbolic order. However, the 
symbolic structure, to which Lacan alludes, would appear to be shot through with process 
insofar as it is distinguished by ‘channels’ through which the signifier and signifying 
chain ‘runs’ in a ‘displacement’ that leaves a ‘train’. This seeming antinomy becomes 
particularly acute where Lacan affirms (in the afterword to his essay) that 
 
...the remembering [mémoration] at stake in the unconscious – and I mean the 
Freudian unconscious – is not related to the register that is assumed to be that of 
memory, insofar as memory is taken to be a property of a living being. 
 
...we can find in the ordered chains of a formal language the entire appearance of 
remembering, and quite especially of the kind required by Freud’s discovery. 
 
In consequence, Lacan concludes that 
                                                 
768
 Lacan, ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter” ’, 21. 
 
 442 
 
...the links [i.e., structure of relations of difference or differential traces between 
signifiers] of this [symbolic] order are the only ones that can be suspected to suffice 
to account for Freud’s notion of the indestructibility of what his unconscious 
preserves.769 
 
Moreover, Lacan also suggests that, in the ‘autonomy of the symbolic’ and the 
‘exigencies of the symbolic chain’ (i.e., the manner by which the symbolic order is 
defined in terms of structural/grammatical/syntactical permissions and prohibitions), the 
‘indestructible persistence of unconscious desire is situated’.770 
  
 Indeed, Lacan’s sensitivity to the contradiction arising from the dual conception of the 
unconscious as structure and unconscious process is evident in Seminar I, where this 
issue is confronted by way of an appeal to the Hegelian notion that ‘The concept is the 
time of the thing.’771 That is to say, things (or, equivalently, aspects of the real) do not 
exist in time but rather are temporal or are as becoming. Relevant, here, is Hegel’s 
assertion, in The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), that 
 
Time is the Notion itself that is there and which presents itself to consciousness as 
empty intuition; for this reason, Spirit [i.e., mind or mentation] necessarily appears 
in Time, and it appears in Time just so long as it has not grasped its pure Notion, 
i.e., has not annulled Time. It is the outer, intuited pure Self which is not grasped 
by the Self, the merely intuited Notion; when this latter grasps itself it sets aside its 
Time-form, comprehends this intuiting, and is a comprehended and comprehending 
intuiting. Time, therefore, appears as the destiny and necessity of the Spirit that is 
not yet complete within itself...772 
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It should be apparent that the Lacanian understanding of concepts (i.e., signifieds) as 
meaning ideals is a necessary consequence of the impossibility of ever being able to 
absolutely determine the (Hegelian) thing which exists as temporality, as becoming. For 
this reason, Lacan describes the ‘relation of the concept to the thing’ as an ‘identity in 
difference’ – terminology, I would suggest, that alludes to the manner by which, moment 
by moment, the thing-in-becoming is becoming different from itself and thus is that 
which, necessarily and inevitably, eludes and exceeds absolute determination in a 
concept. Support for this reading may be found in Lacan’s suggestion that the ‘identity in 
difference... already saturated in the thing’ implies ‘absolute mobility in the existence of 
things such that the flow of the world never comes to pass twice by in the same 
situation.’773 In view of these determinations, Lacan asserts: 
 
At this point we find ourselves at the heart of the problem that Freud sets up when 
he says that the unconscious is located outside time. It is true, and it isn’t. It is 
located outside time exactly like the concept, because it is in itself time, the pure 
time of the thing, and as such it can reproduce the thing within a certain 
modulation, whose material support can be anything. The compulsion to repeat 
involves nothing but this.774 
 
In other words, it is not so much that the unconscious is atemporal per se but rather that 
the unconscious is temporality or temporally structured insofar as it expresses the ‘pure 
time of the thing’ – i.e., the ‘real time’ or ‘real temporality’ within which the thing 
eternally is as becoming and thus is as potential and as possibility. Indeed, insofar as the 
unconscious also admits consideration as the field of signifiers as potential meaning-
forms, one might go so far as to say that the unconscious is the potential to form meaning 
of the real – although, as noted in the Prologue, this formulation is, itself, complicated by 
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the ambiguous status of the Lacanian real as that which eludes and exceeds determination 
in metaphysical terms. 
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8.5 Freud’s conception of primary and secondary processes 
 
 8.5.1 The human psyche as a homeostasis  
 
 Simply stated, Freud conceives of the psyche (or psychical reality) in terms of a 
homeostasis maintained by virtue of the reciprocity between two processes – the so-
called primary process and the so-called secondary process. The primary process reflects 
the functioning of the libido (the fundamental animating principle of the organism) as it is 
expressed in the form of unconscious wishes. By definition, the ‘contents’ of the 
unconscious are repressed and thus unavailable to consciousness. The secondary process 
mediates (filters, censors) libidinal desires in such a way that, in the part of the 
unconscious Freud terms preconscious, they become ideas or objects of thought 
potentially available to consciousness. The primary process functions purely in 
accordance with what, in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, Freud initially refers to as the 
‘unpleasure principle’ (later, simply the ‘pleasure principle’).775 The secondary process 
operates, additionally, in accordance with what Freud will later name the ‘reality 
principle’.776  
 
 For the sake of simplicity, most of the following discussion draws on material 
presented in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’. Nevertheless, it should be noted that an 
earlier understanding of the human psyche as a homeostasis is presented in the ‘Project 
for a Scientific Psychology’. Here, for example, Freud invokes a ‘principle of neuronal 
inertia’ in order to elaborate the relationship obtaining between a ‘primary function of the 
nervous system’, which seeks to fully discharge psychical energy or cathexis, Q, and a 
‘secondary function’ that preserves ‘a store of Qἠ sufficient to meet the demand for a 
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specific action’, subject to what Freud terms ‘the exigencies of life.’777 Furthermore, in 
‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, the conception of the human psyche as a homeostasis is 
reiterated in terms of a ‘principle of constancy’.778 Here, however, it should be 
understood that Freud’s analysis of the psychical phenomenon of repetition compulsion 
leads him to posit something that exceeds and eludes this psychical homeostasis – 
namely, the so-called ‘beyond’ of the pleasure principle, which Freud also refers to as the 
‘death instinct’.779 The relationship between the ‘beyond’ of the pleasure principle, the 
‘death instinct’, the ‘compulsion to repeat’, and the nature of subjective desire is 
discussed in chapter four. 
 
 8.5.2 Basic functioning of the psychical apparatus 
 
 In the chapter of ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ entitled ‘Wish-Fulfilment’ (SE, v5, 
VII. C), Freud presents a gloss of the primary process by imagining how the human 
‘psychical apparatus’ may have functioned at an earlier stage in its evolution. He 
proposes, first, a basic conservation principle according to which the apparatus seeks to 
keep itself ‘free from stimuli’. Hence, in its primitive incarnation, the psychical apparatus 
would have functioned like a ‘reflex apparatus, so that any sensory excitation impinging 
on it could be promptly discharged along a motor path.’ To illustrate this tendency, Freud 
refers to the helpless crying and kicking of a hungry infant. When the infant’s need is 
satisfied (i.e., it is fed), Freud conceives of an ‘experience of satisfaction... which puts an 
end to the internal stimulus.’ Intrinsic to this experience of satisfaction is a ‘particular 
perception’ (by which I take Freud to mean a sensory experience – i.e., ‘of nourishment’) 
that, itself, gives rise to a ‘mnemic image... which remains associated thenceforward with 
the memory trace of the excitation produced by the need.’780 Having theorised this 
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connection between a perception and a thought image or memory trace, Freud suggests 
that the next time the need arises: 
 
...a psychical impulse will at once emerge which will seek to re-cathect the mnemic 
image of the perception and to re-evoke the perception itself, that is to say, to re-
establish the situation of the original satisfaction. An impulse of this kind is what 
we call a wish; the reappearance of the perception is the fulfilment of the wish; and 
the shortest path to the fulfilment of the wish is a path leading direct from the 
excitation produced by the need to a complete cathexis of the perception.781 
 
For example, when one is hungry, one tends to recall the memory of eating as a first step 
towards satisfying the need. However, it is obvious that if the mere memory of eating 
sufficed to satiate hunger then starvation would soon result. For this reason, Freud 
conceives of the necessity for a ‘second system, which is in control of voluntary 
movement’ and which inhibits ‘regression’ (i.e., the mere, hallucinatory perpetuation of a 
mnemic image of satisfaction) in order to ‘arrive at a more efficient expenditure of 
psychical force... which lead[s] eventually to the desired perceptual identity being 
established from the direction of the external world.’782 That is to say, an experience of 
satisfaction that is based in reality, as opposed to fantasy or hallucination. 
 
 8.5.3 Mediation of the primary process by the secondary process 
 
 With this preliminary understanding of the two systems operating in the psychical 
apparatus, one may proceed to Freud’s chapter on ‘The Primary and Secondary Processes 
– Repression’ (SE, v5, VII, E). Here, Freud asserts: 
 
I propose to describe the psychical process of which the first system admits as the 
‘primary process’, and the process which results from the inhibition imposed by the 
second system as the ‘secondary process’.783 
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In working towards this formula, Freud revisits the notion ‘of a primitive psychical 
apparatus whose activities are regulated by an effort to avoid an accumulation of 
excitation and to maintain itself as far as possible without excitation.’784 As Freud relates, 
further:  
 
...the accumulation of excitation... is felt as unpleasure and... it sets the apparatus in 
action with a view to repeating the experience of satisfaction, which involved a 
diminution of excitation and was felt as pleasure. A current of this kind in the 
apparatus, starting from unpleasure and aiming at pleasure, we have termed a 
‘wish’; and we have asserted that only a wish is able to set the apparatus in motion 
and that the course of the excitation in it is automatically regulated by feelings of 
pleasure and unpleasure.785 
 
Freud then reiterates that the most primitive kind of wishing involves a regression that, 
by itself, cannot relieve the accumulation of excitation arising from need: 
 
The first wishing seems to have been a hallucinatory cathecting of the memory of 
satisfaction. Such hallucinations, however, if they were not to be maintained to the 
point of exhaustion, proved to be inadequate to bring about the cessation of the 
need or, accordingly, the pleasure attaching to satisfaction.786 
 
In order to inhibit the condition of regression, Freud recalls that it ‘became necessary’ to 
posit ‘the activity of a second system’ that 
 
...diverted the excitation arising from the need along a roundabout path which 
ultimately, by means of a voluntary movement, altered the external world in such a 
way that it became possible to arrive at a real perception of the object of 
satisfaction.787 
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Whilst Freud concedes that he has no knowledge of the actual ‘mechanics’ of the 
processes at work in the primary and secondary systems, nevertheless, he reaffirms that  
 
...the activity of the first... system is directed towards securing the free discharge of 
the quantities of excitation, while the second system, by means of the cathexes 
emanating from it, succeeds in inhibiting this discharge and in transforming the 
cathexis into a quiescent one, no doubt with a simultaneous raising of its 
potential.788 
 
And, furthermore:  
 
When once the second system has concluded its exploratory thought-activity, it 
releases the inhibition and damming-up of the excitations and allows them to 
discharge themselves in movement.’789 
 
 8.5.4 Relationship of primary and secondary processes to the psychical 
systems Ucs. and Pcs.  
 
 In his discussion of the primary and secondary processes, Freud states explicitly that 
the two systems in question are ‘the germ of what, in the fully developed [psychical] 
apparatus, we have described as the Ucs. and Pcs.’790 That is to say, the primary process 
reflects the functioning of the system Ucs. and the secondary process reflects the 
functioning of the system Pcs. The ‘psychical apparatus’ to which Freud alludes is 
elaborated in the chapter on ‘Regression’ (SE, v5, VII, B). Here, Freud, describes it as a 
virtual ‘compound instrument’ comprised of a series of ‘agencies’ [Instanzen] or 
‘systems’ through which, in a ‘given psychical process, the excitation passes... in a 
particular temporal sequence.’791 Initially, Freud conceives of the apparatus as that in 
which psychical processes advance from ‘the perceptual end to the motor end’ (from the 
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Pcpt. system to the M. system) via a series of intermediate ‘memory traces’ or ‘mnemic 
systems’ (Mnem. systems).792 Freud suggests that the Pcpt. system, which provides 
consciousness with immediate sense experience is, itself, lacking in memory. By contrast, 
the Mnem. systems ‘are in themselves unconscious. They can be made conscious; but 
there can be no doubt that they can produce all their effects while in the unconscious 
condition.’793 Freud, then, seeks to reconcile his conception of a psychical apparatus with 
what was, earlier, hypothesised as necessary for dream formation – namely, ‘two 
psychical agencies, one of which submitted the activity of the other to a criticism which 
involved its exclusion from consciousness’ where the ‘critical agency... stands in a closer 
relation to consciousness than the agency criticised: it stands like a screen between the 
latter and consciousness.’794 On this basis, Freud elaborates his psychical apparatus as a 
series of agencies proceeding thus: Pcpt... Mnem... Mnem... {Ucs}... Pcs – where the 
preconscious system (Pcs) mediates the admission of the contents of the unconscious 
system (Ucs) to consciousness.795 
 
 8.5.5 Repression as a function of the primary and secondary processes 
 
 In Freud’s view, the manner by which the preconscious, secondary process mediates, 
inhibits, or censors that which is produced by virtue of the activity of the unconscious, 
primary process (i.e., memories of satisfaction, unconscious wishes) is synonymous with 
psychical repression. Freud’s speculates that, in accordance with the unpleasure principle, 
the basis of repression can be glimpsed in the manner by which a primitive psychical 
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apparatus reflexively withdraws from the perception of pain. Indeed, Freud suggests that, 
in an apparatus of this kind, 
 
...no inclination will remain to recathect the perception of the source of pain, either 
hallucinatorily or in any other way. On the contrary, there will be an inclination in 
the primitive apparatus to drop the distressing memory-picture immediately, if 
anything happens to revive it, for the very reason that if its excitation were to 
overflow into perception it would provoke unpleasure (or, more precisely, would 
begin to provoke it). 
 
On this basis, Freud proposes: 
 
This effortless and regular avoidance by the psychical processes of the memory of 
anything that had once been distressing affords us the prototype and first example 
of psychical repression.  
 
and, furthermore: 
 
As a result of the unpleasure principle, then, the first... system is totally incapable 
of bringing anything disagreeable into the context of its thoughts. It is unable to do 
anything but wish.796 
 
 By contrast, what Freud refers to as the ‘exploratory thought-activity’ of the second 
system implies that, in order to inhibit regression and divert psychical energies towards 
efficacious modifications of the external world, ‘it requires free access to all the 
memories laid down by experience.’797 However, in accordance with the unpleasure 
principle, the secondary system nevertheless ‘find[s] a method of cathecting 
unpleasurable memories which would enable it to avoid releasing the unpleasure.’ Thus, 
‘cathexis by the second system implies a simultaneous inhibition of the discharge of 
excitation’ and, consequently, the ‘key to the whole theory of repression’ is that ‘the 
second system can only cathect an idea if it is in a position to inhibit any development of 
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unpleasure that may proceed from it.’798 In other words, even as the second system seeks 
the investing/release of libidinal energy, it does so in such a way as to inhibit the 
development of unpleasure. This does not imply that there is never any experience of 
unpleasure. Freud allows that the inhibition of unpleasure need not be complete: ‘a 
beginning of it must be allowed, since that is what informs the second system of the 
nature of the memory concerned and of its possible unsuitability for the purpose which 
the thought-process has in view.’799 However, Freud’s commentary implies that the 
activity of filtering or censoring of the secondary system is such that, in general, it will 
not cathect distressing memories unless this investment of emotional energy is ultimately 
efficacious for the divesting of unpleasure. In consequence, Freud maintains that 
memories of distressing experiences that are unsuitable for the purposes of the secondary 
system remain repressed. 
 
 8.5.6 Freud’s first psychical topography of Ucs., Pcs., and Cs. 
 
 Following his account of the primary and secondary processes, Freud proceeds to 
elaborate with greater care the distinction between the unconscious and consciousness in 
the chapter entitled ‘The Unconscious and Consciousness – Reality’ (SE, v5, VII, F). To 
begin with, Freud takes pains to emphasise the limitations of conceiving of psychical 
systems ‘topographically’ as ‘psychical localities’. Strictly speaking, the primary and 
secondary ‘systems’ are better described in terms of ‘the existence of two kinds of 
processes of excitation or modes of its discharge.’800 Hence, unconscious, preconscious 
and conscious systems are not actual ‘psychical entities’ occupying specific locations in 
the psyche (or, even, in the brain) but rather designate the modes of resistance and 
facilitation that occur among nervous pathways. Given that the ‘objects’ of internal 
reflections are ‘virtual’, Freud suggests that the psychical systems operate in a manner 
analogous to the lenses in a telescope. The manner by which the secondary process 
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modifies or represses the content of the first is thus akin to the refraction of light passing 
through different media (i.e., from air to glass).801 
 
 Secondly, Freud asserts that it is necessary to relax the prejudice according to which 
mind is defined solely in terms of (or seen to originate solely from) consciousness and 
accept the thesis that the greater part of the psyche is subject to unconscious processes. 
Hence, Freud states: 
 
It is essential to abandon the overvaluation of the property of being conscious 
before it becomes possible to form any correct view of the origin of what is 
mental... The unconscious is the true psychical reality...802 
 
In other words, as discussed in section 1.4, expressions of subjectivity/meaning-making 
would seem to be less a matter of what one gives consciously than that which, by virtue 
of the unconscious, is given to one. This said, Freud does not deny that consciousness 
‘contributed its share’ to these creative activities, but he considers it the ‘much-abused 
privilege of conscious activity, wherever it plays a part, to conceal every other activity 
from our eyes.’803 
 
 Freud then reiterates and summarises his theory of the unconscious in relation to the 
Ucs. and Pcs. systems discussed previously. In Freud’s view, dream analysis 
demonstrates that the unconscious  
 
...is found as a function of two separate systems... Thus there are two kinds of 
unconscious... one of them, which we term the Ucs., is also inadmissible to 
consciousness, while we term the other the Pcs. because its excitations – after 
observing certain rules, it is true, and perhaps only after passing a fresh censorship, 
though nonetheless without regard to the Ucs. – are able to reach consciousness.804 
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Hence, the Pcs. operates like a ‘screen’ between the Ucs. system and consciousness as 
well as controlling ‘access to voluntary movement’.805 
 
 In light of these ruminations, Freud is led to propose that the once ‘omnipotent’ 
faculty of consciousness, behind which the true psychical nature of the mind was 
occluded, is now reduced to the status of a ‘sense-organ for the perception of psychical 
qualities.’ Freud goes so far as to say (reiterating his observations in the chapter on 
‘Regression’) that the system of conscious perception (Cs.) resembles the previously 
discussed perceptual systems Pcpt. ‘as being susceptible to excitations by qualities but 
incapable of retaining traces of alterations – that is to say, as having no memory.’806 
Thus, Freud concludes: 
 
The psychical apparatus, which is turned towards the external world with its sense-
organ of the Pcpt. systems, is itself the external world in relation to the sense-organ 
of the Cs., whose teleological justification resides in this circumstance.807 
 
Where the Cs. system receives  
 
Excitatory material... from two directions: from the Pcpt. system, whose excitation, 
determined by qualities, is probably submitted to a fresh revision before it becomes 
a conscious sensation, and from the interior of the apparatus itself, whose 
quantitative processes are felt qualitatively in the pleasure-unpleasure series when, 
subject to certain modifications, they make their way to consciousness.808 
 
In Freud’s thought, then, consciousness retains aspects of agency (or at least 
‘systematicity’) – but it is one psychical agent among several and, moreover, dependent, 
in its functioning, on the unconscious and preconscious psychical systems. In this way, 
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the Freudian conception of consciousness removes it from its once central position in the 
theory of mind and relegates it as one, almost subsidiary, system among several. Indeed, 
the conscious system is reduced to a psychical ‘sense-organ’ that lacks memory. 
 
 456 
8.6 Saussure’s conception of the linguistic sign and linguistic 
value 
 
 8.6.1 Saussure’s definition of the linguistic sign 
 
 In Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (1916), the linguistic sign is 
defined as a ‘two-sided psychological entity’ in which a ‘concept’ (signified) and a 
‘sound image’ (signifier) are ‘intimately united’ in a bi-univocal reciprocity where ‘each 
recalls the other.’809 Here, it should be understood that, when Saussure refers to the term 
‘sound-image’ (or, in other contexts, simply, ‘sound’), he does not mean an actual, 
material sound but rather the mental representation of phenomenal experience. This is 
clear from his assertion that the  
 
...sound-image... is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the 
psychological imprint of the sound, the impression it makes on our senses. The 
sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call it “material,” it is only in that sense, 
and by way of opposing it to the... concept, which is generally more abstract.810 
 
 8.6.2 The concrete indeterminacy of the linguistic sign 
 
 Saussure’s positive conception of the psychical reality of the linguistic sign is evident 
from assertions such as: ‘Language is concrete... Linguistic signs, though basically 
psychological, are not abstractions’ rather they ‘are realities that have their seat in the 
brain... linguistic signs are tangible’ and ‘The signs that make up language are not 
abstractions but real objects... signs and their relations are what linguistics studies; they 
are the concrete entities of our science.’811 On this basis, Saussure states two conditions 
necessary for the existence and definition of the linguistic sign: (1) ‘The linguistic entity 
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exists only through the associating of the signifier with the signified’ (i.e., the positing of 
an identity) and (2) ‘The linguistic entity is not accurately defined until it is delimited, 
i.e., separated from everything that surrounds it on the phonic chain. These delimited 
entities or units stand in opposition to each other in the mechanism of language’ (i.e., the 
positing of a contextual relation of difference among identities).812 
 
 However, these principles are subject to several complicating factors. In the first place, 
the characterisation of the sign in terms of an ‘intimate unity’ of signified and signifier 
does not imply that these associations are, necessarily, predetermined or inevitable. In 
Saussure’s view: ‘The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary’ – which is 
to say that no ‘inner relationship’ or ‘natural connection’ obtains between them.813 
Secondly, Saussure admits that the ‘delimitation’ of signs presents a challenge and, 
indeed, can only be established or inferred in retrospect: ‘language does not offer itself as 
a set of pre-delimited signs that need only be studied according to their meaning and 
arrangement; it is a confused mass, and only attentiveness and familiarization will reveal 
its particular elements.’814 In consequence, Saussure claims that ‘Language... has the 
strange, striking characteristic of not having entities that are perceptible at the outset and 
yet of not permitting us to doubt that they exist and that their functioning constitutes 
it.’815 Thirdly, Saussure insists that the signified and the signifier have no real existence 
(even as psychological ‘realities... in the brain’) apart from their dual relation in the 
linguistic sign. Consequently, ‘Whenever only one element is retained, the entity [i.e., the 
sign] vanishes; instead of a concrete object we are faced with a mere abstraction.’816 
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 The strictly theoretical existence of the signified and the signifier follows from 
Saussure’s hypothesis that signs are produced by virtue of the structuring of an 
undifferentiated field of ‘thought-sound’ by language: ‘Without language, thought is a 
vague, uncharted nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before 
the appearance of language.’817 Here, it is important to appreciate that Saussure attributes 
no independent existence to ‘thoughts’ (i.e., abstract concepts) and ‘sounds’ (i.e., 
phenomenal representations). Saussure does claim that the ‘role of language is... to serve 
as a link between thought and sound’. Moreover, he proposes that language, considered 
in its entirety, can be regarded as ‘a series of contiguous subdivisions marked off on both 
the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas... and the equally vague plane of sounds’.818 
Nevertheless, his commentary also makes clear that this construction is a retrospective 
effect of language – a conception that would not be possible without language. That is to 
say, language does not enable the linkage between two pre-existing, independent realms: 
thought and phenomenal representation. On the contrary, it is by virtue of language that 
the undifferentiated field ‘thought-sound’ (not to mention the theoretical division or 
structuring of this field into planes of ‘thought’ and ‘sound’) becomes conceivable as 
such. It is in this light that one may understand Saussure’s elaboration: 
 
Thought, chaotic by nature, has to become ordered in the process of its 
decomposition. Neither are thoughts given material form nor are sounds 
transformed into mental entities; the somewhat mysterious fact is rather that 
“thought-sound” implies division, and that language works out its units while 
taking shape between two shapeless masses.819 
 
On this basis, Saussure concludes:  
 
Language can... be compared with a sheet of paper: thought is the front and the 
sound the back; one cannot cut the front without cutting the back at the same time; 
likewise in language, one can neither divide sound from thought nor thought from 
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sound; the division could be accomplished only abstractedly, and the result would 
be either pure psychology or pure phonology.’820 
 
 8.6.3 The ideal identity and relative difference of the linguistic sign 
 
 To the extent that the linguistic sign is a positive psychical reality or necessity, 
expressing an identity between the signified and the signifier, the possibility is enlivened 
that, in principle, signs might embody or encapsulate meaning in an intrinsic or 
determinate fashion. However, as previously discussed, Saussure concedes that the 
precise determination of signs proves, ultimately, to pose insurmountable difficulties. 
Hence, the ability of signs to function as autonomous ‘nuggets’ or ‘building blocks’ of 
meaning would appear to be less real than ideal. Indeed, Saussure suggests that signs are 
only conceivable as such by virtue of language operating on the hypothetically 
undifferentiated field of ‘thought-sound’. In a manner reminiscent of Lacan’s conception 
of the real, the Saussurean realm of ‘thought-sound’ would appear to be, quite literally, 
unthinkable ‘outside’ language. Hence, always already, the question of its nature and 
existence is posited within the horizon of language. In other words, in Saussure’s 
linguistics, ontological priority must be accorded to language per se rather than its 
‘elements’. The question thus arises as to the nature of language if it is not conceivable, 
simply or immediately, as a set of positive entities called ‘signs’. In the Cours, this 
question is addressed by considering language to be ‘a system of pure values... 
determined by nothing except the momentary arrangement of its terms’ which are ‘rigidly 
interdependent.’821 In other words, Saussure’s conception of ‘linguistic value’ implies 
that meaning is not an intrinsic quality of signs – on the contrary, meaning obtains within 
a wider context or field by virtue of relations of difference between signs (i.e., meaning is 
diacritical). With reference to the disposition of pieces in a game of chess, Saussure also 
suggests that, in language, at each particular moment in time, there obtains a ‘state of 
equilibrium’ or ‘synchrony’ within which ‘each linguistic term derives its value from its 
opposition to all the other terms’ and where these ‘values depend above all else on an 
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unchangeable convention’ or ‘set of rules’.822 On this basis, the linguistic sign admits 
consideration as a synchronic identity – i.e., a particular association of a signified and a 
signifier obtaining at a particular time.  
 
 Equivalently, one might say that the field of values or differential relations between 
signs, precisely, is that which enlivens the very possibility of determining a sign as a 
particular synchronic identity. In other words, linguistic value is not equivalent to a 
meaning or even the process of meaning-making but rather is associated with the 
conditions of possibility on which basis meaning-making/signification depends. That 
Saussure does, indeed, consider linguistic value in these terms is evident from his 
statement: 
 
...in semiological systems like language, where elements hold each other in 
equilibrium in accordance with fixed rules, the notion of identity blends with that of 
value and vice versa... that is why the notion of value envelopes [my emphasis] the 
notions of unit, concrete entity, and reality.823 
 
In effect, this is to assert that meaning is not solely an expression of an intrinsic property 
of signs (i.e., an identity of signified and signifier) but also an expression of relations of 
difference. Consequently, Saussure insists that  
 
...the idea of value... shows that to consider a term as simply the union of a certain 
sound with a certain concept is grossly misleading. To define it in this way would 
isolate the term from its system; it would mean assuming that one can start from the 
terms and construct the system by adding them together when, on the contrary, it is 
from the interdependent whole that one must start and through analysis obtain its 
elements.824 
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 The crux of this discussion is to reiterate that there are neither ideas nor phenomenal 
representations pre-existing the system of language – instead, one finds only ‘values 
emanating from the system.’ When values  
 
...correspond to concepts, it is understood that the concepts are purely differential 
and defined not by their positive content but negatively by their relations with other 
terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is in being what the others are 
not.825 
 
Saussure goes on to assert that 
 
The conceptual side of value is made up solely of relations and differences with 
respect to the other terms of language, and the same can be said of its material side. 
The important thing is not the sound alone but the phonic differences that make it 
possible to distinguish this word from all others, for differences carry 
signification.826  
 
On this basis, Saussure makes his oft-cited observation:  
 
...in language there are only differences without positive terms. Whether we take 
the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed 
before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have 
issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less 
importance than the other signs that surround it.827 
 
where, to be clear, I would reiterate that ‘phonic substance’ should be understood to mean 
‘phenomenal representation’.  
 
 This said, however, Saussure immediately adds the following qualification: 
 
But the statement that everything in language is negative is true only if the signified 
and the signifier are considered separately; when we consider the sign in its totality, 
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we have something that is positive in its own class. A linguistic system is a series 
of differences of sound combined with a series of differences of ideas; but the 
pairing of a certain number of acoustical signs with as many cuts made from the 
mass of thought engenders a system of values; and this system serves as the 
effective link between the phonic and the psychological elements within each sign. 
Although both the signified and the signifier are purely differential and negative 
when considered separately, their combination is a positive fact...828  
 
Here, Saussure seemingly reifies his positivist conception of the sign – in apparent 
contradiction of his own acknowledgement that (1) in principle, the sign resists 
determination (indeed, the ‘identity’ it entails is, strictly speaking, virtual or theoretical) 
and (2) the sign does not ‘engender’ but is, in fact, derivative of language considered as a 
diacritical system of pure values.  
 
 That Saussure is entirely cognizant of this conundrum is implicit in his 
aforementioned observation that ‘the somewhat mysterious fact is... that “thought-sound” 
implies division, and that language works out its units while taking shape between two 
shapeless masses.’ Moreover, a few pages prior to this admission, Saussure concedes that 
‘Linguistics... works continuously with concepts forged by grammarians without 
knowing whether or not the concepts actually correspond to the constituents of the 
system of language.’ Only through accepting that ‘the concrete entities of language are 
not directly accessible’ can one ‘come into contact with the true facts’ (presumably, that 
signs are a product of language operating on the undifferentiated field of ‘thought-
sound’). On this basis, it is possible to ‘set up all the classifications that linguistics needs 
for arranging all the facts at its disposal’ even if ‘to base the classifications on anything 
except the concrete entities... is to forget that there are no linguistic facts apart from the 
phonic substance cut into significant elements.’829 In other words, in order to make 
meaning, one posits, by necessity as it were, ‘concrete entities’ (i.e., signs) as constituent 
elements in the field of meaning – even though, on further analysis, it becomes evident 
that these entities not only resist precise determination but are, moreover, only 
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conceivable in relation to language considered negatively as a system of pure values or 
differential relations. Thus, the sign, conceived as an identity of a signified and an 
signifier, is only ostensibly or ideally a determinate or determinable meaning. The 
‘ideality’ of the sign inheres or insists in its resistance to precise determination. In the 
face of this resistance, one is led to a consider meaning-making in relation to linguistic 
value – those negative relations of difference, on which basis is enlivened the very 
possibility of positing meaning ideals. 
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8.7 Freud’s conception of the ‘compulsion to repeat’ and the 
‘death instinct’ in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ 
 
 8.7.1 The limits of the pleasure principle 
  
 Freud begins with a brief reiteration of the nature and reciprocal functioning of the 
‘pleasure principle’ and ‘reality principle’ (as noted in section 8.5, these terms were 
originally introduced in the essay ‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental 
Functioning’, although Freud had, earlier, referred to an ‘unpleasure principle’ in ‘The 
Interpretation of Dreams’). Thus, the pleasure principle is characterised as that which is 
expressed in the autonomous regulation of ‘mental events... set in motion by an 
unpleasurable tension’ such that the ‘final outcome coincides with a lowering of that 
tension – that is, with an avoidance of unpleasure or a production of pleasure.’830 Freud 
also suggests that, whilst there is ‘a strong tendency towards the pleasure principle’ in the 
psyche, its absolute ‘dominance’ is ‘opposed by certain other forces or circumstances, so 
that the final outcome cannot always be in harmony with the tendency towards 
pleasure.’831 These other ‘forces’ are described, firstly, in terms of the mediating function 
of the reality principle (i.e., repression), and secondly, in terms of the return of repressed. 
Thus, in the former case, it is suggested that, whilst the reality principle ultimately 
conforms with the aim of the pleasure principle (i.e., the relieving of excitation, the 
production of pleasure), nevertheless, operating ‘Under the influence of the ego’s 
instincts of self-preservation’, the reality principle  
 
...demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction, the 
abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary 
toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure. 
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In the latter event, Freud refers to the ‘release of unpleasure’ that, in the course of the 
ego’s ‘development’, arises from ‘conflicts and dissensions’ between ‘innate instinctual 
impulses.’832. Whilst, initially, some impulses are repressed, ‘held back at lower levels of 
psychical development and cut off... from the possibility of satisfaction’, subsequently 
they may succeed ‘in struggling through, by roundabout paths, to a direct or... substitutive 
satisfaction’. In this case, Freud suggests that the relieving of excitation ‘which would in 
other cases have been an opportunity for pleasure, is felt by the ego as unpleasure.’ 
Indeed, whilst conceding that the ‘process’ of repression is not  ‘clearly understood’, 
Freud maintains that ‘all neurotic unpleasure is... pleasure that cannot be felt as such.’833 
To this extent, the return of the repressed can be understood in terms of pleasure for one 
psychic system (e.g., the Ucs. or unconscious part of the ego) at the cost of unpleasure for 
another (e.g., the Pcs. or preconscious part of the ego).834 
                                                 
832
 Ibid, 10. The manner by which the reality principle mediates the pleasure principle in 
accordance with the ego’s ‘instincts of self-preservation’ merits further explanation. Here, the 
implication is that, left to itself, the pleasure principle may imperil the life of the organism. 
Indeed, Freud asserts, further, that, whilst ‘the pleasure principle is proper to a primary method of 
working on the part of the mental apparatus... from the point of view of the self-preservation of 
the organism... it is from the very outset inefficient and even highly dangerous’ (ibid). As noted in 
chapter three (n318), the same idea is implicit in ibid, ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ (1895) 
in SE, v1, 296-97. Here, Freud refers to the necessity of a ‘secondary function’ of the psyche that 
preserves a ‘store’ of psychical energy sufficient to meet the ‘exigencies of life.’ Also relevant 
(and discussed in greater detail in section 8.5) is ibid, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams (second 
part)’ (1900) in SE, v5, 566, 598. Here, the mediating function of the secondary process is posited 
as a necessary counter to regression (i.e., the indulgence, by means of the primary process, in 
mnemic images of satisfaction). It is clear that the life of the organism could not be sustained if 
hunger could be alleviated merely by recalling a memory of satiation, or if the pain from a life-
threatening injury could be relieved simply by recalling a previous experience of pain relief. 
Moreover, insofar as the primary process is, by nature, reflexive, there is no guarantee that the 
instinctive withdrawal from painful stimulus is, in itself, sufficient to preserve life – as is, 
perhaps, encapsulated in the adage ‘from the frying pan into the fire’. 
 
833
 Ibid, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, (1920) in SE, v18, 11. 
 
834
 Here, it should be noted that ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ prefigures Freud’s so-called 
second psychical topography of id, ego and superego (discussed, more explicitly in ibid, ‘The 
Ego and the Id’ (1923) in SE, v19). On this basis, the ego is not identical to the system Cs. but 
rather is considered to possess conscious and unconscious strata. In ibid, ‘Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle’, (1920) in SE, v18, 19, this is evident from the distinction Freud makes between ‘the 
coherent ego and the repressed’ such that ‘It is certain that much of the ego is itself unconscious, 
and notably what we may describe as its nucleus; only a small part of it is covered by the term 
“preconscious” ’. 
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 That the psyche may evince something that not only eludes the mediation of the 
pleasure principle by the reality principle but that, also, exceeds the dominance of the 
pleasure principle per se is implicit in Freud’s brief discussion of ‘traumatic neurosis’ as 
expressed in dreams. Affirming that the ‘study of dreams may be considered the most 
trustworthy method of investigating deep mental processes’, Freud observes that ‘dreams 
occurring in traumatic neuroses have the characteristic of repeatedly bring the patient 
back into the situation of his accident, a situation from which he wakes up in another 
fright.’ To the extent that it gives rise to an immediate experience of fright, the re-living 
of trauma in dreams evidently short-circuits or bypasses the reality principle – a psychical 
function that, on Freud’s account, reflectively temporises, enduring unpleasure in the 
short term in order to achieve a more efficacious accommodation with what, in the 
‘Project’, Freud refers to as the ‘exigencies of life’. However, it is also the case that the 
re-experiencing of trauma in dreams exceeds the pleasure principle insofar as it 
contradicts one of Freud’s basic conjectures – namely, that dreams function as a way of 
fulfilling wishful impulses arising by virtue of the pleasure principle. In seeking to resolve 
this antinomy, Freud proposes: 
 
If we are not to be shaken in out belief in the wish-fulfilling tenor of dreams by the 
dreams of traumatic neurotics, we still have one resource open to us: we may argue 
that the function of dreaming, like so much else, is upset in this condition and 
diverted from its purposes...835 
  
 8.7.2 The compulsion to repeat and the death instinct  
 
 Having thus specified the operational limits of the pleasure principle, and having 
raised the issue of traumatic experiences revisited in dreams as something potentially 
                                                 
835
 Ibid, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, (1920) in SE, v18, 13. The status of dreams as wish-
fulfilments also is discussed in ibid, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ in SE, v5, VII, C, 568, where 
Freud states that ‘the reason... dreams are invariably wish-fulfilments is that they are products of 
the system Ucs., whose activity knows no other aim than the fulfilment of wishes and which has 
at its command no other forces than wishful impulses.’ See also ibid, ‘On Dreams’ (1901) in SE, 
v5, 678, where it is asserted that ‘the content of a dream is the representation of a fulfilled wish... 
its obscurity is due to alterations in repressed material made by the censorship’ (i.e., by virtue of 
the mediation of the secondary process or reality principle). 
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incompatible with the pleasure principle, Freud progresses to a more direct consideration 
of the compulsion to repeat. In this regard, Freud maintains that, for the most part, the 
compulsion to repeat, as a ‘manifestation of the power of the repressed’, ‘does not 
contradict the pleasure principle’ to the extent that the return of the repressed implies 
‘unpleasure for one system and simultaneously satisfaction for the other.’ That is to say, 
the return of the repressed can be understood in terms of pleasure for one psychic system 
(e.g., the Ucs. or unconscious part of the ego) at the cost of unpleasure for another (e.g., 
the Pcs. or preconscious part of the ego). However, Freud invites the reader to consider a 
‘new and remarkable fact’ – specifically, that 
 
...the compulsion to repeat also recalls from the past experiences which include no 
possibility of pleasure, and which can never, even long ago, have brought 
satisfaction even to instinctual impulses which have since been repressed.836 
 
By way of substantiating this claim, Freud refers to patients who, in the relationship 
established with the analyst during the course of treatment, repeat all manner of 
‘unwanted situations and painful emotions’ experienced in the course of their passage 
from childhood to maturity. Freud also remarks on the  tendency of some people to 
repeatedly make poor life choices, which they often ascribe to a ‘malignant fate’ – 
although, from a psychoanalytic perspective, ‘their fate is for the most part arranged by 
themselves and determined by early infantile influences.’837 
 
 In light of these considerations, Freud concludes that ‘there really does exist in the 
mind a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure principle.’838 In seeking to 
account for this phenomenon, Freud proposes that it reflects a certain principle of 
conservation at work in instincts per se such that 
 
                                                 
836
 Ibid, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, (1920) in SE, v18, 20. 
 
837
 Ibid, 21. 
 
838
 Ibid, 22. 
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...an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things 
which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external 
disturbing forces... it is a kind of organic elasticity, or... the expression of an inertia 
inherent in organic life. 
 
As Freud points out, he implication is that instincts are not merely drivers of ‘change and 
development’ but, on the contrary, express ‘the conservative nature of living 
substance.’839 On this basis, Freud conjectures that 
 
If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for 
internal reasons – becomes inorganic once again – then we shall be compelled to 
say that ‘the aim of all life is death’...840 
 
Indeed, Freud suggests that, if this death instinct is tenable then the ‘instincts of self-
preservation’ do not legislate absolutely. Rather, they are strictly subsidiary to the basic 
impetus of the organism to ‘follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible 
ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the 
organism itself’. In short, as Freud concludes, ‘the organism wishes to die only in its own 
fashion.’841 
 
                                                 
839
 Ibid, 36. 
 
840
 Ibid, 38. 
 
841
 Ibid, 39. 
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8.8 Repression and exclusion: the primordial origin of subjectivity  
 
 8.8.1 The Freudian distinction between Verdrängung and, respectively, 
Urverdrängung, Verwerfung, and Bejahung/Ausstossung  
 
 Particularly relevant to the question of the primordial ground, advent, or founding 
moment of subjectivity are the distinctions Freud sustains between ‘repression proper’ or 
Verdrängung (i.e., the psychical function of repression/overdetermination of meaning) 
and that which admits consideration, variously, as ground or condition of possibility of 
these operations and/or that which is radically excluded from or beyond the terms of 
reference of these operations. To fully appreciate the nuances of Freud’s texts, I would 
suggest bearing in mind that Verdrängung, insofar as it is the psychical operation par 
excellence of meaning-making, also is intrinsic to the function of what Freud calls 
‘intellectual judgement’. From this perspective, the distinctions Freud makes are those 
obtaining between judgement and that which is (1) condition of possibility for judgement, 
(2) radically other than or excluded from the frame of reference of judgement, or, 
paradoxically, (3) both conditions at the same time. This ambiguity reflects the fact that 
Freud’s terminology shifts over the course of his writing – an equivocation compounded 
in Lacan’s revisiting of Freud. 
 
 How is this so? Let us begin by detailing the distinctions in question. In the first place, 
in ‘Repression’, Freud proposes that repression per se ‘cannot arise until a sharp cleavage 
has occurred between conscious and unconscious mental activity’.842 On this basis, Freud 
identifies the necessity of there being an Urverdrängung – a ‘primal repression’ or ‘first 
phase of repression’ by which an ideational representative of an instinct is ‘denied 
entrance into the conscious’. In the process, there is established a ‘fixation’ that is 
unconscious and that functions as a source of ‘attraction’ for further repressions. On 
Freud’s account, the establishment, via primal repression, of a fixation is pre-requisite for 
the functioning of Verdrängung – a ‘second stage of repression’ or ‘repression 
                                                 
842
 Ibid, ‘Repression’ (1915) in SE, v14, 147. 
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proper’.843 Moreover, whilst Freud’s article does not state this explicitly, many 
commentaries (including some by Lacan) identify primal repression with the originary 
‘cleavage... between conscious and unconscious mental activity’. That is to say, primal 
repression is considered to be the founding operation of subjectivity (which is also to say 
that primal repression is implicated in the ‘formation’ of the unconscious, the signifying 
chain, and the symbolic order).844  
                                                 
843
 Thus, in ibid, 148, it is asserted that, consequent to the ‘cleavage... between conscious and 
unconscious mental activity’, 
 
We have reason to assume that there is a primal repression, a first phase of repression, 
which consists in the psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct being denied 
entrance into the conscious. With this a fixation is established; the representative in 
question persists unaltered from then onwards and the instinct remains attached to it. 
 
On the basis of primal repression, 
 
The second stage of repression, repression proper, affects mental derivatives of the 
repressed representative, or such trains of thought as, originating elsewhere, have come 
into associative connection with it. On account of this association, these ideas experience 
the same fate as what was primally repressed. Repression proper, therefore, is actually an 
after-pressure. 
 
Moreover, Freud emphasises that the functioning of repression is to be conceived in terms of a 
counterpoise between the ‘attraction’ exerted by a primally repressed centre or nucleus of 
repression and the ‘repulsion’ of ideational representatives from consciousness that defines 
secondary repressions: 
 
...it is a mistake to emphasize only the repulsion which operates from the direction of the 
conscious upon what is to be repressed; quite as important is the attraction exercised by 
what was primally repressed upon everything with which it can establish a connection. 
Probably the trend towards repression would fail in its purpose if these two forces did not 
co-operate, if there were not something previously repressed ready to receive what is 
repelled by the conscious. 
 
844
 For some references to the idea that ‘primal repression’, as conceived by Freud, is equivalent 
to the ‘advent’ of subjectivity or the ‘formation’ of the unconscious see, for example, Simon 
Boag, ‘Freudian Repression, the Common View, and Pathological Science’ in Review of General 
Psychology, v10, n1, 2006, 77, where it is observed that, on the Freudian model, ‘primal 
repression... results in the formation of a nucleus of unconscious ideas’. See, also, Evans, 165, 
where primal repression is characterised as a ‘ “mythical” forgetting of something that was never 
conscious to begin with, an originary “psychical act” by which the unconscious is first 
constituted’. Also relevant is Ragland-Sullivan, 113, where it is observed that ‘Lacan upholds 
Freud’s statement that repression (Verdrӓngung) requires the possibility of some prior repression 
as a foundation. Lacan makes Urverdrӓngung the equivalent of the fixing of a primary, signifying 
chain in the pre-specular and mirror-stage periods’. 
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 Secondly, in ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’ (1918 (1914)), Freud 
differentiates Verdrängung and Verwerfung. Here, Verwerfung is posed, tacitly, as a 
psychical function whereby an idea is rejected or excluded in a fashion that is more 
radical than repression considered as a function of judgement or meaning-making. Thus, 
in the context of a discussion addressing the so-called ‘Wolfman’s’ sexual neuroses and 
fear of castration, Freud invokes Verwerfung in order to distinguish a ‘repression’ from a 
more radical ‘condemning judgement’.845 Furthermore, addressing the Wolfman’s having 
‘rejected castration’ (i.e., in the context of Freud’s discussion, submission to the authority 
of the Father), Freud remarks:  
 
When I speak of his having rejected it, the first meaning of the phrase is that he 
would have nothing to do with it, in the sense of having repressed it. This really 
involved no judgement upon the question of its existence, but was the same as if it 
did not exist.846 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 For a reference to the idea that Lacan understands primal repression to be synonymous with 
the formation of the unconscious see, for example, Lacan, ‘The Signification of the Phallus’, 579. 
Here, Lacan observes that, among the ‘effects’ of the primordial signifier (here, referred to as the 
‘phallus’) is the alienation of desire when ‘needs are subjected to demand’ (i.e., expressed in 
language – the discourse of the Other). Due to ‘their being put into signifying form as such and of 
the fact that it is from the Other’s locus that... [the] message is emitted’, needs ‘come back... in an 
alienated form.’ In consequence, Lacan concludes that 
 
What is thus alienated in needs constitutes an Urverdrӓngung [primal repression], as it 
cannot, hypothetically, be articulated in demand; it nevertheless appears in an offshoot that 
presents itself in man as desire [das Begehren]. 
 
Similarly, in ibid, ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian 
Unconscious’, 691, Lacan suggests that ‘fantasy is really the “stuff” of the I that is primally 
repressed, because it can be indicated only in the fading of enunciation.’ That is to say, the 
‘essence’ of subjectivity is the function of pure difference – the unary trait. On this basis, Lacan 
suggests that ‘our attention is now drawn to the subjective status of the signifying chain in the 
unconscious or, better, in primal repression (Urverdrӓngung).’ Here, then, Lacan makes a 
relatively unambiguous identification between the ‘signifying chain in the unconscious’ and that 
which is ‘primally repressed’. 
 
845
 Freud, ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’ (1918 (1914))’ in SE, v17, 79-80. 
 
846
 Ibid, 84. 
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 Thirdly, in ‘Negation’, Freud characterises the ‘function’ of ‘intellectual... judgement’ 
(of which, it may be reiterated, Verdrängung is the psychical underpinning) as ‘a 
continuation, along the lines of expediency’ of the primordial ‘interplay of the primary 
instinctual impulses’ or the ‘original process by which the ego took things into itself or 
expelled them from itself according to the pleasure principle’. That is to say, Bejahung 
and Ausstossung, respectively.847 In light of these considerations, Freud attributes the 
‘polarity of judgement... to the opposition of the two groups of instincts we have 
supposed to exist’ (i.e., what, in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, Freud refers to as ‘life 
instincts’ and ‘death instincts’) so that ‘Affirmation – as a substitute for uniting – belongs 
to Eros; negation – the successor to expulsion – belongs to the instinct of destruction.’ 
Crucially, however, Freud asserts that 
 
...the performance of the function of judgement is not made possible until the 
creation of the symbol of negation has endowed thinking with a first measure of 
freedom from the consequences of repression and, with it, from the compulsion of 
the pleasure principle. 
 
In other words, ‘the creation of the symbol of negation’ that makes possible ‘the 
performance of the function of judgement’ testifies to a ‘beyond’, or ‘outside’ of the 
‘original process by which the ego took things into itself or expelled them from itself 
according to the pleasure principle’.848 
                                                 
847
 Ibid, ‘Negation’ (1925) in SE, v19, 239. In making this assertion, Freud’s contends that 
‘judgement is concerned in the main with two sorts of decisions. It affirms or disaffirms the 
possession by a thing of a particular attribute; and it asserts or disputes that a presentation has an 
existence in reality.’ (236). In Freud’s view, the former kinds of judgements typically address 
whether a thing is ‘good or bad, useful or harmful’ and 
 
Expressed in the language of the oldest – the oral – instinctual impulses, the judgement is: 
‘I should like to eat this’, or ‘I should like to spit it out’; and, put more generally: ‘I should 
like to take this into myself and to keep that out.’ That is to say: ‘It shall be inside me’ or 
‘it shall be outside me’. (237) 
 
As Freud relates, further, this reflection on attributive judgements harmonises with the idea that 
‘the original pleasure-ego wants to introject into itself everything that is good and to eject from 
itself everything that is bad’ where ‘What is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is external are, 
to begin with, identical’ (ibid). 
 
848
 Ibid, 239. 
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 8.8.2 Lacan’s transformation of Freud 
 
 In Seminar III, Lacan appropriates, reformulates, and contrasts the Freudian terms 
Bejahung and Verwerfung in order to theorise the phenomenon of psychosis in light of 
the lessons of structural linguistics.849 Relevant, in the present context, is, firstly, Lacan’s 
characterisation of a ‘pure, primitive Bejahung’ as ‘primitive symbolization’ and, by way 
of elucidating the ‘mechanism’ of psychotic phenomena, his suggestion that ‘In the 
beginning, then, there is either Bejahung, which is the affirmation of what is, or 
Verwerfung.’850 To this extent, Bejahung and Verwerfung are presented as opposing 
functions, operating on the same ‘primitive’ level. Secondly, with reference to Freud’s 
‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, Lacan identifies ‘a phenomenon of exclusion 
for which the term Verwerfung appears valid’.851 On this basis, Lacan proposes that ‘it 
happens that whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, 
reappears in the real’852 and, similarly,  
 
                                                 
849
 Indeed, whilst Lacan does not mention this explicitly in Seminar III, a source of inspiration 
would appear to be Freud, ‘The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence’ (1894) in SE, v3, 58. Here, Freud 
makes reference to  
 
...a much more energetic and successful kind of defence... [where] the ego rejects the 
incompatible idea together with its affect and behaves as if the idea had never occurred to 
the ego at all. But from the moment at which this has been successfully done the subject is 
in a psychosis, which can only be classified as ‘hallucinatory confusion’. 
 
That is to say, the term Verwerfung is associated with the condition of psychosis fomented by the 
radical rejection of an idea. 
 
850
 Lacan, Seminar III, 82. For further references to the meaning of Bejahung, see, for example, 
Žižek, Less Than Nothing, Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London and New 
York: Verso, 2012), 860-61, where it is suggested that Bejahung is ‘the primordial gesture of 
subjectively assuming one’s place in the symbolic universe’. See also Evans, 17, where it is 
suggested that ‘Bejahung denotes... the primordial act of symbolisation itself, the inclusion of 
something in the symbolic universe.’ 
 
851
 Lacan, Seminar III, 12. 
 
852
 Ibid, 13. 
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In the subject’s relationship to the symbol there is a possibility of a primitive 
Verwerfung, that is, that something is not symbolized and is going to reappear in 
the real.853  
 
In Seminar III, Lacan’s employment of the term Verwerfung to characterise that which is 
fundamentally other than or excluded from the symbolic order recalls his commentary in 
Seminar I where, in the course of challenging the French translation of Freud’s text, 
Lacan suggests that Verwerfung ought to be understood as a rejection or refusal apart 
from judgement per se (i.e., as ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the system of language-mediated 
subjectivity). Indeed, in Seminar I, Lacan seems to more or less identify Verwerfung with 
Urverdrängung, suggesting that the implication of Freud’s employment of Verwerfung 
 
...shows us that originally, for repression to be possible, there must be a beyond of 
repression, something final, already primitively constituted, an initial nucleus of the 
repressed, which not only is unacknowledged, but which, for not being formulated, 
is literally as if it didn’t exist... And nevertheless, in a certain sense, it is 
somewhere, since, as Freud everywhere tells us, it is the centre of attraction, calling 
up all the subsequent repressions.854 
 
 Returning to Seminar III, Lacan makes two other critical suggestions with reference to 
Freud’s ‘Negation’ (where, it should be noted, Freud employs the term Ausstossung, as 
opposed to Verwerfung). Firstly, Lacan proposes that, in addition to conceiving of the 
unconscious in terms of that which is repressed/returning (i.e., Verdrängung) – it is also 
necessary to posit ‘a primordial Bejahung, an admission in the sense of the symbolic, 
                                                 
853
 Ibid, 81. Here, it should be reiterated that Lacan’s reference to the real as a place in which an 
entity may be banished ought to be taken figuratively as opposed to literally. More precisely, one 
might say that, as a matter of logical and structural necessity, the field of language-mediated 
subjectivity and subjective desire precipitates as a counterpoise between possibility and 
impossibility such that the signifying chain is constituted with a caput mortuum – i.e., 
unresolvable and irreducible structural deficits, aporiae, impossibilities. 
 
854
 Ibid, Seminar I, 43. In the course of challenging the French translation of Freud’s text, Lacan, 
firstly, reproduces Freud’s comment distinguishing a ‘repression’ from a ‘condemning 
judgement’ in the original German (‘Eine Verdrӓngung ist etwas anderes als eine Verwerfung’) 
in order to justify the interpretation of Verwerfung as a rejection or refusal apart from judgement 
per se. Secondly, Lacan points out that Freud only introduces the term judgement (Urteil) 
precisely in order to emphasise that, in the context of Verwerfung-as-rejection, ‘there isn’t any. 
No judgement has been brought to bear on the existence of the problem of castration – Aber 
etwas so, but it was the same, als ob sie nicht, as if it didn’t exist.’ 
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which can itself be wanting’ (i.e., a primordial admission of a signifier of lack: S(Ⱥ)).855 
Secondly, affirming that it is ‘structurally necessary to admit a primitive stage in which 
the world of signifiers as such appears,’ Lacan proposes that it is in the ‘field of symbolic 
articulation’, necessarily grounded in ‘a primitive appearance of the signifier’, that 
‘Verwerfung occurs.’856 Subsequently, Lacan asserts that  
 
What is at issue when I speak of Verwerfung... is the rejection of a primordial 
signifier into the outer shadows, a signifier that will henceforth be missing at this 
level... It’s a matter of a primordial process of exclusion of an original within, 
which is not a bodily within but that of an initial body of signifiers.857 
 
In making these assertions, Lacan appeals to Jean Hyppolite’s ‘A spoken commentary on 
Freud’s Verneinung’ (1954) (originally delivered in the context of Lacan’s seminar of 
1953 and 1954).858 Here, Hyppolite contends that a basic insight of Freud’s essay is that 
judgement, intellection, the functioning of the unconscious – in short, language-mediated 
subjectivity per se – is made possible by a fundamental rejection or expulsion (i.e., 
Verwerfung/Ausstossung) synonymous with what Freud refers to as ‘the creation of a 
symbol of negation.’859  
                                                 
855
 Ibid, Seminar III, 12. 
 
856
 Ibid, 149. 
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 Ibid, 150. 
 
858
 Ibid, 12, n9. For references to Hyppolite’s commentary, see Jean Hyppolite, ‘A spoken 
commentary on Freud’s Verneinung’ in Lacan, Seminar I (Hyppolite’s commentary originally 
presented 10 February 1954 in Lacan’s Seminar of 1953-54 and originally published as 
‘Commentaire parlée sur la Verneinung de Freud’ in La Psychanalyse, n1, 1956, 29-40), 289-97. 
In my quotes, I use the more recent translation presented in Écrits (2006), 746-54. 
 
859
 Thus, in Hyppolite, 749, it is affirmed that Freud’s essay seeks to show ‘how the intellectual 
separates <in action> from the affective, and to give a formulation of a sort of genesis of 
judgment, that is, in short, a genesis of thought’. With regard to the former point, however, 
Hyppolite insists that the ‘role’ Freud attributes to ‘primordial affectivity insofar as it gives rise to 
intelligence’ (ibid) should be conceived in Lacanian terms: 
 
...the primal form of relation known psychologically as the affective is itself situated within 
the distinctive field of the human situation, and that, whilst it gives rise to intelligence, it is 
because, from the outset, it already brings with it a fundamental historicity. (750) 
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 Notwithstanding the various ambiguities arising from Lacan’s reformulation of 
Freud’s ideas (in particular, the subsuming of Freud’s Ausstossung into Verwerfung), I 
would suggest that there appears to obtain a logico-structural equivalence between the 
function of Urverdrängung, the creation of the symbol of negation, the ‘pure, primitive 
Bejahung’ that facilitates an ‘admission in the sense of the symbolic, which can itself be 
wanting’ (i.e., the admission of the signifier of lack S(Ⱥ)), and the ‘primitive 
Verwerfung’ that involves ‘the rejection of a primordial signifier’ or a ‘primordial process 
of exclusion of an original... body of signifiers... into the real’. Moreover (as noted in 
chapter four), given Lacan’s insistence that the primordial signifier or primordial object 
of desire (and thus the primordial moment of the precipitation of subjectivity) is mythical, 
it should be apparent that it makes no sense to ask whether these primordial admissions 
and exclusions occur in relation to a pre-existing symbolic order or whether they are 
                                                                                                                                                 
Whilst Hyppolite does not state this explicitly, I take him to be implying that there is no clear 
division between the (pre-symbolic) domain of ‘primordial affectivity’ and the (post-symbolic) 
domain of intellection. Indeed, insofar as it is ‘situated within the distinctive field of the human 
situation’, wherein, ‘from the outset, it already brings with it a fundamental historicity’, always 
already, what is called ‘primordial affectivity’ is structured and law-governed in a way that 
demands to be conceived of in terms of language. To recall the discussion in section 2.2, 
Hyppolite’s position is equivalent to Lacan’s repudiation of the distinction Freud sustains 
between ‘word-presentations’ or Wortvorstellungen and ‘thing-presentations’ or 
Sachevorstellungen such that, in the field of human subjectivity, it makes no sense to speak of a 
primordial realm of pure forms entirely divorced from meaning. It is in this light that one may 
understand Hyppolite’s affirmation that ‘There is no pure affect on the one hand, entirely engaged 
in the real, and pure intellect on the other, which detaches itself from it in order to grasp it anew’ 
(ibid), and his contention that, in Freud’s speculations on the genesis of judgement, intellection, 
and subjectivity, all references to the primordial status or advent of subjectivity have the status of 
‘grand myths’ (750, 751, 752). 
 
 With regard to Freud’s suggestion that ‘the performance of the function of judgement’ is 
enabled by ‘the creation of the symbol of negation’, Hyppolite proposes that negation, thus 
conceived, is to be identified with neither ‘a tendency towards destruction’ (i.e., negation = the 
death instinct) nor that which operates ‘within a form of judgement’ (i.e., negation = a tacit 
admission within the very form of a denial). Rather, negation, in this context, is to be thought as 
‘the form of destruction’ that bears witness to ‘a concrete attitude at the origin of the explicit 
symbol of negation [négation]’, where ‘this explicit symbol alone makes possible something like 
the use of the unconscious, all the while maintaining the repression’ (752-53). As noted in Julia 
Kristeva, Melanie Klein, trans Ross Guberman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, 
originally published as Le Génie féminin: la vie, la folie, les mots (v2): Mélanie Klein (Paris: 
Arthème Fayard, 2000)), 173, by ‘concrete attitude at the origin of the explicit symbol of 
negation’, Hyppolite means the fundamental rejection/expulsion, Verwerfung/Ausstossung 
involved in the creation of the symbol of negation. 
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coincident with the emergence of such. To all intents and purposes, the primordial 
admission of a signifier of lack, the exclusion of a primordial signifier, and the ‘advent’ 
of the symbolic order as constitutively lacking are logically and structurally synonymous. 
 
 8.8.3 Žižek’s transformation of Lacan 
 
 Support for the interpretation of Lacanian theory given above may be found in Žižek’s 
Less Than Nothing (2012), where, it may be noted, in making sense of Lacan’s 
transformations of Freud, Žižek reconfigures Lacan’s terminology in turn. Intrinsic to 
Žižek’s ‘resolution’ of the ambiguities arising in relation to Lacan’s transformation of 
Freud is that the exclusions or expulsions proper to Ausstossung and Verwerfung are 
considered to be functionally distinct and structurally synonymous. How is this so? In the 
first place, Žižek attributes the ‘ambiguous relation between Ausstossung... and 
Verwerfung... in Freud and Lacan’ to the fact that Lacanian psychoanalysis, reading 
Freud via Hegel, complicates the idea that subjectivity is conceivable in terms of a 
tension between two discrete or determinate entities or domains (e.g., in terms of ‘the gap 
between the system cs/pcs and the unconscious’ or as ‘the separation of the I from the 
unconscious Substance’). Rather, the process of ‘de-centering’ by which Lacanian 
subjectivity emerges is ‘always redoubled’ so that   
 
...the Other, the de-centered site of the subject’s being, is also in its turn de-
centered, truncated, deprived of the unfathomable X that would guarantee its 
consistency. In other words, when the subject is de-centered, the core of its being is 
not the natural Substance, but the “big Other”... the virtual symbolic order which is 
itself constructed around a lack. The gap that separates the subject from the big 
Other is thus simultaneously the gap in the heart of the Other itself.860 
 
To reiterate points made in chapter four, this is to affirm that (1) ‘man’s desire is the 
Other’s desire’ (where the Other in question is the big Other – the ‘locus of the word’) 
and (2) ‘Desire is a relation to lack... [to the] lack of being whereby the being exists’. 
Hence, the ‘lack of being’ proper to subjective desire is not only that of the individual 
subject but also of the transindividual Otherness by which is defined the language-
                                                 
860
 Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 860. 
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mediated field of subjectivity. In consequence, it is not only the individual but also the 
big Other that is constitutively lacking. 
 
 On the basis of their difference, Žižek proposes that Ausstossung designates ‘the 
expulsion of the Real, which is constitutive of the emergence of the symbolic order’, 
whilst Verwerfung defines ‘the “foreclosure” of a signifier from the symbolic into the 
Real’.861 To this extent, Ausstossung would seem synonymous with Urverdrängung, 
whilst Verwerfung, in common with Verdrängung, ‘presuppose[s] that the symbolic order 
is in place, since they deal with how some content relates to it’.862 However, whilst 
sustaining a distinction between Ausstossung and Verwerfung, Žižek also contends that 
they operate on the same level (i.e., they are functionally distinct but structurally 
synonymous). In Žižek’s view, this reflects  
 
...the basic paradox of the symbolic as the two at the same: ultimately, the 
expulsion of the Real from the symbolic and the rejection of a signifier overlap... 
the symbolic order can only emerge as delimited from the Real if it is delimited 
from itself, missing or excluding a central part of itself, not identical with itself. 
There is no Ausstossung without a Verwerfung – the price the symbolic has to pay 
in order to delimit itself from the Real is its own being-truncated.863 
 
 Expressed in the terminology thus far employed, this is equivalent to the 
understanding that the symbolic order or the field of language-mediated subjectivity 
coalesces (1) in the form of a structurally necessary counterpoise between possibility 
(i.e., the tension between the conscious and the unconscious dimensions of the signifying 
chain) and impossibility (i.e., the real as caput mortuum of the signifying chain), and (2) 
by virtue of the self-effacing function of pure difference – a ‘real writing’ or ‘writing in 
the real’ that is the structurally necessary, real-as-impossibility synonymous with, yet 
inassimilable to, the function of representation/symbolisation. As Žižek goes on to point 
out, the missing primordial signifier, by virtue of which the field of language-mediated 
                                                 
861
 Ibid. 
 
862
 Ibid, 859. 
 
863
 Ibid, 863. 
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subjectivity is constitutively lacking, is ‘a signifier that itself stands for the... lack of 
signifier, for the incompleteness-inconsistency of the symbolic field.’864 As noted in 
chapter four, in Lacanian theory, this ‘signifier’ (which, to reiterate, is not an ‘entity’ in 
the singular) is termed, ‘S(Ⱥ)’ (i.e., signifier of a lack in the Other) or, more 
controversially, the ‘phallus’. 
 
                                                 
864
 Ibid. 
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8.9 Tracing Malady series acrylic paintings on canvas from 1970 
 
 8.9.1 Numbered and/or lettered works 
 
Black Painting I from “Malady” (1970) 
 
John Furphy, Australian Art Sales Digest, http://www.aasd.com.au/index.cfm/search-
title/?q=black+painting+I+from+malady&Submit=Search+for+Title&qa=&qw=&house=
&medium=0&sold=2&lo=&hi=&loe=&hie=&height=&width=&loy=&hiy, (12.06.14). 
Identified as ‘Black Painting I from Malady, a Poem by Bill Manhire’. Description: 
‘Acrylic on canvas, signed, titled and dated 1970 on reverse, 177 x 71 cm’. 
 
Black Painting II from “Malady” (1970) 
 
Furphy, http://www.aasd.com.au/index.cfm/search-
title/?q=black+painting+II+from+malady&Submit=Search+for+Title&qa=&qw=&house
=&medium=0&sold=2&lo=&hi=&loe=&hie=&height=&width=&loy=&hiy, (12.06.14). 
Identified as ‘Black Painting II, from the Malady (Melody), a Poem by Bill Manhire’ and 
described as ‘Oil and acrylic on canvas, signed, inscribed and dated ‘Dunedin’ 1970 
verso, 178 x 71 cm’. This reproduction may be heavily overexposed to the blue (if it is 
not then one would question why it merits the designation Black Painting). There is a 
separate listing of what may be the same painting, only reproduced in more natural hues: 
http://www.aasd.com.au/index.cfm/search-
title/?q=black+painting+II&Submit=Search+for+Title&qa=&qw=&house=&medium=0
&sold=2&lo=&hi=&loe=&hie=&height=&width=&loy=&hiy, (12.06.14). Identified as 
‘Black Painting II’. Description: ‘From the Melody series, oil and acrylic on canvas, 
inscribed Melody numerously on the face; inscribed Black Painting II from Malady, a 
poem by Bill Manhire, signed and dated Dunedin 1970 verso’. 
 
W.L. Renwick, Emblems of Identity, Painting, Carving and Maori-Pakeha 
Understanding (Wellington: Visual Production Unit, Department of Education, 1987, kit 
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comprising a booklet, a video, and a selection of 214 slides), 34, slide 172. Identified as 
‘Malady series’. Date: 1970. Description: (possibly erroneous) ‘1829x914’. 
 
Black Painting III from “Malady” (1970) (Te Manawa Museum of Art, Science and 
History, Palmerston North) 
 
Email correspondence between the author and Jeff Fox (Te Manawa, Senior Curator), 
Susanna Shadbolt (Te Manawa, Assistant Curator), and Rebekah Clements (Te Manawa, 
Registrar), 28 November 2013). Identified as ‘70/3: Black Painting: From ‘Malady’, a 
poem by Bill Manhire’. Date: 1970. Description: ‘Inscribed on verso of canvas, in brush 
and black paint: “Black Painting III / from Malady / a poem by / Bill Manhire” and 
“Hotere, Dunedin ‘70” ’ and ‘dye and acrylic on canvas, H 1800 W 1240mm’. 
 
Black Painting IIIa from “Malady” (1970) (Te Manawa Museum of Art, Science and 
History, Palmerston North) 
 
Email correspondence between the author and Jeff Fox (Te Manawa, Senior Curator), 
Susanna Shadbolt (Te Manawa, Assistant Curator), and Rebekah Clements (Te Manawa, 
Registrar), 28 November 2013). Identified as ‘87/47: Black Painting III: From 
‘Malady’, a poem by Bill Manhire’. Date: 1970. Description: ‘On verso of canvas, in 
brush and black paint: “Black Painting IIIa / from MALADY / A poem by / Bill 
Manhire” and “Hotere, Dunedin ‘70” ’ and ‘acrylic on canvas, H 1681 W 1376mm’. 
 
Renwick, 34, slide 173. Identified as ‘Malady series’. Date: 1970. Description: 
(confirmed incorrect) ‘1174x1219’. 
 
Black Painting V from “Malady” (1970) 
PageBlackie Gallery, Wellington, http://www.pageblackiegallery.co.nz/artists/ralph-
hotere/, (13.12.13). Identified as ‘Black Painting V [From...’. Description: Acrylic on 
canvas – signed and dated on verso 1770 x 710 mm’. 
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Waikato Art Gallery Bulletin 4, Ralph Hotere (Hamilton: Waikato Art Gallery, 1973), np. 
Identified as ‘Black Painting V 1970 From Malady – A poem by Bill Manhire’. 
Description: ‘Acrylic on Canvas 70 x 28’. 
 
Black Painting VI from “Malady” (1970) 
 
Art+Object art auctioneers, Auckland, 
http://www.artandobject.co.nz/catalogue/50/important-paintings-and-contemporary-
art#large/18353, (13.12.13). Identified as ‘Black Painting VI’. Description: ‘acrylic on 
canvas, title inscribed, signed and dated Dunedin 70 and inscribed from Malady, a poem 
by Bill Manhire, 1780x710’. 
 
Furphy, 
http://www.aasd.com.au/subscribers/list_all_works.cfm?concat=hotereralph&order=1&st
art=151&show=50, (29.11.13). Identified as ‘Black Painting VI’. Description: ‘Acrylic 
on canvas, title inscribed, signed and dated Dunedin ’70 and inscribed from Malady, a 
poem by Bill Manhire, 178 x 71 cm’. 
 
Black Painting VIII from “Malady” (1970) (Dunedin Public Art Gallery). 
 
Dunedin Public Art Gallery, 
http://collection.dunedin.art.museum/search.do?id=28226&db=object&page=1&view=de
tail, (13.12.13). No image available, but work identified as ‘Black Painting VIII: from 
Malady a poem by Bill Manhire’. Date: 1970. Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 1780 x 
710 mm, 33-1982’. 
 
Renwick, 34, slide 171. Identified as ‘Black Painting VIII’. Date: 1970. Description: 
‘1780x710’. 
 
Black Painting XI from “Malady” (1970) 
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Ralph Hotere, Kriselle Baker and Vincent O’Sullivan, Ralph Hotere (Auckland: Ron 
Sang Publications, 2008), 52. Identified as ‘BLACK PAINTING XI FROM 
“MALADY”’. Date: 1970. Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 1795 x 935’. 
 
Dunedin Public Art Gallery, Ralph Hotere, A survey 1963-73, exh. cat. (Dunedin: 
Dunedin Public Art Gallery, 1974), np. Identified as ‘BLACK PAINTING XI from 
Malady a poem by Bill Manhire’. Date: 1970. Description ‘acrylic on canvas, 177.2 x 
91.2’. 
 
Waikato Art Gallery Bulletin 4, Ralph Hotere, np. Work is pictured in the company of an 
abstract sculpture by Marte Szirmay. Captions and descriptions between two Malady 
series paintings (the latter an un-numbered painting in the 70x28in format with a column 
of MALADYs to the left of its picture space) are muddled. However, piecing together the 
information in the most rational manner yields the identification ‘Black Painting XI 
1970 from Malady – a poem by Bill Manhire’ and the description ‘Acrylic on Canvas 70 
x 36’. 
 
Black Painting XII from “Malady” (1970) (Hocken Collections, Uare Taoka o Hākena, 
University of Otago) 
 
Our Heritage, Hocken Collections, Uare Taoka o Hākena, University of Otago, 
http://otago.ourheritage.ac.nz/items/show/5422, (13.12.13). Identified as ‘Black Painting 
XII from “Malady”, a poem by Bill Manhire’. Date: 1970. Description: ‘Verso upper 
left (u.l.) with brush: Black Painting XII from “Malady”, a poem by Bill Manhire, 
Dunedin 70’, ‘Hocken Pictorial Collections – 73/279, a5254’, ‘1775 x 915 mm’. 
 
Ralph Hotere (2008), 55. Identified as ‘BLACK PAINTING XII from “MALADY”’. 
Date: 1970. Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 1775 x 915’. 
 
Black Painting XIIB from “Malady” (1970) 
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Furphy, http://www.aasd.com.au/index.cfm/search-
title/?q=black+painting+XIIB&Submit=Search+for+Title&qa=&qw=&house=&medium
=0&sold=2&lo=&hi=&loe=&hie=&height=&width=&loy=&hiy , (12.06.14). Identified 
as ‘Black Painting XIIB from Malady’. Description: ‘Acrylic on canvas, title inscribed, 
signed and dated Hotere ’70, Dunedin verso, 178 x 91.5 cm’. 
 
Ralph Hotere (2008), 57. Identified as ‘BLACK PAINTING XIIB FROM 
“MALADY”’. Date: 1970. Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 1775 x 915’. 
 
Black Painting XIII from “Malady” (1970) (Museum of New Zealand Te Papa 
Tongarewa) 
 
Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, 
http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/objectdetails.aspx?irn=38756&term=hotere, (13.12.13). 
Identified as ‘Black Painting XIII, from ‘Malady’ a poem by Bill Manhire’. Date: 1970. 
Description: ‘acrylic on canvas’, ‘1776 (Height) x 914 (Length) x mm’, ‘1971-0024-1’. 
 
Black Painting XIV from “Malady” (1970) 
 
Ralph Hotere (2008), 53. Identified as ‘BLACK PAINTING XIV FROM 
“MALADY”’. Date: 1970. Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 1780 x 915’. 
 
Black Painting XV from “Malady” (1970) (Museum of New Zealand Te Papa 
Tongarewa) 
 
Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, 
http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Search.aspx?page=2&term=hotere, (13.12.13). 
Identified as ‘Black Painting XV, from ‘Malady’ a poem by Bill Manhire’. Date: 1970. 
Description: ‘acrylic on canvas’, ‘1777 (Height) x 915 (Width) x mm’, ‘1971-0024-2’. 
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Ralph Hotere (2008), 54. Identified as ‘BLACK PAINTING XV FROM 
“MALADY”’. Date: 1970. Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 1777 x 915’. 
 
Black Painting XVII from “Malady” (1970) 
 
Ralph Hotere (2008), 56. Identified as ‘BLACK PAINTING XVII FROM 
“MALADY”’. Date: 1970. Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 1780 x 915’. 
 
Ralph Hotere, A survey 1963-73, np. Identified as ‘BLACK PAINTING XVII from 
Malady a poem by Bill Manhire’. Date: 1970. Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 177.5 x 
91.4’. 
 
 8.9.2 Un-numbered and/or un-lettered works 
 
Painting from “Malady” (1970) (Jennifer Gibbs Trust Collection) 
 
Ralph Hotere (2008), 60. Identified as ‘PAINTING FROM “MALADY”’. Date: 1970. 
Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 1116 x 912’. 
 
David Eggleton, ‘From Absence to Presence’ in Dunedin Public Art Gallery and Museum 
of New Zealand Te Papa Tongawera, Ralph Hotere: Black Light, Major works including 
collaborations with Bill Culbert, exh. cat. (Wellington: Te Papa Press, 2000), 60. 
Identified as ‘Painting from ‘Malady’ – A Poem by Bill Manhire’. Date: 1969-70. 
Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 1116 x 912 mm’. 
 
Gregory O’Brien, Hotere, Out The Black Window, Ralph Hotere’s work with New 
Zealand poets (Auckland: Godwit Publishing, 1997), 34. Identified as ‘Malady’. Date: 
1970. Description: ‘ACRYLIC ON CANVAS, 1116 x 912mm’. 
 
Black Painting from “Malady” (1970) (Dowse Art Museum) 
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As noted in chapter four, email correspondence between the author and Georgia Morgan 
(Registrar, Dowse Art Museum), 29 November 2013, confirms that, whilst the ‘title, 
signature and date are present on the verso’ ‘There is no numbering on the painting’. The 
dimensions are given as ‘H2115 x W740mm’. 
 
Ralph Hotere (2008), 59. Identified as ‘BLACK PAINTING FROM “MALADY”’. 
Date: 1970. Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 2118 x 743’. 
 
Black Painting from “Malady” (1970) 
 
Ralph Hotere (2008), 58. Identified as ‘BLACK PAINTING FROM “MALADY”’. 
Date: 1970. Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 1800 x 730’. 
 
Black Painting from “Malady” (1970) 
 
Waikato Art Gallery Bulletin 4, Ralph Hotere, np. Please note, this is the aforementioned 
work distinguished by a column of MALADYs disposed to the left of the picture space. 
The captioning is muddled, but evidently identifies a ‘Black Painting 1970 From 
Malady – A poem by Bill Manhire’, further describing this painting as ‘Acrylic and Oil, 
70 x 28’. 
 
Black Painting from “Malady” (1970) 
 
Ralph Hotere, A survey 1963-73, np. Identified as ‘BLACK PAINTING from Malady a 
poem by Bill Manhire’. Date: 1970. Description: ‘acrylic on canvas, 178.1 x 91.2’. 
Whilst this painting lacks a numerical identifier, it is characterised as ‘First exhibited 
Barry Lett Galleries, 1970’. Hence, if the documentation in the Barry Lett Galleries 
pamphlet accompanying this show is correct then this work would have to be XIIB, XVI, 
or XVIII. 
 
 8.9.3 No data 
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Numbers IV, VII, IX, X, XVI, XVIII. 
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8.10 Evaluating Hotere’s ‘institutional neglect’ 
 
 By way of evaluating Mane-Wheoki’s claim, in ‘Hotere – out the black window’ that 
Hotere has suffered a ‘scandalous... institutional neglect’, Ralph Hotere, A survey 1963-
73 (1974-75) is a good place to begin. Here, it may be noted that, as Mane-Wheoki 
observes, it is certainly the case that damage sustained by forty one of the sixty three 
works included led to the ‘abandonment’ of the touring show. Whilst this unfortunate 
happenstance speaks volumes about the paucity of resources and lack of professionalism 
afflicting some sectors of the New Zealand arts establishment in the mid 1970s, it also 
should be noted that the cancellation of Hotere’s touring exhibition affected only its tenth 
and final destination – Auckland City Art Gallery (admittedly, a lamentable exclusion 
from a key venue located in New Zealand’s most populous city).865 In support of the idea 
that, subsequently, Hotere suffered institutional indifference in New Zealand, Mane-
Wheoki furnishes only two examples of group exhibitions from which Hotere was absent: 
Content/Context: a survey of recent New Zealand art 1986 (1986) and Art Now: the first 
biennial review of contemporary art (1994).866 Whilst these were, indeed, significant 
undertakings, I would suggest that the significance of Hotere’s omission from these 
exhibitions is difficult to assess in any objective fashion. Moreover, even had Hotere’s 
                                                 
865
 For a reference to the damage sustained by Hotere’s work during the national tour of Ralph 
Hotere, A survey 1963-73 and the consequent cancellation of the final showing in Auckland, see, 
for example, anon, ‘Art damage robs city of exhibition’, Auckland Star, City Edition, 6 February 
1975, 1 (no pagination). Here, the Dunedin Public Art Gallery director Les Lloyd is reported as 
being ‘very disturbed about the whole business of inexperienced art gallery staff and helpers 
handling art works.’ The article also paraphrases the assessment of Auckland City Art Gallery 
director E.W. Smith, in whose opinion ‘41 of the 63 paintings... [were] so extensively damaged 
that it would not be fair to the artist to stage the exhibition in Auckland from February 14 to 
March 6 as planned.’ It is also reported that ‘the exhibition... has been to about 10 galleries on its 
tour.’ See also anon, ‘Works of art damaged’, Evening Star, 7 February 1975, 2. This reiterates 
that ‘Due to mishandling, 41 works of art by Dunedin artist Ralph Hotere have suffered extensive 
damage while touring the country’ and also notes that ‘The works have been on tour for a year, 
and until they reached Auckland, had been to every main centre. Auckland was the last port of 
call before the exhibition would return to its owners.’ For a reference to the itinerary of the 
exhibition, see ‘Itinerary’ in Dunedin Public Art Gallery, Ralph Hotere, A survey 1963-73 – 
although, here, it should be noted, Auckland City Art Gallery is listed eighth rather than tenth. 
 
866
 Mane-Wheoki, ‘Hotere – out the black window’, 233-34. 
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work been featured, it is unclear whether, from Mane-Wheoki’s perspective, this would 
have amounted to anything more than ‘inclusion in the odd survey exhibition.’867 
 
 Notwithstanding the absence of any institutional gesture of a magnitude sufficient to 
satisfy Mane-Wheoki’s expectations, it should be acknowledged that, between the touring 
shows of 1974-75 and 1997-98, Hotere’s work did, in fact, receive regular and substantial 
public recognition and support. This took the form of (1) inclusion in prestigious group 
exhibitions and the presentation of at least one significant solo exhibition by a major, 
New Zealand, public arts institution, (2) works acquired by public collections, (3) articles 
published in the most widely read, national publication devoted to the arts in this period: 
Art New Zealand. Let us, briefly, address each of these categories in turn. In relation to 
the first point, it may be noted that Hotere’s work was included in prestigious, group 
exhibitions such as Fifth Sydney Biennale (1984) and Headlands: Thinking Through New 
Zealand Art (1992-93) – both of which presented Hotere’s work in an international (or, at 
least, Australasian) context.868 In relation to the second point, it is apparent that many of 
                                                 
867
 Ibid, 233. For an indication of the scale of the exhibitions in question, see Luit Bieringa, Jim 
Barr, Mary Barr, and Judi Brierley, Content/Context: a survey of recent New Zealand art 1986, 
exh. cat. (Wellington: National Art Gallery, 1986), where there are listed forty six artists working 
in the fields of painting, sculpture, photography, and installation art, and a further fourteen artists 
or groups of artist working in the field of video and film. Similarly, in Museum of New Zealand 
Te Papa Tongarewa, Art Now: the first biennial review of contemporary art, exh. cat. 
(Wellington, 1994), there are surveyed thirty three artists working in the areas of sculpture and 
installation art. 
 
868
 In the former case, as noted in Art Gallery of New South Wales, The Fifth Biennale of Sydney, 
Private Symbol: Social Metaphor, exh. cat (Sydney: Biennale of Sydney Ltd., 1984), np, Hotere 
exhibited the, aforementioned, ten piece work Aramoana and Black Window Towards Aramoana 
(1983, ref. 108) – an installation comprising eight of Hotere’s works utilising recycled, wooden 
window frames of various dimensions. In the latter case, as noted in Museum of Contemporary 
Art, Sydney, Headlands: Thinking Through New Zealand Art, exh. cat. (Sydney: Museum of 
Contemporary Art, Sydney, 1992), 222, in collaboration with Bill Culbert, Hotere exhibited 
Pathway to the sea – Aramoana (1991, ref. 109) (an installation utilising paua shells, rocks, and 
fluorescent lights) and P.R.O.P. (1991, ref. 110) (a sculptural piece incorporating lacquer on 
corrugated and fluorescent tubes). In addition to these large-scale group exhibitions, as noted in 
Dunedin Public Art Gallery, Hotere’s Hoteres, exh. cat. (Dunedin: Dunedin Public Art Gallery, 
1985), np, Dunedin Pubic Art Gallery presented an exhibition of fifty six of Hotere’s works, 28 
January – 24 April 1985 (including the public debut of the large-scale sculpture Black Phoenix 
(1984-88, ref. 111)). According to Kerr and Trewby, 119, 121, Hotere’s Hoteres initially 
comprised a selection of ‘Forty paintings and drawings from the artist’s private collection’, 
exhibited at Bosshard Galleries, Dunedin, 6-17 April 1981. Re-named Hotere’s Hoteres 1961-
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the aforementioned works were acquired by New Zealand public arts collections prior to 
the launch of Hotere – out the black window.869 With regard to the third and final point, 
substantial pieces on Hotere appeared in Art New Zealand on several occasions in the 
1980s and 1990s.870 
                                                                                                                                                 
1984, a similar selection of work was exhibited at the Centre Gallery, Hamilton, 1-31 October 
1984. 
 
869
 Thus, as noted on the website of Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki, 
http://www.aucklandartgallery.com/the-collection/browse-artwork/6514/aramoana, (13.06.14), 
Aramoana was gifted by the Transfield Corporation in 1985. Similarly, on the website of 
Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Object/37093, 
(13.06.14), it is stated that Black Phoenix was purchased in 1988, whilst in, ibid, 
http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Object/41267, (13.06.14), it is mentioned that Pathway to the sea 
– Aramoana was purchased in 1993. Still further, as noted on the website of Dunedin Public Art 
Gallery, 
http://collection.dunedin.art.museum/search.do?id=29610&db=object&page=1&view=detail, 
(13.06.14), P.R.O.P. was purchased in 1991. 
 
870
 See, for example, Leech, ‘Style and Change’, and Janet Paul, ‘Ralph Hotere’s Baby Iron’, Art 
New Zealand, n29, Summer 1983-84, 22-23. See also Brown, ‘Ralph Hotere’, Art New Zealand, 
n34, Autumn 1985, 28-31, 63, Louise Wilton, ‘Ralph Hotere at the Dunedin Public Art Gallery’, 
Art New Zealand, n35, Winter 1985, 24 (a review of the Dunedin Public Art Gallery exhibition 
Hotere’s Hoteres), Kate Darrow, ‘No 8, Ralph Hotere at RKS Art’, Art New Zealand, n63, 
Winter 1992, 46-47), and Eggleton, ‘Ralph Hotere, Shadowing the Sublime’, Art New Zealand, 
n81, Summer 1996-97, 68-73. In addition to the articles listed above, Hotere was also mentioned 
in at least two Art New Zealand pieces addressing group shows featuring contemporary, Māori 
artists: Panoho, ‘Haongia Te Taonga’, Art New Zealand, n40, Spring 1986, 31-33, 82, and Mane-
Wheoki, ‘Korurangi/Toihoukura, Brown Art in White Spaces’, Art New Zealand, n78, Autumn 
1996, 43-47. 
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